Louise Röska-Hardy | Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut (original) (raw)

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Books by Louise Röska-Hardy

Papers by Louise Röska-Hardy

VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks, 1997

Sprechen, Sprache und Handeln Louise Röska-Hardy Was heißt es, eine Handlung mittels der Verwendu... more Sprechen, Sprache und Handeln Louise Röska-Hardy Was heißt es, eine Handlung mittels der Verwendung sprachlicher Ausdrücke zu vollziehen oder eine solche zu verstehen? Wie ist Sprechen, das beobachtbare Äu-ßern von Lauten, nicht bloß als Verhalten, sondern als ...

Springer eBooks, Nov 21, 2008

<jats:p>Do the special features of 'I' have epistemological and metaphysical implic... more <jats:p>Do the special features of 'I' have epistemological and metaphysical implications? Many philosophers have thought so. Here I investigate the relation between the first person singular pronoun 'I' and the first person perspective, construed as the perspective of consciousness. First, I discuss the semantics of 'I' as a lexeme of a natural language. The fact that semantic reference and speaker reference always coincide in the case of 'I' is shown to have important consequences: it explains the 'referential guarantees' and the impossibility of 'misidentification' which have seemed so mysterious. Secondly, it is shown that these special features accrue only to actual uses. Consequently, the relation between 'I' and the first person perspective must be explicated within the context of linguistic action. It is then argued that the functioning of 'I' is not to be equated with that of a name, a description or an identifying singular term. Instead, I propose that a use of 'I' indexes a linguistic act with respect to the responsible agent. Thus construed, the use of 'I' in an utterance does more than express the first person perspective, since the first person perspective can be expressed by unmarked, impersonal or zero-pronominalization linguistic forms. I conclude by illustrating this claim with examples from the Wiener Kreis.</jats:p>

Abhandlungen zur Medien- und Kulturwissenschaft, 2023

transcript Verlag eBooks, Dec 31, 2012

De Gruyter eBooks, Apr 30, 2013

The MIT Press eBooks, Jun 24, 2011

The idea that sayings are doings is a platitude among speech act theorists. It is by now a common... more The idea that sayings are doings is a platitude among speech act theorists. It is by now a commonplace that we can perform actions by saying something. But what sort of doings are sayings? It might be thought that this question has been definitively answered by John R. Searle’s account in Speech Acts (1969). For haven’t Searle and his followers shown that in the case of speech acts the meaning of the utterance determines the act performed? On this view the semantic rules governing the linguistic or paralinguistic expressions uttered constitute a saying as the making of a promise, asking of a question, making of a request, i.e., as a particular action; the meaning of the expressions uttered in the performance of the act determines which action is performed. In order to perform and, correlatively, to understand a speech act it is only necessary to have mastered the meaning of certain linguistic (and paralinguistic) expressions, i.e., the semantic rules governing their use, which constitute that use as a particular act. On Searle’s account the meaning of expressions is logically and conceptually prior to any particular intentions, beliefs and desires speakers’ might have in performing an act by linguistic means. Speakers’ intentions to perform a particular action, their desires and beliefs concerning the physical and/or linguistic context of utterance or the interactional setting play no independent role in the production a linguistic utterance, and mutatis mutandis for hearers’ beliefs in interpreting linguistic utterances as specific actions. For Searle the study of speech acts is a study of langue (Searle 1969, 17). In consequence, the initial question about sayings and doings can be answered within the theory of language.

ProtoSociology (Frankfurt), 2000

The capacity to understand oneself as an individual, integrated instance with abstract qualities ... more The capacity to understand oneself as an individual, integrated instance with abstract qualities like intelligence or a personal history, existing through time, is one of the unique abilities of human beings. This capacity informs our everyday lives and provides the foundation of hu-man ...

Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 2020

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1995

... L'explication de la praxis par le sens commun met en lumière les rapports entre pens... more ... L'explication de la praxis par le sens commun met en lumière les rapports entre pensée et action Revue / Journal Title. ... Pensée ; Action ; Rationalité ; Quotidienneté ; Causalité ; Sens commun ; Praxis ; Aporie ; Anticausalité ; Compréhension de soi ; Localisation / Location. ...

ProtoSociology (Frankfurt), 1991