huseyin yildirim - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by huseyin yildirim
I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an alloc... more I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding "persistent recognition" to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding "transitory recognition". Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of "active" bargainers; and individual's incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.
Evidence suggests that donors have little demand for information before giving to charity. To und... more Evidence suggests that donors have little demand for information before giving to charity. To understand this behavior and its policy implications, we present a model in which each individual can acquire costly information about her true value of charity. We observe that an individual who considers giving less is less likely to become informed; and indeed, an uninformed donor is, on average, less generous than an informed one. This implies that since the free-rider problem in giving worsens in a larger population, the percentage of informed givers becomes vanishingly small, leaving the total expected donations strictly below its highest level to be reached by a fully informed population. We show that while a direct government grant to the charity causes severe crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition, a matching grant increases donations by encouraging it. We further show that a "warm-glow" motive for giving does not necessarily weaken incentives to be informed, and that a (firstorder) stochastic increase in true values for charity may actually decrease donations.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known politic... more We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group. We relate our equilibrium characterization to Myerson's Poisson games, and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010
We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and v... more We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings are disturbing because they suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic process. We show that if the distribution of preferences is common knowledge, then strategic voting leads to a stark neutrality result in which the probability that either alternative wins the election is 1 2 . This occurs because members of the minority compensate exactly for their smaller group size by voting with higher frequency. By contrast, when citizens are symmetrically ignorant about the distribution of types, the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Indeed, when the population is large and voting costs are small, the majority wins with probability arbitrarily close to one in equilibrium. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the distribution of political preferences. * We thank Han Hong and Oksana Loginova for helpful suggestions. Taylor's research was supported in part by NSF grant SES-0417737.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two su... more The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short expiries that prevent a head-to-head supplier competition. With complementary goods, strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for suppliers, which is likely to be the case when suppliers possess relatively high bargaining powers; price offers have short expiries; and/or goods are weak complements. The effects of mandatory disclosure laws, extended return policies, and purchasing alliance formation on trade efficiency are also discussed.
This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdepend... more This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, unlike what is commonly assumed in the literature, the planner is unable to commit to the rule before votes are cast. Characterizing the time-consistent majority rules, we find that the ex ante optimal majority rule is time-consistent; but for groups whose members have sufficiently homogenous preferences, there is an ex ante suboptimal rule that is also time-consistent. Thus, in the absence of an ex ante commitment, the social planner prefers a relatively heterogeneous group in which strategic voting incentives are weak. This finding is in sharp contrast with the observation that under an exogenously given majority rule, the social planner prefers the most homogenous group. Applications to trial jury and advisory committee formations as well as academic hiring decisions are discussed.
iibfdergi.kmu.edu.tr
Perakendecilik sektörü dünyada ve Türkiye'de hızla gelişmektedir. Sektör gelişti... more Perakendecilik sektörü dünyada ve Türkiye'de hızla gelişmektedir. Sektör geliştikçe geleneksel perakendecilik yerini modern perakendeciliğe bırakmaktadır. Gıda perakendeciliği içerisinde önemi gittikçe artan indirimli süpermarketler, ulusal veya global boyutlarda ...
I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an alloc... more I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding "persistent recognition" to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding "transitory recognition". Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of "active" bargainers; and individual's incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view i... more If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. ...
This paper studies the optimal procurement of a large-scale project. The project consists of seve... more This paper studies the optimal procurement of a large-scale project. The project consists of several subprojects to be procured in a predetermined order and yields its full return upon completion. In the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic procurement game, I find that: (1) Even though the procurer lacks long term commitment power, both the procurer and suppliers strictly prefer the project to move forward; (2) unlike the static setting, the procurer's optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly, it is nonmonotonic. As one more supplier participates in the procurement auction, the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost "types" while increasing competition in the mature stages, (3) this, in turn, implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers, and actively search for new bidders along with the procurer, and (4) absent the scheduling and resource constraints, the procurer would prefer to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers' technology exhibited constant or increasing returns, and no additional suppliers were attracted to bid. This rationalizes the frequent division of large-scale projects on the grounds of either decreasing returns to scale technology, e.g., capacity constraints, or enabling smaller firms to enter the bidding process. I also demonstrate that the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the Vickrey type.
This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts a... more This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals' most recent effort in an intermediate stage. It is found that (1) contrary to previous findings, the Stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium.
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the propose... more This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is 9 the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents 11 with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under 13 the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the propose... more This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is 9 the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents 11 with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under 13 the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.
I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an alloc... more I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding "persistent recognition" to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding "transitory recognition". Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of "active" bargainers; and individual's incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.
Evidence suggests that donors have little demand for information before giving to charity. To und... more Evidence suggests that donors have little demand for information before giving to charity. To understand this behavior and its policy implications, we present a model in which each individual can acquire costly information about her true value of charity. We observe that an individual who considers giving less is less likely to become informed; and indeed, an uninformed donor is, on average, less generous than an informed one. This implies that since the free-rider problem in giving worsens in a larger population, the percentage of informed givers becomes vanishingly small, leaving the total expected donations strictly below its highest level to be reached by a fully informed population. We show that while a direct government grant to the charity causes severe crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition, a matching grant increases donations by encouraging it. We further show that a "warm-glow" motive for giving does not necessarily weaken incentives to be informed, and that a (firstorder) stochastic increase in true values for charity may actually decrease donations.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known politic... more We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group. We relate our equilibrium characterization to Myerson's Poisson games, and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010
We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and v... more We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings are disturbing because they suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic process. We show that if the distribution of preferences is common knowledge, then strategic voting leads to a stark neutrality result in which the probability that either alternative wins the election is 1 2 . This occurs because members of the minority compensate exactly for their smaller group size by voting with higher frequency. By contrast, when citizens are symmetrically ignorant about the distribution of types, the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Indeed, when the population is large and voting costs are small, the majority wins with probability arbitrarily close to one in equilibrium. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the distribution of political preferences. * We thank Han Hong and Oksana Loginova for helpful suggestions. Taylor's research was supported in part by NSF grant SES-0417737.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two su... more The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short expiries that prevent a head-to-head supplier competition. With complementary goods, strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for suppliers, which is likely to be the case when suppliers possess relatively high bargaining powers; price offers have short expiries; and/or goods are weak complements. The effects of mandatory disclosure laws, extended return policies, and purchasing alliance formation on trade efficiency are also discussed.
This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdepend... more This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, unlike what is commonly assumed in the literature, the planner is unable to commit to the rule before votes are cast. Characterizing the time-consistent majority rules, we find that the ex ante optimal majority rule is time-consistent; but for groups whose members have sufficiently homogenous preferences, there is an ex ante suboptimal rule that is also time-consistent. Thus, in the absence of an ex ante commitment, the social planner prefers a relatively heterogeneous group in which strategic voting incentives are weak. This finding is in sharp contrast with the observation that under an exogenously given majority rule, the social planner prefers the most homogenous group. Applications to trial jury and advisory committee formations as well as academic hiring decisions are discussed.
iibfdergi.kmu.edu.tr
Perakendecilik sektörü dünyada ve Türkiye'de hızla gelişmektedir. Sektör gelişti... more Perakendecilik sektörü dünyada ve Türkiye'de hızla gelişmektedir. Sektör geliştikçe geleneksel perakendecilik yerini modern perakendeciliğe bırakmaktadır. Gıda perakendeciliği içerisinde önemi gittikçe artan indirimli süpermarketler, ulusal veya global boyutlarda ...
I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an alloc... more I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding "persistent recognition" to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding "transitory recognition". Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of "active" bargainers; and individual's incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view i... more If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. ...
This paper studies the optimal procurement of a large-scale project. The project consists of seve... more This paper studies the optimal procurement of a large-scale project. The project consists of several subprojects to be procured in a predetermined order and yields its full return upon completion. In the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic procurement game, I find that: (1) Even though the procurer lacks long term commitment power, both the procurer and suppliers strictly prefer the project to move forward; (2) unlike the static setting, the procurer's optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly, it is nonmonotonic. As one more supplier participates in the procurement auction, the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost "types" while increasing competition in the mature stages, (3) this, in turn, implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers, and actively search for new bidders along with the procurer, and (4) absent the scheduling and resource constraints, the procurer would prefer to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers' technology exhibited constant or increasing returns, and no additional suppliers were attracted to bid. This rationalizes the frequent division of large-scale projects on the grounds of either decreasing returns to scale technology, e.g., capacity constraints, or enabling smaller firms to enter the bidding process. I also demonstrate that the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the Vickrey type.
This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts a... more This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals' most recent effort in an intermediate stage. It is found that (1) contrary to previous findings, the Stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium.
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the propose... more This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is 9 the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents 11 with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under 13 the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the propose... more This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is 9 the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents 11 with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under 13 the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.