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Review of Ecumenical Studies Feed https://sciendo.com/journal/RESSSciendo RSS Feed for Review of Ecumenical Studies en-us Review of Ecumenical Studies Feed https://sciendo-parsed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/64735f014e662f30ba53bc29/cover-image.jpg https://sciendo.com/journal/RESS140 216 Badness, Wickedness, Evil and the Death of the Soul https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ress-2024-0023 ARTICLE Sat, 28 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ress-2024-0023 Die Differenz im Einssein Notizen zur arendtschen „Banalität des Bösen“ https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ress-2024-0022 Abstract

This paper takes up the controversial arendtian term “banality of evil” and shows how plurality rooted in non-indifference is necessary for preventing us from acting bad. Distinct from “radical Evil” the “Banality of Evil” is not in itself banal. Evil deeds sneak into everyday life if being-one with oneself by consulting with oneself on the actions to be taken is missing. Hence, being-one presupposes plurality for the inner dialogue. As a matter of fact, plurality is rooted in the natality of human beings, in being born as being separated and differentiated from others. Nevertheless, conscious plurality as active non-indifference in thought and judgment is yet necessary.

From a Western, democratic perspective, the state socialism that existed until 1989 was criticised, not without justification, as an “evil empire” (Reagan). The Gulag, Pol Pot’s mass murders or Ceaușescu’s dictatorship show evident elements of evil in socialism. However, a different perspective is taken in the essay. From an internal hermeneutic perspective, it asks what forms of evil emerged within socialist thought. From a cultural-theoretical point of view, socialism is seen as a belief system and moral framework. Evil appears in this framework as (1) abstract evil, as (2) evil in others, and as (3) evil in oneself. These three figurations will be illuminated.

Stupidity is a greater evil than evil itself. This could be the synthesis of the theory put forward by Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He was a Protestant pastor, theologian, counter-intelligence officer, and martyr, whose work decisively influenced the subsequent evolution of the relationship between society and theology. One of the most fascinating aspects of his thinking is represented by the theorization of stupidity, which appears in his meditation “After Ten Years,” where he outlines the disastrous consequences of human stupidity, as well as how stupidity – as a form of legitimizing evil – can be stopped. The greatest evil that society must confront is imbecility. But what is its connection to political (or radical) evil, and how can we stop its disastrous consequences?

Leibniz’s metaphysics already justifies evil not only through the normative power of God, assuming that it is simultaneously the omnipotence of reason. For Kant, evil becomes definitively the sole problem of the rational being, human. While for Leibniz, the divine will had organized all practical relations of humans and movements of the physical world in such a way that the practical reason of all individuals is metaphysically constituted and evil is justified, Kant shifts the focus to the practical reason of humans as autonomous subjects. In this paradigm, God loses his metaphysical power, retaining only a moral role. Nietzsche and Musil build upon this context, yet surprisingly, they do not further advance this development. Instead, they reject the power of pure reason, which becomes absolute for Kant. Simultaneously, they draw on God’s metaphysical power over evil to formulate their concept of the new evil that confronts us in the practical contexts of modern life.

I argue that the Problem of Evil diminishes the likelihood of the simulation hypothesis being true. In section 1, I present the simulation hypothesis. In section 2, I present the Problem of Evil and how it can be addressed to the simulation hypothesis. In section 3, I strengthen my claim by defending the idea that, on the grounds of the expansion of the moral circle, we can infer that potential simulators would most probably view simulated beings as moral subjects. Section 4 is dedicated to counterarguments and their responses, and section 5 contains a conclusion where I clarify the probabilistic nature of my argument.

This paper aims to show that the traditional problem of evil can be logically dissolved by a more thorough analysis of what love (Agape, Eros, Philia) and evil actually are. When investigated this analysis reveals that they are manifestations and evaluations of power dynamical relations leading to a conclusion that it would be logically impossible for God to be all-loving and at the same time prevent evil as all-loving constitutes an unlimited, unjudgmental, empowerment and good and evil are simply evaluations or perspectives on that power use. To stop evil God would have to disempower in some way and that would not be Agape and thus logically impossible as Agape is part of the very nature of God. This paper reveals the “form” of good to be empowerment and the “form” of bad/evil to be disempowerment.

This article attempts to identify certain shortcomings in analytic philosophy as practised today. First, it identifies a disconnect between the darker aspects of the human condition and philosophers’ inability to engage with them. Second, it locates this inability in a certain logic of detachment, explored by Peter Strawson. Third, it points out problems with Strawson’s analysis, which it then tries to overcome, using Constantin Noica’s account of the Platonising attitude philosophers are perennially tempted by – one of several ways in which humans try to overcome their fallen condition. This is contrasted with Thomas Nagel’s valuable but still deficient discussion of the “cosmic question”. This brings us, finally, to a reconsideration of an older tradition in philosophy, which focused more explicitly on human fallenness. Petrarch’s Secretum meum is used as an example to show that while the failure of analytic philosophers has deep existential roots, it is not commendable. Philosophers must learn, again, to reflect on the darkness of the human soul – their own darkness.

There has been no in-depth research into witches and witchcraft trials on Transylvanian Fundus regius for over 50 years. The most recent contributions on the subject either examined the language of the relatively abundant surviving witness testimonies or were content with putting the Transylvanian witchcraft trials in the European mainstream context of the modern era. This paper analyses the published documents of the witchcraft trials of the Sighișoara Seat from the point of view of “dealing” with evil. Starting from the mentality and the state of the theological debate of the time, it focuses on the historical context and the social environment in order to recognize attitudes and strategies of the actors in the process of dealing with evil within the local community.

The article begins by noting a discrepancy between systematic-theological discourse of God, which speaks of ideal qualities, and biblical discourse of God, which does not refrain from associating God with evil, and analyzes this in more detail in a first section. The argument then turns to biblical texts and establishes that, especially where hopes rest on Yhwh as the only God, the authors of biblical texts seem to assume that God is also behind evil. Since most of the texts that see evil together with God are fictional narratives, the lessons drawn are pragmatic in the sense that they are warnings against abuse of power (Saul), aggression and attempts at destruction (Noah and Jonah) and insight into the background of evil (evil spirit, Satan, human culpability, omnipotence and uniqueness) rather than systematic considerations of the attributes of God.