William Flavin - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by William Flavin
Finding the Balance, 2011
This monograph examines the U.S. Military’s struggle to find the correct balance between conventi... more This monograph examines the U.S. Military’s
struggle to find the correct balance between conventional
and counterinsurgency/stability approaches.
The author uses history to remind us that at the end of
wars, Armies often “throw the baby out with the bathwater”
and revert to a default position for organization
and doctrine instead of inculcating those lessons
learned in the recent wars. History shows us that we
do not maintain capabilities and capacity to conduct
operations in complex environments.
Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan Observations on Civil Military Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom, 2004
The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College, has previously ... more The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College,
has previously conducted studies of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in U.S. military
engagements abroad. Based on comments from various levels of command engaged in
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark was the
proper time to do an assessment of CMO there. Most participants would be completing
tours and have the time and perspective to refl ect on their experiences. In late FY 03,
PKI was reorganized into the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI). This report is therefore published under the auspices of PKSOI.
The report covers the period from 11 September 2001 until the end of December 2002.
Afghanistan remains a dynamic situation; therefore, the details associated with the fi ndings
are temporally bound. This report attempts to identify the trends and concerns that still
exist, although their dimensions and magnitude may change.
STABILIZATION: A NEW APPROACH TO WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION, 2018
The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select frag... more The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. The operating environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. government response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners and supported by the affected nation in order to achieve their own national goals. Since 1947, the national security system has struggled to handle effectively the range and complexity of the existing global threats and opportunities.
As the operating environment has changed rapidly since 1947, the response to that environment has also evolved but not fast enough. Over the past thirty plus years numerous academic institutions, think tanks and governmental agencies have all identified and catalogued the problems and challenges. From the Eberstadt report to Congress in October 1945 through the Defense Science Board Summer study of 2016, stacks of studies and reports have been produced all calling for a whole-of-government handling of national security and improvements in the national security system. These Studies and numerous others all call for improving the ability for the US Government to assess, decide, plan, deliver, and adjust. However, as the Congressional Research Service in 2012 concluded, there is no consensus among agencies on how to fix the perceived problems. Numerous reforms have occurred and the need for a holistic approach has been understood but the basic system remains one of stovepipes and not of integrated, horizontal, systemic approaches.
This study, conducted by students and faculty of the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, considered various aspects of the problem to determine what might be possible and what might increase the likelihood of success. It considered the processes, structures, organizational cultures, training and education, resourcing, and human capital in light of historical and current practices. It looked at what seems to have worked and what has not been sustainable. It considered current and past examples, existing research, and the experience of the officer students at the Army War College in their previous assignments. The study examine the follow examples: COORDS in Viet Nam, the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) SOUTH Counter Drug taskforce, Trans Sahel Counter Terrorist Program (TSCTP), the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria) Taskforce, the role of the U.S. Country Team, the Iraq/Afghanistan funding and resourcing programs, and the 3D Joint Staff’s Unity of Effort Framework.
The goal was aspirational and inspirational: what should be done that is feasible and achievable and what existing resources could be applied or re-purposed to improve a whole-of-government approach.
Parameters, 2003
It is easier to start a conflict then to end one. This article looks at the historical cases and... more It is easier to start a conflict then to end one. This article looks at the historical cases and proposes some principles for helping planners to achieve national goals after the conflict had ended.
Finding the Balance, 2011
This monograph examines the U.S. Military’s struggle to find the correct balance between conventi... more This monograph examines the U.S. Military’s
struggle to find the correct balance between conventional
and counterinsurgency/stability approaches.
The author uses history to remind us that at the end of
wars, Armies often “throw the baby out with the bathwater”
and revert to a default position for organization
and doctrine instead of inculcating those lessons
learned in the recent wars. History shows us that we
do not maintain capabilities and capacity to conduct
operations in complex environments.
Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan Observations on Civil Military Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom, 2004
The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College, has previously ... more The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College,
has previously conducted studies of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in U.S. military
engagements abroad. Based on comments from various levels of command engaged in
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark was the
proper time to do an assessment of CMO there. Most participants would be completing
tours and have the time and perspective to refl ect on their experiences. In late FY 03,
PKI was reorganized into the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI). This report is therefore published under the auspices of PKSOI.
The report covers the period from 11 September 2001 until the end of December 2002.
Afghanistan remains a dynamic situation; therefore, the details associated with the fi ndings
are temporally bound. This report attempts to identify the trends and concerns that still
exist, although their dimensions and magnitude may change.
STABILIZATION: A NEW APPROACH TO WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION, 2018
The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select frag... more The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. The operating environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. government response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners and supported by the affected nation in order to achieve their own national goals. Since 1947, the national security system has struggled to handle effectively the range and complexity of the existing global threats and opportunities.
As the operating environment has changed rapidly since 1947, the response to that environment has also evolved but not fast enough. Over the past thirty plus years numerous academic institutions, think tanks and governmental agencies have all identified and catalogued the problems and challenges. From the Eberstadt report to Congress in October 1945 through the Defense Science Board Summer study of 2016, stacks of studies and reports have been produced all calling for a whole-of-government handling of national security and improvements in the national security system. These Studies and numerous others all call for improving the ability for the US Government to assess, decide, plan, deliver, and adjust. However, as the Congressional Research Service in 2012 concluded, there is no consensus among agencies on how to fix the perceived problems. Numerous reforms have occurred and the need for a holistic approach has been understood but the basic system remains one of stovepipes and not of integrated, horizontal, systemic approaches.
This study, conducted by students and faculty of the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, considered various aspects of the problem to determine what might be possible and what might increase the likelihood of success. It considered the processes, structures, organizational cultures, training and education, resourcing, and human capital in light of historical and current practices. It looked at what seems to have worked and what has not been sustainable. It considered current and past examples, existing research, and the experience of the officer students at the Army War College in their previous assignments. The study examine the follow examples: COORDS in Viet Nam, the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) SOUTH Counter Drug taskforce, Trans Sahel Counter Terrorist Program (TSCTP), the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria) Taskforce, the role of the U.S. Country Team, the Iraq/Afghanistan funding and resourcing programs, and the 3D Joint Staff’s Unity of Effort Framework.
The goal was aspirational and inspirational: what should be done that is feasible and achievable and what existing resources could be applied or re-purposed to improve a whole-of-government approach.
Parameters, 2003
It is easier to start a conflict then to end one. This article looks at the historical cases and... more It is easier to start a conflict then to end one. This article looks at the historical cases and proposes some principles for helping planners to achieve national goals after the conflict had ended.