Joe Maiolo | King's College London (original) (raw)

Books by Joe Maiolo

An academic directory and search engine.

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twen... more War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-five eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.

This hugely successful global history of the twentieth century is written by four prominent inter... more This hugely successful global history of the twentieth century is written by four prominent international historians for first-year undergraduate level and upward.

Using their thematic and regional expertise, the authors have produced an authoritative yet accessible and seamless account of the history of international relations in the last century, covering events in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. They focus on the history of relations between states and on the broad ideological, economic and cultural forces that have influenced the evolution of international politics over the past one hundred years.

The third edition is thoroughly updated throughout to take account of the most recent research and global developments, and includes a new chapter on the international history of human rights and its advocacy organizations, including NGOs.

Additional new features include:

New material on the Arab Spring, including specific focus on Libya and Syria
Increased debate on the question of US decline and the rise of China.
A timeline to give increased context to those studying the topic for the first time.
A fully revised companion website including links to further resources and self-testing material can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/best
Antony Best is Associate Professor in International History at the London School of Economics. Jussi M. Hanhimäki is Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. Joseph A. Maiolo is Professor of International History at the Department of War Studies, Kings College London. Kirsten E. Schulze is Associate Professor in International History at the London School of Economics.

This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within... more This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.

Papers by Joe Maiolo

The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to ... more The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn’s preoccupation with national discourses at the expense of international structures and processes is diverting the field away from the analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The author argues that international history should distinguish itself from global and transnational history by drawing clear yet open disciplinary boundaries. Every field of inquiry needs some consensus about what it is, where it is going and why: in other words, an identity, purpose, and values. The author argues that what defines international history is its focus on the origins, structures, processes, and outcomes of international politics, above all the causes of war and the conditions of peace.

Britain in Global Politics Volume 1, 2013

This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the his... more This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the historiography of twentieth-century inter- national history and the origins of the Second World War in Europe. It sets out his characteristic approach to the field, espe- cially the emphasis he placed on the beliefs and perceptions of key decision-makers in the international system in explaining how and why events occurred the way they did. This essay suggests that Donald Watt’s approach to international history was shaped by the connexion he felt with the post-1919 founders of the field and by his own experiences in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

Journal of Contemporary History, 2011

The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal ‘merchant of death’... more The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal ‘merchant of death’. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff’s wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financial director of the arms-maker Vickers, played a key role in making Zaharoff’s services available to prime ministers Asquith and Lloyd George. While Zaharoff has often been portrayed as a sinister force, manipulating statesmen into pursuing his financial and political interests, the reality was the reverse. Zaharoff was a convenient tool of two prime ministers rather than a powerful political manipulator in his own right.

The early setbacks suffered by the Royal Navy during the Second World War have long coloured hist... more The early setbacks suffered by the Royal Navy during the Second World War have long coloured historians’ assessments of the navy’s standing during the interwar years, with a consensus settling around a narrative of decline. Yet Joseph A Maiolo argues that, following the strategic victory of the First World War, the Admiralty manoeuvred with great agility to respond to, and curtail, the rise of other naval powers such as the US, Japan and Germany without setting in motion another naval arms race. The result was that by 1939, the Royal Navy was well positioned to play its part in the second global conflict of the twentieth century.

The present article explores in the context of these broader issues one long-neglected episode in... more The present article explores in the context of these broader issues one long-neglected episode in the history of Anglo-Soviet relations. Most studies of Anglo-Soviet relations focus either on 1934–5, when the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations and signed mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, and diplomatic relations between London and Moscow first began to improve, or, on the spring and summer of 1939 when Hitler destroyed the Munich settlement, when London and Paris extended security guarantees to eastern Europe, specifically Poland and Romania, and when the triple alliance talks with Moscow stalled, and the Nazi–Soviet pact was concluded. In contrast, this article will reconstruct Anglo-Soviet naval armaments diplomacy from 1935 to 1939 from British and Russian archival sources.4 Although this aspect of Anglo-Soviet relations has not attracted attention until very recently, naval armaments diplomacy touched upon long-term strategic concerns vital for both London and Moscow: Britain, the world’s largest maritime empire and naval power, was endeavouring to maintain its place at the top; after a long phase of relative neglect in the 1920s, the USSR was beginning to rebuild its fleet in earnest to counter growing threats in Europe and Asia.
Neither a lack of realism nor visceral anti-communism drove British policy towards the Soviet Union. Likewise Soviet policy was driven neither by an idealistic search for peace through arms control nor by a naïve faith in British open-handedness.

J. Maiolo & P. Jackson, ‘Strategic Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in A... more J. Maiolo & P. Jackson, ‘Strategic Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War’, Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift Vol. 65, No. 2 (2006), ISSN 0026-3826,s pp. 417-61.

This essay examines the key role played by intelligence and deception in the interactive process... more This essay examines the key role played by intelligence and deception in the interactive process of British and German preparations in the 1930s for U-boat warfare. It argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as an 'antidote' to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti-submarine defences. This British campaign of deception had a discernible impact. Before the outbreak of World War II, the German Navy failed to discover the realities behind ASDIC's image, and this intelligence failure helped to shape U-boat policy.

This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions ... more This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions and capabilities in the nineteen-thirties. It demonstrates that the British Naval Staff developed through a methodical war planning process a distinct image of Germany's sea strategy. As the planning process advanced, the Naval Staff became convinced by a steady influx of reliable intelligence that German strategists intended in a future war to launch an aggressive air-sea offensive against British sea lines of communication. British naval planners maintained that the only way in which German surface and subsurface forces could be made deadly was to combine them with a rapid all-out air strike on the British import system. Germany did not launch this `knockout blow' in 1939, but its elaboration by the Admiralty illustrates that the Royal Navy's appreciation of German strategy at sea was far more sophisticated, prudent and informed than historians have previously acknowledged.

An academic directory and search engine.

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twen... more War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-five eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.

This hugely successful global history of the twentieth century is written by four prominent inter... more This hugely successful global history of the twentieth century is written by four prominent international historians for first-year undergraduate level and upward.

Using their thematic and regional expertise, the authors have produced an authoritative yet accessible and seamless account of the history of international relations in the last century, covering events in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. They focus on the history of relations between states and on the broad ideological, economic and cultural forces that have influenced the evolution of international politics over the past one hundred years.

The third edition is thoroughly updated throughout to take account of the most recent research and global developments, and includes a new chapter on the international history of human rights and its advocacy organizations, including NGOs.

Additional new features include:

New material on the Arab Spring, including specific focus on Libya and Syria
Increased debate on the question of US decline and the rise of China.
A timeline to give increased context to those studying the topic for the first time.
A fully revised companion website including links to further resources and self-testing material can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/best
Antony Best is Associate Professor in International History at the London School of Economics. Jussi M. Hanhimäki is Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. Joseph A. Maiolo is Professor of International History at the Department of War Studies, Kings College London. Kirsten E. Schulze is Associate Professor in International History at the London School of Economics.

This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within... more This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.

The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to ... more The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn’s preoccupation with national discourses at the expense of international structures and processes is diverting the field away from the analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The author argues that international history should distinguish itself from global and transnational history by drawing clear yet open disciplinary boundaries. Every field of inquiry needs some consensus about what it is, where it is going and why: in other words, an identity, purpose, and values. The author argues that what defines international history is its focus on the origins, structures, processes, and outcomes of international politics, above all the causes of war and the conditions of peace.

Britain in Global Politics Volume 1, 2013

This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the his... more This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the historiography of twentieth-century inter- national history and the origins of the Second World War in Europe. It sets out his characteristic approach to the field, espe- cially the emphasis he placed on the beliefs and perceptions of key decision-makers in the international system in explaining how and why events occurred the way they did. This essay suggests that Donald Watt’s approach to international history was shaped by the connexion he felt with the post-1919 founders of the field and by his own experiences in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

Journal of Contemporary History, 2011

The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal ‘merchant of death’... more The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal ‘merchant of death’. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff’s wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financial director of the arms-maker Vickers, played a key role in making Zaharoff’s services available to prime ministers Asquith and Lloyd George. While Zaharoff has often been portrayed as a sinister force, manipulating statesmen into pursuing his financial and political interests, the reality was the reverse. Zaharoff was a convenient tool of two prime ministers rather than a powerful political manipulator in his own right.

The early setbacks suffered by the Royal Navy during the Second World War have long coloured hist... more The early setbacks suffered by the Royal Navy during the Second World War have long coloured historians’ assessments of the navy’s standing during the interwar years, with a consensus settling around a narrative of decline. Yet Joseph A Maiolo argues that, following the strategic victory of the First World War, the Admiralty manoeuvred with great agility to respond to, and curtail, the rise of other naval powers such as the US, Japan and Germany without setting in motion another naval arms race. The result was that by 1939, the Royal Navy was well positioned to play its part in the second global conflict of the twentieth century.

The present article explores in the context of these broader issues one long-neglected episode in... more The present article explores in the context of these broader issues one long-neglected episode in the history of Anglo-Soviet relations. Most studies of Anglo-Soviet relations focus either on 1934–5, when the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations and signed mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, and diplomatic relations between London and Moscow first began to improve, or, on the spring and summer of 1939 when Hitler destroyed the Munich settlement, when London and Paris extended security guarantees to eastern Europe, specifically Poland and Romania, and when the triple alliance talks with Moscow stalled, and the Nazi–Soviet pact was concluded. In contrast, this article will reconstruct Anglo-Soviet naval armaments diplomacy from 1935 to 1939 from British and Russian archival sources.4 Although this aspect of Anglo-Soviet relations has not attracted attention until very recently, naval armaments diplomacy touched upon long-term strategic concerns vital for both London and Moscow: Britain, the world’s largest maritime empire and naval power, was endeavouring to maintain its place at the top; after a long phase of relative neglect in the 1920s, the USSR was beginning to rebuild its fleet in earnest to counter growing threats in Europe and Asia.
Neither a lack of realism nor visceral anti-communism drove British policy towards the Soviet Union. Likewise Soviet policy was driven neither by an idealistic search for peace through arms control nor by a naïve faith in British open-handedness.

J. Maiolo & P. Jackson, ‘Strategic Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in A... more J. Maiolo & P. Jackson, ‘Strategic Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War’, Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift Vol. 65, No. 2 (2006), ISSN 0026-3826,s pp. 417-61.

This essay examines the key role played by intelligence and deception in the interactive process... more This essay examines the key role played by intelligence and deception in the interactive process of British and German preparations in the 1930s for U-boat warfare. It argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as an 'antidote' to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti-submarine defences. This British campaign of deception had a discernible impact. Before the outbreak of World War II, the German Navy failed to discover the realities behind ASDIC's image, and this intelligence failure helped to shape U-boat policy.

This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions ... more This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions and capabilities in the nineteen-thirties. It demonstrates that the British Naval Staff developed through a methodical war planning process a distinct image of Germany's sea strategy. As the planning process advanced, the Naval Staff became convinced by a steady influx of reliable intelligence that German strategists intended in a future war to launch an aggressive air-sea offensive against British sea lines of communication. British naval planners maintained that the only way in which German surface and subsurface forces could be made deadly was to combine them with a rapid all-out air strike on the British import system. Germany did not launch this `knockout blow' in 1939, but its elaboration by the Admiralty illustrates that the Royal Navy's appreciation of German strategy at sea was far more sophisticated, prudent and informed than historians have previously acknowledged.

American Historical Review, 2001

This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler wi... more This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.