ottorino chillemi - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by ottorino chillemi

We model at a micro level farms' survival in Veneto Region (Italy) for the period 1999-2004. We u... more We model at a micro level farms' survival in Veneto Region (Italy) for the period 1999-2004. We use a new database which links information on survival histories contained in the Official Registers of the Chamber of Commerce with information on socioeconomic and structural characteristics of farms and farmers collected in the 2000 Census of Agriculture. First, we consider the cohort of farms born in year 1999, then we extend the analysis to all farms registered at the end of year 1999. We find that the model performs quite well in selecting farms with a high probability of survival.

The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, 2000

Continuing interaction with the same partners may ensure greater joint surplus than switching to ... more Continuing interaction with the same partners may ensure greater joint surplus than switching to new partners. When this is so, one can say that past history has led to the accumulation of relation-specific assets, and economic analysis of the relationship boils down to studying the creation and exploitation of such assets. Indeed, bargaining costs may dissipate part of their potential returns, and correspondingly reduce the value of the assets themselves. Furthermore, in an ex ante perspective, investment costs are also to be accounted for, so surplus maximization is subject to even stricter individual incentive compatibility constraints.

A large population plays a two-period sequential common agency game. Agents are long lived, while... more A large population plays a two-period sequential common agency game. Agents are long lived, while principals are short lived. Preferences and technology are additively separable in time and time independent. At the onset, agents are matched in pairs under private information of individual types. At the end of the first period, in each pair the principal can disclose members' reports, in which case members remain together in the second period, or conceal information, in which case members are randomly rematched and in the second period their type remains private information. We show that an equilibrium exists in which information disclosure is e!ciency enhancing. Remarkably, information disclosure would have zero value if reassembling agent pairs was not an option, as in the standard one agency literature.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006

The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a... more The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups affects efficiency and group stability. The paper expands on existing literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown that such enlargement of profitable options prevents group stabilization in the single group case. Stabilization can be obtained with many groups, but its driver is not the efficiency gain due to the presence of cooperative individuals. Rather, stabilization is the result of free riding opportunities.

Advances in Economic Design, 2003

The paper examines auctions in which some bidders may have interest linkages with other bidders. ... more The paper examines auctions in which some bidders may have interest linkages with other bidders. First, it is shown that interest linkages damage the seller in the first-price sealed-bid auction; moreover, bidders’ surplus may be impaired by the seller’s strategic reaction. Then, the revenue-maximizing procedure is characterized, under the assumption that the participation constraint requires a bidder’s total payoff to be non-negative. In sharp contrast to the above results, both the seller’s revenue and joint surplus increase according to the intensity of linkage among the bidders.

We study a contractual design problem between a seller and a buyer where some information correla... more We study a contractual design problem between a seller and a buyer where some information correlated with the buyer's valuation is publicly observed ex-post and the allocation, but not payments, can be made contingent on it. Our analysis shows that, to maximize her profit, the seller should offer one contract in which the good is transferred to the buyer only if the ex-post signal turns out to be bad; this generates inefficient rationing: some buyers with low valuation are assigned the good more often than others with higher valuation. We show that, in contrast with previous results, the optimal contract may decrease social welfare relative to the case in which no signal is available (or it is not used). We apply our model to interpret two real-world situations: internet plans with bandwidth caps for mobile phones and promotion schemes in organizations with exogenously fixed wages.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011

We study the e¤ect on cost overruns of auction formats (average bid as opposed to …rst price rule... more We study the e¤ect on cost overruns of auction formats (average bid as opposed to …rst price rule) conditional on the entry mechanisms (open as opposed to restricted participation). The dataset is a panel of auctions held in the Italian Veneto region between 2004 and 2006. It includes small size public projects (with reserve price up to one million euros) in such sectors as road works and building maintenance. It is commonly believed that cost overruns are lower under average bid auctions relative to …rst price auctions. We …nd support to this belief only when participation to the auction is restricted.

Journal of Labor Economics, 1997

ABSTRACT The authors discuss the concept of &#39;team human capital&#39; and stud... more ABSTRACT The authors discuss the concept of &#39;team human capital&#39; and study the renegotiation of labor compensation after team members privately observe their own reservation wage. As labor productivity can only be high if the number of quits does not exceed a threshold, decisions concerning acceptance of individual wage demands become interdependent. When a team is made up of salaried workers, a peculiar case of efficiency wage results. Moreover, inefficient team dissolution may occur. The authors then show that inefficiency is less likely to occur when team members form a partnership. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Agribusiness, 2010

Economics Letters, 2020

This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the ad... more This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Information Economics and Policy, 2019

We study the properties of simple mobile broadband Internet plans characterized by a data cap and... more We study the properties of simple mobile broadband Internet plans characterized by a data cap and an up-front price. Assuming demand uncertainty and a positive correlation between users' valuations and (expected) demands, we show that a monopolistic provider does always find it convenient to offer one plan with binding cap together with an unlimited one. We characterize all the elements of the profitmaximizing plans, showing that medium users, but not heavy users, will incur the risk of being capped, and that, relative to the benchmark case of unlimited access only, the introduction of a plan with cap leads to a redistribution of surplus from high users to low users. The overall effect on social welfare and users' surplus is, in general, ambiguous, but is certainly negative if low valuation users have a sufficiently homogeneous demand for Internet traffic.

International Journal of Game Theory, 2016

A large population of fixed-type agents engage in exclusive pairwise relationships in a decentral... more A large population of fixed-type agents engage in exclusive pairwise relationships in a decentralized setting. At the onset, agents randomly meet in pairs under private information of individual time-invariant types. They play a voluntary contribution game. At the end of the first period, members of each pair either stay together in the second period, in which case reported information is common knowledge, or quit and meet randomly new partners, under private information of individual types. Thus, either long-term or short-term relationships may arise. We show that there are values of the parameters such that information extracted in the first period has a positive effect on social efficiency. We give an interpretation of our results in terms of advantageous delegation of decisions to uninformed agents. Finally, we consider several extensions of the model in which our results still hold.

Journal of Comparative Economics, 1992

Chillemi, Ottorino, and Gui, Benedetto-On the Performance of Worker-Managed Firms: Does Participa... more Chillemi, Ottorino, and Gui, Benedetto-On the Performance of Worker-Managed Firms: Does Participation Only Exert "Technical" Effects? We consider those studies of worker-managed firms that estimate production functions augmented to include indexes of worker participation. We argue that, when output is measured by value added, participation can affect output not only via technical effects, as usually interpreted, but also via distinct economic effects. We formalize a situation in which the choice of product type and the expected profitability of the firm depend on the amount of collective reserves and the proportion of workers that are members.

Economic Theory, 2013

We study the optimal procurement mechanism when contract breach and abandoning a project may be e... more We study the optimal procurement mechanism when contract breach and abandoning a project may be efficient, either because of completion costs higher than anticipated, or new and more lucrative opportunities for the contractor. When contractors have private information about their costs, the procurer finds it optimal to set damages above expectation damages. There is a lock-in effect, or status-quo bias; the agent that has won the award will complete the project even in situations when it would be efficient to abandon it. If the cost types of all agents are above a threshold, the optimal bidding procedure assigns the project by lottery. The optimal mechanism cannot be implemented by standard auction formats. However, the larger the number of agents bidding for the project, the closer auctions with a liquidated damage clause approximate the optimal mechanism.

European Journal of Political Economy, 2013

We study the effect on cost overruns of two different auction formats, the first price sealed bid... more We study the effect on cost overruns of two different auction formats, the first price sealed bid and the average bid, conditional on whether entry is open or restricted. The first price format awards the contract to the lowest bid, while the average bid format awards the contract to the bid closest to the average of all the bids. This latter format is supposed to prevent an unreliable low bidder from winning the auction; as a consequence cost overruns should be lower under the average bid than under the first price format. We test this hypothesis with a panel data set of auctions held in the Italian Veneto region between 2004 and 2006, including small size public projects in sectors such as road works and building maintenance. We find that cost overruns are lower under the average bid format, but only when the entry is restricted. We then speculate on possible explanations for this result.

Economics Letters, 1991

Abstract When product quality is unobservable before purchase, the equilibrium price may be ineff... more Abstract When product quality is unobservable before purchase, the equilibrium price may be inefficiently high in order to signal high quality. We present a reputation model where under reasonable assumption nonprofit organizations can credibly charge lower prices than for-profit organizations.