Vincy Fon - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Vincy Fon
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2007
Lawmakers can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decis... more Lawmakers can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decision-making process, incorporating rules or standards into the laws they write. The optimal degree of specificity of legal rules under different environmental conditions and the functionality of these rules or standards are the subjects of the present study. A basic model of optimal specificity of laws is presented, clarifying the relevance of legal obsolescence and volume of litigation in the optimal choice. We then consider the important influence of codification style, judges' specialization, and complexity of reality on the optimal choice of legislative instrument. The implications of our results are then reexamined in light of the more complex institutional reality that characterizes contemporary legislative processes in various areas of the law.
ABSTRACT: In this paper we build upon existing literature on the evolution of the common law. We ... more ABSTRACT: In this paper we build upon existing literature on the evolution of the common law. We consider a model of legal evolution in which judges have varying ideologies and propensities to extend the domain of legal remedies and causes of action. Parties have symmetric stakes and are rational. Plaintiffs bring a case to court if the expected net return from the case is positive. The net expected value of he case depends ton the objective merits of the case, the state of the law, and the ideological propensity of the judge. Plaintiffs have full control over whether to bring a case to court. In our model, the combined presence of differences in judges’ ideology and plaintiff’s case selection generate a monotonic upward trend in the evolution of legal rules and remedies. This may explain the stylized fact under which certain areas of the law have been granting increasing levels of remedial protection and recognition of plaintiffs’ actions. Keywords: Legal Evolution, Efficiency of t...
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
ABSTRACT
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
Atlantic Economic Journal, 1985
ABSTRACT This paper starts with an intuitively plausible assumption about the way in which a work... more ABSTRACT This paper starts with an intuitively plausible assumption about the way in which a worker's effectiveness varies over the workday. It develops a number of interesting implications of this assumption. First, in the absence of fixed costs of hiring and premium pay for overtime, hours per day per worker desired by the firm would not vary with the wage. Second, with fixed costs of hiring and a premium-pay-for-overtime requirement, there is likely to be a bunching of firms with desired workdays of eight hours. Third, holding hiring costs constant, desired hours will decrease with expected length of stay (expected tenure) of the employee. Fourth, the framework can be used to analyze the way in which increases in the minimum wage affect both hours per worker and the number of employees.
Synopsis: Norms of positive and negative reciprocity constitute important constraints that affect... more Synopsis: Norms of positive and negative reciprocity constitute important constraints that affect human behavior. While much attention has been devoted to the economics of reciprocity in cooperation, the stylized fact that humans have a natural predisposition towards negative reciprocity and retaliation has received little consideration in the literature. In this study we investigate the behavioral foundations of retaliatory justice by considering the conditions under which norms of retaliation may constitute instruments for promoting desirable cooperation. The results suggest that human instincts for revenge may an important ingredient for the sustainability of peaceful social behavior.
SSRN Electronic Journal
Following a bankruptcy, how should we distribute the available assets among the eligible creditor... more Following a bankruptcy, how should we distribute the available assets among the eligible creditors? Most people would accept a proportional distribution-for each claimant, calculate her percentage of the sum of all claims and assign her that same percentage of total assets. However, this is not the only reasonable approach. For example, if every claim is at least as large as total assets, assigning an equal share to every creditor is a sensible solution. A set of three numerical bankruptcy examples for three claimants, discussed 2,000 years ago in the Talmud, coincide with the above two approaches, but the third case remained a puzzle until recently when modern game theory (Aumann and Maschler 1985) was enlisted to demystify all cases. This paper explains the unifying principle, the Contested-Claim Consistency principle (CCC), behind the Talmudic examples. Importantly, it uses different means to better understand the logic behind the CCC bankruptcy allocations and points out the subtle yet important properties behind them. This clarifies the meaning of fairness underlying the CCC allocation, and may better convey the meaning of the Pari Passu provision that appears in many existing International Sovereign Debt Instruments.
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2005
In this paper we consider the role that litigation and case selection play in the process of lega... more In this paper we consider the role that litigation and case selection play in the process of legal change. We examine the effect of judicial path dependence on the consolidation of liability rules and legal remedies, paying special attention to litigation between parties with different stakes. In the presence of asymmetric stakes, judicial path dependence may lead to consolidation or contraction of legal rules. We study the consequence of private litigation decisions on the contraction or consolidation of legal rules under various litigation and judicial environments. We also consider the relevance of the degree of asymmetry in the litigation stakes, the existence and nature of positive litigation costs, and the weight of past precedents on the ongoing process of legal evolution.
Eastern Economic Journal, Feb 1, 1990
Public Finance Quarterly
An uncertainty model with a choice of free-riding is presented. The model does not provide theore... more An uncertainty model with a choice of free-riding is presented. The model does not provide theoretical justification to support a conclusion that rational individuals will always choose to free-ride. In the case of a contributor, a smaller likelihood of the undesirable event and a less effective benefit production function both lead to a smaller contribution by an individual. However, an individual who becomes more risk-averse, depending on the probability of the undesirable event and the effectiveness of the benefit production function, might choose to make either a larger or smaller contribution.
Ssrn Electronic Journal, 2003
Studies in Economics and Finance, 1985
Maryland Law Review, 2005
Ssrn Electronic Journal, 2002
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2007
Lawmakers can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decis... more Lawmakers can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decision-making process, incorporating rules or standards into the laws they write. The optimal degree of specificity of legal rules under different environmental conditions and the functionality of these rules or standards are the subjects of the present study. A basic model of optimal specificity of laws is presented, clarifying the relevance of legal obsolescence and volume of litigation in the optimal choice. We then consider the important influence of codification style, judges' specialization, and complexity of reality on the optimal choice of legislative instrument. The implications of our results are then reexamined in light of the more complex institutional reality that characterizes contemporary legislative processes in various areas of the law.
ABSTRACT: In this paper we build upon existing literature on the evolution of the common law. We ... more ABSTRACT: In this paper we build upon existing literature on the evolution of the common law. We consider a model of legal evolution in which judges have varying ideologies and propensities to extend the domain of legal remedies and causes of action. Parties have symmetric stakes and are rational. Plaintiffs bring a case to court if the expected net return from the case is positive. The net expected value of he case depends ton the objective merits of the case, the state of the law, and the ideological propensity of the judge. Plaintiffs have full control over whether to bring a case to court. In our model, the combined presence of differences in judges’ ideology and plaintiff’s case selection generate a monotonic upward trend in the evolution of legal rules and remedies. This may explain the stylized fact under which certain areas of the law have been granting increasing levels of remedial protection and recognition of plaintiffs’ actions. Keywords: Legal Evolution, Efficiency of t...
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
ABSTRACT
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
The Economics of Lawmaking, 2009
Atlantic Economic Journal, 1985
ABSTRACT This paper starts with an intuitively plausible assumption about the way in which a work... more ABSTRACT This paper starts with an intuitively plausible assumption about the way in which a worker's effectiveness varies over the workday. It develops a number of interesting implications of this assumption. First, in the absence of fixed costs of hiring and premium pay for overtime, hours per day per worker desired by the firm would not vary with the wage. Second, with fixed costs of hiring and a premium-pay-for-overtime requirement, there is likely to be a bunching of firms with desired workdays of eight hours. Third, holding hiring costs constant, desired hours will decrease with expected length of stay (expected tenure) of the employee. Fourth, the framework can be used to analyze the way in which increases in the minimum wage affect both hours per worker and the number of employees.
Synopsis: Norms of positive and negative reciprocity constitute important constraints that affect... more Synopsis: Norms of positive and negative reciprocity constitute important constraints that affect human behavior. While much attention has been devoted to the economics of reciprocity in cooperation, the stylized fact that humans have a natural predisposition towards negative reciprocity and retaliation has received little consideration in the literature. In this study we investigate the behavioral foundations of retaliatory justice by considering the conditions under which norms of retaliation may constitute instruments for promoting desirable cooperation. The results suggest that human instincts for revenge may an important ingredient for the sustainability of peaceful social behavior.
SSRN Electronic Journal
Following a bankruptcy, how should we distribute the available assets among the eligible creditor... more Following a bankruptcy, how should we distribute the available assets among the eligible creditors? Most people would accept a proportional distribution-for each claimant, calculate her percentage of the sum of all claims and assign her that same percentage of total assets. However, this is not the only reasonable approach. For example, if every claim is at least as large as total assets, assigning an equal share to every creditor is a sensible solution. A set of three numerical bankruptcy examples for three claimants, discussed 2,000 years ago in the Talmud, coincide with the above two approaches, but the third case remained a puzzle until recently when modern game theory (Aumann and Maschler 1985) was enlisted to demystify all cases. This paper explains the unifying principle, the Contested-Claim Consistency principle (CCC), behind the Talmudic examples. Importantly, it uses different means to better understand the logic behind the CCC bankruptcy allocations and points out the subtle yet important properties behind them. This clarifies the meaning of fairness underlying the CCC allocation, and may better convey the meaning of the Pari Passu provision that appears in many existing International Sovereign Debt Instruments.
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2005
In this paper we consider the role that litigation and case selection play in the process of lega... more In this paper we consider the role that litigation and case selection play in the process of legal change. We examine the effect of judicial path dependence on the consolidation of liability rules and legal remedies, paying special attention to litigation between parties with different stakes. In the presence of asymmetric stakes, judicial path dependence may lead to consolidation or contraction of legal rules. We study the consequence of private litigation decisions on the contraction or consolidation of legal rules under various litigation and judicial environments. We also consider the relevance of the degree of asymmetry in the litigation stakes, the existence and nature of positive litigation costs, and the weight of past precedents on the ongoing process of legal evolution.
Eastern Economic Journal, Feb 1, 1990
Public Finance Quarterly
An uncertainty model with a choice of free-riding is presented. The model does not provide theore... more An uncertainty model with a choice of free-riding is presented. The model does not provide theoretical justification to support a conclusion that rational individuals will always choose to free-ride. In the case of a contributor, a smaller likelihood of the undesirable event and a less effective benefit production function both lead to a smaller contribution by an individual. However, an individual who becomes more risk-averse, depending on the probability of the undesirable event and the effectiveness of the benefit production function, might choose to make either a larger or smaller contribution.
Ssrn Electronic Journal, 2003
Studies in Economics and Finance, 1985
Maryland Law Review, 2005
Ssrn Electronic Journal, 2002