Flavia Gasbarri | King's College London (original) (raw)
Drafts by Flavia Gasbarri
Abstract of my Ph.D thesis
Book Reviews by Flavia Gasbarri
Conference Presentations by Flavia Gasbarri
In 1985 the first meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva opened the doors ... more In 1985 the first meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva opened the doors to one of the most innovative aspects of the " Transformation of Global Politics " of the 1980s. The unprecedented relationship developed between the two leaders rapidly became the symbol of the end of the Cold War, as well as one of the most important features of Reagan's foreign policy. Besides the negotiations on the core issue of arms control, another important topic was constantly discussed in all the summits between American and
Papers by Flavia Gasbarri
From the Ogaden War to the Black Hawk Down incident, the Horn of Africa was a theatre of events w... more From the Ogaden War to the Black Hawk Down incident, the Horn of Africa was a theatre of events with far-reaching international consequences. This paper argues that the distinctive process leading to the end of the bipolar conflict in the Horn is crucial to understanding the role of this region both during and after the Cold War. Through an extensive analysis of the period 1985-1991, this article explains why only a few years after the ‘burial’ of SALT II in the sands of the Ogaden, the superpowers withdrew from the region which had been the symbol of the failure of détente. Similarly, an analysis of the end of the Cold War is paramount to understanding why, after the break-up of the USSR, the Horn of Africa hosted one of the most tragic episodes of post-Cold War US foreign policy.
After the successful US–UN action in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, by the mid-1990s Washington’... more After the successful US–UN action in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, by the mid-1990s Washington’s enthusiasm for multilateral action had already faded away. This was evident after the ‘Black Hawk Down’ disaster of the US Mission in Somalia in October 1993 and the release of a much more restrictive peacekeeping policy in May 1994 (PDD-25). The US inaction during the following Rwandan genocide in spring 1994 was then seen as the obvious consequence of the American ‘trauma’ in Somalia, as well as the symbol of Washington’s withdrawal from peacekeeping commitments. However, in the light of new archival documents a different scenario emerges. This article shows that the consequential link, often stressed by the literature, between the Somali disaster, the release of PDD-25 and American inaction in Rwanda is much less straightforward. This suggests that the policy in Rwanda was not just a consequence of the Somali debacle and that the reasons for US inaction toward the genocide must be gauged within a broader set of factors. The study of Washington’s policy in Rwanda thus becomes a significant case to investigate some broader patterns of post-Cold War American foreign policy and to re-evaluate the US peacekeeping experience of the 1990s.
Books by Flavia Gasbarri
The iconic images from the night the Berlin Wall came down, and of the Soviet flag being removed ... more The iconic images from the night the Berlin Wall came down, and of the Soviet flag being removed from the top of the Kremlin have passed into history as intrinsically linked to the end of the Cold War. However, they document just one of the many ‘ends’ of the Cold War. The Cold War was a global conflict; from Berlin it radiated outwards and progressively invested new areas and regions of the planet. Consequently it had as many ends as there were numbers of battlegrounds in which it was waged and each ‘end’ of the Cold War opened a different series of new challenges and opportunities for the post-Cold War international system, led by the sole remaining American superpower. This book looks at one of the most neglected extra-European battlegrounds, the African continent, and explores how American foreign policy developed in this region between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Drawing on a wide range of recently disclosed archival material, the book shows that the Cold War in Africa ended in 1988, namely one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It also reveals how, since then, some of the most controversial and inconsistent episodes of the post-Cold War US foreign policy in Africa, such the intervention in Somalia, are deeply rooted in the unique process whereby American rivalry with the USSR found its end in the continent. The book opens new and original perspectives on the study of the end of the Cold War, thereby challenging its traditional narrative, and provides new insights on the shaping of the US foreign policy during the so-called ‘unipolar moment’ of the early 1990s.
In 1985 the first meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva opened the doors ... more In 1985 the first meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva opened the doors to one of the most innovative aspects of the " Transformation of Global Politics " of the 1980s. The unprecedented relationship developed between the two leaders rapidly became the symbol of the end of the Cold War, as well as one of the most important features of Reagan's foreign policy. Besides the negotiations on the core issue of arms control, another important topic was constantly discussed in all the summits between American and
From the Ogaden War to the Black Hawk Down incident, the Horn of Africa was a theatre of events w... more From the Ogaden War to the Black Hawk Down incident, the Horn of Africa was a theatre of events with far-reaching international consequences. This paper argues that the distinctive process leading to the end of the bipolar conflict in the Horn is crucial to understanding the role of this region both during and after the Cold War. Through an extensive analysis of the period 1985-1991, this article explains why only a few years after the ‘burial’ of SALT II in the sands of the Ogaden, the superpowers withdrew from the region which had been the symbol of the failure of détente. Similarly, an analysis of the end of the Cold War is paramount to understanding why, after the break-up of the USSR, the Horn of Africa hosted one of the most tragic episodes of post-Cold War US foreign policy.
After the successful US–UN action in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, by the mid-1990s Washington’... more After the successful US–UN action in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, by the mid-1990s Washington’s enthusiasm for multilateral action had already faded away. This was evident after the ‘Black Hawk Down’ disaster of the US Mission in Somalia in October 1993 and the release of a much more restrictive peacekeeping policy in May 1994 (PDD-25). The US inaction during the following Rwandan genocide in spring 1994 was then seen as the obvious consequence of the American ‘trauma’ in Somalia, as well as the symbol of Washington’s withdrawal from peacekeeping commitments. However, in the light of new archival documents a different scenario emerges. This article shows that the consequential link, often stressed by the literature, between the Somali disaster, the release of PDD-25 and American inaction in Rwanda is much less straightforward. This suggests that the policy in Rwanda was not just a consequence of the Somali debacle and that the reasons for US inaction toward the genocide must be gauged within a broader set of factors. The study of Washington’s policy in Rwanda thus becomes a significant case to investigate some broader patterns of post-Cold War American foreign policy and to re-evaluate the US peacekeeping experience of the 1990s.
The iconic images from the night the Berlin Wall came down, and of the Soviet flag being removed ... more The iconic images from the night the Berlin Wall came down, and of the Soviet flag being removed from the top of the Kremlin have passed into history as intrinsically linked to the end of the Cold War. However, they document just one of the many ‘ends’ of the Cold War. The Cold War was a global conflict; from Berlin it radiated outwards and progressively invested new areas and regions of the planet. Consequently it had as many ends as there were numbers of battlegrounds in which it was waged and each ‘end’ of the Cold War opened a different series of new challenges and opportunities for the post-Cold War international system, led by the sole remaining American superpower. This book looks at one of the most neglected extra-European battlegrounds, the African continent, and explores how American foreign policy developed in this region between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Drawing on a wide range of recently disclosed archival material, the book shows that the Cold War in Africa ended in 1988, namely one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It also reveals how, since then, some of the most controversial and inconsistent episodes of the post-Cold War US foreign policy in Africa, such the intervention in Somalia, are deeply rooted in the unique process whereby American rivalry with the USSR found its end in the continent. The book opens new and original perspectives on the study of the end of the Cold War, thereby challenging its traditional narrative, and provides new insights on the shaping of the US foreign policy during the so-called ‘unipolar moment’ of the early 1990s.