Stefan Seifert - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Stefan Seifert

This open access book provides a broad range of insights on market engineering and information ma... more This open access book provides a broad range of insights on market engineering and information management. It covers topics like auctions, stock markets, electricity markets, the sharing economy, information and emotions in markets, smart decision-making in cities and other systems, and methodological approaches to conceptual modeling and taxonomy development. Overall, this book is a source of inspiration for everybody working on the vision of advancing the science of engineering markets and managing information for contributing to a bright, sustainable, digital world. Markets are powerful and extremely efficient mechanisms for coordinating individuals' and organizations' behavior in a complex, networked economy. Thus, designing, monitoring, and regulating markets is an essential task of today's society. This task does not only derive from a purely economic point of view. Leveraging market forces can also help to tackle pressing social and environmental challenges. Moreo...

The meritocracy as a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas anna gunnthorsdottir and roumen vragov... more The meritocracy as a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas anna gunnthorsdottir and roumen vragov and kevin mccabe and stefan seifert City University NY

Market Engineering, 2021

This chapter portrays how research topics arise and develop in the creative environment of the re... more This chapter portrays how research topics arise and develop in the creative environment of the research group Information & Market Engineering of the Institute of Information Systems and Marketing at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. It is somewhat long-winded in the beginning but identifies then a clear goal. In the following, it strays around several lines of research; touches on the question of why something like forecasting markets, the actual research topic, works at all – without answering it; and finally reaches a result that has little to do with the original objective. Along the way, the chapter provides some insights into the economic theory of double auctions.

Mehrattributive Auktionen sind elektronische Bietverfahren, die zur Beschaffung heterogener Güter... more Mehrattributive Auktionen sind elektronische Bietverfahren, die zur Beschaffung heterogener Güter und Dienstleistungen eingesetzt werden können. Bei der Gestaltung und Umsetzung solcher Verfahren sind Einkäufer heute weitgehend auf intuitive Ansätze angewiesen, da eine Theorie zu mehr-oder multi-attributiven Auktionen nur in Ansätzen vorliegt. Diese Untersuchung leistet einen Beitrag zur Auswahl eines geeigneten Auktionsmechanismus. Mit Hilfe eines Laborexperiments werden eine mehrattributive englische Auktion und eine mehrattributive Vickrey-Auktion am Beispiel der Beschaffung eines einzelnen, unteilbaren Gutes mit zwei qualitativen Eigenschaften untersucht. Die Studie zeigt, dass die englische Auktion sowohl zu einer höheren allokativen Effizienz als auch zu einem höheren Nutzen des Einkäufers führt. Außerdem belegt sie, dass ein möglichst weitreichendes Verständnis der beteiligten Bieter im Interesse des Einkäufers ist und von diesem beispielsweise durch Schulungen gefördert werden sollte.

This study experimentally tests different design features of primary auctions to allocate Austral... more This study experimentally tests different design features of primary auctions to allocate Australian Emissions Units (AEU) to the entities covered by the proposed emissions trading scheme. On the basis of our experimental results and the theoretical and empirical academic literature on permit auction design, we recommend an appropriate auction format. The key objectives of the Government in relation to the permit allocation auctions are to promote allocative efficiency and efficient price discovery, as well as to raise auction revenue, with the former objectives given priority over the latter. In the proposed Australian scheme called Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) each permit will have a date stamp (vintage), indicating the year in which it becomes applicable. Those permits can be banked (used later than date stamp) and to a limited extent also borrowed (used earlier than date stamp). It is planned to auction both current and future vintages. Using experimental methods, this study addresses the following main questions: 1 Australia's international target is a reduction between 5% and 15% below 2000 levels by 2020. In the event that an ambitious global goal were to be reached and additional conditions met (e.g. stabilisation of atmospheric CO2-e at 450ppm, advanced economy reduction targets, in aggregate, of at least 25% below 1990 levels by 2020), this target rises to 25%. Australia submitted this whole target range to the UN in January 2010. 2 Banking means that permits which have not been used for compliance in one year can be saved for use in future years, e.g. vintage of 2012-13 can be used for compliance in 2014-15. Permits thus do not have an expiry date. Borrowing means that liable companies will be allowed to discharge up to 5% of their obligation by surrendering Australian Emissions Units for the following year. pitt&sherry 4 undertaken by coal fired electricity generators and 2.5% to emissions intensive underground coal mines under the coal sector adjustment scheme (CSAS)." Based on the allocation rules and the structure of Australian industry, it is expected that very few businesses will have a surplus of permits for sale. Even though emissionsintensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries will receive permits for indirect emissions (electricity consumed), and thus will have more permits than needed to meet their obligations arising from the activities for which the free permits are provided, most of these companies will use the freely allocated permits to cover direct emissions from other activities for which they are responsible and do not receive free permits. Thus, most recipients of free permits will not be net sellers. A transitional price cap will apply for the first three years of the scheme, starting at around $40 per tonne in 2010/11 terms and rising at 5 per cent in real terms per annum. Operation of the scheme will be reviewed at an early stage to determine whether the permit price cap should be maintained for more than four years. According to the White Paper it is expected that around 1,000 companies will be covered by the emissions trading scheme. These companies are asymmetric in size. Public data from the first year of the Australian National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS), released on 26 February 2010, suggest that liability may be highly concentrated. We note that emissions coverage of NGERS is somewhat narrower than that proposed for the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (hereafter CPRS), the liability threshold for the first year is higher, and the definition of corporate liability is different. Acknowledging these differences, the data are nevertheless illuminating: of the 335 Mt of direct emissions reported, 80% was accounted for by approximately 35 businesses (calculated from Department of Climate Change, 2010). Financial institutions and professional dealers will not be excluded from participating in the auction and the secondary permit markets. Therefore financial institutions and professional dealers might play a significant role (e.g. purchase permits for smaller emitters). In order to further explore the issue of permit demand by Australian companies, we have made adjustments to convert the emissions reported under NGERs into permit purchase requirements. In doing so, we drew extensively on information provided by individual companies in their environmental and sustainability reporting. Nevertheless, we stress that these estimates are indicative only, because of the many uncertainties involved. These adjustments include: Emissions attributable to combustion of petrol, diesel and other petroleum products by small users are allocated "upstream" to the petroleum refining and marketing companies. Note that this is a "guesstimate" since many business users of petroleum products will have the option of either "upstreaming" their obligations or taking on the liability themselves and the outcome cannot be known until the CPRS starts. Similarly, estimated emissions attributable to combustion of natural gas by small users are allocated "upstream" to gas retailers. Estimates have been made of the free permits which may be made available to individual electricity generation businesses under the Electricity Sector Adjustment Scheme. The estimates are based on total electricity sent out in 2008-09, as reported by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), together with AEMO data on the emissions intensity of individual power stations. The calculations suggest that about 75% of the free permits will go to the Victorian brown coal generators, 12% to NSW generators, 6% to Queensland, 4% to WA and 3% to SA. Similarly, estimates have been made of the free permits which may be made available to businesses involved in EITE activities. These estimates made use of formal assessments of eligible activities for which approval has so far been published, and indicative data provided in the White Paper and the list of activity pitt&sherry 5

According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are competitively ... more According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are competitively rewarded according to their individual contributions to society. However, purely individually based meritocracies seldom occur. We introduce a new model of social production called ��team-based meritocracy��(TBM) in which individual members are rewarded based on their team membership. We demonstrate that as long as such team membership is both mobile and competitively based on contributions, individuals are able ...

Recent research strengthens the conjecture that human decision-making stems from a complex intera... more Recent research strengthens the conjecture that human decision-making stems from a complex interaction of rational judgment and emotional processes. A prominent example of the impact of emotions in economic decision-making is the effect of regret-related information feedback on bidding behaviour in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Revealing the information “missed opportunity to win” upon losing an auction, results in higher bids. Revealing the information “money left on the table” upon winning an auction, results in lower bids. The common explanation for this pattern is winner and loser regret. However, this explanation is still hypothetical and little is known about the actual emotional processes that underlie this phenomenon. This paper investigates actual emotional processes in auctions with varying feedback information. Thereby, we provide an approach that combines an auction experiment with psychophysiological measures which indicate emotional involvement. Our economic results...

Ökologisches Wirtschaften - Fachzeitschrift

Der hohe Flächenverbrauch ist nach wie vor ein zentrales Problem für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung... more Der hohe Flächenverbrauch ist nach wie vor ein zentrales Problem für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung. Durch den Handel mit Flächenausweisungszertifikaten können Effizienzgewinne beim Flächensparen ermöglicht werden. Bis zur Praxisreife eines solchen Systems besteht aber noch erheblicher Bedarf an Akzeptanzschaffung und Kompetenzbildung.

Frontiers in Economics, 2002

My undergraduate degree had been in physics and electrical engineering at Cal Tech. Subsequently ... more My undergraduate degree had been in physics and electrical engineering at Cal Tech. Subsequently I took a master's degree in economics at the University of Kansas to determine if I would continue in the study of economics. This led me to "shop around" among the offerings at Harvard to find out which courses I would not need to take.

Studies in Contemporary Economics, 2002

We examine theoretically and experimentally how a society's grouping and stratification rules aff... more We examine theoretically and experimentally how a society's grouping and stratification rules affect incentives and efficiency, and compare meritocratic and ascriptive grouping. We present a multi-level model of social production, and extend the usual single-grouplevel analysis of cooperation to a broadly defined system, in which individuals compete for inclusion in stratified groups based on the contributions they make. Group members share their collective output equally amongst themselves. The mechanism has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one close to Pareto optimal. The latter equilibrium is asymmetric and rather complex for experimental subjects. Nonetheless, subjects tacitly coordinate this equilibrium very reliably, demonstrating equilibrium's predictive power and providing empirical support for payoff dominance. Our behavioral findings also point to a meritocracy's "naturalness" and effectiveness in eliciting high social contributions. The results make a theoretical and empirical case for why social organization should be based on contribution rather than privilege. They also indicate why societies are increasingly becoming performance-based meritocracies, and are relevant to many forms of contemporary social organization.

Papers of Peter Cramton, 2009

ABSTRACT We investigate the problem of optimally timing production schedules in an emissions trad... more ABSTRACT We investigate the problem of optimally timing production schedules in an emissions trading regime that does not allow the transfer of unused allowances into future periods. We show that companies that produce storable goods partially shift the production to prior periods and imitate - by storing the output - emission rights banking. Competition distortions arise sectorally and intersectorally.

Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications, Sep 1, 2003

and make weakly significantly more profits. However, the experimental evidence does not support t... more and make weakly significantly more profits. However, the experimental evidence does not support the hypothesis that the buyer is better off when revealing her preferences. At least, the results indicate that the buyer is not exploited by suppliers.

Et Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 2003

ABSTRACT An analysis of the available National Allocation Plans for the first period (2005�2007) ... more ABSTRACT An analysis of the available National Allocation Plans for the first period (2005�2007) of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) implies (i) that the total allocation to installations covered under the EU ETS is fairly generous and (ii) that most, if not all EU Member States ban the transfer of allowances (banking) into the second period (2008�2012). In this paper, we explore efficiency issues associated with such a generous allocation of allowances to the trading sectors and the ban on banking. It is argued that allocation to the trading sectors is higher than implied by a cost-minimisation approach. Moreover, due to the reduced level of flexibility a ban on banking increases overall compliance costs. In addition, results of a simulation game conducted with real company participants and with a student control group suggest that a generous primary allocation in the first phase and a ban on banking also lead to an inefficient choice of abatement measures within periods. New results of additional simulations imply that auctioning off a part of the total quantity of allowances and allowing for forward markets may result in more reliable price signals and more efficient outcomes.

10. fachübergreifende Konferenz für interaktive und kooperative Medien. Interaktive Kulturen, 2000

For many cities, traffic management is nowadays a major challenge. Advances in hardware and softw... more For many cities, traffic management is nowadays a major challenge. Advances in hardware and software development have resulted in intelligent driver assistance systems which can be used for traffic management. In principal, this allows the design of sophisticated mechanisms which also take the drivers' valuations of waiting time into account.