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Books by Jan Willem Honig
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Who defines defense policy in the North Atlantic Alliance? Is it NATO, the national government, o... more Who defines defense policy in the North Atlantic Alliance? Is it NATO, the national government, or the national military? Dutch scholar Jan Willem Honig addresses this widely misunderstood issue. His conclusion--which runs counter to the conventional wisdom that ...
Papers by Jan Willem Honig
one basic difference catches the eye. Whether secret –– like the 1950 Report to the US National S... more one basic difference catches the eye. Whether secret –– like the 1950 Report to the US National Security Council known as NSC68, or public –– like NATO’s 1967 ‘Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance’, known as the Harmel Report, they either explicitly contained or quickly permitted the central tenet of the proposed strategy to be captured in a catch-phrase: ‘containment’ and ‘defence and détente’. These notions then not only served to legitimate existing security and defence structures, but they also injected them with direction and development. They provided the political underpinning to NATO’s force structure and it is no accident that they organize the narrative of the history of the Cold
At a time of unprecedented turmoil in the transatlantic relationship, as America asserts its righ... more At a time of unprecedented turmoil in the transatlantic relationship, as America asserts its right to act unilaterally to defend itself against terrorism and Europeans are increasingly aggressive in promoting a multilateralist approach to security issues, this book examines the ...
Zullen we dan maar alles zo veel mogelijk bij het oude houden? : het “Eindrapport Verkenningen” i... more Zullen we dan maar alles zo veel mogelijk bij het oude houden? : het “Eindrapport Verkenningen” in internationaal perspectief’
An academic directory and search engine.
Who defines defense policy in the North Atlantic Alliance? Is it NATO, the national government, o... more Who defines defense policy in the North Atlantic Alliance? Is it NATO, the national government, or the national military? Dutch scholar Jan Willem Honig addresses this widely misunderstood issue. His conclusion--which runs counter to the conventional wisdom that ...
one basic difference catches the eye. Whether secret –– like the 1950 Report to the US National S... more one basic difference catches the eye. Whether secret –– like the 1950 Report to the US National Security Council known as NSC68, or public –– like NATO’s 1967 ‘Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance’, known as the Harmel Report, they either explicitly contained or quickly permitted the central tenet of the proposed strategy to be captured in a catch-phrase: ‘containment’ and ‘defence and détente’. These notions then not only served to legitimate existing security and defence structures, but they also injected them with direction and development. They provided the political underpinning to NATO’s force structure and it is no accident that they organize the narrative of the history of the Cold
At a time of unprecedented turmoil in the transatlantic relationship, as America asserts its righ... more At a time of unprecedented turmoil in the transatlantic relationship, as America asserts its right to act unilaterally to defend itself against terrorism and Europeans are increasingly aggressive in promoting a multilateralist approach to security issues, this book examines the ...
Zullen we dan maar alles zo veel mogelijk bij het oude houden? : het “Eindrapport Verkenningen” i... more Zullen we dan maar alles zo veel mogelijk bij het oude houden? : het “Eindrapport Verkenningen” in internationaal perspectief’
The Future of Military Strategy at Forsvarshogskolan : An Attempt to Identify Some Useful Fundame... more The Future of Military Strategy at Forsvarshogskolan : An Attempt to Identify Some Useful Fundamentals
Armed Forces & Society
The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection inform... more The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion—a sociopolitical and military embeddedness within society—that produced a far stronger strategic effectiveness than we could replicate in our Afghan allies. Furthermore, a military-professional mindset underestimated the degree to which political considerations permeated the battlefield. The political effect of military actions was insufficiently integrated into strategic practice. Specifically, the linchpin officer in staff planning and field operations in Western armies struggled to act as what we term strategic colonels. In both respects, the war continues to offer important les...
Ways Out of War, 2012
When Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose stepped off the plane at Sarajevo airport on January 23,... more When Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose stepped off the plane at Sarajevo airport on January 23, 1994, to take up his new position as the commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the situation he found was not propitious. Peace appeared elusive and remote. The half-heartedness of the intervention by the international community and the belligerent intransigence of the warring parties had thrown the purpose and method of the UNPROFOR mission into turmoil. The role and responsibilities of the commander on the ground were ill-defined. As the most senior UN official in Bosnia, Rose found himself faced with high expectations. These went beyond achieving purely “peacekeeping” successes. As there was not yet a peace to keep in Bosnia, a natural expectation that had emerged was that UN soldiers should play a role in “making” peace. But what role should this be? Soldiers understood—or at least they thought they understood—their role in making peace in a “traditional” international war. But in a conflict within a state, in which they represented an “impartial” and “neutral” “international community,” which did not wish to impose “its” peace by force, how should the military operate? In what ways and to what extent could they use their key professional attribute, force, in such a situation? For senior commanders, like Rose, this situation presented a strategic challenge of the first order and one for which the modern military at the time received little training or made little preparation.
all of whom have impressive chapters in this collection. These range from Bain's 'The pluralist s... more all of whom have impressive chapters in this collection. These range from Bain's 'The pluralist solidarist debate in the English School', to Cochran's 'Normative theory in the English School'. Finally, Yongjin Zhang's concluding chapter deals impressively with the 'Global diffusion of the English School'. The insights he offers are fascinating, especially with reference to the School's impact-as Green summarizes, an inspiration 'for non-Western or "post-Western" IR theorising' (p. 5).
German Historical Institute London Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 54–58, May 2008
Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 217-218, 2006
German History, May 2006
Uwe Tresp notes in his very substantialstudy ofa major late-medieval recruiting ground for mercen... more Uwe Tresp notes in his very substantialstudy ofa major late-medieval recruiting ground for mercenaries that there are not many detailed studies of the trade. One might have expected more, not only because of their importance to political and social history, but also because ...
Icon, vol. 4, pp. 235–239, 1998