Konrad Banicki | Jagiellonian University (original) (raw)

Papers by Konrad Banicki

Diametros, 2022

An attempt is made to develop a basic framework for an existential-phenomenological perspective o... more An attempt is made to develop a basic framework for an existential-phenomenological perspective on personality disorders. Its starting point is taken from the psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński and the philosopher Józef Tischner. The former provides a clinical framework capacious enough to allow ethical, existential, and phenomenological explorations. This conceptual “space” is then explicitly recognized, addressed, and fulfilled by the latter’s investigation of personality dynamics proper to “the hideout.” In order to supplement this thread of thought with a specific illustration, a “case” provided by Fyodor Dostoevsky in his Notes from the Underground is investigated. Then, in turn, Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be is referred to, so that the deepest roots of personality disorders can be identified with an ontological dynamic proper to the avoidance of non-being. Finally, some brief remarks are made concerning how all the above relates to the idea of a normatively neutral science and ho...

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2020

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/1999, p. 232) has famously remarked that in psychology “there are exper... more Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/1999, p. 232) has famously remarked that in psychology “there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion,” and his harsh comment does not seem to be outdated. To clear up the confusion in question, the methods of conceptual analysis can be used such as Gilbert Ryle’s logical geography or Peter Strawson’s conceptual grammar. A promising area of their application can be psychiatric nosology including, especially, the domain of personality pathology. To contribute to logical and methodological clarity concerning the latter, the following steps have been taken. First, a well-established opposition between dimensional and categorical conceptualizations was explored with special attention drawn to considerable crudeness of an idea that this dichotomy alone can fully reflect the conceptual complexity at hand. To do justice to the latter, the classical idea of monothetic classification was introduced and investigated in terms of its background assumptions. The analyses conducted by Peter Zachar and Nick Haslam, in particular, were referred to in order to show not only the monothetic model’s relationship to the notion of a natural kind, essentialism, and the disease model, but also these latter ideas’ internal heterogeneity. The variety of problems faced by psychiatric essentialism and the natural kind view was then summarized together with a more liberal approach of polythetic classification adopted by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The whole “galaxy of ideas” (Ryle, 1971, p. 202) pertinent to the deceptively simple categorical–dimensional dichotomy, finally, was served as a reliable indication of the latter distinction’s insufficiency.

Philosophical Psychology, 2019

Louis Charland’s claim that DSM Cluster B personality disorders are moral rather than clinical ki... more Louis Charland’s claim that DSM Cluster B personality disorders are moral rather than clinical kinds has recently triggered a lively debate. In order to deliver a reliable report of the latter, both (1) Charland’s arguments concerning the impossibility of identifying and treating personality disorders without applying a morally laden conceptual framework and (2) some critical responses they provoked are discussed. Then, in turn, the conceptual history of the notion of personality disorder is traced, including not only well-recognized contributions from (3) medical psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and DSM nosology, but also (4) an important, but often neglected, tradition of virtue and moral character. Finally, (5) the idea of a normatively neutral concept of personality disorder is scrutinized in the context of its logical dependence on the fact-value distinction. The latter dichotomy’s recent criticism, in particular, is employed to support Charland’s argument and to suggest that the normative character of personality disorders may go much deeper than this or that DSM formulation.

Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 2018

Personality disorders have always attracted considerable attention within the philosophy of psych... more Personality disorders have always attracted considerable attention within the philosophy of psychiatry. It was not until two papers written by Louis Charland, however, that they simulated a wider and lively debate. The importance and, at least partly, the strength of Charland's analyses lie in the fact that they are relatively particular and focused in their scope. What he claims, more specifically, is that the histrionic, borderline, narcissistic, and antisocial personality disorders "are moral and not clinical conditions." The aim of the present paper is to highlight, generalize, and discuss one particular issue brought up by Charland: the possibility of fulfilling his pledge and revising our diagnostic criteria in such a way that they would become evaluatively neutral. It is the very feasibility of such descriptive reformulation project, in brief, that is at stake here.

Theory & Psychology, 2017

Many interdisciplinary discussions seem to operate on a tacit assumption that the notions of char... more Many interdisciplinary discussions seem to operate on a tacit assumption that the notions of character and personality can be used interchangeably. In order to argue that such an assumption is at least partly erroneous, the character–personality distinction drawn in various contexts is systematically scrutinized both in an historical and conceptual way. Then, in turn, two particular issues are addressed. The character–personality distinction is shown to be reliant on the dichotomy between value and fact, respectively, and to have a considerable functional dimension with some of the functions fulfilled by the notion of character (but not by that one of personality). The outcomes achieved, finally, are referred to the subtle differences between the fact–value distinction and the Humean is–ought dichotomy.

Ethical Perspectives, 2015

The practical aspect of ancient philosophy has been recently made a focus of renewed metaphilosop... more The practical aspect of ancient philosophy has been recently made a focus of renewed metaphilosophical investigation. After a brief presentation of three accounts of this kind developed by Martha Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot, and Michel Foucault, the model of the therapeutic argument developed by Nussbaum is called into question from the perspectives offered by her French colleagues, who emphasize spiritual exercise (Hadot) or the care of the self (Foucault). The ways in which the account of Nussbaum can be defended are then discussed, including both a ‘negative’ defense, i.e. the indication of the weaknesses of Hadot and Foucault’s proposals, and a ‘positive’ one focused on the points in which Nussbaum can convincingly address doubts about her metaphilosophical account. In response to these analyses, some further remarks made by Hadot and Foucault are discussed in order to demonstrate that their accounts are not as distant from Nussbaum after all. Finally, a recent metaphilosophical study by John Sellars together with a therapeutic (medical) model developed by the author of the present article are suggested as providing a framework for potential reconciliation between all three accounts discussed and a resource for further metaphilosophical studies.

Philosophical Papers, 43(1), 7-31, 2014

The idea of philosophy as a kind of therapy, though by no means standard, has been present in met... more The idea of philosophy as a kind of therapy, though by no means standard, has been present in metaphilosophical reflection since antiquity. Diverse versions of it were also discussed and applied by more recent authors such as Wittgenstein, Hadot and Foucault. In order to develop an explicit, general and systematic model of therapeutic philosophy a relatively broad and well-structured account provided by Martha Nussbaum is subjected to analysis. The results obtained, subsequently, form a basis for a new model constructed around the set of notions intrinsically connected with any, philosophical, psychological, or medical, form of therapy. The conceptual framework of: disease and its symptoms, the health ideal, the process of treatment with its techniques, therapeutic theory, physician, patient, and the physician-patient relationship is constructed and investigated in the context of its possible metaphilosophical use. An illustrative application of this scheme to philosophical therapy developed by Stoicism is, then, discussed. Finally, the issue of the therapeutic metaphilosophy's scope as well as the problem of therapeutic philosophy's specificity and integrity are briefly indicated.

New Ideas in Psychology, 33, 21-34, 2014

The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently pr... more The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is pervaded by specifically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue ethical tradition, the classification was assessed against two fundamental features of the classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues, as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the latter's: (1′) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent variables and (2′) official endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential responses available to the VIA's proponents are discussed.

Conceptual analysis, like any exclusively theoretical activity, is far from overrated in current ... more Conceptual analysis, like any exclusively theoretical activity, is far from overrated in current psychology. Such a situation can be related both to the contingent influences of contextual and historical character and to the more essential metatheoretical reasons. After a short discussion of the latter it is argued that even within a strictly empirical psychology there are non-trivial tasks that can be attached to well-defined and methodologically reliable, conceptual work. This kind of method, inspired by the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Strawson (conceptual grammar), and Gilbert Ryle (conceptual geography), is proposed and formally depicted as being holistic, descriptive, and connective. Finally, the newly presented framework of connective conceptual analysis is defended against the “Charge from Psychology,” in a version developed by William Ramsey, claiming that conceptual analysis is based on psychological assumptions that have already been refuted by empirical psychology.

The main purpose of this article is to undertake a conceptual investigation of the Berlin Wisdom ... more The main purpose of this article is to undertake a conceptual investigation of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: a psychological project initiated by Paul Baltes and intended to study the complex phenomenon of wisdom. Firstly, in order to provide a wider perspective for the subsequent analyses, a short historical sketch is given. Secondly, a meta-theoretical issue of the degree to which the subject matter of the Baltesian study can be identified with the traditional philosophical wisdom is addressed. The main result yielded by a careful conceptual analysis is that the philosophical and psychological concepts of wisdom, though not entirely the same, are at least parallel. Finally, one of the revealed aspects of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, i.e. its relative neglect of the non-cognitive and personal aspects of wisdom is brought to the fore. This deficiency, it is suggested, can be remedied by the application of the virtue ethics' conceptual framework.

Ostrowski, T. M., & Sikorska, I. (2014). Health and resilience. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press (pp. 25-37), 2014.

The notions of health, disease, and illness as essentially applicable in all medical contexts hav... more The notions of health, disease, and illness as essentially applicable in all medical contexts have been extensively discussed within contemporary philosophy of medicine. Among the variety of perspectives offered there are two which seem to be currently dominating: the naturalistic and the normativist ones. The former approach, as represented by Boorse's biostatistical theory, tends to focus on the notion of disease, which is understood in terms of an impairment of statistically normal biological functioning. The latter one in turn, as developed for instance within the action-theoretical theory of Nordenfelt, denies the possibility of specifying health and illness in purely objective biological terms and provides an openly normative framework which is founded on the notions of human ability and vital goals. These two approaches, though obviously different in many nonnegligible aspects, still share one crucial feature: they are formulated from a third-person perspective and use third-person language, accordingly. Having made this point, Carel intended to develop a perspective which would do justice to first-person experiences, especially to those of an ill person. The phenomenological framework offered by her as well as its philosophical sources are briefly scrutinised.

Ostrowski, T. M., Sikorska, I., & Gerc, K. (2015). Resilience and health in a fast-changing world. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press (pp. 47-58), 2015

The chapter is devoted to the analysis of ancient Stoic philosophy as a source of resilience for ... more The chapter is devoted to the analysis of ancient Stoic philosophy as a source of resilience for soldiers. At first, some historical cases are investigated, from a Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius to more recent instances from Vietnam and Iraq. Secondly, in turn, the Epictetus' distinction between the controllable and the uncontrollable is introduced with the focus on the prescription to assign value only to the former as the Stoic source of resilience. Finally, some further questions are briefly addressed including the ones concerning the sources of the Stoicism's appeal to the soldiers, its more particular applications as well as the potential drawbacks of the Stoic resilience.

Etyka i literatura. Antologia tekstów (Ed. A. Głąb). Wydawnictwo KUL: Lublin., 2014

Studium relacji między literaturą piękną a etyką filozoficzną w świetle psychologii analitycznej ... more Studium relacji między literaturą piękną a etyką filozoficzną w świetle psychologii analitycznej Carla Gustava Junga 1

Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL, 2015

Filozofia psychiatrii rozumiana być może jako dyscyplina skoncentrowana na teoretycznych i pojęci... more Filozofia psychiatrii rozumiana być może jako dyscyplina skoncentrowana na teoretycznych i pojęciowych zagadnieniach kluczowych dla współczesnej psychiatrii. Jedną z takich kwestii jest problem demarkacji a więc pytanie o to, czym choroba psychiczna (zaburzenie psychiczne) różni się od funkcjonowania mieszczącego się w ramach psychicznej normalności (zdrowia). Krótka prezentacja najczęściej przywoływanych kryteriów, które umożliwić mają przeprowadzenie takiego rozróżnienia, stanowi dobry punkt wyjścia do omówienia dominującego dzisiaj rozumienia psychiatrii jako dyscypliny naturalistycznej (medycznej), a także właściwej mu koncepcji choroby psychicznej (w wersjach zaproponowanych przez Boorse’a i Wakefielda). Następnie omówione zostają nurty krytyczne wobec psychiatrycznego naturalizmu, które bronią humanistycznego rozumienia tej dyscypliny oraz, co omówione zostało na przykładzie antypsychiatrycznego stanowiska Szasza, wskazują na normatywny aspekt wielu kategorii psychiatrycznych. Aczkolwiek część takiej krytyki ma już charakter historyczny, to wiele jej wątków kontynuowanych jest współcześnie, chociażby w kontekście ujęcia zaburzenia psychicznego przez Amerykańskie Towarzystwo Psychiatryczne (kolejne wersje podręcznika diagnostycznego DSM). Dyskusje te z pewnością będą kontynuowane i – jak się wydaje, szczególnie wartościowych rezultatów oczekiwać można po dociekaniach skoncentrowanych na konkretnych zaburzeniach (nie zaś, jak często bywało, zaburzeniu psychicznym „w ogóle”).

Therapeia, askesis, meditatio. Praktyczny wymiar filozofii w starożytności i średniowieczu (red. K. Łapiński, R. Pawlik, & R. Tichy). Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii UW: Warszawa., 2017

The idea of philosophy as an essentially practical endeavour has been recently enjoying a renaiss... more The idea of philosophy as an essentially practical endeavour has been
recently enjoying a renaissance thanks to the works of such scholars as Hadot, Foucault, or Nussbaum. In order to improve their metaphilosophical perspectives a new therapeutic (medical) model of philosophy has been developed. The therapeutic model is constituted by seven notions, which can be universally applied to any kind of therapeutic project, including non-philosophical ones. The concepts of: disease, the health ideal, therapeutic techniques, therapeutic theory, the physician, the patient, and the physician-patient relationship can be considered a criterion to judge whether a particular philosophy is literally a therapy as well as an instrument for further investigations, including interdisciplinary ones. An instance of such interdisciplinary study can be a comparison between the ancient, and especially Stoic, idea that emotions cured by philosophy are substantially cognitive and contemporary psychotherapy and affective science. Such a scrutiny reveals a non-trivial parallels between Stoicism and current cognitive psychotherapy, but also the outcomes of congitive sciences which shows that there are affective processes which are not preceeded by cognition.

diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl

Stawianie psychologicznych pytań na gruncie etyki, choć często poddawane w wątpliwość, jest przy ... more Stawianie psychologicznych pytań na gruncie etyki, choć często poddawane w wątpliwość, jest przy założeniu ostatecznej jedności podmiotu etycznego i psychospołecznego merytorycznie uzasadnione. Jest ono zasadne tym bardziej, jeśli rozważa się filozofię o tak silnym zaangażowaniu praktycznym jak stoicyzm. Koncepcja wartości sformułowana przez Portyk a także oparte na niej ujęcie emocji poprzez swoją treść (postulat apatii) oraz okoliczności powstania stać się mogą przedmiotem podejrzliwej uwagi psychologa. Istnieją mianowicie przesłanki, aby podejrzewać je o neurotyczność - o bycie efektem lub przyczyną neurozy. Podejrzenie takie zweryfikować można w oparciu o multidyscyplinarną koncepcję nerwicy Paula Tillicha. Po nieco dokładniejszej analizie stoickiej aksjologii i ujęcia emocji okazuje się mianowicie, że zasadniczo nie były one ani owocem, ani przyczyną zaburzeń o charakterze neurotycznym. Jak się wydaje, było wręcz odwrotnie – zbliżały one człowieka do osobowościowego i egzystencjalnego wykwitu. Jednocześnie jednak stwierdzić należy, że źle zrozumiana lub doprowadzona na swoje manowce (Ariston) nauka stoicka mogła (może) stać się neurotyczna.

The question of Socrates' piety as well as all the issues that it entails (including the problem ... more The question of Socrates' piety as well as all the issues that it entails (including the problem of the sources' reliability) have been mainly addressed in the theological or philosophical context. In order to broaden such an approach it may be useful to refer to another, psychological perspective. Socrates, namely, together with one of his memorable interlocutors, Euthyphro can be very interestingly analysed and differentiated in the terms of the two modes of existence distinguished by Erich Fromm. The very self-confident piety of Euthyphro, in particular, turns out to be the one of the having mode: it focuses on the possession of literally understood gods' favours and ethical purity. The analysis of the Socrates' mode of existence is slightly more difficult but still possible. As soon as some forms of Socrates' rationality (including Socratic elenchus, irony, and ignorance as well as the references to daimonion) are investigated it is argued that the Socrates' piety can be classified as specific to the being mode. It is constituted by the constant process of rational inquiry, during which the philosopher neither resigns from the application of his rational faculties nor elevates his reason to the status of the sole and absolute principle.

Despite the fact that Iris Murdoch's influence on contemporary virtue ethics is often neglected, ... more Despite the fact that Iris Murdoch's influence on contemporary virtue ethics is often neglected, both her general criticism of the dominant currents of early 20th century ethical theory and some of its more particular threads, like scepticism towards principle-based accounts and the fact-value distinction or the emphasis on moral psychology, show her affinity with philosophers like Anscombe, Williams, and MacIntyre. On the other hand, some particular details of her perspective seem absent from, if not alien to, the standard neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical stance. It especially applies to Murdoch's high esteem for Plato, which is reflected in the central place she gives to love and the apparently non-natural concept of Good and which, at some points, is developed in religious, or even mystical, directions.

In response to Lamiell’s (2018) commentary arising from my claim that both character and personal... more In response to Lamiell’s (2018) commentary arising from my claim that both character and personality belong to “the discourse of individual differences” (Banicki, 2017, p. 56) some further clarifications are provided. At first, an interdisciplinary project lying behind my original article is sketched and the phrase “individual differences” elucidated as having a non-technical meaning far broader than that connected with individual differences as a specific psychological research paradigm. Then, in turn, Lamiell’s criticism of the notion that the latter can serve as a sole ground for personality psychology is briefly summarised. An attempt is made to simultaneously emphasise the conceptual and logical depth of this criticism and to put into question some of its far-reaching consequences concerning the applicability (or lack thereof) of population-level data at the level of the individual. Finally, a concise remark is made about a specifically philosophical (rather than technically psychological or even psychometrical) approach to the situationism debate.