Katinka Quintelier | Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition (original) (raw)
Papers by Katinka Quintelier
abstract Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel (1983), argue tha... more abstract Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel (1983), argue that children and adults in different cultures make a distinction between moral and conventional transgressions. One interpretation of the theory holds that moral transgressions elicit a signature moral response pattern while conventional transgressions elicit a signature conventional response pattern (eg, Kelly et al. 2007). Four dimensions distinguish the moral response pattern from the conventional response pattern (eg, Nichols 2004). 1.
A growing number of moral philosophers and scientists draw on scientific knowledge concerning 'hu... more A growing number of moral philosophers and scientists draw on scientific knowledge concerning 'human nature'to readdress meta-ethical and normative questions. In this symposium, we investigate our 'evolved moral nature'and we consider the impact of this knowledge on moral philosophy. First, we explore the building blocks of moral behaviour; second, we focus on individual differences in moral psychology.
In de filosofische literatuur is er niet altijd eenduidigheid in het gebruik van termen. Auteurs ... more In de filosofische literatuur is er niet altijd eenduidigheid in het gebruik van termen. Auteurs zoals Ruse en Wilson [1], beweren dat, dankzij vooruitgang in de kennis over de evolutie van de mens, het gronden van ethiek in de natuur mogelijk is. Van tijd tot tijd wordt daarmee bedoelt dat je morele regels afleidt uit beschrijvende uitspraken. En deze afleiding is een veelbestreden denkfout. Om te weten of Wilson, Ruse, of anderen een denkfout maken, moet je dus wel eerst goed weten wat ze bedoelen met 'gronden'.
Abstract In veel aquatische ecosytemen is decompositie het belangrijkste proces voor de afbraak v... more Abstract In veel aquatische ecosytemen is decompositie het belangrijkste proces voor de afbraak van organisch materiaal en recyclage van nutriënten. Bacteria zijn de belangrijkste decomposers in mariene ecosystemen, en alles wat deze microfauna beïnvloedt zal dan ook een effect hebben op de afbraak van organisch materiaal. Behalve abiotische factoren en de kwaliteit van het detritus, hebben andere organismen zo een invloed op de decompositie, door hun invloed op de microbiële activiteit.
3 to be–there is a gap between 'is' and 'ought'. Thus, the fact that we disagree about what right... more 3 to be–there is a gap between 'is' and 'ought'. Thus, the fact that we disagree about what right and wrong does not imply that different moral views are equally true or that we are permitted to do different things, and, relevant to this context, the existence of individual differences in moral cognition is not a sufficient reason to support moral relativism or toleration. On the other hand, it is not really clear how broad this gap is, and what exactly does or does not follow from it.
De eerste zin is altijd de moeilijkste. Goed, de rest is ook niet vanzelf gekomen, maar eens de k... more De eerste zin is altijd de moeilijkste. Goed, de rest is ook niet vanzelf gekomen, maar eens de kop er af was, konik spreken van enige voortgang. Tijdens het schrijven van deze thesis zijn er zeer veel mensen geweest die op verschillende, en overwachte momenten, voor steun hebben gezorgd. Waarschijnlijk zullen sommigen mij momenteel ontglippen, maar ik draag ze toch een warm hart toe. Allereerst heeft mijn promotor, Johan Braeckman, me op dit pad gebracht, wat een goede zaak was.
Vrouwen hebben te maken met een kleverige vloer, lekkende pijplijnen, vertraagde treinen, én een ... more Vrouwen hebben te maken met een kleverige vloer, lekkende pijplijnen, vertraagde treinen, én een glazen plafond.
This study reports results from the first International Body Project (IBP-I), which surveyed 7,43... more This study reports results from the first International Body Project (IBP-I), which surveyed 7,434 individuals in 10 major world regions about body weight ideals and body dissatisfaction. Participants completed the female Contour Drawing Figure Rating Scale (CDFRS) and self-reported their exposure to Western and local media. Results indicated there were significant cross-regional differences in the ideal female figure and body dissatisfaction, but effect sizes were small across high-socioeconomic-status (SES) sites. Within cultures, heavier bodies were preferred in low-SES sites compared to high-SES sites in Malaysia and South Africa (ds = 1.94-2.49) but not in Austria. Participant age, body mass index (BMI), and Western media exposure predicted body weight ideals. BMI and Western media exposure predicted body dissatisfaction among women. Our results show that body dissatisfaction and desire for thinness is commonplace in high-SES settings across world regions, highlighting the need for international attention to this problem.
A chapter submitted for inclusion in Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion, edited by Richard Joyce,... more A chapter submitted for inclusion in Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion, edited by Richard Joyce, Kim Sterelny, and Brett Calcott. MIT Press.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We a... more Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
Individual differences in moral attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use are often explain... more Individual differences in moral attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use are often explained as the downstream effect of more general variables such as political and religious ideology or personality traits. Alternatively, a recent proposal suggests that attitudes towards recreational drug use are influenced by attitudes towards sexual promiscuity and that this relationship cannot be explained by ideological/personal variables. In this study, we investigate student samples from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Japan. We find that although relationships between general variables and drug attitudes vary widely across samples, in all samples attitudes towards sexual promiscuity are strongly related to attitudes towards recreational drug use.
Previous empirical studies on folk morality either treat moral relativism as a unitary concept, o... more Previous empirical studies on folk morality either treat moral relativism as a unitary concept, or focus on appraiser relativism, thereby neglecting the possibility of agent relativism. In this study, we ask if lay people’s moral speech acts are also in accord with agent relativism. In two manipulations, we find comparable frequencies of agent relativists. Our study confirms the presence of moral relativism in lay people’s moral judgments, and shows that individuals may adhere to different kinds of relativism.
There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts, namely, on the one ha... more There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts, namely, on the one hand, acts that are generalizably wrong because they go against universal principles of harm, justice or rights, and, on the other hand, acts that are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. In this paper we criticize existing methods that measure generalizability. We report new findings that indicate that a modification of generalizability measures is in order. We discuss our findings in light of recent criticisms of moral/conventional research.
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescr... more Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of
relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.
Een funderingsethiek tracht morele theorieën onweerlegbaar af te leiden uit één of enkele morele ... more Een funderingsethiek tracht morele theorieën onweerlegbaar af te leiden uit één of enkele morele fundamenten. Een wetenschappelijke ethiek meent dat dit niet kan en niet hoeft. De evolutionaire ethiek is in de loop van twee eeuwen veranderd van een funderingsethiek naar een wetenschappelijke ethiek. Aan de hand van haar geschiedenis geef ik argumenten voor een normatieve ethiek zonder absolute fundering. Ik leg uit hoe wetenschap relevant kan zijn voor normatieve ethiek. Tenslotte bespreek ik nog enkele vertegenwoordigers van een wetenschappelijke ethiek in de filosofische literatuur. Ik besluit dat een wetenschappelijke ethiek waarschijnlijk beter werkt dan een funderingsethiek, maar meer empirisch onderzoek is nodig.
De hier besproken versie van moreel relativisme houdt in dat we moeten verdragen dat andere mense... more De hier besproken versie van moreel relativisme houdt in dat we moeten verdragen dat andere mensen morele oordelen hebben die niet verenigbaar zijn met onze eigen oordelen. Bepaalde filosofen verwijzen recent naar de nieuwste bevindingen in de moraalpsychologie om een haalbare versie van dit moreel relativisme te verdedigen. Ik evalueer één van deze redeneringen en argumenteer dat de besproken versie, hoewel zij niet in tegenspraak is met de werking van ons morele vermogen, beperkt is door haar eigen normatieve vooronderstellingen. De besproken auteur maakt dus succesvol gebruik van empirische informatie zoals deze verkregen door experimentele filosofen; daarbij ziet hij echter de eigen niet-empirische, normatieve vooronderstellingen over het hoofd.
The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is... more The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to
provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific
insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational
ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies
the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative
decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.
Talks by Katinka Quintelier
Sexual selection predicts that women will evolve behavioral strategies that improve the survival ... more Sexual selection predicts that women will evolve behavioral strategies that improve the survival of related children. Recently, ‘cooperative breeding’ is put forward as an evolved solution to the problem of child-rearing since Homo erectus (Hrdy, 2005). This theory postulates that women need help to raise their children. Anthropological data suggest that this help is important for the survival of the child, and that it comes primarily from female kin (e.g. Sear & Mace, 2008). If cooperation among related women is an evolved solution to the problem of child-care, we can expect that related women will augment
cooperation in a context of cooperative breeding. To test this, I translated this to an experimental setting. Men and women were asked to play an investment game. Facial similarity was used as a proxy of relatedness (DeBruine et al., 2008). A context of cooperative breeding was elicited by showing baby pictures. Unfortunately, the results were not entirely clear-cut. I will discuss the results of this experiment and their relevance for the cooperative breeding hypothesis.
abstract Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel (1983), argue tha... more abstract Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel (1983), argue that children and adults in different cultures make a distinction between moral and conventional transgressions. One interpretation of the theory holds that moral transgressions elicit a signature moral response pattern while conventional transgressions elicit a signature conventional response pattern (eg, Kelly et al. 2007). Four dimensions distinguish the moral response pattern from the conventional response pattern (eg, Nichols 2004). 1.
A growing number of moral philosophers and scientists draw on scientific knowledge concerning 'hu... more A growing number of moral philosophers and scientists draw on scientific knowledge concerning 'human nature'to readdress meta-ethical and normative questions. In this symposium, we investigate our 'evolved moral nature'and we consider the impact of this knowledge on moral philosophy. First, we explore the building blocks of moral behaviour; second, we focus on individual differences in moral psychology.
In de filosofische literatuur is er niet altijd eenduidigheid in het gebruik van termen. Auteurs ... more In de filosofische literatuur is er niet altijd eenduidigheid in het gebruik van termen. Auteurs zoals Ruse en Wilson [1], beweren dat, dankzij vooruitgang in de kennis over de evolutie van de mens, het gronden van ethiek in de natuur mogelijk is. Van tijd tot tijd wordt daarmee bedoelt dat je morele regels afleidt uit beschrijvende uitspraken. En deze afleiding is een veelbestreden denkfout. Om te weten of Wilson, Ruse, of anderen een denkfout maken, moet je dus wel eerst goed weten wat ze bedoelen met 'gronden'.
Abstract In veel aquatische ecosytemen is decompositie het belangrijkste proces voor de afbraak v... more Abstract In veel aquatische ecosytemen is decompositie het belangrijkste proces voor de afbraak van organisch materiaal en recyclage van nutriënten. Bacteria zijn de belangrijkste decomposers in mariene ecosystemen, en alles wat deze microfauna beïnvloedt zal dan ook een effect hebben op de afbraak van organisch materiaal. Behalve abiotische factoren en de kwaliteit van het detritus, hebben andere organismen zo een invloed op de decompositie, door hun invloed op de microbiële activiteit.
3 to be–there is a gap between 'is' and 'ought'. Thus, the fact that we disagree about what right... more 3 to be–there is a gap between 'is' and 'ought'. Thus, the fact that we disagree about what right and wrong does not imply that different moral views are equally true or that we are permitted to do different things, and, relevant to this context, the existence of individual differences in moral cognition is not a sufficient reason to support moral relativism or toleration. On the other hand, it is not really clear how broad this gap is, and what exactly does or does not follow from it.
De eerste zin is altijd de moeilijkste. Goed, de rest is ook niet vanzelf gekomen, maar eens de k... more De eerste zin is altijd de moeilijkste. Goed, de rest is ook niet vanzelf gekomen, maar eens de kop er af was, konik spreken van enige voortgang. Tijdens het schrijven van deze thesis zijn er zeer veel mensen geweest die op verschillende, en overwachte momenten, voor steun hebben gezorgd. Waarschijnlijk zullen sommigen mij momenteel ontglippen, maar ik draag ze toch een warm hart toe. Allereerst heeft mijn promotor, Johan Braeckman, me op dit pad gebracht, wat een goede zaak was.
Vrouwen hebben te maken met een kleverige vloer, lekkende pijplijnen, vertraagde treinen, én een ... more Vrouwen hebben te maken met een kleverige vloer, lekkende pijplijnen, vertraagde treinen, én een glazen plafond.
This study reports results from the first International Body Project (IBP-I), which surveyed 7,43... more This study reports results from the first International Body Project (IBP-I), which surveyed 7,434 individuals in 10 major world regions about body weight ideals and body dissatisfaction. Participants completed the female Contour Drawing Figure Rating Scale (CDFRS) and self-reported their exposure to Western and local media. Results indicated there were significant cross-regional differences in the ideal female figure and body dissatisfaction, but effect sizes were small across high-socioeconomic-status (SES) sites. Within cultures, heavier bodies were preferred in low-SES sites compared to high-SES sites in Malaysia and South Africa (ds = 1.94-2.49) but not in Austria. Participant age, body mass index (BMI), and Western media exposure predicted body weight ideals. BMI and Western media exposure predicted body dissatisfaction among women. Our results show that body dissatisfaction and desire for thinness is commonplace in high-SES settings across world regions, highlighting the need for international attention to this problem.
A chapter submitted for inclusion in Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion, edited by Richard Joyce,... more A chapter submitted for inclusion in Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion, edited by Richard Joyce, Kim Sterelny, and Brett Calcott. MIT Press.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We a... more Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
Individual differences in moral attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use are often explain... more Individual differences in moral attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use are often explained as the downstream effect of more general variables such as political and religious ideology or personality traits. Alternatively, a recent proposal suggests that attitudes towards recreational drug use are influenced by attitudes towards sexual promiscuity and that this relationship cannot be explained by ideological/personal variables. In this study, we investigate student samples from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Japan. We find that although relationships between general variables and drug attitudes vary widely across samples, in all samples attitudes towards sexual promiscuity are strongly related to attitudes towards recreational drug use.
Previous empirical studies on folk morality either treat moral relativism as a unitary concept, o... more Previous empirical studies on folk morality either treat moral relativism as a unitary concept, or focus on appraiser relativism, thereby neglecting the possibility of agent relativism. In this study, we ask if lay people’s moral speech acts are also in accord with agent relativism. In two manipulations, we find comparable frequencies of agent relativists. Our study confirms the presence of moral relativism in lay people’s moral judgments, and shows that individuals may adhere to different kinds of relativism.
There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts, namely, on the one ha... more There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts, namely, on the one hand, acts that are generalizably wrong because they go against universal principles of harm, justice or rights, and, on the other hand, acts that are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. In this paper we criticize existing methods that measure generalizability. We report new findings that indicate that a modification of generalizability measures is in order. We discuss our findings in light of recent criticisms of moral/conventional research.
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescr... more Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of
relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.
Een funderingsethiek tracht morele theorieën onweerlegbaar af te leiden uit één of enkele morele ... more Een funderingsethiek tracht morele theorieën onweerlegbaar af te leiden uit één of enkele morele fundamenten. Een wetenschappelijke ethiek meent dat dit niet kan en niet hoeft. De evolutionaire ethiek is in de loop van twee eeuwen veranderd van een funderingsethiek naar een wetenschappelijke ethiek. Aan de hand van haar geschiedenis geef ik argumenten voor een normatieve ethiek zonder absolute fundering. Ik leg uit hoe wetenschap relevant kan zijn voor normatieve ethiek. Tenslotte bespreek ik nog enkele vertegenwoordigers van een wetenschappelijke ethiek in de filosofische literatuur. Ik besluit dat een wetenschappelijke ethiek waarschijnlijk beter werkt dan een funderingsethiek, maar meer empirisch onderzoek is nodig.
De hier besproken versie van moreel relativisme houdt in dat we moeten verdragen dat andere mense... more De hier besproken versie van moreel relativisme houdt in dat we moeten verdragen dat andere mensen morele oordelen hebben die niet verenigbaar zijn met onze eigen oordelen. Bepaalde filosofen verwijzen recent naar de nieuwste bevindingen in de moraalpsychologie om een haalbare versie van dit moreel relativisme te verdedigen. Ik evalueer één van deze redeneringen en argumenteer dat de besproken versie, hoewel zij niet in tegenspraak is met de werking van ons morele vermogen, beperkt is door haar eigen normatieve vooronderstellingen. De besproken auteur maakt dus succesvol gebruik van empirische informatie zoals deze verkregen door experimentele filosofen; daarbij ziet hij echter de eigen niet-empirische, normatieve vooronderstellingen over het hoofd.
The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is... more The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to
provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific
insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational
ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies
the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative
decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.
Sexual selection predicts that women will evolve behavioral strategies that improve the survival ... more Sexual selection predicts that women will evolve behavioral strategies that improve the survival of related children. Recently, ‘cooperative breeding’ is put forward as an evolved solution to the problem of child-rearing since Homo erectus (Hrdy, 2005). This theory postulates that women need help to raise their children. Anthropological data suggest that this help is important for the survival of the child, and that it comes primarily from female kin (e.g. Sear & Mace, 2008). If cooperation among related women is an evolved solution to the problem of child-care, we can expect that related women will augment
cooperation in a context of cooperative breeding. To test this, I translated this to an experimental setting. Men and women were asked to play an investment game. Facial similarity was used as a proxy of relatedness (DeBruine et al., 2008). A context of cooperative breeding was elicited by showing baby pictures. Unfortunately, the results were not entirely clear-cut. I will discuss the results of this experiment and their relevance for the cooperative breeding hypothesis.
State of the Art (max. 1.800 characters including spaces -ca. 300 words) [1.775] Indicate the sta... more State of the Art (max. 1.800 characters including spaces -ca. 300 words) [1.775] Indicate the status quaestionis concerning the topic(s) you want to investigate. Philosophers [1, 2], psychologists [3], marketing, consumer [4] and communication [5] scientists make use of the notion of moral relativism. Broadly speaking, moral relativism is the philosophical theory that conflicting moral statements or acts can be equally acceptable, or true [6], or morally permissible [7]. Importantly, there are different theories of moral relativism such as agent relativism (moral acts are relativized to the actor) and appraiser relativism (moral statements are relativized to the speaker uttering the statement) [8, 9]. Problematically, it is not clear if and how other moral theories such as value pluralism (there are many values) [1] differ from moral relativism. Moreover, versions of moral relativism may be compatible with theories that are usually presented as its opposite, such as moral objectivism (moral statements are objectively true or false) [10]. At present, we do not know if different kinds of moral relativism can all be subsumed under one coherent concept that is still distinguishable from other moral theories. Empirical scientists have documented that individuals ('the folk') can be moral relativists [2, 4]. Certain philosophers and empirical scientists link moral relativism to tolerance [11] while others criticize moral relativism because endorsing it would lead to nihilism [12]. In this, philosophers and empirical scientists seem to discuss the same concept; however, it is not known if folk moral relativism maps onto philosophical moral relativism. Moreover, while researchers find correlations between folk moral theories and self-reports about hypothetical behavior [13], at present, it is not sufficiently studied to what extent individuals' relativism causes their actual behavioral reactions to moral issues. Objectives (max. 6.000 characters including spaces -ca. 1.000 words) [5.946] Describe the envisaged research and the research hypothesis, why it is important to the field, what impact it could have, whether and how it is specifically unconventional and challenging