songying fang - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by songying fang
British Journal of Political Science / FirstView Article / August 2015, pp 1 21 DOI: 10.1017/S000... more British Journal of Political Science / FirstView Article / August 2015, pp 1 21 DOI: 10.1017/S0007123415000216, Published online: 28 July 2015 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123415000216 How to cite this article: Terrence Chapman, Songying Fang, Xin Li and Randall W. Stone Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets. British Journal of Political Science, Available on CJO 2015 doi:10.1017/ S0007123415000216 Request Permissions : Click here
International Studies Quarterly, 2014
There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce importa... more There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce important elements of the status quo than they are to propel post-conflict states toward a liberal democracy. In contrast to existing theories that focus on the resources available to peacebuilders or the degree of damage caused by the war to explain the outcome, we highlight the interaction between international and domestic actors. Specifically, we conceive of peacebuilding as a strategic process involving peacebuilders, a postwar government, and other local elites. The equilibrium results show that this process typically concludes in a compromised peacebuilding outcome. This is not surprising when the policy preferences of the actors diverge, but the results also hold when domestic elites prefer a liberal democracy to the status quo. Why? Primarily, because postwar governments are rewarded by relatively impatient peacebuilders with more resources than they would otherwise receive. Additionally, if there exists a secondary elite with veto power, a compromised outcome becomes even more likely. We illustrate these findings with reference to post-1989 peacebuilding operations. Although peacebuilding might not work as it is intended, in the conclusion, we argue that it is better than the alternatives and propose a more realistic measure of peacebuilding success.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
Political Science Research and Methods
Is it possible for international organizations to persuade governments to adopt policy recommenda... more Is it possible for international organizations to persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information? If so, under what conditions? In this study we develop a game theoretic model of persuasion that applies to all types of governments, including those that do not face domestic constituency constraints. In our model persuasion takes place on two levels. First, the international institution can send a credible signal about a crisis and prompt the government to take an action in response, and second, it can direct the government's attention to domestic experts and make their expertise policy relevant. The condition under which this effect can take place is that there is a preference difference between the IO and domestic experts, and that the institution holds the more moderate policy position. In such cases, the IO will truthfully reveal its information, thus building trust with the government, and the government will condition its policy on the IO's information. The results suggest that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for international organizations to exert effective influence.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019
In recent years, Beijing has significantly increased its support for UN peacekeeping operations (... more In recent years, Beijing has significantly increased its support for UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). Of the five permanent members of the Security Council, China is currently the largest troop-contributing country and the second-largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. What is the view of the Chinese public on its country's involvement in peacekeeping operations? We investigate the question using a public opinion survey experiment conducted in China. Our main findings are, first, that respondents showed a high level of support generally for China's participation in peacekeeping operations but highest of all when China performed a leadership role. Secondly, China's particular interest in a host country did not affect the degree of public support for China's involvement; however, respondents did perceive broad benefits to China's international reputation from such activities. Thirdly, although there was a similar level of support for China's participation in peacekeeping whether the mission was authorised by the United Nations or by the African Union, neither was seen as a substitute for host state consent. Finally, respondents generally preferred China to make personnel (military and police) contributions in addition to financial contributions. These findings provide important insights into the domestic motivations for Beijing's future peacekeeping policy and attendant constraints in this regard.
In this paper, we study the dynamics of alliances in a world of anarchy by taking states' ou... more In this paper, we study the dynamics of alliances in a world of anarchy by taking states' outside options seriously. We investigate how the existence of outside options afiects the decision of producing a collective good within an existing alliance. Our analysis shows that anarchy plays an important role in mitigating the incentive to free- ride on alliance partners, and that the incentive to invest political capital in an alliance arises endogenously. Additionally, we show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the cost of searching for a new ally and the probability of breaking the old alliance and forming a new one.
There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce importa... more There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce important elements of the status quo than they are to propel post-conflict states toward a liberal democracy. In contrast to existing theories that focus on the resources available to peacebuilders or the degree of damage caused by the war to explain the outcome, we highlight the interaction between international and domestic actors. Specifically, we conceive of peacebuilding as a strategic process involving peacebuilders, a postwar government, and other local elites. The equilibrium results show that this process typically concludes in a compromised peacebuilding outcome. This is not surprising when the policy preferences of the actors diverge, but the results also hold when domestic elites prefer a liberal democracy to the status quo. Why? Primarily, because postwar governments are rewarded by relatively impatient peacebuilders with more resources than they would otherwise receive. Additional...
Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ... more Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents’ perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline poli...
International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis
This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations (UN)... more This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1990 as a result of China’s changing national interests. We conclude that China is unlikely to abandon its long-held foreign policy principle of non-interference. However, motivated by a desire to be seen as a responsible global power, Beijing is seriously considering a more proactive approach to humanitarian crises, which may include direct intervention. Furthermore, as a significant contributor of troops and financing, China is uniquely positioned to represent the perspectives of both developing and developed countries in UN peacekeeping. To do so, Beijing will need to increase its leadership role in UN peacekeeping operations and offer creative ideas about how to promote reconciliation and development in post-conflict societies.
The Journal of Politics
Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical o... more Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical ownership by at least one side of a dispute. Why does historical ownership lead to more hardened bargaining stances than in other territorial disputes? Do such uncompromising positions lead to more military conflict? We investigate these questions in this study. After developing a theoretical argument for how historical ownership may lead to a perception of territorial indivisibility, we test the hypotheses derived from the theory with a survey experiment implemented in China. We find that a historical ownership treatment increases the number of respondents who view the indivisible outcome of a hypothetical dispute as the only acceptable outcome. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military solutions to the dispute, and much less likely to support bilateral negotiation or arbitration by an international organization.
Complex peacebuilding operations are reasonably successful at ending violence, but not as success... more Complex peacebuilding operations are reasonably successful at ending violence, but not as successful at their stated goal of removing the root causes of conict and promot- ing a positive peace. What explains the failure? In this paper we develop a bargaining model to explain why there is a tendency that the peacebuilding outcome gravitates toward a compromised peacebuilding. Specically, we argue that compromised peace- building, in most post-conict situations, is the best outcome that can be achieved by peacebuilders because of the strategic interactions between the peacebuilders and the local elites. In severe cases compromised peacebuilding can lead to a ceremonial liber- alization { imparting the symbols of liberal democracy but masking the substance of an illiberal order. We illustrate our argument in the case of Afghanistan after September 2001. We conclude by considering the implications of our model for how to increase the chance that a contract will be accepted by local elit...
British Journal of Political Science, 2015
The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depe... more The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depends on the lender’s political motivations. There are conditions under which lending reduces the risk of a deepening crisis and the risk premium demanded by market actors. Yet the political interests that make lenders willing to lend may weaken the credibility of commitments to reform, and the act of accepting an agreement reveals unfavorable information about the state of the borrower’s economy. The net ‘catalytic’ effect on the price of private borrowing depends on whether these effects dominate the beneficial effects of the liquidity the loan provides. Decomposing the contradictory effects of crisis lending provides an explanation for the discrepant empirical findings in the literature about market reactions. This study tests the implications of the theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to lo...
Abstract We develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden-sharing in nonbindi... more Abstract We develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden-sharing in nonbinding alliance agreements. The analysis provides an explanation for the variance in ally contributions to NATO over time and why the post-Cold War period has seen an increase in the use of coalitions of the willing. Additionally, our analysis reveals something of an initiator’s disadvantage in
How do geopolitical forces influence international capital markets? In particular, do market acto... more How do geopolitical forces influence international capital markets? In particular, do market actors condition their responses to crisis lending initiatives on the political incentives of major lenders? We analyze a formal model which demonstrates that the effect of crisis lending announcements on international investment flows is conditional on how market actors interpret the political and economic motivations behind lending decisions on the part of the lender and borrower. If investors believe the decision to accept crisis lending is a sign of economic weakness and lending decisions are influenced by the political interests of the major donor countries, then crisis lending may not reduce borrowing costs or quell fears of international investors. On the other hand, if market actors believe that crisis lending programs, and attendant austerity conditions, will significantly reduce the risk of a financial crisis, they may respond with increased private investment, creating a "catalytic effect." In our model, the political biases of key lending countries can affect the inferences market actors draw, because some sovereign lenders have strategic interests in ensuring that certain borrowing countries do not collapse under the strain of economic crisis. Although our theory applies to multiple types of crisis lending, it helps explain discrepant empirical findings about market reactions to IMF programs. We test the implications of our theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to loans, and measures of the geopolitical interests of the United States, a key IMF principal.
Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 2014
The ongoing democratic movements and civil wars in the Middle East have challenged the stability ... more The ongoing democratic movements and civil wars in the Middle East have challenged the stability of regimes across the region. On the other hand, the commercial exploitation of large reserves of unconventional oil and gas in the United States is poised to significantly change the current equilibrium in energy markets. What are the implications of these developments on Saudi Arabia's energy policy? Will the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance remain the cornerstone of the kingdom's relationship with the outside world? We study these questions using a game-theoretic approach. Specifically, we investigate whether the new political and economic trends may warm the Saudi regime to a workable energy cartel with Russia. We analyze the outcomes from different coalitions that could form among major energy suppliers and show that this is indeed a possibility. We discuss the implications of our results for U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia.
British Journal of Political Science / FirstView Article / August 2015, pp 1 21 DOI: 10.1017/S000... more British Journal of Political Science / FirstView Article / August 2015, pp 1 21 DOI: 10.1017/S0007123415000216, Published online: 28 July 2015 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123415000216 How to cite this article: Terrence Chapman, Songying Fang, Xin Li and Randall W. Stone Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets. British Journal of Political Science, Available on CJO 2015 doi:10.1017/ S0007123415000216 Request Permissions : Click here
International Studies Quarterly, 2014
There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce importa... more There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce important elements of the status quo than they are to propel post-conflict states toward a liberal democracy. In contrast to existing theories that focus on the resources available to peacebuilders or the degree of damage caused by the war to explain the outcome, we highlight the interaction between international and domestic actors. Specifically, we conceive of peacebuilding as a strategic process involving peacebuilders, a postwar government, and other local elites. The equilibrium results show that this process typically concludes in a compromised peacebuilding outcome. This is not surprising when the policy preferences of the actors diverge, but the results also hold when domestic elites prefer a liberal democracy to the status quo. Why? Primarily, because postwar governments are rewarded by relatively impatient peacebuilders with more resources than they would otherwise receive. Additionally, if there exists a secondary elite with veto power, a compromised outcome becomes even more likely. We illustrate these findings with reference to post-1989 peacebuilding operations. Although peacebuilding might not work as it is intended, in the conclusion, we argue that it is better than the alternatives and propose a more realistic measure of peacebuilding success.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
Political Science Research and Methods
Is it possible for international organizations to persuade governments to adopt policy recommenda... more Is it possible for international organizations to persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information? If so, under what conditions? In this study we develop a game theoretic model of persuasion that applies to all types of governments, including those that do not face domestic constituency constraints. In our model persuasion takes place on two levels. First, the international institution can send a credible signal about a crisis and prompt the government to take an action in response, and second, it can direct the government's attention to domestic experts and make their expertise policy relevant. The condition under which this effect can take place is that there is a preference difference between the IO and domestic experts, and that the institution holds the more moderate policy position. In such cases, the IO will truthfully reveal its information, thus building trust with the government, and the government will condition its policy on the IO's information. The results suggest that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for international organizations to exert effective influence.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019
In recent years, Beijing has significantly increased its support for UN peacekeeping operations (... more In recent years, Beijing has significantly increased its support for UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). Of the five permanent members of the Security Council, China is currently the largest troop-contributing country and the second-largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. What is the view of the Chinese public on its country's involvement in peacekeeping operations? We investigate the question using a public opinion survey experiment conducted in China. Our main findings are, first, that respondents showed a high level of support generally for China's participation in peacekeeping operations but highest of all when China performed a leadership role. Secondly, China's particular interest in a host country did not affect the degree of public support for China's involvement; however, respondents did perceive broad benefits to China's international reputation from such activities. Thirdly, although there was a similar level of support for China's participation in peacekeeping whether the mission was authorised by the United Nations or by the African Union, neither was seen as a substitute for host state consent. Finally, respondents generally preferred China to make personnel (military and police) contributions in addition to financial contributions. These findings provide important insights into the domestic motivations for Beijing's future peacekeeping policy and attendant constraints in this regard.
In this paper, we study the dynamics of alliances in a world of anarchy by taking states' ou... more In this paper, we study the dynamics of alliances in a world of anarchy by taking states' outside options seriously. We investigate how the existence of outside options afiects the decision of producing a collective good within an existing alliance. Our analysis shows that anarchy plays an important role in mitigating the incentive to free- ride on alliance partners, and that the incentive to invest political capital in an alliance arises endogenously. Additionally, we show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the cost of searching for a new ally and the probability of breaking the old alliance and forming a new one.
There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce importa... more There is considerable evidence that peacebuilding operations are more likely to reproduce important elements of the status quo than they are to propel post-conflict states toward a liberal democracy. In contrast to existing theories that focus on the resources available to peacebuilders or the degree of damage caused by the war to explain the outcome, we highlight the interaction between international and domestic actors. Specifically, we conceive of peacebuilding as a strategic process involving peacebuilders, a postwar government, and other local elites. The equilibrium results show that this process typically concludes in a compromised peacebuilding outcome. This is not surprising when the policy preferences of the actors diverge, but the results also hold when domestic elites prefer a liberal democracy to the status quo. Why? Primarily, because postwar governments are rewarded by relatively impatient peacebuilders with more resources than they would otherwise receive. Additional...
Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ... more Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents’ perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline poli...
International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis
This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations (UN)... more This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1990 as a result of China’s changing national interests. We conclude that China is unlikely to abandon its long-held foreign policy principle of non-interference. However, motivated by a desire to be seen as a responsible global power, Beijing is seriously considering a more proactive approach to humanitarian crises, which may include direct intervention. Furthermore, as a significant contributor of troops and financing, China is uniquely positioned to represent the perspectives of both developing and developed countries in UN peacekeeping. To do so, Beijing will need to increase its leadership role in UN peacekeeping operations and offer creative ideas about how to promote reconciliation and development in post-conflict societies.
The Journal of Politics
Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical o... more Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical ownership by at least one side of a dispute. Why does historical ownership lead to more hardened bargaining stances than in other territorial disputes? Do such uncompromising positions lead to more military conflict? We investigate these questions in this study. After developing a theoretical argument for how historical ownership may lead to a perception of territorial indivisibility, we test the hypotheses derived from the theory with a survey experiment implemented in China. We find that a historical ownership treatment increases the number of respondents who view the indivisible outcome of a hypothetical dispute as the only acceptable outcome. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military solutions to the dispute, and much less likely to support bilateral negotiation or arbitration by an international organization.
Complex peacebuilding operations are reasonably successful at ending violence, but not as success... more Complex peacebuilding operations are reasonably successful at ending violence, but not as successful at their stated goal of removing the root causes of conict and promot- ing a positive peace. What explains the failure? In this paper we develop a bargaining model to explain why there is a tendency that the peacebuilding outcome gravitates toward a compromised peacebuilding. Specically, we argue that compromised peace- building, in most post-conict situations, is the best outcome that can be achieved by peacebuilders because of the strategic interactions between the peacebuilders and the local elites. In severe cases compromised peacebuilding can lead to a ceremonial liber- alization { imparting the symbols of liberal democracy but masking the substance of an illiberal order. We illustrate our argument in the case of Afghanistan after September 2001. We conclude by considering the implications of our model for how to increase the chance that a contract will be accepted by local elit...
British Journal of Political Science, 2015
The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depe... more The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depends on the lender’s political motivations. There are conditions under which lending reduces the risk of a deepening crisis and the risk premium demanded by market actors. Yet the political interests that make lenders willing to lend may weaken the credibility of commitments to reform, and the act of accepting an agreement reveals unfavorable information about the state of the borrower’s economy. The net ‘catalytic’ effect on the price of private borrowing depends on whether these effects dominate the beneficial effects of the liquidity the loan provides. Decomposing the contradictory effects of crisis lending provides an explanation for the discrepant empirical findings in the literature about market reactions. This study tests the implications of the theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to lo...
Abstract We develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden-sharing in nonbindi... more Abstract We develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden-sharing in nonbinding alliance agreements. The analysis provides an explanation for the variance in ally contributions to NATO over time and why the post-Cold War period has seen an increase in the use of coalitions of the willing. Additionally, our analysis reveals something of an initiator’s disadvantage in
How do geopolitical forces influence international capital markets? In particular, do market acto... more How do geopolitical forces influence international capital markets? In particular, do market actors condition their responses to crisis lending initiatives on the political incentives of major lenders? We analyze a formal model which demonstrates that the effect of crisis lending announcements on international investment flows is conditional on how market actors interpret the political and economic motivations behind lending decisions on the part of the lender and borrower. If investors believe the decision to accept crisis lending is a sign of economic weakness and lending decisions are influenced by the political interests of the major donor countries, then crisis lending may not reduce borrowing costs or quell fears of international investors. On the other hand, if market actors believe that crisis lending programs, and attendant austerity conditions, will significantly reduce the risk of a financial crisis, they may respond with increased private investment, creating a "catalytic effect." In our model, the political biases of key lending countries can affect the inferences market actors draw, because some sovereign lenders have strategic interests in ensuring that certain borrowing countries do not collapse under the strain of economic crisis. Although our theory applies to multiple types of crisis lending, it helps explain discrepant empirical findings about market reactions to IMF programs. We test the implications of our theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to loans, and measures of the geopolitical interests of the United States, a key IMF principal.
Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 2014
The ongoing democratic movements and civil wars in the Middle East have challenged the stability ... more The ongoing democratic movements and civil wars in the Middle East have challenged the stability of regimes across the region. On the other hand, the commercial exploitation of large reserves of unconventional oil and gas in the United States is poised to significantly change the current equilibrium in energy markets. What are the implications of these developments on Saudi Arabia's energy policy? Will the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance remain the cornerstone of the kingdom's relationship with the outside world? We study these questions using a game-theoretic approach. Specifically, we investigate whether the new political and economic trends may warm the Saudi regime to a workable energy cartel with Russia. We analyze the outcomes from different coalitions that could form among major energy suppliers and show that this is indeed a possibility. We discuss the implications of our results for U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia.