Zachary Goldberg - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Articles and Reviews by Zachary Goldberg

CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2023

Although the current draft of the AI Act contains explicit provisions and general exclusions that... more Although the current draft of the AI Act contains explicit provisions and general exclusions that create significant innovation opportunities for SMEs, these companies will still need to comply with most provisions of the Act. After surveying these opportunities, this position paper recommends concrete steps how SMEs can overcome the challenges associated with the operationalization of the AI Act through work processes that evidence compliance and aim to create responsible and trustworthy AI. These steps include risk and impact assessments methods and best practice approaches to embed them in company procedures.

ACM WebSci, 2022

This paper provides two distinct approaches to conduct an ethics assessment of AI in policing. Cr... more This paper provides two distinct approaches to conduct an ethics assessment of AI in policing. Crucially, ethical scrutiny must engage all aspects of the policing context. The context for adopting AI is neither solely technical nor solely societal in importance; it is a socio-technical interaction whereby technological systems (law enforcement or safeguarding) are designed by humans (developers) for humans (police) with an impact on individuals (citizens, residents, suspects, victims) and their relationship with the police. With this socio-technical complexity forming the policing context, ethical assessments must be carried out encompassing both the technical and the societal (human).

Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 1382), 2021

Calls for ethics by and in design of new technologies are now commonplace in academic literature,... more Calls for ethics by and in design of new technologies are now commonplace in academic literature, private businesses such as Microsoft and Google, and the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe research projects. This emphasis on ethics is necessary owing to the ways in which new technologies are embedded in our every day practices, can radically affect these practices, and have the potential for transgressing or promoting important values. Despite this importance, there is a lack of clarity concerning how designers can translate ethical theories and ethical values into ethical action. In this paper, I canvass some of the most prominent ethical theories and explain their connection to action. Finding these wanting, I propose an ethic of responsibility as a first step in a more ethically sensitive approach to value-oriented design. This approach internalizes responsibility for ethical action into the actor, rather than seeking ethical characteristics in the external act or value. The reader should keep in mind that this is only the first step given constraints on time and space of this paper. The following step of identifying concrete design suggestions will follow in a subsequent article.

Über das Böse: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (ISBN: 978-3-495-49024-2), 2019

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschreibt und bewertet verschiedene Methoden, die moralisches Böses thema... more Die vorliegende Arbeit beschreibt und bewertet verschiedene Methoden, die moralisches Böses thematisieren. Es gibt drei methodische Möglichkeiten: Erstens kann man die Behauptung zurückweisen, dass der Begriff des Bösen ein geeignetes Thema ernsthafter, säkularer, wissenschaftlicher Betätigung ist. Die Überlegungen zur Unterstützung dieser Perspektive sind anziehend aber letztendlich nicht überzeugend. Wenn es um die Formulierung positiver Theorien des Bösen geht, gibt es zwei andere anwendbare Methoden: Die eine ist platonisch und die andere wittgensteinisch. Der platonische Ansatz bringt die Position vor, dass die notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen aller Begriffe bestimmt werden können. Der wittgensteinsche Ansatz besteht darauf, dass viele Begriffe unter einem solchem platonischen Exaktheitsideal nicht hinreichend erfasst werden können. Begriffe können unscharfe, verschwommene Grenzen haben. Darauf aufbauend müssen viele Begriffe durch paradigmatische Anwendungsfälle und „Familienähnlichkeiten“ verstanden werden. Beide Ansätze haben deutliche Vorteile und spezifische Nachteile, die sich direkt auf unser Verständnis böser Handlungen auswirken. Ich schlage daher einen gesamtheitlichen Ansatz vor, der die Vorteile jeder Methodik bewahrt und die Nachteile vermeidet.

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66(6), 2018

Journal of Value Inquiry , 2018

In this article I seek a more complete understanding of evil action. To this end, in the first ha... more In this article I seek a more complete understanding of evil action. To this end, in the first half of the article I assess the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of the most compelling theories of evil action found in the contemporary philosophical literature. I conclude that the theories that fall under the category I call ‘‘Nuanced Harm Accounts’’ successfully identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of the concept. However, necessary and sufficient conditions are not coextensive with significant features, and Nuanced Harm Accounts are incomplete even if they are correct. In order to supplement them, in the second half of the article I examine the normative relation that obtains between perpetrators and victims of evil and find them to be parties to a relation of asymmetrical power in which the vulnerability of the weaker party is exploited by the stronger party for its advantage, pleasure, or otherwise to achieve its aims. Moreover, the parties in the relation reciprocally enable each other’s role relative to one another. The strength of the more powerful party emerges out of the states of vulnerability of the victims, and the victims are vulnerable relative to the power(s) of the perpetrator.

Kantian Review, Sep 2017

In this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in orde... more In this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.

Wozu ist das Böse gut? Mentis. ISBN: 9783957430502, 2016

This essay will address the question: “Wozu ist das Böse gut?”, or in English translation, for wh... more This essay will address the question: “Wozu ist das Böse gut?”, or in English translation, for what good or purpose is evil. First, an examination of the use-mention distinction between evil and “evil” produces two distinct questions: what good is the presence of evil in the world, and what good is the concept of evil as part of our ethical vocabulary describing human interaction. By severing all logically necessary connections between evil and greater goods, we discover that the answer to the first question—what good is evil in the world—is none whatsoever. Evil deeds leave an enduring and destructive impact on people’s lives. Attempts to justify this ruination belittle the torment that sufferers of evil sustain. Because there is no normative vindication of evil’s existence, recognizing it as an indelible fact of human interaction proves to be crucial to understanding elemental features of the moral community and one’s role within it. Hence, the answer to the second question—what good is the concept of evil—is that it is of the utmost importance. Insofar as evil is a perpetual element of human interaction, being aware of this very fact—that is, understanding the concept of evil—is central to comprehending one’s moral agency, to appropriately reacting to others in the moral community, and to possibly inhibiting future incidents of evil.

Philosophia, 2015

The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, li... more The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In spite of, or perhaps because of this frequency of use the characterization of moral innocence continues to have varying connotations. As a result, the concept is often used without sufficient heed given to some of its most salient attributes, especially those germane to moral agency and the moral community. In this article I intend to identify these attributes and propose that moral innocence is best defined as an inability to enter the moral community as a result of a trust in moral illusions. The content of the illusions pertains to several factors including one’s role(s) in the moral community, one’s ability to wrong or harm others, the intricacies of one’s moral interaction with others, and the corresponding manifold complexities tangled up with the concepts of good and evil. Maintaining these illusions impedes or even prohibits an appropriate exchange of praise and blame with others. As membership in the moral community requires precisely this ability to engage in such an exchange, moral illusions necessarily give rise to an inability to participate in the moral community.

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2015

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2014

Philosophical Forum, 2013

Southwest Philosophy Review, 2010

In chapter 6 of An Essay on Free Will Peter van Inwagen presents an influential argument that we ... more In chapter 6 of An Essay on Free Will Peter van Inwagen presents an influential argument that we are justified in believing we are free. He does so by claiming that the determinist’s objection to the argument for the belief in freedom fails in the exact same way that the skeptic’s argument fails to prove that none of our empirical beliefs are justified. I show that this strategy to defend the belief in freedom fails due to a disanalogy. The failure of his attempted defense raises the question whether there are any other arguments available to him for his target conclusion. I answer this question affirmatively by presenting an interesting argument for belief in freedom that van Inwagen gestures toward without ever explicitly formulating. Namely, that “If you deliberate about what to do while believing you’re not free, then you have inconsistent beliefs.” Alongside this conclusion, van Inwagen suggests that (1) inconsistency is an epistemic defect and (2) it is implausible that some truth is such that your simply believing it would make epistemically defective your engaging in so basic an activity as deliberation. In this way, the above conclusion plays an important role in van Inwagen’s overall argument for the thesis that we should (epistemically speaking) believe in free will. Finally, I show that this argument fares no better than the other.

Chapters by Zachary Goldberg

Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evil, 2019

Endeavouring to distinguish acts of evil from acts of mundane wrongdoing, many philosophers have ... more Endeavouring to distinguish acts of evil from acts of mundane wrongdoing, many philosophers have identified a particular kind or degree of harm as definitive of evil (Card 2002; Russell 2007, 2012, 2014; French 2011; Calder 2003, 2013, 2015). These accounts purport to explain why acts like genocide are evil while acts like theft are simply wrong. My principal aim in this essay is not to critique the details of the arguments found in these theories of evil; in general, I find that each account contains important truths about the nature of evil and the kind or degree of harm that typifies it. Rather, I argue that an analysis and description of evil harm alone does not provide a complete understanding of evil action. While definitions of evil as harm focus mainly on synchronic, or current time-slice, features of evil action, I argue that evil action is a phenomenon whose history is often significant to understanding it as evil. Correspondingly, a diachronic approach reveals two critical attributes of evil. First, we discern conditions that facilitate evil’s distinctive harm. Evil action develops out of a normative relation that obtains between the victims and perpetrators of evil; it is an asymmetrical relation of power based on fundamental vulnerabilities and their exploitation. This relation is frequently enduring over time. When it is, and the exploitation of fundamental vulnerabilities occurs, then evil obtains. Secondly, the moral history of the victim of a putative evil act is often relevant to whether the act is in fact evil. To support this latter claim, I examine three different approaches for assessing the relevance of the past evildoing of a former perpetrator turned victim.

Das Böse Erzählen: Perspektiven aus Philosophie, Film und Literatur, 2017

Why do detailed, factual narrations of evil acts play a prominent role in the philosophical discu... more Why do detailed, factual narrations of evil acts play a prominent role in the philosophical discussion of the moral concept of evil? I will argue that the opportunity to normatively condemn acts of evil is dependent upon evil’s narration. To arrive at this conclusion, I adopt a Humean psychology and distinguish moral from normative judgments. Making a moral judgment regarding an agent’s responsibility implicitly assumes that the agent shares a motivational background with the speaker and is thereby susceptible to relevant moral considerations. Agents of evil create a genuine problem for moral assessment because through perpetrating evil acts they prove that they lack the shared motivational background required for moral ascriptions. In contrast, normative judgments concern states of affairs; they assess situations rather than agents. This distinction will reveal that while it is inappropriate to claim that it was wrong for the perpetrator to act in a certain way, it is entirely appropriate to say that her act is wrong. Since most of us are fortunate enough not to experience evil directly, the primary manner in which we acquire the opportunity to normatively condemn evil acts, is through their factual narration.

Reflections on Responsibility and Ethics: Essays in Honor of Peter A. French, 2017

In this chapter, I examine Peter French’s account of moral evil and his claim that it ought to be... more In this chapter, I examine Peter French’s account of moral evil and his claim that it ought to be understood as a human action that jeopardizes another person’s (or group’s) aspirations to live a worthwhile life (or lives). In addition, French argues that a person’s life is worthwhile if what he or she really gives a damn about satisfies some condition(s) of value. Although I find French’s definition of moral evil to be correct, his account of what makes a life worthwhile is too demanding. In order to salvage his definition of evil, I offer an alternate definition of a worthwhile life. To this end, I shall examine the definitions of meaningful, significant, valuable, and good lives while distinguishing each from a worthwhile life. Subsequently, I turn to a discussion of what does not make a life worthwhile and how this understanding helps us clarify the nature of evil.

Innocence Uncovered: Literary and Theological Perspectives, 2017

Establishing a precise definition of moral innocence is a difficult task. Ordinarily philosophers... more Establishing a precise definition of moral innocence is a difficult task. Ordinarily philosophers explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of a term or concept in order to determine its meaning. Doing so with “moral innocence” proves difficult because the concept is mutable. The term is used in varying contexts to refer to ignorance, naiveté, sexual inexperience, legal and moral culpability, noncombatants in war, and moral purity. For our present purposes, we can exclude the contexts of law and war because they are too specialized to aid us in identifying the commonalities present in the more general uses of the term. Once we take the other common uses into consideration—ignorance, naiveté, and sexual inexperience—a shared feature surfaces. Each of these conditions of character or states of being is a mode of immaturity. Now we are impelled to ask: what are the qualities of this immaturity? More specifically, what are the features of moral immaturity?
To answer this question, the first section of this chapter argues that moral innocence ought to be interpreted in terms of illusion and inability. The innocent hold certain illusions about the moral order that make them unable to engage in practices constitutive of the moral community. Specifically, the morally innocent falsely believe that a life of moral purity—that is, a life devoid of wrongdoing—is possible to achieve. This illusion is based on the following three elements characteristic of an immature and rudimentary understanding of moral interaction: the belief that human nature has only a propensity for goodness; the belief that following ethical rules is sufficient to avoid transgressing moral values; and, the inability to see oneself as a perpetual source of wrongdoing.
The subsequent sections establish why each of these elements hinders the development of a realistic and mature moral acumen. We will proceed by examining the thought of two figures in the history of philosophy who have not previously been associated with the notion of moral innocence, and yet through the present analysis and interpretation can provide insight into its nature. First, Immanuel Kant’s theory of radical evil demonstrates that the human propensity to evil is so pervasive that it is, practically speaking, unavoidable. Therefore, to believe that one can avoid acting upon temptations to evil is self-deception. The final section engages in a thorough analysis of Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy and interprets it in a new way as a theory of moral maturity. The morally mature individual is one who questions ethical rules and who, through self-reflection, recognizes herself as a potential source of wrongdoing. As a result of these arguments, we will identify rule-questioning, self-reflection, and locating wrongdoing in terms of one’s own agency as essential features of moral maturity. We will determine the essential characteristics of moral innocence by examining its positive attributes before establishing it as a negative counterpart to moral maturity.

Praxiology and the Reasons for Action, 2016

A recent distinction in the philosophy of action suggests that a dual-process model of moral cogn... more A recent distinction in the philosophy of action suggests that a dual-process model of moral cognition can make sense of a great deal of phenomena involving “belief-behavior mismatch”. In a series of articles, Tamar Szabó Gendler suggests that alongside beliefs there is a mental state called “aliefs” that can motivate an individual’s behavior. Although aliefs and beliefs often align with one another, under certain circumstances, an individual’s beliefs can conflict with her aliefs. In such cases it turns out that the aliefs are the trumping motivational force. This interesting psychological observation allows us to explain how it is possible for an individual to exhibit behavior that conflicts with her beliefs. In what follows I will show that if “aliefs” do appropriately refer to occurrent or dispositional mental states, then it becomes an especially noteworthy mental category in situations of moral import. It allows us to make ascriptions of moral responsibility even when, or especially when, an individual’s morally appropriate or inappropriate behavior conflicts with her settled moral beliefs. Yet, a worry immediately surfaces. Some might object that an individual cannot be morally responsible for her alief-motivated behavior insofar as, and as we shall see, it is automatic, implicit, and not subject to an individual’s direct and voluntary control. I reject this claim in two steps: first, I show that aliefs are in various ways closely connected to what an individual cares about. Second, I show that regarding their cares, individuals can have the appropriate kind of control necessary for ascriptions of moral responsibility. It follows from these conclusions that an individual’s behavior that is motivated by her aliefs and cares may be more telling about her moral character than her moral beliefs. Consequently, it may be more morally significant what a person cares about and alieves than believes.

Books by Zachary Goldberg

The book considers unresolved questions belonging to metaethical, normative, and practical characteristics of evil action. It begins by asking whether Kant’s historical account of evil is still relevant for contemporary thinkers. Then it addresses features of evil action that distinguish it from mundane wrongdoing, thereby placing it as a proper category of philosophical inquiry. Next, the author inquires into how evil acts affect moral relationships and challenge Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. He then draws conceptual and empirical connections between evil acts such as genocide, torture, and slavery and collective agency, and asks why evil acts are often collective acts. Finally, the author questions both the possibility and propriety of forgiveness and vengeance in the aftermath of evil and discusses how individuals ought to cope with the pervasiveness of evil in human interaction.

The Routledge International Handbook of Perpetrator Studies traces the growth of an important int... more The Routledge International Handbook of Perpetrator Studies traces the growth of an important interdisciplinary field, its foundations, key debates and core concerns, as well as highlighting current and emerging issues and approaches and pointing to new directions for enquiry. With a focus on the perpetrators of mass killings, political violence and genocide, the handbook is concerned with a range of issues relating to the figure of the perpetrator, from questions of definition, typology, and conceptual analysis, to the study of motivations and group dynamics to questions of guilt and responsibility, as well as representation and memory politics. Offering an overview of the field, its essential concepts and approaches, this foundational volume presents contemporary perspectives on longstanding debates and recent contributions to the field that significantly expand the theoretical, temporal, political, and geographical discussion of perpetrators and their representation through literature, film, and art. It points to emerging areas and future trends in the field, thus providing scholars with ideas or encouragement for future research activity. As such, It will appeal to scholars across a range of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, criminology, philosophy, memory studies, psychology, political science, literary studies, film studies, law, cultural studies and visual art.

CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2023

ACM WebSci, 2022

Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 1382), 2021

Über das Böse: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (ISBN: 978-3-495-49024-2), 2019

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66(6), 2018

Journal of Value Inquiry , 2018

Kantian Review, Sep 2017

Wozu ist das Böse gut? Mentis. ISBN: 9783957430502, 2016

Philosophia, 2015

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2015

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2014

Philosophical Forum, 2013

Southwest Philosophy Review, 2010

Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evil, 2019

Das Böse Erzählen: Perspektiven aus Philosophie, Film und Literatur, 2017

Reflections on Responsibility and Ethics: Essays in Honor of Peter A. French, 2017

Innocence Uncovered: Literary and Theological Perspectives, 2017

Praxiology and the Reasons for Action, 2016

With original contributions from: Maike Albertzart Carlos Gomez-Jara Diez John Martin Fischer/Ben... more With original contributions from:
Maike Albertzart
Carlos Gomez-Jara Diez
John Martin Fischer/Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin
Peter A. French
Zachary J. Goldberg
Ishtiyaque Haji
Virginia Held
Tracy Isaacs
Andrew Khory
Michael McKenna
William J. Morgan
Deborah Tollefsen
Margaret Urban Walker
Leo Zaibert

The term "evil" is used widely in ordinary language and yet philosophers have disagreed on what, ... more The term "evil" is used widely in ordinary language and yet philosophers have disagreed on what, if anything, distinguishes an evil act from a wrong act or an evil person from a bad one. Is "evil" a distinct and important moral category? Which agents and acts can and should be classified as "evil"? In which areas of practice does evil arise? These questions indicate three essential categories that belong to a thorough analysis of the concept of evil: meta-evil, the nature of evil, and applied evil. The articles presented in this volume provide insight into these categories.

Wozu ist das Böse gut?

Evil, "Evil", and Taking Responsibility: Employing the use-mention distinction produces two disti... more Evil, "Evil", and Taking Responsibility:
Employing the use-mention distinction produces two distinct questions: what good is the presence of evil in the world, and what good is the concept of evil as part of our ethical vocabulary describing human interaction. By severing any logical connections between evil and greater goods, we discover that the answer to the first question—what good is evil in the world—is none whatsoever. Furthermore, the basic rules of logical argumentation—the principles of parsimony and coherence—impel us to eschew the presumption of a moral order to the universe or claims that human nature is more fundamentally good than evil. Precisely for these reasons, the answer to the second formulation of the question—for what good is “evil”—is that it is absolutely crucial to a species of taking responsibility. Taking responsibility is the reflexive awareness of oneself as a moral agent interacting with other agents embedded in a world circumscribed by norms. Insofar as evil is a perpetual element of human interaction, being aware of this very fact is central to comprehending one’s moral agency, to appropriately reacting to others in the moral community, and to possibly inhibiting future incidents of evil.

The Philosophical Quarterly, Oct 20, 2014

conclusions. I suspect even Greene may not dispute this claim, and nothing in Tribes aims to meet... more conclusions. I suspect even Greene may not dispute this claim, and nothing in Tribes aims to meet this extreme version of the challenge. But there is another popular version of the challenge: no empirical results can do philosophical work in moral arguments. Throughout Moral Tribes Greene demonstrates successfully how empirical data about our moral brain and cognitive processing can be incorporated (with further normative premises) into arguments to achieve philosophical conclusions. Philosophers will likely agree that Moral Tribes is ambitious book. It is also an impressive one, weaving empirical work from psychology, evolutionary theory, economics, and neuroscience into a profound ethical argument. Remarkably, it offers a serious philosophical argument for an intelligent general readership. The book also deserves to gain traction in philosophical circles. As a comprehensive state of affairs of contemporary moral psychology it is a valuable resource, and the book offers worthy ethical arguments-from metaethics and normative ethics to moral psychology and practical ethics. Tribes recognizes its ambition, and I suspect that this is just the beginning of new debates in empirically informed moral philosophy.

Moving technology ethics at the forefront of society, organisations and governments, 2021, ISBN 978-84-09-28672-0, págs. 157-168, 2021

CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research - Zenodo, Sep 23, 2022

Kühl S. Ordinary Organizations. A System Theory Approach to Perpetrator Studies. In: Knittel S, G... more Kühl S. Ordinary Organizations. A System Theory Approach to Perpetrator Studies. In: Knittel S, Goldberg Z, eds. The Routledge International Handbook of Perpetrator Studies. London, New York: Routledge; 2019: 37-45

14th ACM Web Science Conference 2022

This workshop addresses successful approaches and challenges to assessing the ethical implication... more This workshop addresses successful approaches and challenges to assessing the ethical implications of artificial intelligence in policing. It is divided into three main streams: A) How to conduct an ethics assessment of AI in policing? B) Applying Explainable AI in a Policing Context; C) The Practicalities of Co-Design Between Police and Developers CCS CONCEPTS • Human-Centered Computing; • Human Computer Interaction; • Applied Computing; • Arts and Humanities; • Computing Methodologies; • Social and Professional Topics; • Human and Societal Aspects of Security and Privacy;

14th ACM Web Science Conference 2022

Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility, 2017

In this chapter, I examine Peter French’s account of moral evil and his claim that it ought to be... more In this chapter, I examine Peter French’s account of moral evil and his claim that it ought to be understood as a human action that jeopardizes another person’s (or group’s) aspirations to live a worthwhile life (or lives). In addition, French argues that a person’s life is worthwhile if what he or she really gives a damn about satisfies some condition(s) of value. Although I find French’s definition of moral evil to be correct, his account of what makes a life worthwhile is too demanding. In order to salvage his definition of evil, I offer an alternate definition of a worthwhile life. To this end, I shall examine the definitions of meaningful, ☻, valuable, and good lives while distinguishing each from a worthwhile life. Subsequently, I turn to a discussion of what does not make a life worthwhile and how this understanding helps us clarify the nature of evil.

Establishing a precise definition of moral innocence is a difficult task. Ordinarily philosophers... more Establishing a precise definition of moral innocence is a difficult task. Ordinarily philosophers explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of a term or concept in order to determine its meaning. Doing so with “moral innocence” proves difficult because the concept is mutable. The term is used in varying contexts to refer to ignorance, naiveté, sexual inexperience, legal and moral culpability, noncombatants in war, and moral purity. For our present purposes, we can exclude the contexts of law and war because they are too specialized to aid us in identifying the commonalities present in the more general uses of the term. Once we take the other common uses into consideration—ignorance, naiveté, and sexual inexperience—a shared feature surfaces. Each of these conditions of character or states of being is a mode of immaturity. Now we are impelled to ask: what are the qualities of this immaturity? More specifically, what are the features of moral immaturity? To answer this question, the first section of this chapter argues that moral innocence ought to be interpreted in terms of illusion and inability. The innocent hold certain illusions about the moral order that make them unable to engage in practices constitutive of the moral community. Specifically, the morally innocent falsely believe that a life of moral purity—that is, a life devoid of wrongdoing—is possible to achieve. This illusion is based on the following three elements characteristic of an immature and rudimentary understanding of moral interaction: the belief that human nature has only a propensity for goodness; the belief that following ethical rules is sufficient to avoid transgressing moral values; and, the inability to see oneself as a perpetual source of wrongdoing. The subsequent sections establish why each of these elements hinders the development of a realistic and mature moral acumen. We will proceed by examining the thought of two figures in the history of philosophy who have not previously been associated with the notion of moral innocence, and yet through the present analysis and interpretation can provide insight into its nature. First, Immanuel Kant’s theory of radical evil demonstrates that the human propensity to evil is so pervasive that it is, practically speaking, unavoidable. Therefore, to believe that one can avoid acting upon temptations to evil is self-deception. The final section engages in a thorough analysis of Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy and interprets it in a new way as a theory of moral maturity. The morally mature individual is one who questions ethical rules and who, through self-reflection, recognizes herself as a potential source of wrongdoing. As a result of these arguments, we will identify rule-questioning, self-reflection, and locating wrongdoing in terms of one’s own agency as essential features of moral maturity. We will determine the essential characteristics of moral innocence by examining its positive attributes before establishing it as a negative counterpart to moral maturity.

Wozu ist das Böse gut?, 2016

This book is an inquiry into particular matters concerning the nature, normativity, and aftermath... more This book is an inquiry into particular matters concerning the nature, normativity, and aftermath of evil action. It combines philosophical conceptual analysis with empirical studies in psychology and discussions of historical events to provide an innovative analysis of evil action. The book considers unresolved questions belonging to metaethical, normative, and practical characteristics of evil action. It begins by asking whether Kant's historical account of evil is still relevant for contemporary thinkers. Then it addresses features of evil action that distinguish it from mundane wrongdoing, thereby placing it as a proper category of philosophical inquiry. Next, the author inquires into how evil acts affect moral relationships and challenge Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. He then draws conceptual and empirical connections between evil acts such as genocide, torture, and slavery and collective agency, and asks why evil acts are often collective acts. Finally, the author questions both the possibility and propriety of forgiveness and vengeance in the aftermath of evil and discusses how individuals ought to cope with the pervasiveness of evil in human interaction.

This Thing of Darkness: Shedding Light on Evil, 2016

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2019

What is the nature of evil action? My thesis is that perpetrators and victims of evil inhabit an ... more What is the nature of evil action? My thesis is that perpetrators and victims of evil inhabit an asymmetrical relation of power; the strength of the more powerful party lies in its ability to exploit the other’s fundamental vulnerability, and the weaker party is vulnerable precisely insofar as it is directly dependent on the more powerful party for the satisfaction of its fundamental needs. The fundamental vulnerabilities that are exploited correspond to features essential to our humanity (ontological), moral personhood (personal), and individuality (characteristic). These kinds of vulnerabilities are both constituted by and engender fundamental needs and give rise to direct dependencies on others to satisfy or to refrain from interfering with the satisfaction of fundamental needs. The unambiguous exploitation by the more powerful agent on whom the vulnerable directly depend is characteristic of evil action. Although I do not claim that the exploitation of ontological, personal, and...

Kantian Review, 2017

Philosophia, 2015

The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, li... more The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In spite of, or perhaps because of this frequency of use the characterization of moral innocence continues to have varying connotations. As a result, the concept is often used without sufficient heed given to some of its most salient attributes, especially those germane to moral agency and the moral community. In this article I intend to identify these attributes and propose that moral innocence is best defined as an inability to enter the moral community as a result of a trust in moral illusions. The content of the illusions pertains to several factors including one's role(s) in the moral community, one's ability to wrong or harm others, the intricacies of one's moral interaction with others, and the corresponding manifold complexities tangled up with the concepts of good and evil. Maintaining these illusions impedes or even prohibits an appropriate exchange of praise and blame with others. As membership in the moral community requires precisely this ability to engage in such an exchange, moral illusions necessarily give rise to an inability to participate in the moral community. Keywords Moral innocence. Moral community. Moral illusion. Moral imagination. Moral agency. Responsibility The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. 1 The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In many literary and religious contexts, moral innocence is associated with sexual innocence and is considered an attribute that an individual should try not to lose, or should try and regain. In spite of, or perhaps because of this Philosophia

The appetite for space mining is growing and the corresponding legislation is mushrooming, but ma... more The appetite for space mining is growing and the corresponding legislation is mushrooming, but mainly at a national level. Beyond questions of law, questions emerging from the field of environmental ethics take on an engaging significance concerning mining in space.

Intelligence is inherently neither good nor bad, it can be used in improper ways-even unintention... more Intelligence is inherently neither good nor bad, it can be used in improper ways-even unintentionally-causing significant harm and infringing on fundamental rights, but it also holds great promise to promote individual wellbeing and solve societal problems. The development and use of AI require ethical values to ensure that AI tools are developed and used for societal good, to identify bias and mitigate any corresponding discriminatory effects, and to enhance rather than replace human decision making. Ethics unleashes the power of AI to help solve societal issues in a trustworthy way.

Although we can't yet be certain that space is the final frontier, it is without question the nex... more Although we can't yet be certain that space is the final frontier, it is without question the next one. Human space flight and the exploration of space has fascinated the human imagination for millennia. From the myth of Icarus to Jules Verne's From the Earth to the Moon, we imagined what it would be like to fly near the sun or to explore the moon long before our technology could get us there.

Most of us don't spend a single day without using an artificially intelligent (AI) technology or ... more Most of us don't spend a single day without using an artificially intelligent (AI) technology or AI-enhanced device. AI appears in our phones, music and TV streaming platforms, smart homes, classrooms and offices. It powers financial services, creates personalized advertisements, predicts the weather and is used in road, railway and aviation transport. It is used for policing and security purposes, and even in outer space. As a technology that impacts almost every aspect of our lives and wellbeing, AI tools require robust ethical assessments to determine their potential for promoting as well as transgressing our ethical values, societal values, fundamental rights and human rights.