shaun bowler - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by shaun bowler
The Journal of Legislative Studies, 2017
The Mexican Constitution, in the Poder Legislativo, grants state legislatures the authority to in... more The Mexican Constitution, in the Poder Legislativo, grants state legislatures the authority to introduce legislation (iniciativas de ley) in the federal congress. In this paper the authors examine this powerful mechanism through which the Mexican state legislatures can directly influence policymaking at the federal level. Using a new data set of state-led initiatives, this work: describes the frequency with which iniciativas are introduced; describes the substance, timing, and final disposition of these state-led initiatives; and explains which factors affect the probability of presenting a state-led initiative. The authors find that party competition and partisan divisions at the state and federal levels play a significant role in the use of iniciativas de los congresos estatales. The authors' study of this peculiar authority granted to the Mexican states contributes to the rich discussion of the changing role of the states in the era of Mexico's nuevo federalismo.
Politics and Governance, 2019
We examine the gap between perceptions of seeing referendums as an important democratic principle... more We examine the gap between perceptions of seeing referendums as an important democratic principle, versus perceiving how referendums are used in practice. We term this the “referendum disappointment” gap. We find support for referendums as a democratic principle is strongest among those most disaffected from the political system, and that the disaffected are more likely to perceive they are not given a say via referendums. We also find context-specific effects. Disappointment was greater in countries with higher corruption and income inequality. We also find higher disappointment among right-populist voters, those who distrusted politicians, and among people who viewed themselves at the bottom of society. Overall, these patterns reflect disappointment with democracy among sections of society who have a sense of not being heard that conflicts with how they expect democracy should work in principle.
Direct Democracy’s Impact on American Political Institutions, 2008
Politics, Groups and Identities, 2013
We’ve been asked to give a bit of background as to how and why Politics, Groups, and Identities (... more We’ve been asked to give a bit of background as to how and why Politics, Groups, and Identities (PGI) came into being. The story begins in 2005 with the suggestion by former executive director of the Western Political Science Association (WPSA), Betty Moulds, that the leadership of the organization needed to think seriously and more broadly about its financial future, and seek to diversify its sources of income in order to better support a staff and a growing membership that could no longer count on subsidies from traditional sources. So after considerable debate and, at times, heated discussions among members of the WPSA Executive Council, our committee was appointed in 2007 by the president of the association at that time, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, to make that exploration. The official title of our ad hoc committee was the Strategic Planning Committee. We first met in person as a committee at the San Diego meeting in 2008. It was the first of many meetings of the committee at regional and national conferences. Our conversations very quickly focused on the idea that it would be good for the Association to have a journal of its own – a journal wholly owned by the Association and one that would be less constrained by the requirements of being a general interest journal and instead be a journal that would more closely reflect both the intellectual interests and methodological diversity of our association. We saw the opportunity for a journal that could both reflect the Association, and help finance the meetings and infrastructure of the Association. Our discussions regularly revolved around two main themes – one intellectual and one practical.
Political Studies, 1999
British electoral history contains a whole series of debates over alternatives to the ®rst past t... more British electoral history contains a whole series of debates over alternatives to the ®rst past the post system. 1 Prominent among these alternatives have been variations on proportional representation and also such methods as Limited Vote and Cumulative Vote (CV). 2 But these alternatives were not just debated, in some instances they were also put into practice. The ®rst example of CV in practice came in elections (from 1854 to 1890) to the Cape Legislative Council, the colony's upper house. 3 The means of election to this body were set out in a Report from a Committee of the Board of Trade and Plantations (30 January 1850). In addition to a description of how the system would work, the report also provided a justi®cation for its introduction.
West European Politics, 1987
This article examines the contradictions between Lindblom's thesis of the ‘privileged positio... more This article examines the contradictions between Lindblom's thesis of the ‘privileged position of business’ and the corporatist views of writers such as Schmitter and Lehmbruch. The implications of the two theories are analysed in the context of the exchanges between the capital and labour in corporatist systems. The analysis focuses on the kinds of exchange business may enter into, with
Public Opinion Quarterly, 2011
This article examines how electoral competition, in the form of district-level campaign expenditu... more This article examines how electoral competition, in the form of district-level campaign expenditures, affects votersÕ opinions about elections. We direct our attention at how voters perceive competition, and at how electoral competition affects how people perceive elections. Although people generally overestimate the competitiveness of U.S. House races, we demonstrate that perceptions of competition are connected to actual levels of campaign activity. We also find that electoral competition may have contradictory democratic effects. District-level spending is associated with greater attention to news about the local campaign, but also with greater dissatisfaction with election choices.
PS: Political Science & Politics, 2007
It has now been four years of contested elections for the Council of the Association. In this not... more It has now been four years of contested elections for the Council of the Association. In this note we ask: What can we learn about these elections from a political science perspective?
Political Studies, 1988
In this note we seek to examine whether or not governments can improve their bargaining position,... more In this note we seek to examine whether or not governments can improve their bargaining position, in the context of the relationship to business posited by Lindblom, by acting as a cartel. Taking the Common Market as affording the opportunities for cartel-like behaviour , both individual and aggregate-level information is examined in order to find evidence that the bargaining position is altered. It is concluded that governments do not seem to be unqualified beneficiaries of European Community (EC) membership and that, to the extent that the Lindblom framework is a ‘problem’, then it is one which seems to be robust in a variety of settings. In Politics and Markets Lindblom, as part of his general thesis, lays out an argument for the ‘privileged position’ of business. In a bargaining situation between (typically) a business and a government, the bargain struck will favour the business. In return for maintaining essential investment functions, the government will reward the business with tax concessions, subsidies, loans or legal privileges.’ The means by which such a bargain is enforced is the ability of business to engage in an ‘investment strike’, with all that this entails for employment and government re-election prospects. Once we assume the presence of more than one government, then the business is not restricted to the choice between an investment strike or to invest but can actively disinvest and move elsewhere. This situation presents even more opportunities for capital to exercise influence. Tax subsidies offered by country A can be used by a corporation to pry even greater subsidies from country B and from there the corporation can return to bargain again with A. In this way it is possible for governments, as independent actors and observing only the claims of business, to bid away many of the economic gains from corporate presence in the form of
Political Research Quarterly, 2011
Elections send ambiguous signals to the political system, particularly when interpreting the mean... more Elections send ambiguous signals to the political system, particularly when interpreting the meaning of various “nonvotes” (e.g., abstention, ballot spoiling, and roll-off). While a “none of the above” (NOTA) option may allow voters to better signal discontent, how NOTA voting is used is not well understood. The authors’ analysis of all races in Nevada, which has allowed for NOTA voting since 1976, suggests that NOTA voting is consistent with protest voting and limited information. Thus, while NOTA voting can be a less ambiguous signal of discontent than other nonvotes, the practice of NOTA voting is less clear.
Western Political Quarterly, 1992
or the most part, the decision to cast a ballot for third parties N~ under simple plurality elect... more or the most part, the decision to cast a ballot for third parties N~ under simple plurality electoral systems has been downplayed in the voting studies literature. Yet it is in the decision to vote for a third party under single member &dquo;winner-take-all&dquo; electoral systems that we see the interaction between the individual-level attitudes which determine vote choice and the incentive structure provided by the electoral system. In the wake of Duverger's Law, &dquo;third&dquo; parties have been, and are, regarded as a fairly peripheral set of actors, their long-term survival made doubtful by the voters' wishes to avoid wasting a vote. One important empirical objection to Duverger's Law, however, is that, except for the case of the United States, in those countries which use this system meaningful third parties persist (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982). Parties will, of course, attract a certain number of voters regardless of their electoral situation. Every party possesses loyal voters who stay with their party through periods of boom and bust. By the same token, there are voters who will never vote for a third party under any circumstances. Between these two extremes, however, lie two sets of voters who will vote for minor or &dquo;third&dquo; parties subject to the state of party competition. These two types of citizens are &dquo;strategic&dquo; and &dquo;protest&dquo; voters, who may cast their ballots for a third party, often without regard to that party's overall platform and agenda. The presence of such voters in part depends on the capacity of &dquo;winner-take-all&dquo; electoral systems to provide perverse incentives for
Political Behavior, 1992
Using data from the UK General Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987, we present a critical test of d... more Using data from the UK General Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987, we present a critical test of different approaches to tactical voting. Specifically, we are concerned with how the competitive situation in each constituency affects voters' likelihood of voting tactically, as well as the role of voters' attitudes and personal characteristics. We find that voters are less sensitive to the actual marginality of a district than to whether or not their party has a chance of winning the seat. In addition, we find that party identification, and particularly intense loyalty, dampen the tendency to vote tactically, regardless of the type of district. We also consider differences in tactical voting between constituencies where Labour dominates vs. districts where the Conservatives are strongest. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of these findings for the study of voting behavior. In recent years, the question of tactical voting has received considerable attention. At a theoretical level, rational choice models, with their emphasis on individual strategic behavior, have been prominent in addressing these issues. ~ At an empirical level, recent British electoral history has given testimony to the practical importance of tactical voting (Rasmussen, 1984; Catt, 1989). Indeed, this issue has been so salient in Britain that a pressure group has been formed with the aim of encouraging the spread of this practice. One major spur to the increased attention paid to tactical voting in the UK has been the rise of third-party politics during the 1980s. It is the very presence of a meaningful third party that makes tactical voting not just possible but also sensible. Quite self-consciously, Britain's third party, under its various names, has sought to encourage tactical voting by stressing,
Parliamentary Affairs, 2000
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2010
Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making in many multiparty legislatures. It is not c... more Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making in many multiparty legislatures. It is not clear, however, whether these rapporteurs are best characterized as partisan animals or technical experts seeking consensus in nonmajoritarian institutions. we addressed this question by examining which members of the European Parliament become repeat rapporteurs. Using an original dataset comprising all committee reports from the 4th and 5th European Parliaments (1994-2004), we found that the report allocation process provides a way to pursue partisan policy goals within a multiparty, consensual institution that rewards both coalition building and expertise.
European Journal of Political Research, 1989
Abstract. Previous survey level research on attitudes towards the economy among European voters h... more Abstract. Previous survey level research on attitudes towards the economy among European voters has tended to focus on the short-term implications of these attitudes, relating them to vote choice or executive popularity. In this paper we seek to examine the relationships between economic assessments and more fundamental aspects of voter attitudes. More concretely, we examine the links between ideology and economic information, arguing that they are interdependent to the exctent that they can be seen to exist within a reciprocal relationship. In the wake of Kramer, we approach this problem from a comparative perspective, and find that the hypothesised reciprocal relationship is well supported by the statistical evidence.
European Journal of Political Research, 2002
... The issues at the heart shaun bowler & todd donovan © European Consortium... more ... The issues at the heart shaun bowler & todd donovan © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 Page 3. 779 ... 1991; Alvarez 1997; Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Bowler & tv ads as a source of information in referendums © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 ...
Environmental Politics, 1992
American Politics Quarterly, 1997
This article considers the institutional and environmental factors that influence the degree of c... more This article considers the institutional and environmental factors that influence the degree of countermajoritarian judicial activism among state supreme courts. In our analysis, we consider two indicators of such activism: the tendency of each state court to overturn acts of the legislature and the extent to which each court engages in tort innovation. We find, contrary to much conventional wisdom, that courts in states where judges are most insulated from local partisan politics are the least likely to exhibit activist behavior. Rather, the most activist courts are in states where justices reach office through district-based electoral systems. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of judicial activism and judicial behavior.
The Journal of Legislative Studies, 2017
The Mexican Constitution, in the Poder Legislativo, grants state legislatures the authority to in... more The Mexican Constitution, in the Poder Legislativo, grants state legislatures the authority to introduce legislation (iniciativas de ley) in the federal congress. In this paper the authors examine this powerful mechanism through which the Mexican state legislatures can directly influence policymaking at the federal level. Using a new data set of state-led initiatives, this work: describes the frequency with which iniciativas are introduced; describes the substance, timing, and final disposition of these state-led initiatives; and explains which factors affect the probability of presenting a state-led initiative. The authors find that party competition and partisan divisions at the state and federal levels play a significant role in the use of iniciativas de los congresos estatales. The authors' study of this peculiar authority granted to the Mexican states contributes to the rich discussion of the changing role of the states in the era of Mexico's nuevo federalismo.
Politics and Governance, 2019
We examine the gap between perceptions of seeing referendums as an important democratic principle... more We examine the gap between perceptions of seeing referendums as an important democratic principle, versus perceiving how referendums are used in practice. We term this the “referendum disappointment” gap. We find support for referendums as a democratic principle is strongest among those most disaffected from the political system, and that the disaffected are more likely to perceive they are not given a say via referendums. We also find context-specific effects. Disappointment was greater in countries with higher corruption and income inequality. We also find higher disappointment among right-populist voters, those who distrusted politicians, and among people who viewed themselves at the bottom of society. Overall, these patterns reflect disappointment with democracy among sections of society who have a sense of not being heard that conflicts with how they expect democracy should work in principle.
Direct Democracy’s Impact on American Political Institutions, 2008
Politics, Groups and Identities, 2013
We’ve been asked to give a bit of background as to how and why Politics, Groups, and Identities (... more We’ve been asked to give a bit of background as to how and why Politics, Groups, and Identities (PGI) came into being. The story begins in 2005 with the suggestion by former executive director of the Western Political Science Association (WPSA), Betty Moulds, that the leadership of the organization needed to think seriously and more broadly about its financial future, and seek to diversify its sources of income in order to better support a staff and a growing membership that could no longer count on subsidies from traditional sources. So after considerable debate and, at times, heated discussions among members of the WPSA Executive Council, our committee was appointed in 2007 by the president of the association at that time, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, to make that exploration. The official title of our ad hoc committee was the Strategic Planning Committee. We first met in person as a committee at the San Diego meeting in 2008. It was the first of many meetings of the committee at regional and national conferences. Our conversations very quickly focused on the idea that it would be good for the Association to have a journal of its own – a journal wholly owned by the Association and one that would be less constrained by the requirements of being a general interest journal and instead be a journal that would more closely reflect both the intellectual interests and methodological diversity of our association. We saw the opportunity for a journal that could both reflect the Association, and help finance the meetings and infrastructure of the Association. Our discussions regularly revolved around two main themes – one intellectual and one practical.
Political Studies, 1999
British electoral history contains a whole series of debates over alternatives to the ®rst past t... more British electoral history contains a whole series of debates over alternatives to the ®rst past the post system. 1 Prominent among these alternatives have been variations on proportional representation and also such methods as Limited Vote and Cumulative Vote (CV). 2 But these alternatives were not just debated, in some instances they were also put into practice. The ®rst example of CV in practice came in elections (from 1854 to 1890) to the Cape Legislative Council, the colony's upper house. 3 The means of election to this body were set out in a Report from a Committee of the Board of Trade and Plantations (30 January 1850). In addition to a description of how the system would work, the report also provided a justi®cation for its introduction.
West European Politics, 1987
This article examines the contradictions between Lindblom's thesis of the ‘privileged positio... more This article examines the contradictions between Lindblom's thesis of the ‘privileged position of business’ and the corporatist views of writers such as Schmitter and Lehmbruch. The implications of the two theories are analysed in the context of the exchanges between the capital and labour in corporatist systems. The analysis focuses on the kinds of exchange business may enter into, with
Public Opinion Quarterly, 2011
This article examines how electoral competition, in the form of district-level campaign expenditu... more This article examines how electoral competition, in the form of district-level campaign expenditures, affects votersÕ opinions about elections. We direct our attention at how voters perceive competition, and at how electoral competition affects how people perceive elections. Although people generally overestimate the competitiveness of U.S. House races, we demonstrate that perceptions of competition are connected to actual levels of campaign activity. We also find that electoral competition may have contradictory democratic effects. District-level spending is associated with greater attention to news about the local campaign, but also with greater dissatisfaction with election choices.
PS: Political Science & Politics, 2007
It has now been four years of contested elections for the Council of the Association. In this not... more It has now been four years of contested elections for the Council of the Association. In this note we ask: What can we learn about these elections from a political science perspective?
Political Studies, 1988
In this note we seek to examine whether or not governments can improve their bargaining position,... more In this note we seek to examine whether or not governments can improve their bargaining position, in the context of the relationship to business posited by Lindblom, by acting as a cartel. Taking the Common Market as affording the opportunities for cartel-like behaviour , both individual and aggregate-level information is examined in order to find evidence that the bargaining position is altered. It is concluded that governments do not seem to be unqualified beneficiaries of European Community (EC) membership and that, to the extent that the Lindblom framework is a ‘problem’, then it is one which seems to be robust in a variety of settings. In Politics and Markets Lindblom, as part of his general thesis, lays out an argument for the ‘privileged position’ of business. In a bargaining situation between (typically) a business and a government, the bargain struck will favour the business. In return for maintaining essential investment functions, the government will reward the business with tax concessions, subsidies, loans or legal privileges.’ The means by which such a bargain is enforced is the ability of business to engage in an ‘investment strike’, with all that this entails for employment and government re-election prospects. Once we assume the presence of more than one government, then the business is not restricted to the choice between an investment strike or to invest but can actively disinvest and move elsewhere. This situation presents even more opportunities for capital to exercise influence. Tax subsidies offered by country A can be used by a corporation to pry even greater subsidies from country B and from there the corporation can return to bargain again with A. In this way it is possible for governments, as independent actors and observing only the claims of business, to bid away many of the economic gains from corporate presence in the form of
Political Research Quarterly, 2011
Elections send ambiguous signals to the political system, particularly when interpreting the mean... more Elections send ambiguous signals to the political system, particularly when interpreting the meaning of various “nonvotes” (e.g., abstention, ballot spoiling, and roll-off). While a “none of the above” (NOTA) option may allow voters to better signal discontent, how NOTA voting is used is not well understood. The authors’ analysis of all races in Nevada, which has allowed for NOTA voting since 1976, suggests that NOTA voting is consistent with protest voting and limited information. Thus, while NOTA voting can be a less ambiguous signal of discontent than other nonvotes, the practice of NOTA voting is less clear.
Western Political Quarterly, 1992
or the most part, the decision to cast a ballot for third parties N~ under simple plurality elect... more or the most part, the decision to cast a ballot for third parties N~ under simple plurality electoral systems has been downplayed in the voting studies literature. Yet it is in the decision to vote for a third party under single member &dquo;winner-take-all&dquo; electoral systems that we see the interaction between the individual-level attitudes which determine vote choice and the incentive structure provided by the electoral system. In the wake of Duverger's Law, &dquo;third&dquo; parties have been, and are, regarded as a fairly peripheral set of actors, their long-term survival made doubtful by the voters' wishes to avoid wasting a vote. One important empirical objection to Duverger's Law, however, is that, except for the case of the United States, in those countries which use this system meaningful third parties persist (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982). Parties will, of course, attract a certain number of voters regardless of their electoral situation. Every party possesses loyal voters who stay with their party through periods of boom and bust. By the same token, there are voters who will never vote for a third party under any circumstances. Between these two extremes, however, lie two sets of voters who will vote for minor or &dquo;third&dquo; parties subject to the state of party competition. These two types of citizens are &dquo;strategic&dquo; and &dquo;protest&dquo; voters, who may cast their ballots for a third party, often without regard to that party's overall platform and agenda. The presence of such voters in part depends on the capacity of &dquo;winner-take-all&dquo; electoral systems to provide perverse incentives for
Political Behavior, 1992
Using data from the UK General Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987, we present a critical test of d... more Using data from the UK General Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987, we present a critical test of different approaches to tactical voting. Specifically, we are concerned with how the competitive situation in each constituency affects voters' likelihood of voting tactically, as well as the role of voters' attitudes and personal characteristics. We find that voters are less sensitive to the actual marginality of a district than to whether or not their party has a chance of winning the seat. In addition, we find that party identification, and particularly intense loyalty, dampen the tendency to vote tactically, regardless of the type of district. We also consider differences in tactical voting between constituencies where Labour dominates vs. districts where the Conservatives are strongest. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of these findings for the study of voting behavior. In recent years, the question of tactical voting has received considerable attention. At a theoretical level, rational choice models, with their emphasis on individual strategic behavior, have been prominent in addressing these issues. ~ At an empirical level, recent British electoral history has given testimony to the practical importance of tactical voting (Rasmussen, 1984; Catt, 1989). Indeed, this issue has been so salient in Britain that a pressure group has been formed with the aim of encouraging the spread of this practice. One major spur to the increased attention paid to tactical voting in the UK has been the rise of third-party politics during the 1980s. It is the very presence of a meaningful third party that makes tactical voting not just possible but also sensible. Quite self-consciously, Britain's third party, under its various names, has sought to encourage tactical voting by stressing,
Parliamentary Affairs, 2000
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2010
Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making in many multiparty legislatures. It is not c... more Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making in many multiparty legislatures. It is not clear, however, whether these rapporteurs are best characterized as partisan animals or technical experts seeking consensus in nonmajoritarian institutions. we addressed this question by examining which members of the European Parliament become repeat rapporteurs. Using an original dataset comprising all committee reports from the 4th and 5th European Parliaments (1994-2004), we found that the report allocation process provides a way to pursue partisan policy goals within a multiparty, consensual institution that rewards both coalition building and expertise.
European Journal of Political Research, 1989
Abstract. Previous survey level research on attitudes towards the economy among European voters h... more Abstract. Previous survey level research on attitudes towards the economy among European voters has tended to focus on the short-term implications of these attitudes, relating them to vote choice or executive popularity. In this paper we seek to examine the relationships between economic assessments and more fundamental aspects of voter attitudes. More concretely, we examine the links between ideology and economic information, arguing that they are interdependent to the exctent that they can be seen to exist within a reciprocal relationship. In the wake of Kramer, we approach this problem from a comparative perspective, and find that the hypothesised reciprocal relationship is well supported by the statistical evidence.
European Journal of Political Research, 2002
... The issues at the heart shaun bowler & todd donovan © European Consortium... more ... The issues at the heart shaun bowler & todd donovan © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 Page 3. 779 ... 1991; Alvarez 1997; Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Bowler & tv ads as a source of information in referendums © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 ...
Environmental Politics, 1992
American Politics Quarterly, 1997
This article considers the institutional and environmental factors that influence the degree of c... more This article considers the institutional and environmental factors that influence the degree of countermajoritarian judicial activism among state supreme courts. In our analysis, we consider two indicators of such activism: the tendency of each state court to overturn acts of the legislature and the extent to which each court engages in tort innovation. We find, contrary to much conventional wisdom, that courts in states where judges are most insulated from local partisan politics are the least likely to exhibit activist behavior. Rather, the most activist courts are in states where justices reach office through district-based electoral systems. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of judicial activism and judicial behavior.