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Papers by Aaron Taliaferro
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license u... more This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [Jun 2013].
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license u... more This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [June 2013].
The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position o... more The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsoring organization.
Institute for Defense Analyses Publications, 2018
Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadre... more Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was issued. However, but for a few exceptions,
the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to U.S. Combatant Commands have not prepared
their people to be good or even adequate at planning for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation activities, which is the principal way the Department of Defense (DOD)
builds partner capacity. Rather, the focus of military education and training primarily remains on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not
useful for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation planning. Not only are people poorly prepared, the DOD lacks a framework for security cooperation planning. This
paper’s intent is to propose a framework for security cooperation planning that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan,
and resource security cooperation activities carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces.
The Colombian Ministry of National Defense’s “Transformation and Future Initiative” Retrospective on a 9-Year Cooperative Effort Between the United States Department of Defense and the Colombian Ministry of National Defense, 2017
The Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI) of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND... more The Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI) of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND) was a pre-emptive action to prepare the Colombian Defense and Security sector for a security environment not predominantly characterized by internal conflict. Buoyed by consistent national policy and relatively stable senior civilian leadership in the sector over four consecutive presidential terms (from 2002 to the present), the Colombian TFI provides a model of change management in the public sector.
Throughout the past two decades and from the beginning of TFI, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has supported the Colombian Defense and Security sector’s efforts.
Specific to TFI, DOD has provided through direct advisory assistance. This paper explains MND efforts to transform the management practices of the Defense and Security
sector as the security situation in Colombia changed and to provide a retrospective commentary on the U.S. advisors’ assistance. The paper’s source material is drawn from a
series of interviews (transcripts included in appendix B) with current and former MND officials, as well as the first-hand experience of the authors (one a former employee of
the Colombian MND and the other an advisor tasked by DOD to assist the Colombian MND with TFI).
Security Sector Assistance in the Post-Cold War Era: Is There A Balanced Approach in the Interagency?, 2014
President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23), Security Sector Assistance (SSA... more President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23), Security Sector Assistance (SSA) with the stated intent that the United States provide SSA more selectively in line with U.S. Foreign Policy and Security objectives. The PPD defined SSA as “the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to engage with foreign partners” to “shape their policies and actions in the security sector,” and has as its goal reducing the possibility the United States intervenes abroad in response to instability. Since 9/11, SSA has consistently been touted as a means of mitigating threats likely to emanate from weak, failing states, which may prompt a direct U.S. military response. Given the post 9/11 focus on building partner capacity through SSA, this paper seeks to answer the question, “Why did the President issue PPD-23 and how can it be implemented to achieve its stated objectives?” To answer these
questions, this paper explains three causal factors. First, the legislative evolution of SSA along with its use by the Department of Defense since the end of the Cold War. Second, the change in post 9/11 Defense strategy and planning constructs that directed U.S. armed forces put more emphasis on building partner security capacity. Finally, the armed forces’ experience in building security sector capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors contend that understanding these factors will facilitate moving toward the coherent and collaborative approach stated as the goal in PPD-23.
Institute for Defense Analyses Publications, 2017
The Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS) is a computer program developed by the Institu... more The Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS) is a computer program developed by the Institute Defense Analyses (IDA) to assist partner nations in improving their defense management. FOCIS allows a user to rapidly and accurately analyze various force structures and their fully burdened cost, and as such, is a valuable tool for host-nations seeking to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of their defense sector. This document is a non-technical guide intended to
bring new task leaders up to speed on what FOCIS is, how it works, how FOCIS can be integrated into a work plan, the benefits of using FOCIS, and common
pitfalls to avoid.
Institute for Defense Analyses Publications, 2013
Improving the military capabilities of partner nations is an increasingly important facet of the ... more Improving the military capabilities of partner nations is an increasingly important facet of the security policies of the United States. In many cases, sustaining such improvements also requires enhancing the institutional-level capacity of host nation ministries of defense and their armed forces headquarters to plan and manage capabilities, forces, and programs in an affordable manner. The United States has engaged extensively in such institution building efforts since September 11, 2001.
Post-9/11, U.S. security programs and defense strategy have pointed to this need to assist partner nations in improving their own security, as well as increasing their capability to act more effectively as partners in regional and coalition security efforts. Collectively, there is now a substantial body of experience in such post-9/11 efforts. They have generally employed theories and methodologies familiar to those who work in change management, development assistance, and security sector reform. But, the authors argue, much of this security sector reform work has been based on historical U.S. Department of Defense experience in building allied capabilities to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War
and is premised on theories of management and governance grounded in Western norms of interpersonal interaction in organizational settings—
characteristics not present in many countries that are the primary recipients of post-9/11 U.S. security assistance. In this paper, the authors present, from a practitioners’ view, observations of this problem as seen in the field and thoughts on how a better understanding of this problem might improve reform outcomes.
Implementing the Philippine Defense Reform Program through the Defense System of Management, 2017
Established in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program envisioned the implementation of... more Established in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program envisioned the implementation of reforms that would affect every level of the Philippine defense establishment and military. The ultimate goal of PDR was to create more capable armed forces. To do that, PDR focused on reforming the defense establishment for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Therefore, PDR required the support and focus of senior leaders and staff at all levels and a substantial commitment of people. This paper explores why, from a Philippine perspective, PDR was needed and how it was implemented through the Defense System of Management (DSOM) approach. This
paper will also describe how the United States Department of Defense (DOD) partnered with the Republic of the Philippines Department of National Defense (DND) in implementing PDR with a particular focus on multi-year defense planning and the related areas of capability planning and defense budgeting.
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2019
Begun in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program affected the entire Philippine defense... more Begun in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program affected
the entire Philippine defense establishment. Its goal was to create more-capable armed forces. To do that, the PDR required the support of senior
leaders at all levels of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)—as well as a substantial commitment of people.
This article explains why, from a Philippine perspective, senior leaders within the Philippines defense sector felt reform was needed and how it was implemented. It also describes how the United States Department of Defense (DOD) partnered with the Republic of the Philippines to implement PDR with a particular focus on defense-force
planning and budgeting.
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license u... more This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [Jun 2013].
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license u... more This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [June 2013].
The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position o... more The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsoring organization.
Institute for Defense Analyses Publications, 2018
Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadre... more Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was issued. However, but for a few exceptions,
the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to U.S. Combatant Commands have not prepared
their people to be good or even adequate at planning for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation activities, which is the principal way the Department of Defense (DOD)
builds partner capacity. Rather, the focus of military education and training primarily remains on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not
useful for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation planning. Not only are people poorly prepared, the DOD lacks a framework for security cooperation planning. This
paper’s intent is to propose a framework for security cooperation planning that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan,
and resource security cooperation activities carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces.
The Colombian Ministry of National Defense’s “Transformation and Future Initiative” Retrospective on a 9-Year Cooperative Effort Between the United States Department of Defense and the Colombian Ministry of National Defense, 2017
The Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI) of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND... more The Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI) of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND) was a pre-emptive action to prepare the Colombian Defense and Security sector for a security environment not predominantly characterized by internal conflict. Buoyed by consistent national policy and relatively stable senior civilian leadership in the sector over four consecutive presidential terms (from 2002 to the present), the Colombian TFI provides a model of change management in the public sector.
Throughout the past two decades and from the beginning of TFI, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has supported the Colombian Defense and Security sector’s efforts.
Specific to TFI, DOD has provided through direct advisory assistance. This paper explains MND efforts to transform the management practices of the Defense and Security
sector as the security situation in Colombia changed and to provide a retrospective commentary on the U.S. advisors’ assistance. The paper’s source material is drawn from a
series of interviews (transcripts included in appendix B) with current and former MND officials, as well as the first-hand experience of the authors (one a former employee of
the Colombian MND and the other an advisor tasked by DOD to assist the Colombian MND with TFI).
Security Sector Assistance in the Post-Cold War Era: Is There A Balanced Approach in the Interagency?, 2014
President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23), Security Sector Assistance (SSA... more President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23), Security Sector Assistance (SSA) with the stated intent that the United States provide SSA more selectively in line with U.S. Foreign Policy and Security objectives. The PPD defined SSA as “the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to engage with foreign partners” to “shape their policies and actions in the security sector,” and has as its goal reducing the possibility the United States intervenes abroad in response to instability. Since 9/11, SSA has consistently been touted as a means of mitigating threats likely to emanate from weak, failing states, which may prompt a direct U.S. military response. Given the post 9/11 focus on building partner capacity through SSA, this paper seeks to answer the question, “Why did the President issue PPD-23 and how can it be implemented to achieve its stated objectives?” To answer these
questions, this paper explains three causal factors. First, the legislative evolution of SSA along with its use by the Department of Defense since the end of the Cold War. Second, the change in post 9/11 Defense strategy and planning constructs that directed U.S. armed forces put more emphasis on building partner security capacity. Finally, the armed forces’ experience in building security sector capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors contend that understanding these factors will facilitate moving toward the coherent and collaborative approach stated as the goal in PPD-23.
Institute for Defense Analyses Publications, 2017
The Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS) is a computer program developed by the Institu... more The Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS) is a computer program developed by the Institute Defense Analyses (IDA) to assist partner nations in improving their defense management. FOCIS allows a user to rapidly and accurately analyze various force structures and their fully burdened cost, and as such, is a valuable tool for host-nations seeking to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of their defense sector. This document is a non-technical guide intended to
bring new task leaders up to speed on what FOCIS is, how it works, how FOCIS can be integrated into a work plan, the benefits of using FOCIS, and common
pitfalls to avoid.
Institute for Defense Analyses Publications, 2013
Improving the military capabilities of partner nations is an increasingly important facet of the ... more Improving the military capabilities of partner nations is an increasingly important facet of the security policies of the United States. In many cases, sustaining such improvements also requires enhancing the institutional-level capacity of host nation ministries of defense and their armed forces headquarters to plan and manage capabilities, forces, and programs in an affordable manner. The United States has engaged extensively in such institution building efforts since September 11, 2001.
Post-9/11, U.S. security programs and defense strategy have pointed to this need to assist partner nations in improving their own security, as well as increasing their capability to act more effectively as partners in regional and coalition security efforts. Collectively, there is now a substantial body of experience in such post-9/11 efforts. They have generally employed theories and methodologies familiar to those who work in change management, development assistance, and security sector reform. But, the authors argue, much of this security sector reform work has been based on historical U.S. Department of Defense experience in building allied capabilities to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War
and is premised on theories of management and governance grounded in Western norms of interpersonal interaction in organizational settings—
characteristics not present in many countries that are the primary recipients of post-9/11 U.S. security assistance. In this paper, the authors present, from a practitioners’ view, observations of this problem as seen in the field and thoughts on how a better understanding of this problem might improve reform outcomes.
Implementing the Philippine Defense Reform Program through the Defense System of Management, 2017
Established in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program envisioned the implementation of... more Established in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program envisioned the implementation of reforms that would affect every level of the Philippine defense establishment and military. The ultimate goal of PDR was to create more capable armed forces. To do that, PDR focused on reforming the defense establishment for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Therefore, PDR required the support and focus of senior leaders and staff at all levels and a substantial commitment of people. This paper explores why, from a Philippine perspective, PDR was needed and how it was implemented through the Defense System of Management (DSOM) approach. This
paper will also describe how the United States Department of Defense (DOD) partnered with the Republic of the Philippines Department of National Defense (DND) in implementing PDR with a particular focus on multi-year defense planning and the related areas of capability planning and defense budgeting.
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2019
Begun in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program affected the entire Philippine defense... more Begun in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program affected
the entire Philippine defense establishment. Its goal was to create more-capable armed forces. To do that, the PDR required the support of senior
leaders at all levels of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)—as well as a substantial commitment of people.
This article explains why, from a Philippine perspective, senior leaders within the Philippines defense sector felt reform was needed and how it was implemented. It also describes how the United States Department of Defense (DOD) partnered with the Republic of the Philippines to implement PDR with a particular focus on defense-force
planning and budgeting.