Vincenzo Galasso - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Vincenzo Galasso

Despite large take-up rates in most OECD countries, millions of people still refuse COVID-19 vacc... more Despite large take-up rates in most OECD countries, millions of people still refuse COVID-19 vaccination. The large number of unvaccinated individuals raises major concerns about the diffusion of the virus. Anti-vax individuals are often very vocal about their choice and use social media to convince undecided individuals not to get vaccinated. Using original data from two surveys in nine OECD countries, we show that half of the individuals, who expressed anti-vax intentions in December 2020, were vaccinated by summer 2021. We find that information plays a key role. Vaccinations were more likely among individuals aged 50+, more informed on traditional media, trusting scientists, exposed to COVID-19, compliant with public restrictions, and less concerned about vaccines’ side effects. We also run a survey experiment with informational messages in the first wave. A striking result is that these informational treatments affected not only immediate vaccination intentions, but also actual ...

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from... more An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org • from the CESifo website: Twww.CESifo-group.org/wp T CESifo Working Paper No. 2646

IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series, 2004

We document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protect... more We document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL) in the provision of insurance against labor market risk. Different countries' locations along this trade-off represent stable, hard to modify, politico-economic equilibria. We develop a model in which voters are required to cast a ballot over the strictness of EPL, the generosity of UBs and the amount of redistribution involved by the financing of unemployment insurance. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status - insiders and outsiders - and skills - low and high. Unlike previous work on EPL, we model employment protection as an institution redistributing among insiders, notably in favour of the low-skill workers. A key implication of the model is that configurations with strict EPL and low UB should emerge in presence of compressed wage structures. Micro data on wage premia on educational attainments and on the strictness of EPL are in l...

Labor: Demographics & Economics of the Family, 2005

We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future of re... more We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future of retirement. In a Markovian political economic theoretical framework, in which incentives to retire early are embedded, we derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. Aging has two opposite effects: it leads to lower taxes and fewer (early) retirees, while a poorer median voter will push for higher contributions. The model highlights the existence of crucial income effects: a decrease of the income of young people will induce them to postpone retirement and to vote for less social security.

Does electoral competition lead to a better selection of politicians while providing also stronge... more Does electoral competition lead to a better selection of politicians while providing also stronger reelection incentives to incumbents? To address the existence of this double dividend of political competition, we introduce a theoretical model in which ideological parties have to select political candidates between party loyals and experts, and have to allocate them into the electoral districts. Non-ideological voters care about national and local policies and strongly prefer experts, who are better able to respond to the shocks to the economy. Parties hence face a trade-off between more party loyalty and more expertise and hence a higher probability of winning the election. We show that competition disciplines political parties to select more experts and to allocate them in more contestable districts. Expert candidates serve also as a commitment device of the future policies. The theoretical model also suggests that re-election incentives induce the incumbents in contestable distri...

Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal, 2013

This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persua... more This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. During the 2011 municipal elections in Milan, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to the same incumbent's campaign but to different opponent's campaigns, with either a positive or a negative tone. The third – control – group received no electoral information. The campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). Stark gender differences emerge. Negative advertising increases men's turnout, but has no effect on women. Females, however, vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the opponent's positive campaign. Exactly the opposite occurs for males. Additional tests show that our results are not driven by gender identification with the candidate, ideology, or other voter's observable attributes. Effe...

Randomized Social Experiments eJournal, 2016

This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persua... more This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. We implemented a survey experiment during the (mixed gender) electoral race for mayor in Milan (2011), and a field experiment during the (same gender) electoral race for mayor in Cava de' Tirreni (2015). In both cases, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to either a positive or a negative campaign by one of the opponents. The third (control) group received no electoral information. In Milan, the campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). In Cava de' Tirreni, we implemented a large scale door-to-door campaign in collaboration with one of the candidates, randomizing positive vs. negative messages. In both experiments, stark gender differences emerge. Females vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the o...

Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of two alternative t... more Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of two alternative theories - children as 'consumption' vs. 'investment' good. We use as a natural experiment the Italian pension reforms of the 90s that introduced a clear discontinuity in the treatment across workers. This policy experiment is particularly well suited, since the 'consumption' motive predicts lower future pensions to reduce fertility, while the 'old-age security' to increase it. Our empirical analysis identifies a clear and robust positive effect of less generous future pensions on post-reform fertility. These findings are consistent with 'old-age security' even for contemporary fertility.

Gender stereotypes are well established also among women. Yet, a recent literature suggests that ... more Gender stereotypes are well established also among women. Yet, a recent literature suggests that learning from other women experience about the effects of maternal employment on children outcomes may increase female labor force participation. To further explore this channel, we design a randomized survey experiment, in which 1500 Italian women aged 20 to 40 are exposed to two informational treatments on the positive consequences of formal childcare on children future educational attainments. Surprisingly, we find that women reduce their intended labor supply. However, this result hides strong heterogenous effects: high educated non-mothers are persuaded by the informational treatments to increase their intended use of formal child care (and to pay more); whereas low educated non-mothers to reduce their intended labor supply. These findings are consistent with women responding to monetary incentive and/or having different preferences for maternal care. These heterogenous responses ac...

Generous early retirement provisions account for a large proportion of the drop in the labor forc... more Generous early retirement provisions account for a large proportion of the drop in the labor force participation of elderly workers. The aim of this paper is to provide a positive theory of early retirement. We suggest that the political support for generous early retirement provisions relies on: (i) the existence of a significant group of elderly workers with incomplete working history, who are not entitled to an old age pension; and (ii) the intragenerational redistribution built in this provision via the utility from leisure that induces low-ability workers to retire early. The majority which supports early retirement in a bidimensional voting game is composed of elderly with incomplete working history and low-ability workers; social security is supported by retirees and low-ability workers.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. JEL classification:H53; H55; D72

This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our... more This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our theoretical model delivers unambigous predictions on the interaction between institutions and a time varying event, namely the unemployment rate in pivotal and non-pivotal districts. We use local level data on unemployment rate and political competition to obtain an empirical specification which matches our model. First, we test the effect of electoral incentives under majority rule, by analyzing the US House representatives voting records on the 2009 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act, which increased unemployment benefit coverage and generosity. Second, we exploit the time-varying dimension of our theoretical prediction to test the causal effect on panel data. We use a dataset with local information on electoral competitiveness and unemployment rates for 29 OECD countries in 1980-2001 and employ panel analysis on different measures of UB generosity. The empirical eviden...

International Tax and Public Finance

We study how family culture affected the initial welfare state design. Our theoretical framework ... more We study how family culture affected the initial welfare state design. Our theoretical framework shows that pre-existing institutions — namely inheritance rules — shaped the within family intergenerational transmission of resources. This organization is embedded in the family culture that later affected the design of pension systems. Countries with equalitarian inheritance rules acquired a non-individualistic family culture that induced the adoption of generous Bismarckian pension systems, whereas non-equalitarian inheritance rules nurtured family independence and led to Beveridgean (safety net) pension systems. Cross countries analyses using historical inheritance rules support these predictions, and results are robust to controlling for alternative legal, religious, demographic, economic and political explanations. Evidence from individual data confirm these findings: US citizens whose ancestors came from countries featuring equal inheritance rules prefer to rely on the government as a provider of old age security through generous retirement benefits.

Iza Research Reports, 2013

Despite large take-up rates in most OECD countries, millions of people still refuse COVID-19 vacc... more Despite large take-up rates in most OECD countries, millions of people still refuse COVID-19 vaccination. The large number of unvaccinated individuals raises major concerns about the diffusion of the virus. Anti-vax individuals are often very vocal about their choice and use social media to convince undecided individuals not to get vaccinated. Using original data from two surveys in nine OECD countries, we show that half of the individuals, who expressed anti-vax intentions in December 2020, were vaccinated by summer 2021. We find that information plays a key role. Vaccinations were more likely among individuals aged 50+, more informed on traditional media, trusting scientists, exposed to COVID-19, compliant with public restrictions, and less concerned about vaccines’ side effects. We also run a survey experiment with informational messages in the first wave. A striking result is that these informational treatments affected not only immediate vaccination intentions, but also actual ...

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from... more An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org • from the CESifo website: Twww.CESifo-group.org/wp T CESifo Working Paper No. 2646

IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series, 2004

We document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protect... more We document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL) in the provision of insurance against labor market risk. Different countries' locations along this trade-off represent stable, hard to modify, politico-economic equilibria. We develop a model in which voters are required to cast a ballot over the strictness of EPL, the generosity of UBs and the amount of redistribution involved by the financing of unemployment insurance. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status - insiders and outsiders - and skills - low and high. Unlike previous work on EPL, we model employment protection as an institution redistributing among insiders, notably in favour of the low-skill workers. A key implication of the model is that configurations with strict EPL and low UB should emerge in presence of compressed wage structures. Micro data on wage premia on educational attainments and on the strictness of EPL are in l...

Labor: Demographics & Economics of the Family, 2005

We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future of re... more We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future of retirement. In a Markovian political economic theoretical framework, in which incentives to retire early are embedded, we derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. Aging has two opposite effects: it leads to lower taxes and fewer (early) retirees, while a poorer median voter will push for higher contributions. The model highlights the existence of crucial income effects: a decrease of the income of young people will induce them to postpone retirement and to vote for less social security.

Does electoral competition lead to a better selection of politicians while providing also stronge... more Does electoral competition lead to a better selection of politicians while providing also stronger reelection incentives to incumbents? To address the existence of this double dividend of political competition, we introduce a theoretical model in which ideological parties have to select political candidates between party loyals and experts, and have to allocate them into the electoral districts. Non-ideological voters care about national and local policies and strongly prefer experts, who are better able to respond to the shocks to the economy. Parties hence face a trade-off between more party loyalty and more expertise and hence a higher probability of winning the election. We show that competition disciplines political parties to select more experts and to allocate them in more contestable districts. Expert candidates serve also as a commitment device of the future policies. The theoretical model also suggests that re-election incentives induce the incumbents in contestable distri...

Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal, 2013

This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persua... more This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. During the 2011 municipal elections in Milan, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to the same incumbent's campaign but to different opponent's campaigns, with either a positive or a negative tone. The third – control – group received no electoral information. The campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). Stark gender differences emerge. Negative advertising increases men's turnout, but has no effect on women. Females, however, vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the opponent's positive campaign. Exactly the opposite occurs for males. Additional tests show that our results are not driven by gender identification with the candidate, ideology, or other voter's observable attributes. Effe...

Randomized Social Experiments eJournal, 2016

This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persua... more This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. We implemented a survey experiment during the (mixed gender) electoral race for mayor in Milan (2011), and a field experiment during the (same gender) electoral race for mayor in Cava de' Tirreni (2015). In both cases, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to either a positive or a negative campaign by one of the opponents. The third (control) group received no electoral information. In Milan, the campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). In Cava de' Tirreni, we implemented a large scale door-to-door campaign in collaboration with one of the candidates, randomizing positive vs. negative messages. In both experiments, stark gender differences emerge. Females vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the o...

Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of two alternative t... more Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of two alternative theories - children as 'consumption' vs. 'investment' good. We use as a natural experiment the Italian pension reforms of the 90s that introduced a clear discontinuity in the treatment across workers. This policy experiment is particularly well suited, since the 'consumption' motive predicts lower future pensions to reduce fertility, while the 'old-age security' to increase it. Our empirical analysis identifies a clear and robust positive effect of less generous future pensions on post-reform fertility. These findings are consistent with 'old-age security' even for contemporary fertility.

Gender stereotypes are well established also among women. Yet, a recent literature suggests that ... more Gender stereotypes are well established also among women. Yet, a recent literature suggests that learning from other women experience about the effects of maternal employment on children outcomes may increase female labor force participation. To further explore this channel, we design a randomized survey experiment, in which 1500 Italian women aged 20 to 40 are exposed to two informational treatments on the positive consequences of formal childcare on children future educational attainments. Surprisingly, we find that women reduce their intended labor supply. However, this result hides strong heterogenous effects: high educated non-mothers are persuaded by the informational treatments to increase their intended use of formal child care (and to pay more); whereas low educated non-mothers to reduce their intended labor supply. These findings are consistent with women responding to monetary incentive and/or having different preferences for maternal care. These heterogenous responses ac...

Generous early retirement provisions account for a large proportion of the drop in the labor forc... more Generous early retirement provisions account for a large proportion of the drop in the labor force participation of elderly workers. The aim of this paper is to provide a positive theory of early retirement. We suggest that the political support for generous early retirement provisions relies on: (i) the existence of a significant group of elderly workers with incomplete working history, who are not entitled to an old age pension; and (ii) the intragenerational redistribution built in this provision via the utility from leisure that induces low-ability workers to retire early. The majority which supports early retirement in a bidimensional voting game is composed of elderly with incomplete working history and low-ability workers; social security is supported by retirees and low-ability workers.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. JEL classification:H53; H55; D72

This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our... more This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our theoretical model delivers unambigous predictions on the interaction between institutions and a time varying event, namely the unemployment rate in pivotal and non-pivotal districts. We use local level data on unemployment rate and political competition to obtain an empirical specification which matches our model. First, we test the effect of electoral incentives under majority rule, by analyzing the US House representatives voting records on the 2009 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act, which increased unemployment benefit coverage and generosity. Second, we exploit the time-varying dimension of our theoretical prediction to test the causal effect on panel data. We use a dataset with local information on electoral competitiveness and unemployment rates for 29 OECD countries in 1980-2001 and employ panel analysis on different measures of UB generosity. The empirical eviden...

International Tax and Public Finance

We study how family culture affected the initial welfare state design. Our theoretical framework ... more We study how family culture affected the initial welfare state design. Our theoretical framework shows that pre-existing institutions — namely inheritance rules — shaped the within family intergenerational transmission of resources. This organization is embedded in the family culture that later affected the design of pension systems. Countries with equalitarian inheritance rules acquired a non-individualistic family culture that induced the adoption of generous Bismarckian pension systems, whereas non-equalitarian inheritance rules nurtured family independence and led to Beveridgean (safety net) pension systems. Cross countries analyses using historical inheritance rules support these predictions, and results are robust to controlling for alternative legal, religious, demographic, economic and political explanations. Evidence from individual data confirm these findings: US citizens whose ancestors came from countries featuring equal inheritance rules prefer to rely on the government as a provider of old age security through generous retirement benefits.

Iza Research Reports, 2013