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Papers by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
Standard theoretical arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and ex... more Standard theoretical arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. We employ a panel of 27 countries observed from 1820-2000 to explore whether institutional reforms have differential growth effects in monarchies and republics. A set of Barro-type regressions show that there are no significant growth differences between the two regime types and that the effects of incremental reforms do not differ between them, but that those of large-scale reforms do. Specifically, we find a strong "valley-of-tears" effect of large reforms in republics while monarchies benefit from such reforms in the ten-year perspective adopted here. We offer some tentative thoughts on the underlying mechanisms responsible for the results.
P. Kurrild-Klitgaard, L. Bille and T. Bryder (red.), Valg, …, 2000
Public Choice, 2010
Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the... more Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool resource problems may be solved voluntarily by rational individuals, even in situations that resemble Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The program, however, pays little attention to how individuals’ ability to exit may affect the interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situations, for worse or better. We argue why this is a worthwhile consideration and survey results from public choice and game theory.
Why constitutions matter. New Brunswick: …, 2002
Politica Tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, 2012
The Review of Austrian Economics, 2001
A comparison is made of the views on economic theory and method of the Austrian philosopher and s... more A comparison is made of the views on economic theory and method of the Austrian philosopher and sociologist Alfred Schütz and those of his mentor, the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises . Schütz basically agreed with the fundamental parts of the Austrian program, but he also had disagreements with Mises on the epistemological character of the core assumptions, on the formulation and status of the rationality principle, and on the use of ideal types in economic analysis. In several of these aspects Schütz had important points of value not only for the use of ideal types in economic modeling, but also within political science and sociology. In the end, however, there is more which unites than separates Schütz and Mises.
Political scientists and economists increasingly agree that institutions may influence economic g... more Political scientists and economists increasingly agree that institutions may influence economic growth, but there is little general agreement on what institutions tend to produce what consequences. We apply public choice insights for a theoretical analysis that may be termed "Madisonian": Institutions that divide political power between multiple veto players and institutions that protect private property rights may be expected to have positive effects on economic growth. We analyze data from a panel of countries for the period 1980-2000 in order to study the relationships, including a series of "extreme bounds" analyses in order to test the robustness of the statistical results. We find that particularly the presence of secure private property has a significant, positive and robust effect on economic growth and that when outliers are excluded a configuration where political power is dispersed among more veto players has a similar effect.
Public Choice, 2004
The constitutional choicefacing Iraq is addressed by drawing uponinsights from public choice theo... more The constitutional choicefacing Iraq is addressed by drawing uponinsights from public choice theory andconstitutional economics. Whether the oneor the other constitutional framework isadopted may potentially have importantlong-term consequences for the country andthe region. The U.S. administration'sdecision to revise its initial strategy, soas now to proceed with elections beforeputting a constitutional framework in placeseems to get things wrong and ispotentially a recipe for long-termdisaster.
Public Choice, 2000
... PETER KURRILD-KLITGAARD Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, DK-800... more ... PETER KURRILD-KLITGAARD Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, DK-8000, Denmark ... The reasons may be seen by contrasting the situation of, for example, a crownprince (ie, an heir apparent) in an autocratic regime with hereditary succession with ...
The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2003
All in all, it seems clear that the Miseskreis must have influenced Schutz significantly, and muc... more All in all, it seems clear that the Miseskreis must have influenced Schutz significantly, and much more than acknowledged by Wagner. Schutz participated in the seminar not only in the years in which he formed the foundations of his phenomenology, but even before this. After just three years at the university this group of friends and colleagues provided him with a forum of peers interested in the very same problems-the only forum he had, and probably the best he could possibly get, for formulating, developing, and presenting his own ideas.
... another line of research has focused on the dynamics of rebellious action and the role of exp... more ... another line of research has focused on the dynamics of rebellious action and the role of expectations (Gunning, 1972; Chalmers and Shelton, 1975; Roeder, 1982; Mason, 1984; DeNardo, 1985; Oberschall, 1993, 1994; Kuran, 1989, 1991, 1995; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 1997, 1998). ...
Journal Des Economistes Et Des Etudes Humaines, 2004
The paper outlines why and how political institutions, especially constitutional ones, matter for... more The paper outlines why and how political institutions, especially constitutional ones, matter for what decisions are made in the political process and thereby for how the economy functions. The main part contains a survey of empirical studies in this area. Among the things covered: the effects of political and economic freedom, not least property rights, on economic growth; how stricter
Public Choice, 2001
... I am very grateful to Otto Brøns-Petersen for his helpful comments and for having initially m... more ... I am very grateful to Otto Brøns-Petersen for his helpful comments and for having initially made me aware of the paradox, and to Marcus J. Schmidt for access to the data. ... Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 41 26 33 8 +2 Source: Borre and Andersen (1997: 96–97; Table 4.5) ...
Politica Tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, 2012
Standard theoretical arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and ex... more Standard theoretical arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. We employ a panel of 27 countries observed from 1820-2000 to explore whether institutional reforms have differential growth effects in monarchies and republics. A set of Barro-type regressions show that there are no significant growth differences between the two regime types and that the effects of incremental reforms do not differ between them, but that those of large-scale reforms do. Specifically, we find a strong "valley-of-tears" effect of large reforms in republics while monarchies benefit from such reforms in the ten-year perspective adopted here. We offer some tentative thoughts on the underlying mechanisms responsible for the results.
P. Kurrild-Klitgaard, L. Bille and T. Bryder (red.), Valg, …, 2000
Public Choice, 2010
Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the... more Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool resource problems may be solved voluntarily by rational individuals, even in situations that resemble Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The program, however, pays little attention to how individuals’ ability to exit may affect the interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situations, for worse or better. We argue why this is a worthwhile consideration and survey results from public choice and game theory.
Why constitutions matter. New Brunswick: …, 2002
Politica Tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, 2012
The Review of Austrian Economics, 2001
A comparison is made of the views on economic theory and method of the Austrian philosopher and s... more A comparison is made of the views on economic theory and method of the Austrian philosopher and sociologist Alfred Schütz and those of his mentor, the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises . Schütz basically agreed with the fundamental parts of the Austrian program, but he also had disagreements with Mises on the epistemological character of the core assumptions, on the formulation and status of the rationality principle, and on the use of ideal types in economic analysis. In several of these aspects Schütz had important points of value not only for the use of ideal types in economic modeling, but also within political science and sociology. In the end, however, there is more which unites than separates Schütz and Mises.
Political scientists and economists increasingly agree that institutions may influence economic g... more Political scientists and economists increasingly agree that institutions may influence economic growth, but there is little general agreement on what institutions tend to produce what consequences. We apply public choice insights for a theoretical analysis that may be termed "Madisonian": Institutions that divide political power between multiple veto players and institutions that protect private property rights may be expected to have positive effects on economic growth. We analyze data from a panel of countries for the period 1980-2000 in order to study the relationships, including a series of "extreme bounds" analyses in order to test the robustness of the statistical results. We find that particularly the presence of secure private property has a significant, positive and robust effect on economic growth and that when outliers are excluded a configuration where political power is dispersed among more veto players has a similar effect.
Public Choice, 2004
The constitutional choicefacing Iraq is addressed by drawing uponinsights from public choice theo... more The constitutional choicefacing Iraq is addressed by drawing uponinsights from public choice theory andconstitutional economics. Whether the oneor the other constitutional framework isadopted may potentially have importantlong-term consequences for the country andthe region. The U.S. administration'sdecision to revise its initial strategy, soas now to proceed with elections beforeputting a constitutional framework in placeseems to get things wrong and ispotentially a recipe for long-termdisaster.
Public Choice, 2000
... PETER KURRILD-KLITGAARD Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, DK-800... more ... PETER KURRILD-KLITGAARD Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, DK-8000, Denmark ... The reasons may be seen by contrasting the situation of, for example, a crownprince (ie, an heir apparent) in an autocratic regime with hereditary succession with ...
The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2003
All in all, it seems clear that the Miseskreis must have influenced Schutz significantly, and muc... more All in all, it seems clear that the Miseskreis must have influenced Schutz significantly, and much more than acknowledged by Wagner. Schutz participated in the seminar not only in the years in which he formed the foundations of his phenomenology, but even before this. After just three years at the university this group of friends and colleagues provided him with a forum of peers interested in the very same problems-the only forum he had, and probably the best he could possibly get, for formulating, developing, and presenting his own ideas.
... another line of research has focused on the dynamics of rebellious action and the role of exp... more ... another line of research has focused on the dynamics of rebellious action and the role of expectations (Gunning, 1972; Chalmers and Shelton, 1975; Roeder, 1982; Mason, 1984; DeNardo, 1985; Oberschall, 1993, 1994; Kuran, 1989, 1991, 1995; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 1997, 1998). ...
Journal Des Economistes Et Des Etudes Humaines, 2004
The paper outlines why and how political institutions, especially constitutional ones, matter for... more The paper outlines why and how political institutions, especially constitutional ones, matter for what decisions are made in the political process and thereby for how the economy functions. The main part contains a survey of empirical studies in this area. Among the things covered: the effects of political and economic freedom, not least property rights, on economic growth; how stricter
Public Choice, 2001
... I am very grateful to Otto Brøns-Petersen for his helpful comments and for having initially m... more ... I am very grateful to Otto Brøns-Petersen for his helpful comments and for having initially made me aware of the paradox, and to Marcus J. Schmidt for access to the data. ... Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 41 26 33 8 +2 Source: Borre and Andersen (1997: 96–97; Table 4.5) ...
Politica Tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, 2012