Todd Grantham - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Todd Grantham
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Jan 2, 2024
Biology and Philosophy, Oct 1, 1993
The past fifteen years have witnessed a renewed interest in one of the most persistent and perple... more The past fifteen years have witnessed a renewed interest in one of the most persistent and perplexing issues in the philosophy of biology: What are species? After this recent flurry of activity it is only appropriate that we take stock of where we have been and where we are going. Thanks to professor Ereshefskywho has compiled an outstanding collection of some of the most important papers-o u r job is now much easier. It is sometimes thought that anthologies signal the death of a debate. By the time enough articles have been written to produce an edited volume, the topics or the proponents are often exhausted. I find Kitcher's remarks on the species problem interesting in this regard. He claims that "[there is no] need to prolong a sterile debate about whether species are 'individuals' or 'classes.' As I have tried to show, the important, deep, and difficult issues lie elsewhere" (1987, p. 191). In part, this reflects his view that the species-as-individuals (SAI) thesis is "one of the least-promising suggestions in recent philosophy of science" (1986, p. 649). But while Kitcher is eager to see the debate over individuality draw to a close, he thinks that further reflection on the species problemespecially on pluralistic species concepts-is worthwhile. The object of this review is, then, to reflect on the materials gathered by Ereshefsky not only to convey the contents of the book, but to draw attention to some of the important issues that remain. Since a significant proportion of Units of Evolution is devoted to the issues of pluralism and the SAI thesis, I will focus on these topics. Despite some differences between our views, I agree with Kitcher that we need to move beyond the current debates over individuality and confront the problem of pluralism.
Biology and Philosophy, 2004
Gould's Structure of Evolutionary Theory argues that Darwinism has undergone significant revision... more Gould's Structure of Evolutionary Theory argues that Darwinism has undergone significant revision. Although Gould succeeds in showing that hierarchical approaches have expanded Darwinism, his critique of adaptationism is less successful. Gould claims that the ubiquity of developmental constraints and spandrels has forced biologists to soften their commitment to adaptationism. I argue that Gould overstates his conclusion; his principal claims are compatible with at least some versions of adaptationism. Despite this weakness, Gould's discussion of adaptationism-particularly his discussions of the exaptive pool and cross-level spandrels-should provoke new work in evolutionary theory and the philosophy of biology.
Philosophy of Science, Dec 1, 2000
Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of... more Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.
Biology and Philosophy, Jun 1, 2000
One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as a Process (Hull 1988) is determining th... more One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as a Process (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the "demic structure" of science. I conclude that the social account can do significant explanatory work independently of the selectionist account. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demic structure of science points us toward an important set of issues in social epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process is correct, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solely on his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promising aspects of his theory.
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 1995
... lution (a special case of upward causation in which selection at the lower-level causes highe... more ... lution (a special case of upward causation in which selection at the lower-level causes higher-level sorting). ... section.) In sum, two questions are central in the current debate over hierarchical theories of macroevolution: (a) Are there distinct macroevolutionary properties ...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Operant conditioning is not a selection process. According to Hull et al., selection processes re... more Operant conditioning is not a selection process. According to Hull et al., selection processes require entities that reproduce to form lineages. However, since operant behaviors do not reproduce, operant conditioning is not a selection process.
... adaptationism. Page 64. 50 Todd Grantham and Shaun Nichols 2.1 Panglossianism Biologists have... more ... adaptationism. Page 64. 50 Todd Grantham and Shaun Nichols 2.1 Panglossianism Biologists have often assumed that all (or at least most) traits are adaptations. This ... traits. A familiar example comes from Maynard-Smith (1978). Sharks ...
Philosophy of Science, Sep 1, 1999
This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correc... more This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correctly explained in two distinct ways). To defend pluralism, I argue that a certain class of macroevolutionary trends (what I call "asymmetrical passive trends") can be explained in two distinct but compatible ways. The first approach ("actual sequence explanation") is to trace out the particular forces that affect each species. The second approach treats the trend as "passive" or "random" diffusion from a boundary in morphological space. I argue that while these strategies are distinct, both kinds of explanation can be true of a single trend. Further, since neither strategy can be reduced or eliminated from paleobiology, we should accept that both strategies can provide correct explanations for a single trend.
Biology Philosophy, 1994
Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains t... more Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.
BioScience, 2014
theories, and gene concepts up to date and casts a fresh perspective over the history of the fiel... more theories, and gene concepts up to date and casts a fresh perspective over the history of the field. The authors thoughtfully engage recent studies in several areas of philosophical and molecular genetics research. They chose not to address the relationship between the molecular biosciences and historical, evolutionary, and population biosciences, so in that sense, the book is not a comprehensive philosophy of the gene. Genetics and Philosophy's best contributions are its rich taxonomy of gene concepts, the concept of Crick information, the developmental niche concept articulated with arguments about molecular epigenesis and distributed specificity, and the updated critique of informational concepts in genetics and genomics.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2001
Philosophy of Science, 2000
Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of... more Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.
Philosophy of Science, 1999
This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correc... more This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correctly explained in two distinct ways). To defend pluralism, I argue that a certain class of macroevolutionary trends (what I call "asymmetrical passive trends") can be explained in two distinct but compatible ways. The first approach ("actual sequence explanation") is to trace out the particular forces that affect each species. The second approach treats the trend as "passive" or "random" diffusion from a boundary in morphological space. I argue that while these strategies are distinct, both kinds of explanation can be true of a single trend. Further, since neither strategy can be reduced or eliminated from paleobiology, we should accept that both strategies can provide correct explanations for a single trend.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Jan 2, 2024
Biology and Philosophy, Oct 1, 1993
The past fifteen years have witnessed a renewed interest in one of the most persistent and perple... more The past fifteen years have witnessed a renewed interest in one of the most persistent and perplexing issues in the philosophy of biology: What are species? After this recent flurry of activity it is only appropriate that we take stock of where we have been and where we are going. Thanks to professor Ereshefskywho has compiled an outstanding collection of some of the most important papers-o u r job is now much easier. It is sometimes thought that anthologies signal the death of a debate. By the time enough articles have been written to produce an edited volume, the topics or the proponents are often exhausted. I find Kitcher's remarks on the species problem interesting in this regard. He claims that "[there is no] need to prolong a sterile debate about whether species are 'individuals' or 'classes.' As I have tried to show, the important, deep, and difficult issues lie elsewhere" (1987, p. 191). In part, this reflects his view that the species-as-individuals (SAI) thesis is "one of the least-promising suggestions in recent philosophy of science" (1986, p. 649). But while Kitcher is eager to see the debate over individuality draw to a close, he thinks that further reflection on the species problemespecially on pluralistic species concepts-is worthwhile. The object of this review is, then, to reflect on the materials gathered by Ereshefsky not only to convey the contents of the book, but to draw attention to some of the important issues that remain. Since a significant proportion of Units of Evolution is devoted to the issues of pluralism and the SAI thesis, I will focus on these topics. Despite some differences between our views, I agree with Kitcher that we need to move beyond the current debates over individuality and confront the problem of pluralism.
Biology and Philosophy, 2004
Gould's Structure of Evolutionary Theory argues that Darwinism has undergone significant revision... more Gould's Structure of Evolutionary Theory argues that Darwinism has undergone significant revision. Although Gould succeeds in showing that hierarchical approaches have expanded Darwinism, his critique of adaptationism is less successful. Gould claims that the ubiquity of developmental constraints and spandrels has forced biologists to soften their commitment to adaptationism. I argue that Gould overstates his conclusion; his principal claims are compatible with at least some versions of adaptationism. Despite this weakness, Gould's discussion of adaptationism-particularly his discussions of the exaptive pool and cross-level spandrels-should provoke new work in evolutionary theory and the philosophy of biology.
Philosophy of Science, Dec 1, 2000
Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of... more Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.
Biology and Philosophy, Jun 1, 2000
One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as a Process (Hull 1988) is determining th... more One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as a Process (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the "demic structure" of science. I conclude that the social account can do significant explanatory work independently of the selectionist account. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demic structure of science points us toward an important set of issues in social epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process is correct, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solely on his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promising aspects of his theory.
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 1995
... lution (a special case of upward causation in which selection at the lower-level causes highe... more ... lution (a special case of upward causation in which selection at the lower-level causes higher-level sorting). ... section.) In sum, two questions are central in the current debate over hierarchical theories of macroevolution: (a) Are there distinct macroevolutionary properties ...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Operant conditioning is not a selection process. According to Hull et al., selection processes re... more Operant conditioning is not a selection process. According to Hull et al., selection processes require entities that reproduce to form lineages. However, since operant behaviors do not reproduce, operant conditioning is not a selection process.
... adaptationism. Page 64. 50 Todd Grantham and Shaun Nichols 2.1 Panglossianism Biologists have... more ... adaptationism. Page 64. 50 Todd Grantham and Shaun Nichols 2.1 Panglossianism Biologists have often assumed that all (or at least most) traits are adaptations. This ... traits. A familiar example comes from Maynard-Smith (1978). Sharks ...
Philosophy of Science, Sep 1, 1999
This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correc... more This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correctly explained in two distinct ways). To defend pluralism, I argue that a certain class of macroevolutionary trends (what I call "asymmetrical passive trends") can be explained in two distinct but compatible ways. The first approach ("actual sequence explanation") is to trace out the particular forces that affect each species. The second approach treats the trend as "passive" or "random" diffusion from a boundary in morphological space. I argue that while these strategies are distinct, both kinds of explanation can be true of a single trend. Further, since neither strategy can be reduced or eliminated from paleobiology, we should accept that both strategies can provide correct explanations for a single trend.
Biology Philosophy, 1994
Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains t... more Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.
BioScience, 2014
theories, and gene concepts up to date and casts a fresh perspective over the history of the fiel... more theories, and gene concepts up to date and casts a fresh perspective over the history of the field. The authors thoughtfully engage recent studies in several areas of philosophical and molecular genetics research. They chose not to address the relationship between the molecular biosciences and historical, evolutionary, and population biosciences, so in that sense, the book is not a comprehensive philosophy of the gene. Genetics and Philosophy's best contributions are its rich taxonomy of gene concepts, the concept of Crick information, the developmental niche concept articulated with arguments about molecular epigenesis and distributed specificity, and the updated critique of informational concepts in genetics and genomics.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2001
Philosophy of Science, 2000
Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of... more Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.
Philosophy of Science, 1999
This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correc... more This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correctly explained in two distinct ways). To defend pluralism, I argue that a certain class of macroevolutionary trends (what I call "asymmetrical passive trends") can be explained in two distinct but compatible ways. The first approach ("actual sequence explanation") is to trace out the particular forces that affect each species. The second approach treats the trend as "passive" or "random" diffusion from a boundary in morphological space. I argue that while these strategies are distinct, both kinds of explanation can be true of a single trend. Further, since neither strategy can be reduced or eliminated from paleobiology, we should accept that both strategies can provide correct explanations for a single trend.