Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Wydawnictwo KUL eBooks, 2020
Preface to the English Edition so closely connected with crises in philosophy and the deteriorati... more Preface to the English Edition so closely connected with crises in philosophy and the deterioration of respect for human dignity. 1 The social role of philosophy stems in a way from our human nature. Kamiński writes: Everyone philosophizes in one way or another, regardless of whether one is aware of that or not. At any rate, it is impossible for a human being not to philosophize, for the human by his/her own nature wants to investigate the most profound reasons for everything, especially the reasons and meaning of the world, and human activity within it. Particularly in the decisive moments of one's life the human being confronts questions for which he/she does not find an answer in any science, art or life practice. 2 Andrzej Bronk, Kamiński's disciple, adds: A philosopher does not have ready recipes to organize the world. Although instant practical rebuilding of the world is not a task for philosophy comprehended as the Greek theoría, a philosophical point of view can turn out to be important and helpful. The impact of philosophy is long-term and in the field of the consciousness rather than in outright practice. Philosophizing is a way of fulfilling human intellectuality, and, naturally, it is not restricted to professional philosophers. Everyone who on his/her own is looking for answers to fundamental questions about the meaning of life, philosophizes. 3 John Paul II -Karol Wojtyła, a philosopher belonging to the Lublin School, who became pope -expresses a similar conviction in his encyclical Fides et ratio: Men and women have at their disposal an array of resources for generating greater knowledge of truth so that their lives may be ever more human. Among these is philosophy, which is directly concerned with 1
Filozoficzny Kontekst Nauki
[rec.] Nicholas Maxwell, How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser World: The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution
Mode 2 Science and its Consequences
Metodologia Nauk
Metodologia nauk, 2019
Teologia i Moralność
Transhumanistyczny projekt zbudowania „lepszego świata” ma zapewnić bytom czującym wszechogarniaj... more Transhumanistyczny projekt zbudowania „lepszego świata” ma zapewnić bytom czującym wszechogarniające szczęście. Filozofi a pokazuje, że życie szczęśliwe to trwałe, pełne, uzasadnione zadowolenie z całości życia jako sensownego. Takiego szczęścia „lepszy świat” nie oferuje. Sprowadza on szczęście do realizacji pragnień i doświadczania nowych rzeczy. Przez to szczęście staje się nieciągłym zbiorem przemijających „chwil szczęśliwych” i traci związek z prawdą i dobrem. Sam ciąg pragnień i doświadczeń nie wykreuje też sensu życia. Transhumanistyczne szczęście okazuje się więc iluzoryczne.
Ruch Filozoficzny
Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until ... more Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until recently it was claimed that the presence of non-cognitive values threatened the rationality and objectivity of science and it was a sign of a scientist’s weakness. This view appeared to be correct when cognitive and non-cognitive values were treated dichotomously, and science was seen as a set of theories and procedures. The analysis of science as a social practice shows however that this dichotomy cannot be maintained and that the scientist, when planning and conducting research, makes assumptions which include value judgments encompassing certain non-cognitive values. Ignoring the presence of non-cognitive values does not secure objectivity and rationality of science. On the contrary, since they are constitutive elements of scientific research, pretending that they do not work in research exposes science to ideologization. Rational subordination of science to them becomes a vehicle an...
Are There Things Which We Should Not Know?
<jats:p>It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the pu... more <jats:p>It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the publication of research results are purely methodological, and that any moral considerations refer only to research methods and uses of acquired knowledge. The arguments advanced in favor of this view appeal to the moral neutrality of scientific knowledge and the intrinsic value of truth. I argue that neither is valid. Moreover, I show three cases where a scientist's decision to begin research clearly bears moral relevance: (1) when starting an inquiry would create circumstances threatening some non-cognitive values; (2) when achieving a certain piece of knowledge would threaten the existence of the individual's private sphere; and (3) when there are reasons to think that humankind is not prepared to accumulate some knowledge. These cases do not prove the existence of some intrinsically 'morally forbidden topics,' but show that the moral permissibility of any given inquiry is not a priori guaranteed but needs to be judged in the same way that its methodological soundness is judged. Judgments concerning research topics have both methodological and moral aspects and these two cannot be separated under the threat of distorting science. Making such judgments requires knowledge not only of scientific methodology, but also of its social and philosophical implications. Philosophy is necessary in order to do good science.</jats:p>
Komodytyzacja prawdy - komodytyzacja nauki – komodytyzacja człowieka. Chrześcijańska odpowiedź
Academia in the Grip of the Wolf and Its Utopia
Minerva, 2021
In 2015, Willem Halffman and Hans Radder published in Minerva a paper, in which they diagnosed th... more In 2015, Willem Halffman and Hans Radder published in Minerva a paper, in which they diagnosed that our universities are colonized by “The Wolf of management.” Using the example of the reforms afflicting the Polish academic world, I show that this colonization has intensified, and apart from the processes described in the aforementioned paper, it brought consequences that have changed academic culture: research is subjected to publication policy, many academic activities are treated as a hobby, researchers must be in a stand-by mode to react quickly to new regulations, and responsibility for the institutional prestige is collective. I argue that the attempts to reduce research results into numbers and algorithms stem from a quest for objectivity and a mistrust of academics’ (and the Wolf’s) ability to pass fair judgments. The Wolf tries to realize a utopian dream: the building of a structure that by necessity secures the productivity of research, which in turn brings the prestige of institutions, ultimately measured by rankings. Yet, prestige is not an epistemic but rather a political value, and when academics are forced to aim at prestige, vital academic values are endangered. Any efficient resistance to the Wolf requires grassroots work on the part of academics. By reconsidering the nature of research and education as well as their role in society, academics might be able to develop viable alternatives to the “productivist university.” This requires cooperation with broader society. As such, the alternative of either remaining in the ivory tower or submitting to the Wolf is a false dilemma.
Nauka a Wartości
Metodologia nauk, 2019
Filozofia i Nauka, 2021
Ćwierć wieku temu John Ziman sformułował tezę, iż nauka akademicka i nauka przemysłowa stapiają s... more Ćwierć wieku temu John Ziman sformułował tezę, iż nauka akademicka i nauka przemysłowa stapiają się w jeden system nauki postakademickiej i zarazem postprzemysłowej, w którym Mertonowskie normy nauki akademickiej wyrażone akronimem CUDOS (communism, universalism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism) ustępują miejsca normom nauki przemysłowej wyrażonym akronimem PLACE (proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned, expert). W niniejszym artykule bronię tezy, iż ów system wyewoluował w system akademickiej nauki przemysłowej, której normy można wyrazić akronimem PRICE: patron relevant, innovative, competitive, econometrical. Reformowanie nauki akademickiej okazuje się wobec tego także jej re-normowaniem w zakresie i etyki, i organizacji badań. Źródłem owej transformacji jest utożsamienie wiedzy z towarem. Etyka badań naukowych przekształca się w etykę produkcji wiedzy, a instytucje naukowe to producenci wiedzy, która staje się "towarem epistemicznym", gdy jest na tenże fragment zapotrzebowanie jako na coś, co zaspokaja potrzeby "konsumentów". Naukowcy są zaś elementem procesu produkcji wiedzy, a sam ten proces podlega kalkulacjom rynkowym. Nie podważa to epistemicznej wartości danego projektu badawczego i jego wyników, ale prowadzi do kontrowersyjnych konsekwencji, m.in. do fragmentaryzacji i aspektualizacji wiedzy, związania kierunków badawczych z interesami podmiotów władzy i ignorowania krytyki transformatywnej. W rezultacie niekiedy to, co było w nauce Mertonowskiej traktowane jako zagrożenie czy wykroczenie przeciwko etosowi nauki okazuje się racjonalnym zachowaniem przedsiębiorcy funkcjonującego na rynku dóbr i usług epistemicznych. Akademicka nauka przemysłowa nie jest też w stanie pełnić w społeczeństwie ról poza-instrumentalnych (kształtowania światopoglądu, wspierania społecznej racjonalności, dostarczania niezależnych ekspertów), które pełniła nauka akademicka. Próby zapobiegania tym problemom czy zagrożeniom będą zaś z góry skazane na niepowodzenie, ponieważ środki zaradcze są oparte na innym rozumieniu wiedzy. Słowa kluczowe: nauka akademicka, nauka przemysłowa, akademicka nauka przemysłowa, etyka badań naukowych, etyka produkcji wiedzy, wiedza jako towar epistemiczny, poza-instrumentalne role nauki.
Armin Grunwald sketched a program of rational technology assessment (RTA) which binds TA and ethi... more Armin Grunwald sketched a program of rational technology assessment (RTA) which binds TA and ethics of technology in order to secure both an empirical dimension and a normative dimension of judgments evaluating technology. The paper suggests a way of radicalizing that program. Against the background of basic presuppositions of TA, first Grunwald's program is presented, and then it is argued that in order to fullfil its task of issuing value-judgments and recommendation for decision-makers, RTA needs to be imbedded in a philosophy which grasps a normative structure of reality. Only the those value-judgments obtain rational justification. Seeing value-judgments as judgments optimizing various values involved in technology or as "if-then" judgments (thus, ultimately descriptive judgments value-neutral) does not respect cognitive, practical and evaluative rationality which Grunwald required for his RTA. At the end a hypothesis is posed that classical philosophy developed by the Lublin School of Philosophy is a promising paradigm for RTA.
The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy" : między rygorem metodologicznym a polityczną poprawnością / Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Law and Business, 2021
AIs’ presence in and influence on human life is growing. AIs are seen more and more as autonomous... more AIs’ presence in and influence on human life is growing. AIs are seen more and more as autonomously acting agents, which creates a challenge to build ethics into their design. This paper defends the thesis that we need to equip AI with artificial conscience to make them capable of wise judgements. An argument is built in three steps. First, the concept of decision is presented, and second, the Asilomar Principles for AI development are analysed. It is then shown that to meet those principles AI needs the capability of passing moral judgements on right and wrong, of following that judgement, and of passing a meta-judgement on the correctness of a given moral judgement, which is a role of conscience. In classical philosophy, the ability to discover right and wrong and to stick to one's judgement of what is right action in given circumstances is called practical wisdom. The conclusion is that we should equip AI with artificial wisdom. Some problems stemming from ascribing moral age...
O kłamstwie / Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
[rec.] Alasdair MacIntyre, Bóg, filozofia, uniwersytety. Wybrane zagadnienia z historii katolickiej tradycji filozoficznej
Rational Decisions and Wise Decisions: Two Names for the Same Thing?
Rationality and Decision Making, 2018
Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 2019
agnieszka lekka-kowalik Ulepszanie człowieka w perspektywie filozoficznej, red. grzegorz hołub i ... more agnieszka lekka-kowalik Ulepszanie człowieka w perspektywie filozoficznej, red. grzegorz hołub i piotr duchliński, seria: Universum Ethicae Christianae, wydawnictwo naukowe akademii ignatianum w Krakowie, Kraków 2018, ss. 314 (w tym indeks osób)
Wydawnictwo KUL eBooks, 2020
Preface to the English Edition so closely connected with crises in philosophy and the deteriorati... more Preface to the English Edition so closely connected with crises in philosophy and the deterioration of respect for human dignity. 1 The social role of philosophy stems in a way from our human nature. Kamiński writes: Everyone philosophizes in one way or another, regardless of whether one is aware of that or not. At any rate, it is impossible for a human being not to philosophize, for the human by his/her own nature wants to investigate the most profound reasons for everything, especially the reasons and meaning of the world, and human activity within it. Particularly in the decisive moments of one's life the human being confronts questions for which he/she does not find an answer in any science, art or life practice. 2 Andrzej Bronk, Kamiński's disciple, adds: A philosopher does not have ready recipes to organize the world. Although instant practical rebuilding of the world is not a task for philosophy comprehended as the Greek theoría, a philosophical point of view can turn out to be important and helpful. The impact of philosophy is long-term and in the field of the consciousness rather than in outright practice. Philosophizing is a way of fulfilling human intellectuality, and, naturally, it is not restricted to professional philosophers. Everyone who on his/her own is looking for answers to fundamental questions about the meaning of life, philosophizes. 3 John Paul II -Karol Wojtyła, a philosopher belonging to the Lublin School, who became pope -expresses a similar conviction in his encyclical Fides et ratio: Men and women have at their disposal an array of resources for generating greater knowledge of truth so that their lives may be ever more human. Among these is philosophy, which is directly concerned with 1
Filozoficzny Kontekst Nauki
[rec.] Nicholas Maxwell, How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser World: The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution
Mode 2 Science and its Consequences
Metodologia Nauk
Metodologia nauk, 2019
Teologia i Moralność
Transhumanistyczny projekt zbudowania „lepszego świata” ma zapewnić bytom czującym wszechogarniaj... more Transhumanistyczny projekt zbudowania „lepszego świata” ma zapewnić bytom czującym wszechogarniające szczęście. Filozofi a pokazuje, że życie szczęśliwe to trwałe, pełne, uzasadnione zadowolenie z całości życia jako sensownego. Takiego szczęścia „lepszy świat” nie oferuje. Sprowadza on szczęście do realizacji pragnień i doświadczania nowych rzeczy. Przez to szczęście staje się nieciągłym zbiorem przemijających „chwil szczęśliwych” i traci związek z prawdą i dobrem. Sam ciąg pragnień i doświadczeń nie wykreuje też sensu życia. Transhumanistyczne szczęście okazuje się więc iluzoryczne.
Ruch Filozoficzny
Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until ... more Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until recently it was claimed that the presence of non-cognitive values threatened the rationality and objectivity of science and it was a sign of a scientist’s weakness. This view appeared to be correct when cognitive and non-cognitive values were treated dichotomously, and science was seen as a set of theories and procedures. The analysis of science as a social practice shows however that this dichotomy cannot be maintained and that the scientist, when planning and conducting research, makes assumptions which include value judgments encompassing certain non-cognitive values. Ignoring the presence of non-cognitive values does not secure objectivity and rationality of science. On the contrary, since they are constitutive elements of scientific research, pretending that they do not work in research exposes science to ideologization. Rational subordination of science to them becomes a vehicle an...
Are There Things Which We Should Not Know?
<jats:p>It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the pu... more <jats:p>It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the publication of research results are purely methodological, and that any moral considerations refer only to research methods and uses of acquired knowledge. The arguments advanced in favor of this view appeal to the moral neutrality of scientific knowledge and the intrinsic value of truth. I argue that neither is valid. Moreover, I show three cases where a scientist's decision to begin research clearly bears moral relevance: (1) when starting an inquiry would create circumstances threatening some non-cognitive values; (2) when achieving a certain piece of knowledge would threaten the existence of the individual's private sphere; and (3) when there are reasons to think that humankind is not prepared to accumulate some knowledge. These cases do not prove the existence of some intrinsically 'morally forbidden topics,' but show that the moral permissibility of any given inquiry is not a priori guaranteed but needs to be judged in the same way that its methodological soundness is judged. Judgments concerning research topics have both methodological and moral aspects and these two cannot be separated under the threat of distorting science. Making such judgments requires knowledge not only of scientific methodology, but also of its social and philosophical implications. Philosophy is necessary in order to do good science.</jats:p>
Komodytyzacja prawdy - komodytyzacja nauki – komodytyzacja człowieka. Chrześcijańska odpowiedź
Academia in the Grip of the Wolf and Its Utopia
Minerva, 2021
In 2015, Willem Halffman and Hans Radder published in Minerva a paper, in which they diagnosed th... more In 2015, Willem Halffman and Hans Radder published in Minerva a paper, in which they diagnosed that our universities are colonized by “The Wolf of management.” Using the example of the reforms afflicting the Polish academic world, I show that this colonization has intensified, and apart from the processes described in the aforementioned paper, it brought consequences that have changed academic culture: research is subjected to publication policy, many academic activities are treated as a hobby, researchers must be in a stand-by mode to react quickly to new regulations, and responsibility for the institutional prestige is collective. I argue that the attempts to reduce research results into numbers and algorithms stem from a quest for objectivity and a mistrust of academics’ (and the Wolf’s) ability to pass fair judgments. The Wolf tries to realize a utopian dream: the building of a structure that by necessity secures the productivity of research, which in turn brings the prestige of institutions, ultimately measured by rankings. Yet, prestige is not an epistemic but rather a political value, and when academics are forced to aim at prestige, vital academic values are endangered. Any efficient resistance to the Wolf requires grassroots work on the part of academics. By reconsidering the nature of research and education as well as their role in society, academics might be able to develop viable alternatives to the “productivist university.” This requires cooperation with broader society. As such, the alternative of either remaining in the ivory tower or submitting to the Wolf is a false dilemma.
Nauka a Wartości
Metodologia nauk, 2019
Filozofia i Nauka, 2021
Ćwierć wieku temu John Ziman sformułował tezę, iż nauka akademicka i nauka przemysłowa stapiają s... more Ćwierć wieku temu John Ziman sformułował tezę, iż nauka akademicka i nauka przemysłowa stapiają się w jeden system nauki postakademickiej i zarazem postprzemysłowej, w którym Mertonowskie normy nauki akademickiej wyrażone akronimem CUDOS (communism, universalism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism) ustępują miejsca normom nauki przemysłowej wyrażonym akronimem PLACE (proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned, expert). W niniejszym artykule bronię tezy, iż ów system wyewoluował w system akademickiej nauki przemysłowej, której normy można wyrazić akronimem PRICE: patron relevant, innovative, competitive, econometrical. Reformowanie nauki akademickiej okazuje się wobec tego także jej re-normowaniem w zakresie i etyki, i organizacji badań. Źródłem owej transformacji jest utożsamienie wiedzy z towarem. Etyka badań naukowych przekształca się w etykę produkcji wiedzy, a instytucje naukowe to producenci wiedzy, która staje się "towarem epistemicznym", gdy jest na tenże fragment zapotrzebowanie jako na coś, co zaspokaja potrzeby "konsumentów". Naukowcy są zaś elementem procesu produkcji wiedzy, a sam ten proces podlega kalkulacjom rynkowym. Nie podważa to epistemicznej wartości danego projektu badawczego i jego wyników, ale prowadzi do kontrowersyjnych konsekwencji, m.in. do fragmentaryzacji i aspektualizacji wiedzy, związania kierunków badawczych z interesami podmiotów władzy i ignorowania krytyki transformatywnej. W rezultacie niekiedy to, co było w nauce Mertonowskiej traktowane jako zagrożenie czy wykroczenie przeciwko etosowi nauki okazuje się racjonalnym zachowaniem przedsiębiorcy funkcjonującego na rynku dóbr i usług epistemicznych. Akademicka nauka przemysłowa nie jest też w stanie pełnić w społeczeństwie ról poza-instrumentalnych (kształtowania światopoglądu, wspierania społecznej racjonalności, dostarczania niezależnych ekspertów), które pełniła nauka akademicka. Próby zapobiegania tym problemom czy zagrożeniom będą zaś z góry skazane na niepowodzenie, ponieważ środki zaradcze są oparte na innym rozumieniu wiedzy. Słowa kluczowe: nauka akademicka, nauka przemysłowa, akademicka nauka przemysłowa, etyka badań naukowych, etyka produkcji wiedzy, wiedza jako towar epistemiczny, poza-instrumentalne role nauki.
Armin Grunwald sketched a program of rational technology assessment (RTA) which binds TA and ethi... more Armin Grunwald sketched a program of rational technology assessment (RTA) which binds TA and ethics of technology in order to secure both an empirical dimension and a normative dimension of judgments evaluating technology. The paper suggests a way of radicalizing that program. Against the background of basic presuppositions of TA, first Grunwald's program is presented, and then it is argued that in order to fullfil its task of issuing value-judgments and recommendation for decision-makers, RTA needs to be imbedded in a philosophy which grasps a normative structure of reality. Only the those value-judgments obtain rational justification. Seeing value-judgments as judgments optimizing various values involved in technology or as "if-then" judgments (thus, ultimately descriptive judgments value-neutral) does not respect cognitive, practical and evaluative rationality which Grunwald required for his RTA. At the end a hypothesis is posed that classical philosophy developed by the Lublin School of Philosophy is a promising paradigm for RTA.
The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy" : między rygorem metodologicznym a polityczną poprawnością / Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Law and Business, 2021
AIs’ presence in and influence on human life is growing. AIs are seen more and more as autonomous... more AIs’ presence in and influence on human life is growing. AIs are seen more and more as autonomously acting agents, which creates a challenge to build ethics into their design. This paper defends the thesis that we need to equip AI with artificial conscience to make them capable of wise judgements. An argument is built in three steps. First, the concept of decision is presented, and second, the Asilomar Principles for AI development are analysed. It is then shown that to meet those principles AI needs the capability of passing moral judgements on right and wrong, of following that judgement, and of passing a meta-judgement on the correctness of a given moral judgement, which is a role of conscience. In classical philosophy, the ability to discover right and wrong and to stick to one's judgement of what is right action in given circumstances is called practical wisdom. The conclusion is that we should equip AI with artificial wisdom. Some problems stemming from ascribing moral age...
O kłamstwie / Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
[rec.] Alasdair MacIntyre, Bóg, filozofia, uniwersytety. Wybrane zagadnienia z historii katolickiej tradycji filozoficznej
Rational Decisions and Wise Decisions: Two Names for the Same Thing?
Rationality and Decision Making, 2018
Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 2019
agnieszka lekka-kowalik Ulepszanie człowieka w perspektywie filozoficznej, red. grzegorz hołub i ... more agnieszka lekka-kowalik Ulepszanie człowieka w perspektywie filozoficznej, red. grzegorz hołub i piotr duchliński, seria: Universum Ethicae Christianae, wydawnictwo naukowe akademii ignatianum w Krakowie, Kraków 2018, ss. 314 (w tym indeks osób)