Walter Ladwig - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Walter Ladwig
Asian Survey, Nov 1, 2010
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jun 9, 2017
Providing aid and advice to local governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than directly ... more Providing aid and advice to local governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than directly intervening with American forces, has recently been identified as a more cost-effective way to counter irregular threats to U.S. interests. The challenge that such undertakings have repeatedly faced in the past is that partner governments often have their own interests and priorities which can diverge significantly from those of Washington. Consequently, a host of observers have pointed out that while the United States has provided its partners with extensive assistance to combat insurgents and terrorist groups, an inability to convince them to adopt its counterinsurgency prescriptions or address what Washington sees as the political and economic “root causes” of a conflict has repeatedly emerged as a major impediment to success. In the absence of sufficient influence to convince a local government to address these shortcomings, critics suggest that significant American aid and support c...
Traditionally the neglected ‘Cinderella’ service of the Indian armed forces, the Indian Navy is i... more Traditionally the neglected ‘Cinderella’ service of the Indian armed forces, the Indian Navy is in the midst of a modernization programme that has attracted international concern from commentators who worry that this might pose a risk to stability in the Indian Ocean or presage a naval arms race in Asia. This chapter attempts to understand what is driving this uncharacteristic focus on the Navy, concentrating on developments in the 20-year period since the end of the Cold War (1991–2011). The analysis proceeds in two parts. The first section examines several different measures, including number of ships, aggregate tonnage, number of missile cells and budgetary allocation to understand the trajectory of the Indian Navy over the past 20 years. Section two examines three oft-cited justifications for naval expansion – defence against hostile maritime powers, the cultivation of power projection capability to further India’s political interests, and the protection of trade – in relation t...
Systemic shifts are reorienting the world’s economic center of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. The I... more Systemic shifts are reorienting the world’s economic center of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is emerging as a strategic zone of particular importance, one with tremendous economic potential but significant security challenges. Still the sole superpower, the US has a unique role to play in securing and maintaining the international system—including in the IOR—but requires a reliable network of overseas bases to do so, in a region that is not part of its traditional sphere of influence. The British island of Diego Garcia in the center of the Indian Ocean offers unique capabilities in this regard, and is therefore being further developed by the US military as a regional hub. Meanwhile, India and China are strengthening their presence in the IOR, without challenging US influence. India, which logically views the Indian Ocean as its geostrategic backyard, increasingly views American presence as a positive hedge against China. On the other hand, China’s intere...
The latent conºict between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan makes continued strategic stab... more The latent conºict between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan makes continued strategic stability in South Asia uncertain. A breakdown of deterrence between the two countries would have serious consequences, including the potential use of nuclear weapons. Since 1999 there have been two military crises involving India and Pakistan that escalated to the point where outside actors felt the need to intervene to prevent the outbreak of war. A low-level, Pakistani-backed insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir adds to the tense relations between the two nations. Given the nuclear dimension involved, as well as India's increasingly prominent role in world affairs and Pakistan's domestic instability, strategic and military developments on the subcontinent are of great concern to the broader international community. In response to the perceived inability of the Indian military to react to the December 2001 attack on the Parliament building in New Delhi by Pakistanibacked Kashmiri militants and the subsequent military standoff with Pakistan, known as Operation Parakram (Operation Victory), the Indian Army announced a new limited war doctrine in April 2004 that would allow it to mobilize quickly and undertake retaliatory attacks in response to speciªc challenges posed by Pakistan's "proxy war" in Kashmir. This Cold Start doctrine marked a break from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military has employed since independence in 1947. Requiring combined arms operating jointly with airpower from the Indian Air Force, Cold Start represents a signiªcant undertaking for the Indian military. This study explores the Cold Start concept, including its potential impact on strategic stability in South Asia, and assesses the Indian military's progress toward implementing the new doctrine since its unveiling. Limited war on the subcontinent poses a serious risk of escalation based on a number of factors that are not necessarily under the control of the policymakers or military leaders who would initiate the conºict. A history of misperception, poor intelligence, and India's awkward national security
This special issue of Asia Policy scrutinizes the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership byexamining the... more This special issue of Asia Policy scrutinizes the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership byexamining the prospects for bilateral cooperation in Asia. Although peacetimeforeign policy collaboration between major powers is a rarity, China’s rapid rise inthe international system appears to have forced the United States and India intounprecedentedly close consultation on regional security issues. Will this consultationmature into active cooperation? To answer this question, this introductory essay firstexamines the concept of strategic partnerships—a nebulous type of politicalrelationship that have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. It then highlightsthe obstacles to peacetime cooperation between major powers in other regions of the world. Following this, attention turns to the articles in this special issue whichexamine the history of Indo-U.S. cooperation in various sub-regions of Asia.Collectively, these pieces challenge misperceptions and misunderstandings of eachcountry’s policie...
Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a globalpartnership with th... more Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a globalpartnership with the potential to shape the future security architecture of theIndo-Pacific. As is widely acknowledged, the two countries’ extraregional interestsalign most closely in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, this article examines thepotential for and limitations of U.S. and Indian cooperation in the region to achieveshared aims. It argues that extensive diplomatic consultations between the twocountries have led to a significant convergence in their positions on regionalsecurity challenges. Active cooperation, however, remains constrained by anumber of factors, including India’s need to prioritize foreign policy challengescloser to home, concerns about provoking China, and a discomfort among countriesin Southeast Asia regarding the idea of a joint U.S.-India approach toward theregion. Due to these limitations, U.S.-India policies in Southeast Asia are expectedto operate in parallel instead of becoming ...
This book is a comparative study of U.S. efforts to assist allied nations in counterinsurgency th... more This book is a comparative study of U.S. efforts to assist allied nations in counterinsurgency through indirect intervention, with a specific focus on how external aid can induce political, economic and military reform as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. A critical error lies at the heart of the U.S. Counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, and much of the literature it draws on: the erroneous assumption that it will be comparatively easy for a patron state to shape the counterinsurgency strategies of the client government it is supporting because the priorities, goals and interests of the two parties will be closely aligned. In fact, history demonstrates that is rarely the case. Critical counterinsurgency scholars, such as Douglas Blaufarb, Michael Shafer, William adorn and Benjamin Schwartz, have argued that given the divergent preferences of the U.S. and the local government it is assisting and the relative lack of leverage provided by foreign aid, external assistance will reduce the local government's incentives to address root causes of discontent and encourage counterinsurgency strategies based solely on repression-contravening American counterinsurgency doctrine and preferences. Although this represents an important critique of U.S. counterinsurgency thinking that has been ignored in the contemporary discourse, it is incomplete. This study revises the arguments of these critical scholars about the ability to gain leverage via aid by examining their principal case studies, the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines (1946-1953), Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem (1955-1963) and the Salvadorian Civil War (1979-1991) in considerably greater detail than the original scholars did-drawing on tens of thousands of pages of primary materials from nineteen different archives in three countries. In doing so, this work makes several unique contributions. First, the book demonstrates that while the warnings of the critical COIN scholars are cogent, they failed to detect the use of varying aid strategies by the United States during the course of its interventions. In fact, the particular choice of aid strategy directly affected the generation of inter-alliance leverage, with inducement-the unilateral provision of incentives and other positive sanctions-and conditionality-the strict tying of specific aid to specific reforms-resulting in significantly different levels of client compliance with the patron's preferred policies. Second, it employs agency theory to examine the patterns of patron-client dynamics during indirect interventions in a theoretically rigorous and structured manner that indicates the key agency problem is about adverse selection, not moral hazard, as some critical scholars have suggested. Finally, the study identifies and corrects several important errors of causality in the case studies employed by the critical counterinsurgency scholars. In addition to expanding the understanding of the role of allies and external support in counterinsurgency, two areas which are under-theorized in the academic literature on the subject, the issues explored in this study have relevance for contemporary policy challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo
Asian Survey, Nov 1, 2010
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jun 9, 2017
Providing aid and advice to local governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than directly ... more Providing aid and advice to local governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than directly intervening with American forces, has recently been identified as a more cost-effective way to counter irregular threats to U.S. interests. The challenge that such undertakings have repeatedly faced in the past is that partner governments often have their own interests and priorities which can diverge significantly from those of Washington. Consequently, a host of observers have pointed out that while the United States has provided its partners with extensive assistance to combat insurgents and terrorist groups, an inability to convince them to adopt its counterinsurgency prescriptions or address what Washington sees as the political and economic “root causes” of a conflict has repeatedly emerged as a major impediment to success. In the absence of sufficient influence to convince a local government to address these shortcomings, critics suggest that significant American aid and support c...
Traditionally the neglected ‘Cinderella’ service of the Indian armed forces, the Indian Navy is i... more Traditionally the neglected ‘Cinderella’ service of the Indian armed forces, the Indian Navy is in the midst of a modernization programme that has attracted international concern from commentators who worry that this might pose a risk to stability in the Indian Ocean or presage a naval arms race in Asia. This chapter attempts to understand what is driving this uncharacteristic focus on the Navy, concentrating on developments in the 20-year period since the end of the Cold War (1991–2011). The analysis proceeds in two parts. The first section examines several different measures, including number of ships, aggregate tonnage, number of missile cells and budgetary allocation to understand the trajectory of the Indian Navy over the past 20 years. Section two examines three oft-cited justifications for naval expansion – defence against hostile maritime powers, the cultivation of power projection capability to further India’s political interests, and the protection of trade – in relation t...
Systemic shifts are reorienting the world’s economic center of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. The I... more Systemic shifts are reorienting the world’s economic center of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is emerging as a strategic zone of particular importance, one with tremendous economic potential but significant security challenges. Still the sole superpower, the US has a unique role to play in securing and maintaining the international system—including in the IOR—but requires a reliable network of overseas bases to do so, in a region that is not part of its traditional sphere of influence. The British island of Diego Garcia in the center of the Indian Ocean offers unique capabilities in this regard, and is therefore being further developed by the US military as a regional hub. Meanwhile, India and China are strengthening their presence in the IOR, without challenging US influence. India, which logically views the Indian Ocean as its geostrategic backyard, increasingly views American presence as a positive hedge against China. On the other hand, China’s intere...
The latent conºict between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan makes continued strategic stab... more The latent conºict between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan makes continued strategic stability in South Asia uncertain. A breakdown of deterrence between the two countries would have serious consequences, including the potential use of nuclear weapons. Since 1999 there have been two military crises involving India and Pakistan that escalated to the point where outside actors felt the need to intervene to prevent the outbreak of war. A low-level, Pakistani-backed insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir adds to the tense relations between the two nations. Given the nuclear dimension involved, as well as India's increasingly prominent role in world affairs and Pakistan's domestic instability, strategic and military developments on the subcontinent are of great concern to the broader international community. In response to the perceived inability of the Indian military to react to the December 2001 attack on the Parliament building in New Delhi by Pakistanibacked Kashmiri militants and the subsequent military standoff with Pakistan, known as Operation Parakram (Operation Victory), the Indian Army announced a new limited war doctrine in April 2004 that would allow it to mobilize quickly and undertake retaliatory attacks in response to speciªc challenges posed by Pakistan's "proxy war" in Kashmir. This Cold Start doctrine marked a break from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military has employed since independence in 1947. Requiring combined arms operating jointly with airpower from the Indian Air Force, Cold Start represents a signiªcant undertaking for the Indian military. This study explores the Cold Start concept, including its potential impact on strategic stability in South Asia, and assesses the Indian military's progress toward implementing the new doctrine since its unveiling. Limited war on the subcontinent poses a serious risk of escalation based on a number of factors that are not necessarily under the control of the policymakers or military leaders who would initiate the conºict. A history of misperception, poor intelligence, and India's awkward national security
This special issue of Asia Policy scrutinizes the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership byexamining the... more This special issue of Asia Policy scrutinizes the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership byexamining the prospects for bilateral cooperation in Asia. Although peacetimeforeign policy collaboration between major powers is a rarity, China’s rapid rise inthe international system appears to have forced the United States and India intounprecedentedly close consultation on regional security issues. Will this consultationmature into active cooperation? To answer this question, this introductory essay firstexamines the concept of strategic partnerships—a nebulous type of politicalrelationship that have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. It then highlightsthe obstacles to peacetime cooperation between major powers in other regions of the world. Following this, attention turns to the articles in this special issue whichexamine the history of Indo-U.S. cooperation in various sub-regions of Asia.Collectively, these pieces challenge misperceptions and misunderstandings of eachcountry’s policie...
Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a globalpartnership with th... more Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a globalpartnership with the potential to shape the future security architecture of theIndo-Pacific. As is widely acknowledged, the two countries’ extraregional interestsalign most closely in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, this article examines thepotential for and limitations of U.S. and Indian cooperation in the region to achieveshared aims. It argues that extensive diplomatic consultations between the twocountries have led to a significant convergence in their positions on regionalsecurity challenges. Active cooperation, however, remains constrained by anumber of factors, including India’s need to prioritize foreign policy challengescloser to home, concerns about provoking China, and a discomfort among countriesin Southeast Asia regarding the idea of a joint U.S.-India approach toward theregion. Due to these limitations, U.S.-India policies in Southeast Asia are expectedto operate in parallel instead of becoming ...
This book is a comparative study of U.S. efforts to assist allied nations in counterinsurgency th... more This book is a comparative study of U.S. efforts to assist allied nations in counterinsurgency through indirect intervention, with a specific focus on how external aid can induce political, economic and military reform as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. A critical error lies at the heart of the U.S. Counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, and much of the literature it draws on: the erroneous assumption that it will be comparatively easy for a patron state to shape the counterinsurgency strategies of the client government it is supporting because the priorities, goals and interests of the two parties will be closely aligned. In fact, history demonstrates that is rarely the case. Critical counterinsurgency scholars, such as Douglas Blaufarb, Michael Shafer, William adorn and Benjamin Schwartz, have argued that given the divergent preferences of the U.S. and the local government it is assisting and the relative lack of leverage provided by foreign aid, external assistance will reduce the local government's incentives to address root causes of discontent and encourage counterinsurgency strategies based solely on repression-contravening American counterinsurgency doctrine and preferences. Although this represents an important critique of U.S. counterinsurgency thinking that has been ignored in the contemporary discourse, it is incomplete. This study revises the arguments of these critical scholars about the ability to gain leverage via aid by examining their principal case studies, the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines (1946-1953), Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem (1955-1963) and the Salvadorian Civil War (1979-1991) in considerably greater detail than the original scholars did-drawing on tens of thousands of pages of primary materials from nineteen different archives in three countries. In doing so, this work makes several unique contributions. First, the book demonstrates that while the warnings of the critical COIN scholars are cogent, they failed to detect the use of varying aid strategies by the United States during the course of its interventions. In fact, the particular choice of aid strategy directly affected the generation of inter-alliance leverage, with inducement-the unilateral provision of incentives and other positive sanctions-and conditionality-the strict tying of specific aid to specific reforms-resulting in significantly different levels of client compliance with the patron's preferred policies. Second, it employs agency theory to examine the patterns of patron-client dynamics during indirect interventions in a theoretically rigorous and structured manner that indicates the key agency problem is about adverse selection, not moral hazard, as some critical scholars have suggested. Finally, the study identifies and corrects several important errors of causality in the case studies employed by the critical counterinsurgency scholars. In addition to expanding the understanding of the role of allies and external support in counterinsurgency, two areas which are under-theorized in the academic literature on the subject, the issues explored in this study have relevance for contemporary policy challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo