Steinar Holden - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Steinar Holden
We gratefully acknowledge the support and hospitality of our hosts, the European Central Bank. Th... more We gratefully acknowledge the support and hospitality of our hosts, the European Central Bank. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of the funding organization(s) nor of CEPR, which takes
RÉSUMÉ ............................................................................................. more RÉSUMÉ ............................................................................................................................ 2 THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM A NORWEGIAN PERSPECTIVE................................ .......... 5
What is the economic role of credit rating agencies (CRAs), and how should they be paid? We study... more What is the economic role of credit rating agencies (CRAs), and how should they be paid? We study how credit rating agencies (CRAs) can serve as coordination device, and thereby prevent or cause ineffi cient liquidation of projects with a long horizon. We show that if CRAs can impact real outcomes, then their reputation concerns hamper truthful revelation of information, and, as a consequence, limit their ratings’informational content. We then show that equilibrium behavior is shaped by two prominent regimes: (i) an ‘optimistic’regime in which CRAs tend to give good ratings, and (ii) a ‘pessimistic’regime in which CRAs tend to give bad ratings. But both regimes are self-defeating: (i) only bad ratings do affect investors’ behavior in an optimistic regime while (ii) only good ratings affect investors’ behavior in a pessimistic regime. Existing evidence on the environment preceding the financial turmoil starting in 2007-2008 fits with our characterization of an optimistic regime. Henc...
This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The oligopoly is assu... more This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The oligopoly is assumed to consist of Egypt, Oman, Mexico, Malaysia and Norway plus all OPEC members. The remaining oil producing countries are included in a fringe which by assumption takes the oil price development as exogenously given. Outcomes with varying degrees of collusion within the oligopoly are specified. Intermediate cases are also studied, such as complete or partial cooperation within OPEC, but no cooperation between OPEC and any other countries in the oligopoly. The model is implemented in the PCbased MODLER software, and empirical results from the simulations on the different model versions are presented. Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome. THE OIL MARKET AS AN OLIGOPOLY Kjell Berger, Michael Hoel, Steinar Holden and . Øystein Olsen *
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning
What is the role of “large players”, e.g., hedge funds, in speculative attacks? Recent work sugge... more What is the role of “large players”, e.g., hedge funds, in speculative attacks? Recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack. However, many observers argue that large players move late so as to benefit from interest rate differentials. We propose a model where large players can do both. Using data on currency trading by foreign (large) and local (small) players, we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone during the 1990s. During the attack on the Swedish krona after the Russian moratorium in 1998, foreign players moved early. Gains by delaying attack were small, however, since interest rates did not increase.
The paper argtues that the Rubinstein perfect informat ion inf in j- te-hor izon al- ternat ing-o... more The paper argtues that the Rubinstein perfect informat ion inf in j- te-hor izon al- ternat ing-of fers model is problemat ic when appl ied to wage negot iat ions. A str ike or any other industr iaf act ion is not an automat ic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement, because product ion can cont inue as normal- a l-so when negot iat ions take place. An inf in i te-hor izon al ternat ing-of fers model incorporat ing the choice of cal l ing a str ike is devel-oped. I t is shown that in th is model there j-s no longer a unique subgame perfect equi l ibr ium, and that str ikes wi th a length in real t i rne can occur in equi l ibr ium.
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market... more We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations rely on wage compression across skill categories. JEL Categories: J31, D82. ∗Thanks to Alison Booth, Espen Moen and seminar participants at Essex for useful comments. V. Bhaskar thanks the Economic and Social Research Council, UK for its
We gratefully acknowledge the support and hospitality of our hosts, the European Central Bank.
This paper explores the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) in 19 OECD countries, ove... more This paper explores the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) in 19 OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for hourly nominal earnings at the industry level. Based on a nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country ‐ and year‐ specific variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we find evidence of some DRWR in OECD countries overall, as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods. There is some evidence that real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density. Generally, we find stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for downward real wage rigidity.
We gratefully acknowledge the support and hospitality of our hosts, the European Central Bank. Th... more We gratefully acknowledge the support and hospitality of our hosts, the European Central Bank. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of the funding organization(s) nor of CEPR, which takes
RÉSUMÉ ............................................................................................. more RÉSUMÉ ............................................................................................................................ 2 THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM A NORWEGIAN PERSPECTIVE................................ .......... 5
What is the economic role of credit rating agencies (CRAs), and how should they be paid? We study... more What is the economic role of credit rating agencies (CRAs), and how should they be paid? We study how credit rating agencies (CRAs) can serve as coordination device, and thereby prevent or cause ineffi cient liquidation of projects with a long horizon. We show that if CRAs can impact real outcomes, then their reputation concerns hamper truthful revelation of information, and, as a consequence, limit their ratings’informational content. We then show that equilibrium behavior is shaped by two prominent regimes: (i) an ‘optimistic’regime in which CRAs tend to give good ratings, and (ii) a ‘pessimistic’regime in which CRAs tend to give bad ratings. But both regimes are self-defeating: (i) only bad ratings do affect investors’ behavior in an optimistic regime while (ii) only good ratings affect investors’ behavior in a pessimistic regime. Existing evidence on the environment preceding the financial turmoil starting in 2007-2008 fits with our characterization of an optimistic regime. Henc...
This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The oligopoly is assu... more This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The oligopoly is assumed to consist of Egypt, Oman, Mexico, Malaysia and Norway plus all OPEC members. The remaining oil producing countries are included in a fringe which by assumption takes the oil price development as exogenously given. Outcomes with varying degrees of collusion within the oligopoly are specified. Intermediate cases are also studied, such as complete or partial cooperation within OPEC, but no cooperation between OPEC and any other countries in the oligopoly. The model is implemented in the PCbased MODLER software, and empirical results from the simulations on the different model versions are presented. Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome. THE OIL MARKET AS AN OLIGOPOLY Kjell Berger, Michael Hoel, Steinar Holden and . Øystein Olsen *
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning
What is the role of “large players”, e.g., hedge funds, in speculative attacks? Recent work sugge... more What is the role of “large players”, e.g., hedge funds, in speculative attacks? Recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack. However, many observers argue that large players move late so as to benefit from interest rate differentials. We propose a model where large players can do both. Using data on currency trading by foreign (large) and local (small) players, we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone during the 1990s. During the attack on the Swedish krona after the Russian moratorium in 1998, foreign players moved early. Gains by delaying attack were small, however, since interest rates did not increase.
The paper argtues that the Rubinstein perfect informat ion inf in j- te-hor izon al- ternat ing-o... more The paper argtues that the Rubinstein perfect informat ion inf in j- te-hor izon al- ternat ing-of fers model is problemat ic when appl ied to wage negot iat ions. A str ike or any other industr iaf act ion is not an automat ic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement, because product ion can cont inue as normal- a l-so when negot iat ions take place. An inf in i te-hor izon al ternat ing-of fers model incorporat ing the choice of cal l ing a str ike is devel-oped. I t is shown that in th is model there j-s no longer a unique subgame perfect equi l ibr ium, and that str ikes wi th a length in real t i rne can occur in equi l ibr ium.
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market... more We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations rely on wage compression across skill categories. JEL Categories: J31, D82. ∗Thanks to Alison Booth, Espen Moen and seminar participants at Essex for useful comments. V. Bhaskar thanks the Economic and Social Research Council, UK for its
We gratefully acknowledge the support and hospitality of our hosts, the European Central Bank.
This paper explores the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) in 19 OECD countries, ove... more This paper explores the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) in 19 OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for hourly nominal earnings at the industry level. Based on a nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country ‐ and year‐ specific variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we find evidence of some DRWR in OECD countries overall, as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods. There is some evidence that real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density. Generally, we find stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for downward real wage rigidity.