David Papineau | King's College London (original) (raw)
Papers by David Papineau
Quantum reports, Feb 28, 2023
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Mar 1, 2001
When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If ... more When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight away, and then set out for Camden.’
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Jun 1, 1996
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2022
Defenders of the Everettian version of quantum mechanics generally hold that it makes no differen... more Defenders of the Everettian version of quantum mechanics generally hold that it makes no difference to what we ought to do. This paper will argue against this stance, by considering the use of lotteries to select the recipients of indivisible goods. On orthodox non-Everettian metaphysics this practice faces the objection that only actual and not probable goods matter to distributive justice. However, this objection loses all force within Everettianism. This result should be of interest to both philosophers of physics and to ethicists.
International Studies in The Philosophy of Science, 1990
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, 2021
In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Natu... more In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.
Times Literary Supplement Tls, 1993
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 18, 2021
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Mar 1, 2004
PSA;, 1992
This paper will be a mirror image of Huw Price's paper. Like Price, I shall first in... more This paper will be a mirror image of Huw Price's paper. Like Price, I shall first in-troduce the "fork asymmetry", then consider objections to using it to analyse causal asymmetry, and finally examine the relation between causation and human agency. But where Price rejects ...
Page 1. OXFORD :v 4 THE ROOTS of REASON PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON Rationality, Evolution, and Proba... more Page 1. OXFORD :v 4 THE ROOTS of REASON PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON Rationality, Evolution, and Probability • David Papineau Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. ... Page 5. THE ROOTS OF REASON This One X4CQ-A5E-U6HA Page 6. Page 7. ...
Philosophical Studies, Sep 4, 2013
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2020
Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Nat... more Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Naturaslim shows students how to think about the relation between Philosophy and Science, and why is both essencial and fascinating to do so. All the authors in this collection reconsider the core questions in Philosophical Naturalism in light of the challenges raised in Contemporary Philosophy. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to vigorous current debates - including complex questions about metaphysics, semantics, religion, intentionality, pragmatism, reductionism, ontology, metaethics, mind, science, belief and delusion, among others – showing how these issues, and philosopher’s attempts to answer them, matter in the Philosophy. In this sense, this collection is also compelling and illuminating reading for philosophers, philosophy students, and anyone interested in Naturalism and their place in current discussions.
Quantum reports, Feb 28, 2023
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Mar 1, 2001
When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If ... more When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight away, and then set out for Camden.’
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Jun 1, 1996
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2022
Defenders of the Everettian version of quantum mechanics generally hold that it makes no differen... more Defenders of the Everettian version of quantum mechanics generally hold that it makes no difference to what we ought to do. This paper will argue against this stance, by considering the use of lotteries to select the recipients of indivisible goods. On orthodox non-Everettian metaphysics this practice faces the objection that only actual and not probable goods matter to distributive justice. However, this objection loses all force within Everettianism. This result should be of interest to both philosophers of physics and to ethicists.
International Studies in The Philosophy of Science, 1990
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, 2021
In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Natu... more In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.
Times Literary Supplement Tls, 1993
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 18, 2021
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Mar 1, 2004
PSA;, 1992
This paper will be a mirror image of Huw Price's paper. Like Price, I shall first in... more This paper will be a mirror image of Huw Price's paper. Like Price, I shall first in-troduce the "fork asymmetry", then consider objections to using it to analyse causal asymmetry, and finally examine the relation between causation and human agency. But where Price rejects ...
Page 1. OXFORD :v 4 THE ROOTS of REASON PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON Rationality, Evolution, and Proba... more Page 1. OXFORD :v 4 THE ROOTS of REASON PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON Rationality, Evolution, and Probability • David Papineau Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. ... Page 5. THE ROOTS OF REASON This One X4CQ-A5E-U6HA Page 6. Page 7. ...
Philosophical Studies, Sep 4, 2013
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2020
Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Nat... more Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Naturaslim shows students how to think about the relation between Philosophy and Science, and why is both essencial and fascinating to do so. All the authors in this collection reconsider the core questions in Philosophical Naturalism in light of the challenges raised in Contemporary Philosophy. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to vigorous current debates - including complex questions about metaphysics, semantics, religion, intentionality, pragmatism, reductionism, ontology, metaethics, mind, science, belief and delusion, among others – showing how these issues, and philosopher’s attempts to answer them, matter in the Philosophy. In this sense, this collection is also compelling and illuminating reading for philosophers, philosophy students, and anyone interested in Naturalism and their place in current discussions.
Biology & Philosophy, 2019
Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of... more Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex "conceptual" representations and not just perceptual ones.
Forum for Philosophy, 2019