Tur Muhammet - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Tur Muhammet
This article examines the radicalization of young Southeast Asians into the violent extremism tha... more This article examines the radicalization of young Southeast Asians into the violent extremism that characterizes the notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). After situating ISIS within its wider and older Al Qaeda Islamist ideological milieu, the article sketches out the historical landscape of violent Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia. There it focuses on the Al Qaeda-affiliated, Indonesian-based but transnational Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, revealing how the emergence of ISIS has impacted JI's evolutionary trajectory. The article surveys major explanations of how radicalization into violent extremism (RIVE) occurs, setting the stage for the ensuing discussion of two features of RIVE in Southeast Asia: violent Islamism and extremism. It shows that for sound policy reasons "radicals" and "extremists" should be viewed as analytically distinct and argues that extremism itself, not just violent extremism, is a problem that should be addressed in Southeast Asia and beyond. It asserts that there is no such thing as "nonviolent" extremism and suggests that "not-yet violent" extremism is a more accurate term. The article concludes by discussing operational and strategic policy options. ___________________________________________________________________________ In May 2015, Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed at a high-level international security conference in Singapore that a month earlier, a nineteen-year-old Singaporean who had been detained for planning to join the notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had intended to assassinate the prime minister and the country's president. Because the young man, who had been radicalized online by violent Islamist propaganda, could not leave for Syria to join ISIS, he had made plans to assassinate the two Singaporean political leaders and go on to kill ordinary citizens in public places. 1 While self-radicalized Singaporeans were not a new phenomenon, this young man was the first who had planned to carry out terrorist attacks within the country rather than joining a militant group overseas. 2 The dramatic announcement by the prime minister underscored how serious a threat ISIS had become not just in Singapore but in the wider Southeast Asian region. In less than a year, ISIS had all but eclipsed Al Qaeda and its affiliated Southeast Asian militant networks, such as the Indonesian-based transnational Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), as the key transnational terrorist threat to the region. Heightening regional concerns was the fact that ISIS, as Prime Minister Lee also said during his speech in May, appeared keen to fish in troubled Southeast Asian waters for moral and manpower support. On June 29, 2014, the ISIS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi proclaimed a worldwide Islamic state or caliphate with himself as the leader or caliph. Southeast Asia-home to approximately 240 million Muslims, or about 42 percent of the Southeast Asian population and 25 percent of the estimated global Muslim population of 1.6 billion-seems to be in his sights. 3 ISIS seeks to turn the region into a wilayat or province of its caliphate, and to this end has started a Malay-speaking unit in its ranks called Katibah
This article examines the radicalization of young Southeast Asians into the violent extremism tha... more This article examines the radicalization of young Southeast Asians into the violent extremism that characterizes the notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). After situating ISIS within its wider and older Al Qaeda Islamist ideological milieu, the article sketches out the historical landscape of violent Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia. There it focuses on the Al Qaeda-affiliated, Indonesian-based but transnational Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, revealing how the emergence of ISIS has impacted JI's evolutionary trajectory. The article surveys major explanations of how radicalization into violent extremism (RIVE) occurs, setting the stage for the ensuing discussion of two features of RIVE in Southeast Asia: violent Islamism and extremism. It shows that for sound policy reasons "radicals" and "extremists" should be viewed as analytically distinct and argues that extremism itself, not just violent extremism, is a problem that should be addressed in Southeast Asia and beyond. It asserts that there is no such thing as "nonviolent" extremism and suggests that "not-yet violent" extremism is a more accurate term. The article concludes by discussing operational and strategic policy options. ___________________________________________________________________________ In May 2015, Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed at a high-level international security conference in Singapore that a month earlier, a nineteen-year-old Singaporean who had been detained for planning to join the notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had intended to assassinate the prime minister and the country's president. Because the young man, who had been radicalized online by violent Islamist propaganda, could not leave for Syria to join ISIS, he had made plans to assassinate the two Singaporean political leaders and go on to kill ordinary citizens in public places. 1 While self-radicalized Singaporeans were not a new phenomenon, this young man was the first who had planned to carry out terrorist attacks within the country rather than joining a militant group overseas. 2 The dramatic announcement by the prime minister underscored how serious a threat ISIS had become not just in Singapore but in the wider Southeast Asian region. In less than a year, ISIS had all but eclipsed Al Qaeda and its affiliated Southeast Asian militant networks, such as the Indonesian-based transnational Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), as the key transnational terrorist threat to the region. Heightening regional concerns was the fact that ISIS, as Prime Minister Lee also said during his speech in May, appeared keen to fish in troubled Southeast Asian waters for moral and manpower support. On June 29, 2014, the ISIS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi proclaimed a worldwide Islamic state or caliphate with himself as the leader or caliph. Southeast Asia-home to approximately 240 million Muslims, or about 42 percent of the Southeast Asian population and 25 percent of the estimated global Muslim population of 1.6 billion-seems to be in his sights. 3 ISIS seeks to turn the region into a wilayat or province of its caliphate, and to this end has started a Malay-speaking unit in its ranks called Katibah