Sandra Rousseau | KU Leuven (original) (raw)
Papers by Sandra Rousseau
This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete c... more This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behaviour to change over time. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders if
Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empiric... more Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empirical questions concerning the use of emission standards. We find that the Becker result ("maximal fine / minimal inspection") does not hold if we include rule making, implementation and enforcement costs into the model. There is a balance between the fine and the inspection variables.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2012
The analysis jointly considers the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compl... more The analysis jointly considers the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and allows land users' behaviour to change over time. A distinction is made between compliance and participation incentives. Under conditions that are frequently observed in practice, we find that compliance incentives of program participants are variable over time, which can have a significant impact on the efficacy of conservation policies. We match existing enforcement policies with the rational actor model to demonstrate the effects of different kinds of penalty and monitoring schemes for a range of program participant characteristics. Land users are shown to have sizeable incentives to participate in compensation schemes, but their incentives for compliance with program requirements are considerable lower.
Scientometrics, 2008
Received October 4, 2007 Address for correspondence: SANDRA ROUSSEAU Center of Economic Studies, ... more Received October 4, 2007 Address for correspondence: SANDRA ROUSSEAU Center of Economic Studies, KULeuven, Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium E-mail: Sandra.Rousseau@econ.kuleuven.be ... 01389130/US $ 20.00 Copyright © 2008 ...
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007
Abstract Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natu-ral response to this sh... more Abstract Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natu-ral response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the ...
International Review of Law and Economics, 2009
a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: K42 illegal behavior and the enforcement of law Keyword... more a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: K42 illegal behavior and the enforcement of law Keywords: Enforcement Non-monetary instruments Warnings Measurement errors a b s t r a c t
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2010
Abstract This contribution focuses on the formulation of optimal inspection strategies and distin... more Abstract This contribution focuses on the formulation of optimal inspection strategies and distinguishes between a targeting approach and a filtered approach to monitoring. Using a case study for the Flemish textile industry, we investigate the costs and benefits associated with specific ...
In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental po... more In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental policy instruments in a general equilibrium framework. Goulder et al. (J.Pub.Econ., 1999) look into the choice of policy instruments in the presence of distortionary taxes. We extend this model by no longer assuming full compliance from firms. A violating firm is caught with a certain probability by the inspection agency. Once a violator is detected, he always has to pay a fine. With a positive, finite expected fine and a probability of detection smaller than unity, there will always be a certain proportion of noncompliance in the economy. We calculate the gross efficiency costs of different policy instruments (emission tax, output tax, tradable permits and technology mandate). We illustrate the model for different price instruments (emission tax, output tax and tradable permits). We find that the relative inefficiency of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes found in a secondbest setting with perfect compliance, is strongly decreased with imperfect compliance.
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmenta... more We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental policy instruments. We use a static partial equilibrium framework to study different combinations of regulatory instruments (taxes, standards…) and enforcement instruments (criminal fine, administrative fine…). The firms' compliance decisions depend on the instrument combination selected by the government. The model is used to compare the welfare effects of different instrument combinations for the textile industry in Flanders. We find that administrative, implementation, enforcement and monitoring costs are important to decide on the necessity of an environmental policy. Moreover, we show that emission taxes are not necessarily the most cost-effective instrument. This result holds even if we include industry heterogeneity. The decision of whether to pursue an environmental policy or not depends crucially on the formulation of an appropriate monitoring and enforcement policy.
In this paper we study the impact of the choice scenario on the willingness to accept the investm... more In this paper we study the impact of the choice scenario on the willingness to accept the investment in wind turbines in Flanders. We use two different scenarios in a stated choice experiment to elicit household preferences: one based on the decision to buy a house with particular characteristics in the neighborhood of a wind farm and one based on the decision to support a policy to locate a wind farm in the respondent’s municipality. By including three identical attributes to describe the wind farm in both scenarios, we are able to analyze the impact of the selected scenario on the WTA. Overall, the results of the main effects model are very similar from a qualitative perspective, but some important differences are found that need further research. The different scenarios seem to trigger a different mindset for the respondents. The housing scenario triggers a response dominated by private considerations, while the policy scenario seems to trigger a more public spirited response.
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 2015
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 2015
We investigate a researcher's preferences regarding the submission of a manuscript. We use a stat... more We investigate a researcher's preferences regarding the submission of a manuscript. We use a stated choice experiment to study researcher preferences in the discipline of information sciences and investigate the relative importance of different journal characteristics in convincing potential authors to submit. The analysis distinguishes high quality from standard quality papers and focuses on the question whether communicating acceptance rates rather than rejection rates leads to other submission decisions. This is an example of 'framing'. Our results show that a positive framing effect might be present when submitting a high quality paper. No evidence of a framing effect is found when submitting a standard quality paper. From a journal marketing perspective, communicating acceptance rates rather than rejection rates might be a better strategy to convince researchers to submit to their journal.
Environmental Policy and Governance, 2014
ABSTRACT
Waste Management, 2015
A possible solution for the oversupply of dredged sediments is their use as a raw material in bri... more A possible solution for the oversupply of dredged sediments is their use as a raw material in brick production. Despite the fact that several examples (e.g., Agostini et al., 2007; Hamer and Karius, 2002; Xu et al., 2014) show that this application is feasible, some economic, technical and social limitations interfere with the development of a market of dredged materials in brick production in Flanders. While we describe the main characteristics of the supply side, we focus on the limitations and barriers from the demand side in the present study. Based on a consumers survey we analyze consumers' risk perceptions and attitudes towards bricks produced from dredged sediments. Consumers in Flanders are rather suspicious with respect to bricks produced from dredged sediments and their risk perception is mainly determined by the possibility of a bad bargain (brick of inferior quality) and the connotation with chemical contamination. The willingness to pay for bricks made from dredged sediments is mainly influenced by the age of the respondents, as well environmental awareness, and the respondents' belief in their ability to influence environmental problems. Sensitization and information of customers seems to be of primary importance to make dredged-sediment-derived bricks a successful product.
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014
ABSTRACT We conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the treatment difference between adminis... more ABSTRACT We conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the treatment difference between administrative and criminal enforcement of environmental violations. Our aim is to control for the selection bias effect and make a comparison of how similar offenses are treated in both enforcement tracks. This analysis is relevant to answer the question of how deterrence and welfare in a combined criminal-administrative enforcement system compare with an enforcement system relying on criminal penalization only. This is an important question given the observed shift towards two-track penalization systems, combining administrative and criminal penalization, for environmental enforcement in the European Union. We apply matching techniques on a unique dataset of environmental enforcement cases to control for sample selection bias. We match different enforcement cases, based on case characteristics and estimate the average treatment effect for these cases. Overall, we find that the marginal penalty is slightly lower in administrative enforcement compared to criminal enforcement.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We investigate whether environmental sanctions should increase with the degree of intentionality ... more We investigate whether environmental sanctions should increase with the degree of intentionality of the violation. To this end we develop a simple model which is used to make predictions concerning the effect of the degree of intentionality, the amount of illegal gain obtained and the harm caused by the offense on the level of the optimal fine. These predictions are then used to learn more about the objectives pursued by enforcing authorities. We empirically test our theoretical predictions for firms as well as individuals using data on criminal environmental sanctions in Flanders and administrative environmental fines in Brussels. We find that judges and administrative officers aim at a mixture of social welfare maximization and regulation compliance maximization. Also, we find that in practice intentionality of a violation is always a factor which makes the sanction level increase. This is in contrast to a result from our theoretical analysis, in which we demonstrate that more intentional violations can lead to lower optimal fines.
ABSTRACT This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice between fine and detecti... more ABSTRACT This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice between fine and detection probability. We distinguish two lobby groups: vulnerable road users and car drivers. If only vulnerable road users are lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between detection probability and the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. This theory is empirically tested for the enforcement of speeding in the European Union.
Regulation & Governance, 2013
ABSTRACT We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using ... more ABSTRACT We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case-specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by lower criminal courts, as well as their follow-up by the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of the courts has proven to be varied as well as consistent. Judges carefully balance effective and suspended penalties, most often using them cumulatively, but in specific cases opting to use them as substitutes. Overall, both judges in lower and appeal courts balance environmental law and classic criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment.
This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete c... more This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behaviour to change over time. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders if
Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empiric... more Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empirical questions concerning the use of emission standards. We find that the Becker result ("maximal fine / minimal inspection") does not hold if we include rule making, implementation and enforcement costs into the model. There is a balance between the fine and the inspection variables.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2012
The analysis jointly considers the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compl... more The analysis jointly considers the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and allows land users' behaviour to change over time. A distinction is made between compliance and participation incentives. Under conditions that are frequently observed in practice, we find that compliance incentives of program participants are variable over time, which can have a significant impact on the efficacy of conservation policies. We match existing enforcement policies with the rational actor model to demonstrate the effects of different kinds of penalty and monitoring schemes for a range of program participant characteristics. Land users are shown to have sizeable incentives to participate in compensation schemes, but their incentives for compliance with program requirements are considerable lower.
Scientometrics, 2008
Received October 4, 2007 Address for correspondence: SANDRA ROUSSEAU Center of Economic Studies, ... more Received October 4, 2007 Address for correspondence: SANDRA ROUSSEAU Center of Economic Studies, KULeuven, Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium E-mail: Sandra.Rousseau@econ.kuleuven.be ... 01389130/US $ 20.00 Copyright © 2008 ...
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007
Abstract Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natu-ral response to this sh... more Abstract Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natu-ral response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the ...
International Review of Law and Economics, 2009
a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: K42 illegal behavior and the enforcement of law Keyword... more a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: K42 illegal behavior and the enforcement of law Keywords: Enforcement Non-monetary instruments Warnings Measurement errors a b s t r a c t
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2010
Abstract This contribution focuses on the formulation of optimal inspection strategies and distin... more Abstract This contribution focuses on the formulation of optimal inspection strategies and distinguishes between a targeting approach and a filtered approach to monitoring. Using a case study for the Flemish textile industry, we investigate the costs and benefits associated with specific ...
In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental po... more In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental policy instruments in a general equilibrium framework. Goulder et al. (J.Pub.Econ., 1999) look into the choice of policy instruments in the presence of distortionary taxes. We extend this model by no longer assuming full compliance from firms. A violating firm is caught with a certain probability by the inspection agency. Once a violator is detected, he always has to pay a fine. With a positive, finite expected fine and a probability of detection smaller than unity, there will always be a certain proportion of noncompliance in the economy. We calculate the gross efficiency costs of different policy instruments (emission tax, output tax, tradable permits and technology mandate). We illustrate the model for different price instruments (emission tax, output tax and tradable permits). We find that the relative inefficiency of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes found in a secondbest setting with perfect compliance, is strongly decreased with imperfect compliance.
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmenta... more We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental policy instruments. We use a static partial equilibrium framework to study different combinations of regulatory instruments (taxes, standards…) and enforcement instruments (criminal fine, administrative fine…). The firms' compliance decisions depend on the instrument combination selected by the government. The model is used to compare the welfare effects of different instrument combinations for the textile industry in Flanders. We find that administrative, implementation, enforcement and monitoring costs are important to decide on the necessity of an environmental policy. Moreover, we show that emission taxes are not necessarily the most cost-effective instrument. This result holds even if we include industry heterogeneity. The decision of whether to pursue an environmental policy or not depends crucially on the formulation of an appropriate monitoring and enforcement policy.
In this paper we study the impact of the choice scenario on the willingness to accept the investm... more In this paper we study the impact of the choice scenario on the willingness to accept the investment in wind turbines in Flanders. We use two different scenarios in a stated choice experiment to elicit household preferences: one based on the decision to buy a house with particular characteristics in the neighborhood of a wind farm and one based on the decision to support a policy to locate a wind farm in the respondent’s municipality. By including three identical attributes to describe the wind farm in both scenarios, we are able to analyze the impact of the selected scenario on the WTA. Overall, the results of the main effects model are very similar from a qualitative perspective, but some important differences are found that need further research. The different scenarios seem to trigger a different mindset for the respondents. The housing scenario triggers a response dominated by private considerations, while the policy scenario seems to trigger a more public spirited response.
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 2015
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 2015
We investigate a researcher's preferences regarding the submission of a manuscript. We use a stat... more We investigate a researcher's preferences regarding the submission of a manuscript. We use a stated choice experiment to study researcher preferences in the discipline of information sciences and investigate the relative importance of different journal characteristics in convincing potential authors to submit. The analysis distinguishes high quality from standard quality papers and focuses on the question whether communicating acceptance rates rather than rejection rates leads to other submission decisions. This is an example of 'framing'. Our results show that a positive framing effect might be present when submitting a high quality paper. No evidence of a framing effect is found when submitting a standard quality paper. From a journal marketing perspective, communicating acceptance rates rather than rejection rates might be a better strategy to convince researchers to submit to their journal.
Environmental Policy and Governance, 2014
ABSTRACT
Waste Management, 2015
A possible solution for the oversupply of dredged sediments is their use as a raw material in bri... more A possible solution for the oversupply of dredged sediments is their use as a raw material in brick production. Despite the fact that several examples (e.g., Agostini et al., 2007; Hamer and Karius, 2002; Xu et al., 2014) show that this application is feasible, some economic, technical and social limitations interfere with the development of a market of dredged materials in brick production in Flanders. While we describe the main characteristics of the supply side, we focus on the limitations and barriers from the demand side in the present study. Based on a consumers survey we analyze consumers' risk perceptions and attitudes towards bricks produced from dredged sediments. Consumers in Flanders are rather suspicious with respect to bricks produced from dredged sediments and their risk perception is mainly determined by the possibility of a bad bargain (brick of inferior quality) and the connotation with chemical contamination. The willingness to pay for bricks made from dredged sediments is mainly influenced by the age of the respondents, as well environmental awareness, and the respondents' belief in their ability to influence environmental problems. Sensitization and information of customers seems to be of primary importance to make dredged-sediment-derived bricks a successful product.
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014
ABSTRACT We conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the treatment difference between adminis... more ABSTRACT We conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the treatment difference between administrative and criminal enforcement of environmental violations. Our aim is to control for the selection bias effect and make a comparison of how similar offenses are treated in both enforcement tracks. This analysis is relevant to answer the question of how deterrence and welfare in a combined criminal-administrative enforcement system compare with an enforcement system relying on criminal penalization only. This is an important question given the observed shift towards two-track penalization systems, combining administrative and criminal penalization, for environmental enforcement in the European Union. We apply matching techniques on a unique dataset of environmental enforcement cases to control for sample selection bias. We match different enforcement cases, based on case characteristics and estimate the average treatment effect for these cases. Overall, we find that the marginal penalty is slightly lower in administrative enforcement compared to criminal enforcement.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We investigate whether environmental sanctions should increase with the degree of intentionality ... more We investigate whether environmental sanctions should increase with the degree of intentionality of the violation. To this end we develop a simple model which is used to make predictions concerning the effect of the degree of intentionality, the amount of illegal gain obtained and the harm caused by the offense on the level of the optimal fine. These predictions are then used to learn more about the objectives pursued by enforcing authorities. We empirically test our theoretical predictions for firms as well as individuals using data on criminal environmental sanctions in Flanders and administrative environmental fines in Brussels. We find that judges and administrative officers aim at a mixture of social welfare maximization and regulation compliance maximization. Also, we find that in practice intentionality of a violation is always a factor which makes the sanction level increase. This is in contrast to a result from our theoretical analysis, in which we demonstrate that more intentional violations can lead to lower optimal fines.
ABSTRACT This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice between fine and detecti... more ABSTRACT This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice between fine and detection probability. We distinguish two lobby groups: vulnerable road users and car drivers. If only vulnerable road users are lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between detection probability and the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. This theory is empirically tested for the enforcement of speeding in the European Union.
Regulation & Governance, 2013
ABSTRACT We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using ... more ABSTRACT We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case-specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by lower criminal courts, as well as their follow-up by the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of the courts has proven to be varied as well as consistent. Judges carefully balance effective and suspended penalties, most often using them cumulatively, but in specific cases opting to use them as substitutes. Overall, both judges in lower and appeal courts balance environmental law and classic criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment.