Sidgi Kaballo - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Sidgi Kaballo

هذه الورقة في الأصل قدمت لمؤتمر حزب الأمة الاقتصادي في نوفمبر 2011 ثم أضيف لها جزء جديد بعد أن تص... more هذه الورقة في الأصل قدمت لمؤتمر حزب الأمة الاقتصادي في نوفمبر 2011 ثم أضيف لها جزء جديد بعد أن تصل البلدان لاتفاق في سبتمبر 2012

هذه مقالة كتبت في نهاية التسعينات من القرن الماضي وتقدم بعض الأفكار لما ينبغي عليه الدستور الديمق... more هذه مقالة كتبت في نهاية التسعينات من القرن الماضي وتقدم بعض الأفكار لما ينبغي عليه الدستور الديمقراطي في السودان وقد أجريت عليها بعض التعديلات في فترات مختلفة

This an article writen in January 2007 and published in newspapers and the internet and reading i... more This an article writen in January 2007 and published in newspapers and the internet and reading it in 2014 gives one some thoughts about the civil war in independent Southern Sudan

The colonial state could be identified as relatively autonomous from the Condominium powers and t... more The colonial state could be identified as relatively autonomous from the Condominium powers and the Sudanese socio-economic formation (Kaballo, 1994, Chapter 2). That allowed the colonial state to articulate forces and structures both on the economic and political level. The post-colonial state history is one of its quest and attempt to establish this relative autonomy, with little success during the military regimes, in vain most of the other times, as we will see in this Chapter. Niblock noticed that, "...the pre-1969 Sudanese state enjoyed only limited autonomy. It was controlled fairly directly by the 'incipient bourgeoisie', through the influence which the Sudanese establishment could exert on the main political parties and on the military leadership" (Niblock:1987, 233) The main reason behind this lack of relative autonomy was the competition among the different fractions of the ruling power bloc to inherit, not only the political power of the state but also its economic power. This in turn was a direct result of economic statism developed during the colonial era and the articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. By 1955 the government's current revenue was 16.5% and its expenditure was 14.8% of the Sudan GDP. Its share in the gross national capital formation reached 5.1% of the GDP, compared with 3.4% the share of the private sector. Moreover, the importance of the state as a tool of capital accumulation and a device for financial transfers from the public sector to the private sector in the Sudan was apparent. It played a decisive role in issuing export and import licences, allotting new mechanised rain-fed agricultural schemes and irrigated pumps schemes, approving the establishment of new industries and granting them concessions, as well as sorting government's bids, appointing government's contractors and determining its purchases. There were prolonged discussions in the first Sudanese parliament on these issues. There were also exchanged accusations of corruption and utilisation of official positions to give licences or allot schemes to relatives or political followers or partners. Both provided clear evidence that the different fractions in the ruling club were giving great importance to the domination of the state apparatus. It was, as Morris Szeftel, (1983), described the situation in Zambia , the politics derived by the aim of distributing the spoils. The discussions in the parliament also showed the backing that some fractions of the Sudanese bourgeoisie was expecting from the state in its competition with foreign enterprise (Awad: 1966, 37,56); which is shown in chapter 4 was dominating Sudan foreign trade and its banking system. The competition itself could have taken place among rival fractions of the ruling power bloc when the hegemony of the bloc as a whole was established, and rules were set for the competition game that ensure the reproduction of the social relations. The relative autonomy of the state in such a case would have been an expression of that hegemony. It would also have been a manifestation of the role of the state as a mediator and/or arbitrator of a last resort in the competition game without losing sight of its obligation safeguard the conditions for reproduction and expansion of the dominant mode of production or the articulated system of modes of production. In the Sudanese case the ruling power bloc was unable to establish its hegemony as a bloc, nor was any fraction of it was able to establish its own hegemony. Ali noticed that, "..neither the bourgeoisie in the state nor any other class or fraction succeeded in retaining ascendancy over the entire power block indefinitely. In fact, frequent change in the structure and distribution of power within the ruling bloc, and unabated and unceasing quest for hegemony therein, characterised the post-colonial state and prevented the dominant social forces from achieving any enduring or stable equilibrium of class alliances." (Ali, 1989 :74) This situation was partially an element of the colonial heritage. Sudan, like other Third Word countries, "was left with a heterogeneous set of class forces where no single or bloc of classes could ensure the sustainability or reproduction of their political domination" (Bush and Kaballo, 1991:4). The adoption of the colonial state of political and economic policies of articulation did not lead to a classical transformation of the pre-capitalist modes of production and social forces in the Sudan into a capitalist mode of production. Instead an articulated system of modes of production was established. As a result the Sudan was left with a weak capitalist class. The colonial economy in which this class emerged and developed was dominated, (in modern irrigated agriculture, ) by the colonial state and (in foreign trade and finance) by foreign capital. The rain-fed agriculture was mainly a peasant economy dominated by pre-capitalist relations politically articulated under the auspices of tribal leaders and internationally linked through exchange relations by commercial capital. The local merchants in these rural areas were petty traders who were mainly commercial agents of foreign capital. Some of them began investing in groundnut production as the boom in oil-seeds prices began after independence (For data on oilseeds prices see Kaballo, 1984, Appendix ) The presence of local capital in agriculture was in the private pump schemes on the White and Blue Niles as well as the Northern province. Although by 1954 (the first year of self-government) their investment reached 57, 000 feddans of cotton, it only constituted 9% of the 628 thousands feddans, the total area cultivated by cotton that year. The presence of the local capital in mechanised rain-fed agriculture was also weak and did not gather any momentum before the beginning of the implementation of the recommendation of the working party formed by the first national government. The working party was assigned the task to study the development of the mechanised rainfed agriculture. The party in its recommendations favoured the encouragement of private investment . The industrial fraction of the Sudanese bourgeoisie was also weak due to the recent history of manufacturing industry in the country, its primary processing type as well as its small share (1%) in the GDP in 1956 . The commercial fraction of the Sudanese capitalist class, except for a few individuals, was mainly a fraction of petty-traders distributing commodities imported by foreign companies and/or collecting agricultural products for export by the same foreign enterprises. In addition to the weakness of its economic base, the Sudanese capitalist class was, due to the uneven development of the economy, a class composed of Northern Sudanese of Islamic and Arab origin. This had great complication in Sudanese politics, especially if it is noticed that the other fractions of the power bloc, the religious aristocrats and the educated petty bourgeoisie were mainly from the same region and origin. This was one of the basic reasons behind the politics of the ethnic conflicts faced the Sudan since 1955. The capitalist class was also weak because it was divided on sectarian and tribal lines. It has already been shown in other places, how the colonial state, seeking its own allies, promoted sectarian and tribal leaders and strengthened their political and economic

Review of African Political Economy, 1988

Review of African Political Economy, 1993

Political Studies, 1995

Democracy in modern societies, unlike in the ancient Greek or Roman societies, is, by definition,... more Democracy in modern societies, unlike in the ancient Greek or Roman societies, is, by definition, organically linked to the civil and political human rights of all people. This is mainly because modern societies are based on the freedom of the individual and the equality of citizens before the law. The dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa has concluded a complete historical era and has, at last, accomplished the universality of the aims that were first put forward by the French Revolution two centuries ago.

Review of African Political Economy, 1989

South Atlantic Quarterly, 2010

Review of African Political Economy, 1988

Review of African Political Economy, 1993

Political Studies, 1995

Review of African Political Economy, 1989

South Atlantic Quarterly, 2010

The paper criticize the foreign currency policy of the Sudan Government and that the policy attem... more The paper criticize the foreign currency policy of the Sudan Government and that the policy attempt all the time to affect the supply of foreign currency. The main argument is that the supply is rigid and the chance to maneuver to increase is limited. The paper suggest that Government should attempt to affect the demand for foreign currency>