alinda alinda - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by alinda alinda

Research paper thumbnail of Encoding the levels of information in pictures and words

Journal of Experimental Psychology-general, 1976

From a levels-of-processing framework (e.g., , we derive the idea that the levels of information ... more From a levels-of-processing framework (e.g., , we derive the idea that the levels of information implicit in a stimulus, such as its physical configuration, its name, and the category to which it belongs, may become available for subsequent processing at different times after stimulus onset. In particular, tasks which allow the use of physical codes should be performed more rapidly than those which require "deeper" information. There are two important implications here: The first is that the ability to use a code does not mean that that code has been "matched to" a representation in memory. The second is that "depth" effects (i.e., physical < name < conceptual) should be demonstrable within both pictorial and verbal materials. The approach as a whole may be contrasted with current dualcoding approaches (e.g., Paivio, Note 1), which, while they allow for different levels of meaning in both verbal and imaginal symbolic systems, seem forced to assume that certain types of conceptual information are more easily accommodated within the verbal system. This leads to the prediction that some kinds of conceptual information will not be directly available from pictures, but must instead become available to the subject via an interaction between the symbolic systems.

Research paper thumbnail of Framing pictures: The role of knowledge in automatized encoding and memory for gist

Journal of Experimental Psychology-general, 1979

In general, frame theories are theories about the representation and use of knowledge for pattern... more In general, frame theories are theories about the representation and use of knowledge for pattern recognition. In the present article, the general properties of frame theories are discussed with regard to their implications for psychological processes, and an experiment is presented which tests whether this approach yields viable predictions about the manner in which people comprehend and remember pictures of real-world scenes. Normative ratings were used to construct six target pictures, each of which contained both expected and unexpected objects. Eye movements were then recorded as subjects who anticipated a difficult recognition test viewed the targets for 30 sec each. Then, the subjects were asked to discriminate the target pictures from distractors in which either expected or unexpected objects had been changed. One consequence of the embeddedness of frame systems is that global frames may function as &quot;semantic pattern detectors,&quot; so that the perceptual knowledge in them could be used for relatively automatic pattern recognition and comprehension. Thus, subjects might be able to identify expected objects by using automatized encoding procedures that operate on global physical features. In contrast, identification of unexpected objects (i.e., objects not represented in the currently active frame) should generally require more analysis of local visual details. These hypotheses were confirmed with the fixation duration data: First fixations to the unexpected objects were approximately twice as long as first fixations to the expected objects. On the recognition test, subjects generally noticed only the changes that had been made to the unexpected objects, despite the fact that the proportions of correct rejections were made conditional on whether the target objects had been fixated. These data are again consistent with the idea that local visual details of objects represented in the frame are not neccesary for identification and are thus not generally encoded. Further, since subjects usually did not notice when expected objects were deleted or replaced with different expected objects, it was concluded that if two events instantiate the same frame, they may often be indistinguishable, as long as any differences between them are represented as arguments in the frame. Thus, for the most part, the only information about an event that is episodically &quot;tagged&quot; is information which distinguishes that particular event from others of the same general class. The data reinforce the utility of a frame theory approach to perception and memory.

Research paper thumbnail of Encoding the levels of information in pictures and words

Journal of Experimental Psychology-general, 1976

From a levels-of-processing framework (e.g., , we derive the idea that the levels of information ... more From a levels-of-processing framework (e.g., , we derive the idea that the levels of information implicit in a stimulus, such as its physical configuration, its name, and the category to which it belongs, may become available for subsequent processing at different times after stimulus onset. In particular, tasks which allow the use of physical codes should be performed more rapidly than those which require "deeper" information. There are two important implications here: The first is that the ability to use a code does not mean that that code has been "matched to" a representation in memory. The second is that "depth" effects (i.e., physical < name < conceptual) should be demonstrable within both pictorial and verbal materials. The approach as a whole may be contrasted with current dualcoding approaches (e.g., Paivio, Note 1), which, while they allow for different levels of meaning in both verbal and imaginal symbolic systems, seem forced to assume that certain types of conceptual information are more easily accommodated within the verbal system. This leads to the prediction that some kinds of conceptual information will not be directly available from pictures, but must instead become available to the subject via an interaction between the symbolic systems.

Research paper thumbnail of Framing pictures: The role of knowledge in automatized encoding and memory for gist

Journal of Experimental Psychology-general, 1979

In general, frame theories are theories about the representation and use of knowledge for pattern... more In general, frame theories are theories about the representation and use of knowledge for pattern recognition. In the present article, the general properties of frame theories are discussed with regard to their implications for psychological processes, and an experiment is presented which tests whether this approach yields viable predictions about the manner in which people comprehend and remember pictures of real-world scenes. Normative ratings were used to construct six target pictures, each of which contained both expected and unexpected objects. Eye movements were then recorded as subjects who anticipated a difficult recognition test viewed the targets for 30 sec each. Then, the subjects were asked to discriminate the target pictures from distractors in which either expected or unexpected objects had been changed. One consequence of the embeddedness of frame systems is that global frames may function as &quot;semantic pattern detectors,&quot; so that the perceptual knowledge in them could be used for relatively automatic pattern recognition and comprehension. Thus, subjects might be able to identify expected objects by using automatized encoding procedures that operate on global physical features. In contrast, identification of unexpected objects (i.e., objects not represented in the currently active frame) should generally require more analysis of local visual details. These hypotheses were confirmed with the fixation duration data: First fixations to the unexpected objects were approximately twice as long as first fixations to the expected objects. On the recognition test, subjects generally noticed only the changes that had been made to the unexpected objects, despite the fact that the proportions of correct rejections were made conditional on whether the target objects had been fixated. These data are again consistent with the idea that local visual details of objects represented in the frame are not neccesary for identification and are thus not generally encoded. Further, since subjects usually did not notice when expected objects were deleted or replaced with different expected objects, it was concluded that if two events instantiate the same frame, they may often be indistinguishable, as long as any differences between them are represented as arguments in the frame. Thus, for the most part, the only information about an event that is episodically &quot;tagged&quot; is information which distinguishes that particular event from others of the same general class. The data reinforce the utility of a frame theory approach to perception and memory.