Josh Milburn | Loughborough University (original) (raw)

Books by Josh Milburn

Imagine a zoopolis – a state that respects animals’ rights. What would the food system of the zoo... more Imagine a zoopolis – a state that respects animals’ rights. What would the food system of the zoopolis look like? Ethicists typically assume that the zoopolis would be a vegan state. This book, however, argues that we can have our cow and eat her too – that we can respect animal rights while still having access to the animal-based foods we value. There are principled reasons that should lead us, as a matter of ideal theory, to be reluctant about fully endorsing plant-based food systems, even if animals have rights. These include concerns on both humans’ behalf and animals’ behalf. Consequently, if we could identify an animal-rights-respecting, but non-vegan, food system, the zoopolis should be ready to permit it, and even support it. What might this food system contain? This book explores non-sentient – unthinking, unfeeling – invertebrates, as well as those who may be non-sentient. It looks to highly realistic plant-based meats (and other plant-based ‘animal’ products). It considers cellular agriculture, which can produce animal products (such as cultivated meat or milk) with no or little animal involvement. And it asks if we could respectfully keep chickens for their eggs. Though a single book cannot show that a particular food system is the all-things-considered best, it does show that there are a range of reasons for us to believe that a non-vegan food system would be preferable to a fully plant-based system, even in a state that robustly protects animals’ rights.

Animal lovers who feed meat to other animals are faced with a paradox: perhaps fewer animals woul... more Animal lovers who feed meat to other animals are faced with a paradox: perhaps fewer animals would be harmed if they stopped feeding the ones they love. Animal diets do not raise problems merely for individuals. To address environmental crises, health threats, and harm to animals, we must change our food systems and practices. And in these systems, animals, too, are eaters.

Asking questions beyond what humans should eat and whether to count animals as food, Just Fodder answers ethical and political questions arising from thinking about animals as eaters. Josh Milburn begins with practical dilemmas about feeding the animals closest to us, our pets or animal companions. The questions grow more complicated as he considers relationships with more distance - questions about whether and how to feed garden birds, farmland animals who would eat our crops, and wild animals. Milburn evaluates the nature and circumstances of our relationships with animals to generate a novel theory of animal rights.

Looking past arguments about what we can and cannot do to other beings, Just Fodder asks what we can, should, and must do for them, laying out a fuller range of our ethical obligations to other animals.

Journal articles by Josh Milburn

Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research

Imagine you come across a leftover turkey sandwich that will expire soon, no one is around to eat... more Imagine you come across a leftover turkey sandwich that will expire soon, no one is around to eat it, and you cannot donate it to someone else before it goes bad. In this case, if you don’t eat the sandwich, it will go to landfill. A new omnivore says that you should eat the sandwich, rather than buying some plant-based food. A common rebuttal to new omnivorism says that by eating the turkey sandwich you become complicit in industrialized animal agriculture: consuming the leftover sandwich amounts to a retroactive endorsement of the institution that produced it. This is wrongful, and so we should reject new omnivorism. This is the complicity objection to new omnivorism. In this paper, we argue that the complicity objection fails to ethically distinguish new omnivores and vegans. We argue that, in terms of complicity with wrongdoing, vegans are at least as bad as new omnivores in their dietary choices. We suggest that we accept the moral tragedy of our situation, which is that there is no harmless-to-animals diet available, and so, rather than trying to find the impossible, we should confront this morally tragic reality head on. Confronting our dietary choices may well support new omnivorism over veganism in certain circumstances.

Philosophical Inquiries

Meat production raises a host of ethical problems that a move away from animal agriculture and to... more Meat production raises a host of ethical problems that a move away from animal agriculture and towards cellular agriculture could, partially, resolve. Unsurprisingly, then, ethicists have offered a range of positive cases for cultivated meat, and ethics has been an important part of the broader conversation about the technology. However, academics continue to raise new ethical challenges to cultivated meat. In this paper, to bolster the positive ethical cases for cultivated meat offered elsewhere, we respond to three recent challenges to cultivated meat. These are Ben Bramble's argument that we should not want to be the kind of people who want to eat cultivated meat; Carlo Alvaro's suggestions that a virtuous individual would not eat cultivated meat and that cultivated meat will fail to eliminate animal agriculture; and Elan Abrell's claim that endorsing cultivated meat represents a missed opportunity. All three challenges, we contend, fail.

Food Ethics, 2024

In Just Fodder: The Ethics of Feeding Animals, I explore a range of overlooked practical question... more In Just Fodder: The Ethics of Feeding Animals, I explore a range of overlooked practical questions in animal ethics and the philosophy of food, developing a new approach to animal ethics. According to the position I defend, animals have negative rights based on their possession of normatively significant interests, and we have positive obligations towards (and concerning) animals based on our normatively salient relationships with them. Gary O'Brien, Angie Pepper, Clare Palmer, and Leon Borgdorf offer a range of insightful challenges to my framework and its applications. Here, I respond to them around five themes: extensionism, agency, predation, interventionism, and environmentalism.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, 2023

What we could call 'relational non-interventionism' holds that we have no general obligation to a... more What we could call 'relational non-interventionism' holds that we have no general obligation to alleviate animal suffering, and that we do not typically have special obligations to alleviate wild animals' suffering. Therefore, we do not generally have a duty to intervene in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering. However, there are a range of relationships that we may have with wild animals that do generate special obligations to aid-and the consequences of these obligations can be surprising. In this paper, I argue that we have special obligations to those animals we have historically welcomed or encouraged into our spaces. This includes many wild animals. One of the consequences of this is that we may sometimes possess obligations to actively prevent rewilding-or even to dewild-for the sake of welcomed animals who thrive in human-controlled spaces.

International Relations, 2023

Animals have been almost entirely absent from scholarly appraisals of the ethics of war. Just-war... more Animals have been almost entirely absent from scholarly appraisals of the ethics of war. Just-war theory concerns when communities may permissibly resort to war; who may wage war; who they may harm in war; and what kinds of harm they may cause. Each question can be complicated by animals’ inclusion. After introducing just-war theory and the argument for an animal-inclusive just-war theory, this paper reviews ethical appraisals of war on animals’ behalf and wars against animals. It then turns to consider harm to and use of animals in war. It concludes by considering questions in the ethics of war beyond just-war theory as traditionally construed.

Animal Sentience, 2023

Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been ... more Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been demonstrated that plants are sentient (i.e., that they can feel). Moreover, even if it were demonstrated that plants could feel, it would also have to be demonstrated that they can feel the affectively "valenced" feelings that are ethically significant, such as pain and fear, rather than just neutral sensations such as darker/lighter, or wetter/drier. Finally, if plants could feel valenced feelings, veganism would likely still be the ethical option, on the principle of causing the least harm.

PLOS One, 2022

The number of people reducing their meat consumption due to ethical and environmental concerns is... more The number of people reducing their meat consumption due to ethical and environmental concerns is growing. However, meat reducers sometimes care for omnivorous or carnivorous pets, creating the 'vegetarian's dilemma'. Some meat-reducers opt to feed plant-based diets to companion animals, but others express reservations. Cultivated meat offers a possible third path, but consumer perceptions of cultivated meat as pet food have received little scholarly attention. Using survey data from 729 respondents, we analyzed consumers' willingness to feed cultivated meat to companion animals, particularly with reference to their own current dietary practices, and their own willingness to eat cultivated meat. Though not all our respondents willing to eat cultivated meat were willing to feed it to their companions, a large majority were (81.4%, 193/237). However, for those unwilling to eat cultivated meat, the story was more complicated. Vegans and vegetarians were less likely to say they would eat cultivated meat (16.4%, 39/238) than meat-eating respondents (40.3%, 198/491). However, among vegans and vegetarians who would not consume cultivated meat, the majority (55.9%, 86/154) indicated that they would still feed it to their pets. Among meat-eating respondents, only a small minority (9.6%, 11/114) unwilling to eat cultivated meat would feed it to their pets. Consequently, we suggest that the potential market for cultivated meat for pet food is markedly different from the potential market for cultivated meat from human consumption. A key concern among our respondents about feeding cultivated meat to pets was a worry that it was not healthy, indicating that there may be easy gains in cultivated pet food's uptake through messaging relating to safety and nutritional completeness.

Food Ethics, 2022

New omnivorism is a term coined by Andy Lamey to refer to arguments that-paradoxically-our duties... more New omnivorism is a term coined by Andy Lamey to refer to arguments that-paradoxically-our duties towards animals require us to eat some animal products. Lamey's claim to have identified a new, distinctive position in food ethics is problematic, however, for some of his interlocutors are not new (e.g., Leslie Stephen in the nineteenth century), not distinctive (e.g., animal welfarists), and not obviously concerned with eating animals (e.g., plant neurobiologists). It is the aim of this paper to bolster Lamey's argument that he has identified a novel, unified, and intriguing position (or set of positions) in animal ethics and the philosophy of food. We distinguish new omnivorism from four other non-vegan positions and then differentiate three versions of new omnivorism based on the kinds of animal products they propose we consume. We conclude by exploring a range of argumentative strategies that could be deployed in response to the new omnivore.

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2020

In two recent articles, Marcus William Hunt has posed questions about raising children as vegans.... more In two recent articles, Marcus William Hunt has posed questions about raising children as vegans. In 'Parental Compromise', he argues that pro-vegan-children parents should compromise with anti-vegan-children co-parents, and, in 'Veganism and Children', he challenges arguments in favour of vegan parenting. I argue that his pro-compromise position overlooks the idea that respect for animal rights is a duty of justice, and thus not something to be compromised on lightly. To demonstrate the plausibility of this position, I challenge his arguments that Tom Regan's case for animal rights does not endorse vegan parenting. Nonetheless, I argue that there may be space for pro-vegan-children parents to compromise with anti-vegan-children parents over 'unusual eating'. This seeks out unusual sources of animal protein that do not involve violations of animals' rights.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021

What we could call ‘relational non-interventionism’ holds that we have no general obligation to a... more What we could call ‘relational non-interventionism’ holds that we have no general obligation to alleviate animal suffering, and that we do not typically have special obligations to alleviate wild animals’ suffering. Therefore, we do not generally have a duty to intervene in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering. However, there are a range of relationships that we may have with wild animals that do generate special obligations to aid – and the consequences of these obligations can be surprising. In this paper, it is argued that we have special obligations to those animals we have historically welcomed or encouraged into our spaces. This includes many wild animals. One of the consequences of this is that we may sometimes possess obligations to actively prevent rewilding – or even to dewild – for the sake of welcomed animals who thrive in human-controlled spaces.

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2021

Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer prot... more Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer protection to nonhuman animals. Using racist hate speech as our primary example, we explore the discrepancy between the legal response to hate speech targeting human groups and what might be called anti-animal or speciesist hate speech. We explore two sets of possible defences of this legal discrepancy drawn from the philosophical literature on hate speech-non-consequentialist and harm-based-and find both wanting. We thus conclude that, absent a compelling alternative argument, there is no in-principle reason to support the censure of racist hate speech but not the censure of speciesist hate speech.

Social Theory and Practice, 2021

War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the... more War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the justice of military actions. In this paper, we propose a way in which concern for animals can be included within the just-war framework, with a focus on necessity and proportionality. We argue that counting animals in war will not make just-war theory excessively demanding, but it will make just-war theory more humane. By showing how animals can be included in our proportionality and necessity assessments, we provide a crucial first step towards developing an animal-inclusive account of just-war theory.

Ethics and Education, 2021

What is to be done when parents disagree about whether to raise their children as vegans? Three p... more What is to be done when parents disagree about whether to raise their children as vegans? Three positions have recently emerged. Marcus William Hunt has argued that parents should seek a compromise. I have argued that there should be no compromise on animal rights, but there may be room for compromise over some ‘unusual’ sources of non-vegan, but animal-rights-respecting, food. Carlo Alvaro has argued that both Hunt and I are wrong; veganism is like religion, and there should be no compromise on religion, meaning there should be no compromise on veganism. This means that even my minimal-compromise approach should be rejected. This paper critiques Alvaro’s zero-compromise veganism, demonstrating that his case against Hunt’s position is undermotivated, and his case against my position rests upon misunderstandings. If vegans wish to reject Hunt’s pro-compromise position, they should favour a rightist approach, not Alvaro’s zero-compromise approach.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021

There is a surprising consensus among vegan philosophers that freeganism — eating animal-based fo... more There is a surprising consensus among vegan philosophers that freeganism — eating animal-based foods going to waste — is permissible. Some ethicists even argue that vegans should be freegans. In this paper, we offer a novel challenge to freeganism drawing upon Donaldson and Kymlicka’s ‘zoopolitical’ approach, which supports ‘restricted freeganism’. On this position, it’s prima facie wrong to eat the corpses of domesticated animals, as they are members of a mixed human-animal community, ruling out many freegan practices. This exploration reveals how the ‘political turn’ in animal ethics can offer fertile lenses through which to consider ethical puzzles about eating animals.

Animal Studies Journal, 2020

This paper offers a novel argument against the eating of meat: the zoopolitical case for vegetari... more This paper offers a novel argument against the eating of meat: the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism. The argument is, in brief, that eating meat involves the disrespect of an animal's corpse, and this is respect that the animal is owed because they are a member of our political community. At least three features of this case are worthy of note: First, it draws upon political philosophy, rather than moral philosophy. Second, it is a case for vegetarianism, and not a case for veganism. Third, while it is animal-focussed, it does not rely upon a claim about the wrong of inflicting death and suffering upon animals. The paper sets out the argument, responds to two challenges (that the argument is merely academic, and that the argument does not go far enough), and concludes by comparing the case to Cora Diamond's classic argument for vegetarianism.

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2019

Suppose that animals have rights. If so, may you go down to your local farm store, buy some chick... more Suppose that animals have rights. If so, may you go down to your local farm store, buy some chicks, raise them in your backyard, and eat their eggs? You wouldn't think so. But we argue, to the contrary, that you may. Just as there are circumstances in which it's permissible to liberate a slave, even if that means paying into a corrupt system, so there are circumstances in which it's permissible to liberate chickens by buying them. Moreover, we contend that restrictions on freedom of movement can be appropriate for chickens, but not humans, because of the obvious differences between the interests of healthy, adult humans versus those of chickens who have been bred for human use. We also argue that egg consumption is permissible based on the plausible assumption that no one's rights are violated in their consumption, and so while there may sometimes be morally preferable uses for eggs, you do nothing unjust in eating them. If we're right, then the rights view doesn't imply that veganism is obligatory; rather, it implies that the constraints on how we source animal products, though highly demanding, are not so demanding that they can't be met.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2018

The possibility of “clean milk” – dairy produced without the need for cows – has been championed ... more The possibility of “clean milk” – dairy produced without the need for cows – has been championed by several charities, companies, and individuals. One can ask how those critical of the contemporary dairy industry, including especially vegans and others sympathetic to animal rights, should respond to this prospect. In this paper, I explore three kinds of challenges that such people may have to clean milk: First, that producing clean milk fails to respect animals; second, that humans should not consume dairy products; and third, that the creation of clean milk would affirm human superiority over cows. None of these challenges, I argue, gives us reason to reject clean milk. I thus conclude that the prospect is one that animal activists should both welcome and embrace.

Imagine a zoopolis – a state that respects animals’ rights. What would the food system of the zoo... more Imagine a zoopolis – a state that respects animals’ rights. What would the food system of the zoopolis look like? Ethicists typically assume that the zoopolis would be a vegan state. This book, however, argues that we can have our cow and eat her too – that we can respect animal rights while still having access to the animal-based foods we value. There are principled reasons that should lead us, as a matter of ideal theory, to be reluctant about fully endorsing plant-based food systems, even if animals have rights. These include concerns on both humans’ behalf and animals’ behalf. Consequently, if we could identify an animal-rights-respecting, but non-vegan, food system, the zoopolis should be ready to permit it, and even support it. What might this food system contain? This book explores non-sentient – unthinking, unfeeling – invertebrates, as well as those who may be non-sentient. It looks to highly realistic plant-based meats (and other plant-based ‘animal’ products). It considers cellular agriculture, which can produce animal products (such as cultivated meat or milk) with no or little animal involvement. And it asks if we could respectfully keep chickens for their eggs. Though a single book cannot show that a particular food system is the all-things-considered best, it does show that there are a range of reasons for us to believe that a non-vegan food system would be preferable to a fully plant-based system, even in a state that robustly protects animals’ rights.

Animal lovers who feed meat to other animals are faced with a paradox: perhaps fewer animals woul... more Animal lovers who feed meat to other animals are faced with a paradox: perhaps fewer animals would be harmed if they stopped feeding the ones they love. Animal diets do not raise problems merely for individuals. To address environmental crises, health threats, and harm to animals, we must change our food systems and practices. And in these systems, animals, too, are eaters.

Asking questions beyond what humans should eat and whether to count animals as food, Just Fodder answers ethical and political questions arising from thinking about animals as eaters. Josh Milburn begins with practical dilemmas about feeding the animals closest to us, our pets or animal companions. The questions grow more complicated as he considers relationships with more distance - questions about whether and how to feed garden birds, farmland animals who would eat our crops, and wild animals. Milburn evaluates the nature and circumstances of our relationships with animals to generate a novel theory of animal rights.

Looking past arguments about what we can and cannot do to other beings, Just Fodder asks what we can, should, and must do for them, laying out a fuller range of our ethical obligations to other animals.

Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research

Imagine you come across a leftover turkey sandwich that will expire soon, no one is around to eat... more Imagine you come across a leftover turkey sandwich that will expire soon, no one is around to eat it, and you cannot donate it to someone else before it goes bad. In this case, if you don’t eat the sandwich, it will go to landfill. A new omnivore says that you should eat the sandwich, rather than buying some plant-based food. A common rebuttal to new omnivorism says that by eating the turkey sandwich you become complicit in industrialized animal agriculture: consuming the leftover sandwich amounts to a retroactive endorsement of the institution that produced it. This is wrongful, and so we should reject new omnivorism. This is the complicity objection to new omnivorism. In this paper, we argue that the complicity objection fails to ethically distinguish new omnivores and vegans. We argue that, in terms of complicity with wrongdoing, vegans are at least as bad as new omnivores in their dietary choices. We suggest that we accept the moral tragedy of our situation, which is that there is no harmless-to-animals diet available, and so, rather than trying to find the impossible, we should confront this morally tragic reality head on. Confronting our dietary choices may well support new omnivorism over veganism in certain circumstances.

Philosophical Inquiries

Meat production raises a host of ethical problems that a move away from animal agriculture and to... more Meat production raises a host of ethical problems that a move away from animal agriculture and towards cellular agriculture could, partially, resolve. Unsurprisingly, then, ethicists have offered a range of positive cases for cultivated meat, and ethics has been an important part of the broader conversation about the technology. However, academics continue to raise new ethical challenges to cultivated meat. In this paper, to bolster the positive ethical cases for cultivated meat offered elsewhere, we respond to three recent challenges to cultivated meat. These are Ben Bramble's argument that we should not want to be the kind of people who want to eat cultivated meat; Carlo Alvaro's suggestions that a virtuous individual would not eat cultivated meat and that cultivated meat will fail to eliminate animal agriculture; and Elan Abrell's claim that endorsing cultivated meat represents a missed opportunity. All three challenges, we contend, fail.

Food Ethics, 2024

In Just Fodder: The Ethics of Feeding Animals, I explore a range of overlooked practical question... more In Just Fodder: The Ethics of Feeding Animals, I explore a range of overlooked practical questions in animal ethics and the philosophy of food, developing a new approach to animal ethics. According to the position I defend, animals have negative rights based on their possession of normatively significant interests, and we have positive obligations towards (and concerning) animals based on our normatively salient relationships with them. Gary O'Brien, Angie Pepper, Clare Palmer, and Leon Borgdorf offer a range of insightful challenges to my framework and its applications. Here, I respond to them around five themes: extensionism, agency, predation, interventionism, and environmentalism.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, 2023

What we could call 'relational non-interventionism' holds that we have no general obligation to a... more What we could call 'relational non-interventionism' holds that we have no general obligation to alleviate animal suffering, and that we do not typically have special obligations to alleviate wild animals' suffering. Therefore, we do not generally have a duty to intervene in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering. However, there are a range of relationships that we may have with wild animals that do generate special obligations to aid-and the consequences of these obligations can be surprising. In this paper, I argue that we have special obligations to those animals we have historically welcomed or encouraged into our spaces. This includes many wild animals. One of the consequences of this is that we may sometimes possess obligations to actively prevent rewilding-or even to dewild-for the sake of welcomed animals who thrive in human-controlled spaces.

International Relations, 2023

Animals have been almost entirely absent from scholarly appraisals of the ethics of war. Just-war... more Animals have been almost entirely absent from scholarly appraisals of the ethics of war. Just-war theory concerns when communities may permissibly resort to war; who may wage war; who they may harm in war; and what kinds of harm they may cause. Each question can be complicated by animals’ inclusion. After introducing just-war theory and the argument for an animal-inclusive just-war theory, this paper reviews ethical appraisals of war on animals’ behalf and wars against animals. It then turns to consider harm to and use of animals in war. It concludes by considering questions in the ethics of war beyond just-war theory as traditionally construed.

Animal Sentience, 2023

Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been ... more Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been demonstrated that plants are sentient (i.e., that they can feel). Moreover, even if it were demonstrated that plants could feel, it would also have to be demonstrated that they can feel the affectively "valenced" feelings that are ethically significant, such as pain and fear, rather than just neutral sensations such as darker/lighter, or wetter/drier. Finally, if plants could feel valenced feelings, veganism would likely still be the ethical option, on the principle of causing the least harm.

PLOS One, 2022

The number of people reducing their meat consumption due to ethical and environmental concerns is... more The number of people reducing their meat consumption due to ethical and environmental concerns is growing. However, meat reducers sometimes care for omnivorous or carnivorous pets, creating the 'vegetarian's dilemma'. Some meat-reducers opt to feed plant-based diets to companion animals, but others express reservations. Cultivated meat offers a possible third path, but consumer perceptions of cultivated meat as pet food have received little scholarly attention. Using survey data from 729 respondents, we analyzed consumers' willingness to feed cultivated meat to companion animals, particularly with reference to their own current dietary practices, and their own willingness to eat cultivated meat. Though not all our respondents willing to eat cultivated meat were willing to feed it to their companions, a large majority were (81.4%, 193/237). However, for those unwilling to eat cultivated meat, the story was more complicated. Vegans and vegetarians were less likely to say they would eat cultivated meat (16.4%, 39/238) than meat-eating respondents (40.3%, 198/491). However, among vegans and vegetarians who would not consume cultivated meat, the majority (55.9%, 86/154) indicated that they would still feed it to their pets. Among meat-eating respondents, only a small minority (9.6%, 11/114) unwilling to eat cultivated meat would feed it to their pets. Consequently, we suggest that the potential market for cultivated meat for pet food is markedly different from the potential market for cultivated meat from human consumption. A key concern among our respondents about feeding cultivated meat to pets was a worry that it was not healthy, indicating that there may be easy gains in cultivated pet food's uptake through messaging relating to safety and nutritional completeness.

Food Ethics, 2022

New omnivorism is a term coined by Andy Lamey to refer to arguments that-paradoxically-our duties... more New omnivorism is a term coined by Andy Lamey to refer to arguments that-paradoxically-our duties towards animals require us to eat some animal products. Lamey's claim to have identified a new, distinctive position in food ethics is problematic, however, for some of his interlocutors are not new (e.g., Leslie Stephen in the nineteenth century), not distinctive (e.g., animal welfarists), and not obviously concerned with eating animals (e.g., plant neurobiologists). It is the aim of this paper to bolster Lamey's argument that he has identified a novel, unified, and intriguing position (or set of positions) in animal ethics and the philosophy of food. We distinguish new omnivorism from four other non-vegan positions and then differentiate three versions of new omnivorism based on the kinds of animal products they propose we consume. We conclude by exploring a range of argumentative strategies that could be deployed in response to the new omnivore.

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2020

In two recent articles, Marcus William Hunt has posed questions about raising children as vegans.... more In two recent articles, Marcus William Hunt has posed questions about raising children as vegans. In 'Parental Compromise', he argues that pro-vegan-children parents should compromise with anti-vegan-children co-parents, and, in 'Veganism and Children', he challenges arguments in favour of vegan parenting. I argue that his pro-compromise position overlooks the idea that respect for animal rights is a duty of justice, and thus not something to be compromised on lightly. To demonstrate the plausibility of this position, I challenge his arguments that Tom Regan's case for animal rights does not endorse vegan parenting. Nonetheless, I argue that there may be space for pro-vegan-children parents to compromise with anti-vegan-children parents over 'unusual eating'. This seeks out unusual sources of animal protein that do not involve violations of animals' rights.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021

What we could call ‘relational non-interventionism’ holds that we have no general obligation to a... more What we could call ‘relational non-interventionism’ holds that we have no general obligation to alleviate animal suffering, and that we do not typically have special obligations to alleviate wild animals’ suffering. Therefore, we do not generally have a duty to intervene in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering. However, there are a range of relationships that we may have with wild animals that do generate special obligations to aid – and the consequences of these obligations can be surprising. In this paper, it is argued that we have special obligations to those animals we have historically welcomed or encouraged into our spaces. This includes many wild animals. One of the consequences of this is that we may sometimes possess obligations to actively prevent rewilding – or even to dewild – for the sake of welcomed animals who thrive in human-controlled spaces.

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2021

Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer prot... more Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer protection to nonhuman animals. Using racist hate speech as our primary example, we explore the discrepancy between the legal response to hate speech targeting human groups and what might be called anti-animal or speciesist hate speech. We explore two sets of possible defences of this legal discrepancy drawn from the philosophical literature on hate speech-non-consequentialist and harm-based-and find both wanting. We thus conclude that, absent a compelling alternative argument, there is no in-principle reason to support the censure of racist hate speech but not the censure of speciesist hate speech.

Social Theory and Practice, 2021

War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the... more War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the justice of military actions. In this paper, we propose a way in which concern for animals can be included within the just-war framework, with a focus on necessity and proportionality. We argue that counting animals in war will not make just-war theory excessively demanding, but it will make just-war theory more humane. By showing how animals can be included in our proportionality and necessity assessments, we provide a crucial first step towards developing an animal-inclusive account of just-war theory.

Ethics and Education, 2021

What is to be done when parents disagree about whether to raise their children as vegans? Three p... more What is to be done when parents disagree about whether to raise their children as vegans? Three positions have recently emerged. Marcus William Hunt has argued that parents should seek a compromise. I have argued that there should be no compromise on animal rights, but there may be room for compromise over some ‘unusual’ sources of non-vegan, but animal-rights-respecting, food. Carlo Alvaro has argued that both Hunt and I are wrong; veganism is like religion, and there should be no compromise on religion, meaning there should be no compromise on veganism. This means that even my minimal-compromise approach should be rejected. This paper critiques Alvaro’s zero-compromise veganism, demonstrating that his case against Hunt’s position is undermotivated, and his case against my position rests upon misunderstandings. If vegans wish to reject Hunt’s pro-compromise position, they should favour a rightist approach, not Alvaro’s zero-compromise approach.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021

There is a surprising consensus among vegan philosophers that freeganism — eating animal-based fo... more There is a surprising consensus among vegan philosophers that freeganism — eating animal-based foods going to waste — is permissible. Some ethicists even argue that vegans should be freegans. In this paper, we offer a novel challenge to freeganism drawing upon Donaldson and Kymlicka’s ‘zoopolitical’ approach, which supports ‘restricted freeganism’. On this position, it’s prima facie wrong to eat the corpses of domesticated animals, as they are members of a mixed human-animal community, ruling out many freegan practices. This exploration reveals how the ‘political turn’ in animal ethics can offer fertile lenses through which to consider ethical puzzles about eating animals.

Animal Studies Journal, 2020

This paper offers a novel argument against the eating of meat: the zoopolitical case for vegetari... more This paper offers a novel argument against the eating of meat: the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism. The argument is, in brief, that eating meat involves the disrespect of an animal's corpse, and this is respect that the animal is owed because they are a member of our political community. At least three features of this case are worthy of note: First, it draws upon political philosophy, rather than moral philosophy. Second, it is a case for vegetarianism, and not a case for veganism. Third, while it is animal-focussed, it does not rely upon a claim about the wrong of inflicting death and suffering upon animals. The paper sets out the argument, responds to two challenges (that the argument is merely academic, and that the argument does not go far enough), and concludes by comparing the case to Cora Diamond's classic argument for vegetarianism.

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2019

Suppose that animals have rights. If so, may you go down to your local farm store, buy some chick... more Suppose that animals have rights. If so, may you go down to your local farm store, buy some chicks, raise them in your backyard, and eat their eggs? You wouldn't think so. But we argue, to the contrary, that you may. Just as there are circumstances in which it's permissible to liberate a slave, even if that means paying into a corrupt system, so there are circumstances in which it's permissible to liberate chickens by buying them. Moreover, we contend that restrictions on freedom of movement can be appropriate for chickens, but not humans, because of the obvious differences between the interests of healthy, adult humans versus those of chickens who have been bred for human use. We also argue that egg consumption is permissible based on the plausible assumption that no one's rights are violated in their consumption, and so while there may sometimes be morally preferable uses for eggs, you do nothing unjust in eating them. If we're right, then the rights view doesn't imply that veganism is obligatory; rather, it implies that the constraints on how we source animal products, though highly demanding, are not so demanding that they can't be met.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2018

The possibility of “clean milk” – dairy produced without the need for cows – has been championed ... more The possibility of “clean milk” – dairy produced without the need for cows – has been championed by several charities, companies, and individuals. One can ask how those critical of the contemporary dairy industry, including especially vegans and others sympathetic to animal rights, should respond to this prospect. In this paper, I explore three kinds of challenges that such people may have to clean milk: First, that producing clean milk fails to respect animals; second, that humans should not consume dairy products; and third, that the creation of clean milk would affirm human superiority over cows. None of these challenges, I argue, gives us reason to reject clean milk. I thus conclude that the prospect is one that animal activists should both welcome and embrace.

Between the Species, 2018

Robert Nozick’s oft-quoted review of Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights levels a range of cha... more Robert Nozick’s oft-quoted review of Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights levels a range of challenges to Regan’s philosophy. Many commentators have focussed on Nozick’s putative defence of speciesism, but this has led to them overlooking other aspects of the critique. In this paper, I draw attention to two. First is Nozick’s criticism of Regan’s political theory, which is best understood relative to Nozick’s libertarianism. Nozick’s challenge invites the possibility of a libertarian account of animal rights – which is not as oxymoronic as it may first sound. Second is Nozick’s criticism of Regan’s axiological theory, which is best understood relative to Nozick’s own axiological inegalitarianism. While Nozick’s axiology has distasteful consequences, it should not be dismissed out-of-hand. Nozick’s challenges to Regan – and Nozick’s wider animal ethics – are rich and original, warranting attention from contemporary theorists for reasons beyond mere historical interest.

Environmental Values, 2017

Recent proposals in political philosophy concerning nonhuman animals as property-holders – from J... more Recent proposals in political philosophy concerning nonhuman animals as property-holders – from John Hadley and Steve Cooke – have focussed on the interests that nonhuman animals have in access to and use of their territories. The possibility that such rights might be grounded on the basis of a Lockean (that is, labour-mixing) account of property has been rejected. In this paper, I explore four criticisms of Lockean property rights for nonhuman animals – concerning self-ownership, initiative, exertion and the sufficiency of protection offered – concluding that Lockean property rights could be extended to nonhuman animals. I then suggest that Lockean property rights actually offer advantages over interest-based accounts: they more clearly ground property, they are potentially broader, and they are considerably stronger.

Positive Duties to Wild Animals, 2025

What we could call 'relational non-interventionism' holds that we have no general obligation to a... more What we could call 'relational non-interventionism' holds that we have no general obligation to alleviate animal suffering, and that we do not typically have special obligations to alleviate wild animals' suffering. Therefore, we do not generally have a duty to intervene in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering. However, there are a range of relationships that we may have with wild animals that do generate special obligations to aid-and the consequences of these obligations can be surprising. In this paper, I argue that we have special obligations to those animals we have historically welcomed or encouraged into our spaces. This includes many wild animals. One of the consequences of this is that we may sometimes possess obligations to actively prevent rewilding—or even to dewild—for the sake of welcomed animals who thrive in human-controlled spaces.

This chapter is a republished version of a paper available open access in the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics and Ethics, Policy, and Environment.

Consuming the Environment

• Dogs and cats have an adverse impact on the environment, primarily because we feed dogs and cat... more • Dogs and cats have an adverse impact on the environment, primarily because we feed dogs and cats meat. We produce meat via animal agriculture, which is very bad for the environment (and for animals).
• Possible alternatives to 'slaughter-based' pet foods include pet foods based on cultivated meat or insects, or vegan pet foods. Since these do not rely on animal agriculture, they may be significantly less environmentally damaging.
• Vegan pet foods have limited uptake among guardians of dogs and cats, who worry that vegan pet foods may be 'unnatural' or unhealthy. Meanwhile, critics charge guardians of animals fed vegan diets with forcing their ideologies on animals.
• Recent research suggests that vegan pet foods are just as palatable, and at least as healthy, for dogs and cats as slaughter-based pet foods.
• Quantifications of pet food's impact show that switching dogs and cats to vegan diets globally would drastically reduce the number of animals farmed, and thus the greenhouse gas emissions, land use, and freshwater use of animal agriculture.

The Plant-based and Vegan Handbook: Psychological and Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Guardians face a dilemma when it comes to feeding companion animals. On the one hand, a meaty die... more Guardians face a dilemma when it comes to feeding companion animals. On the one hand, a meaty diet might seem suitable for dogs and cats. On the other hand, we are increasingly aware of the problems with animal agriculture. What is there to do? This chapter briefly introduces pet food, reviews the case against slaughter-based ('conventional') pet food, and explores the ethical credentials of three possible alternatives. These are plantbased pet food, invertebrate-based pet food, and cultivated pet food. While plant-based pet food provides a viable alternative to slaughter-based pet food in many cases, it may be unsuitable for at least some companions. The ethics of invertebrate-based pet food, meanwhile, are complicated, while cultivated pet food currently remains theoretical. Ultimately, exploring pet food as a collective, political question may lead to desirable, lasting solutions.

New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism, 2024

Ethicists often assume that animal protectionist principles (including animal rights principles) ... more Ethicists often assume that animal protectionist principles (including animal rights principles) commit us to veganism. But "unusual eaters" and "new omnivores" argue that animal protectionist principles permit or even oblige us to be freegans, here understood as people who, though mostly vegan, eat animal products that would otherwise go to waste. This is a conclusion that animal protectionists may want to resist. In this chapter, Josh Milburn canvasses six sets of critiques of freeganism: 1) That animal products aren't food; 2) That animal products are unappealing; 3) That championing freeganism makes for bad activism; 4) That it's wrong to benefit from the wrongdoing of others; 5) That we should donate, rather than eat, waste animal products; and 6) That eating meat disrespects animal corpses. Milburn concludes that though these challenges can speak in favor of veganism, the case for new omnivore freeganism remains compelling in many circumstances. In closing, Milburn turns to the common ground between new omnivores, unusual eaters, and strict vegans, asking what this debate about the ethics of diet might mean for the political question of future food systems.

Meat and Meat Replacements

Meat production involves a range of harms to animals and the environment. There is thus a good ca... more Meat production involves a range of harms to animals and the environment. There is thus a good case to move away from meat production in our food system. However, people value meat, and this gives us both principled and pragmatic reasons to pursue food systems without the animal farming of today's food system, but which still incorporate meat (or meat-like products). However, meat alternatives also raise ethical questions. After exploring the case for adopting meat alternatives (relative to both a system incorporating slaughter-based meat and a fully plant-based system), this chapter reviews some of the ethical challenges raised by three possible meat alternatives: Plant-based meat, cultivated meat, and insects.

The Edinburgh Companion to Vegan Literary Studies, 2022

In her contribution to the 2018 collection Thinking Veganism in Literature and Culture, Sara Sali... more In her contribution to the 2018 collection Thinking Veganism in Literature and Culture, Sara Salih recounts the challenges of teaching animal studies in a literature department. She began the class with a work of philosophy and, in her chapter, asks: What was a bunch of literature and creative writing students supposed to make of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, the first book on our reading list? Instead of engaging with the book's uncompromising moral message, the students focused on Singer's rhetorical strategies, which some of them dismissed as polemic. I now understood I had unconsciously wished to shock, perhaps even convert the students taking my course, and I felt disappointed and stupid when I saw how they responded to the text as any other texta literary artefact to be analysed and assessed. (63) The vegan students had heard it all before, recounts Salih, while the non-vegans became This is the almost final version of a chapter that is forthcoming in (or appeared in) The Edinburgh Companion to Vegan Literary Studies, edited by Laura Wright and Emelia Quinn and published by Edinburgh University Press. For the final, citable version of the paper, please see the book. Philosophical exploration of the ethics of human/animal relationshipswhat we can call animal ethicsforms part of the prehistory of vegan (literary) studies (Wright, Vegan Studies Project 11; Wright, "Doing vegan studies" xv), and remains an important touch-stone for scholars of veganism in literature (Quinn and Westwood, 16; Milburn). It is thus not surprising that Salih included animal ethics in her course. But the response of her students, and her consequent frustration, is understandable, too. To what extent does it make sense to group philosophical essays within or alongside more conventional "literary texts" (Salih 64)? Should scholars of vegan literature respond to philosophical essays "as any other text" (Salih 63)? This chapter interrogateswithout necessarily answeringthese questions. It is first worth saying that there are multiple traditions of philosophy that may be of interest to vegan literary scholars. We can first distinguish between the so-called "continental" and "analytic" traditions of philosophy. Continental philosophy has its origins in French and German thought, and is at the foundation of much contemporary literary theory. The philosopher Jacques Derrida is a recognisably continental philosopher who is a frequent source of engagement for vegan literary scholars (see, for example, Schuster). Analytic philosophy, on the other hand, takes its lead from the sciences, especially mathematics, aiming to answer philosophical questions with scientific rigour. Within analytic philosophy, we can identify two approaches to animal ethics: "traditional" and "nontraditional" (Crary). The traditional approaches are more familiar: the animal welfare philosophy of Peter Singer and the animal rights philosophy of Tom Regan are paradigm examples. The non-traditional is worth mentioning in this chapter, however, as this nontraditional work sometimes involves close engagement with literature. Cora Diamond (without using this language) establishes the differences between the traditional and non-traditional approaches to animals in an early criticism of Singer. In doing so, she engages closely with literature and poetry to understand human relationships to animals ("Eating Meat"). In more This is the almost final version of a chapter that is forthcoming in (or appeared in) The Edinburgh Companion to Vegan Literary Studies, edited by Laura Wright and Emelia Quinn and published by Edinburgh University Press. For the final, citable version of the paper, please see the book. recent work, she looks to J. M. Coetzee's The Lives of Animals ("Difficulty")a book that, incidentally, includes an ironic piece of short fiction by Singer, in which a fictionalised Singer criticises the use of fiction to think about animal ethics: he (the fictional version, at least) prefers "to keep truth and fiction clearly separate" ("Reflections" 86). However, for better or worse, the work of "traditional" analytic animal ethicistsespecially Singerremains both influential and widely read. Salih's choice to start her course with his work is not, I think, atypical. For students across multiple disciplines, Singer's work may be some of the only philosophy they readand, indeed, for many students, his work may be some of the only animal protectionist scholarship with which they engage. For many vegan theorists, meanwhile, Singer's work has been formative. 2 And, indeed, his influence and readership stretches well beyond the academy, to animal activists and members of the public. As such, this chapter advances by way of conversation with Singer's 1974 essay "All Animals Are Equal," a version of which appears as the first chapter of his Animal Liberation, taking this as representative of a certain kind of philosophical essay. I begin by placing the essay in context. I then use the essay to reflect on the goals and tools of analytic philosophy, contrasting these with the goals and tools of literary work and literary analysis. I conclude by returning to reflect on the role of work like Singer's in vegan literary studies. Singer in Context Singer, an Australian, became a vegetarian in Oxford (UK), where he was undertaking graduate studies in philosophy. After attending a lecture in autumn 1970, Singer met the philosopher Richard Keshen, also a graduate student, and the pair ate together. Keshen's meal was vegetarian, and he introduced Singer to the moral case against meat. Over the next few months, All the while, however, they should remember Salih's words. It is the "moral message" that is key. Though the vegan literary scholar should of course bring her expertise to bare on the language of the philosophical essay, she should be prepared, too, to engage with philosophical essays on their own terms.

Animals and Business Ethics, 2022

For-profit industries within which nonhuman animals are transformed into commodities for human co... more For-profit industries within which nonhuman animals are transformed into commodities for human consumption are the source of many significant ethical concerns. Not surprisingly, we are seeing rapid growth and expansion of vegan/plant-based food businesses that offer dietary alternatives. This expansion of vegan food businesses raises several important ethical, economic, and practical questions for those interested in labour, economics, and the wellbeing of members of our own and other species. In this chapter, we begin the process of examining vegan food jobs and businesses in more detail, as part of considering their accomplishments, challenges, and potential. We pay particular attention to the possibilities for creating food businesses that, in addition to championing animals, prioritize environmental protection and worker-wellbeing through the lens of humane jobs.

The Routledge Handbook of Vegan Studies, 2021

Philosophical consideration of animals constitutes an important building block of vegan studies, ... more Philosophical consideration of animals constitutes an important building block of vegan studies, with the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan forming a part of the “prehistory” of vegan studies. However, contemporary work in “animal ethics” remains of value to vegan studies scholars, who frequently address questions with a philosophical character. This chapter serves as an introduction to animal ethics for the vegan studies scholars. While it begins with Singer and Regan, it does not end with them, and instead introduces readers to a range of questions in the ethics of veganism and contemporary animal rights theory. In these debates, scholars of vegan studies will, if they scratch the surface, find a great deal of value for their own work. It is the contention of this chapter that analytic philosophy and animal ethics should be more than a stopping-off point on the way to vegan studies. Indeed, animal ethics may be able to provide the kind of vegan theory that vegan studies scholars seek—or, at least, the normative dimension of such a theory. Thus, though vegan studies and animal ethics are different disciplines, they can be closely allied.

Handbook of Eating and Drinking

The philosophical literature may seem to be replete with arguments for vegetarianism based on har... more The philosophical literature may seem to be replete with arguments for vegetarianism based on harm to animals. However, these arguments turn out to be arguments for veganism, not vegetarianism. This chapter explores whether anything can be said for vegetarianism. Some reasons motivating vegetarianism seem to be very personal, and so not the sorts of things that could be the foundation of a moral argument. Meanwhile, though they may hold some weight, arguments about vegetarianism as a “middle way” between veganism and omnivorism are highly contingent. Both of these routes, then, may seem unsatisfying to the vegetarian. Could there be a principled case for vegetarianism? Tzachi Zamir is the one philosopher who has argued at length for vegetarianism over veganism, but a close examination of his arguments show that they are not as compelling as they first seem. A final option remains open: there may be potential for arguments critiquing the eating of animals’ flesh and/or their bodies that are independent of concerns about harms to animals in food production. Such arguments, which have been hinted at in animal ethics, offer a critique of meat consumption, but not, necessarily, of egg and dairy consumption. Perhaps, then, they could form the basis of a principled case for vegetarianism that does not immediately become a case for veganism. The consequences of such an argument, if one can be made, are not simple.

Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues, 2017

In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosop... more In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally.

Pets and People, 2017

Animal lovers normally contribute to significant harm inflicted upon nonhuman animals. This is be... more Animal lovers normally contribute to significant harm inflicted upon nonhuman animals. This is because dogs and cats are fed animal-derived foods, which are the product of death and suffering. This chapter presents an argument suggesting that, typically, people have an obligation to feed their companions a vegan diet. The claim is then defended against three challenges—from dignity, naturalness, and freedom, respectively—that are unsuccessful. A final challenge, from health, is more problematic, and a four-pronged approach to companion veganism is defended. For dogs, people’s moral and political obligations roughly coincide: individually and collectively, people should switch their dogs to vegan diets. For cats, people’s obligations diverge: while individually they should minimize the impact of their companions’ diets, as members of society they have an obligation to come to a greater understanding of how the negative impact of cats’ diets can be fully eliminated.

Intervention or Protest: Acting for Nonhuman Animals

Intervention and Protest, edited by Andrew Woodhall and Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade, published ... more Intervention and Protest, edited by Andrew Woodhall and Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade, published by Vernon Press. It may differ slightly from the published version. For the final version of this paper, please see the published book. A problem for those -academics and activists -concerned with human relationships with nonhuman animals (NHAs) is the nature of our relationship with free-living, or "wild", NHAs, especially given the huge levels of NHA death and suffering in nature. There are at least two ways we can think about this issue. One is at the individual, "moral" level; we can ask questions about the relationship we should as individuals have with free-living NHAs, and concerning our individual response to suffering and death in nature. The other way to think about this is at the collective, political, institutional level. This entails asking questions about what kind of relationship it is appropriate for us as states and societies to have with free-living NHAs, and about what, if anything, the state should do about the suffering and death of free-living NHAs. The two are, of course, linked, as political change relies upon the actions of individuals. Thus, one could be an activist for free-living NHAs by helping them directly, or by agitating for political reform.

The Routledge Handbook of Food Ethics

Animal Liberation (1975). Animal rights (AR) philosophy, though there were earlier proponents, ga... more Animal Liberation (1975). Animal rights (AR) philosophy, though there were earlier proponents, gained prominence after the publication of Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights in 1983. This work offered a deontological alternative to Singer's utilitarian account of the moral status of NHAs, and, excluding Animal Liberation, is probably the most important 20 th century work of animal ethics. As it is through food (including meat, eggs and milk) that many people primarily "interact" with NHAs, animal ethics has long engaged with issues related to food, especially food ethics and food policy. Today, if we accept AR, it should be uncontroversial to say that we have a duty to adopt a vegan diet. However, it is my contention that this is not, or should not be, all that that an AR approach to food will say. As the philosophy of food becomes more developed, so must AR approaches to food.

Global Encyclopedia of Territorial RIghts, 2020

Definition: Animal property rights theory is an approach to territorial rights in which wild anim... more Definition: Animal property rights theory is an approach to territorial rights in which wild animals are conceived of as owners of the natural spaces they inhabit and use.

Global Encyclopedia of Territorial Rights

Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics: Second Edition

Politics and Animals, 2018

On 10 October 2018, a symposium was held by the University of Sheffield Political Theory Research... more On 10 October 2018, a symposium was held by the University of Sheffield Political Theory Research Group discussing Alasdair Cochrane's book Sentientist Politics: A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice, published October 2019 by Oxford University Press. This forum contains extended versions of the papers at the symposium. Cochrane opens with a synopsis of the book. Siobhan O'Sullivan then reflects upon Cochrane's methodology of ideal theory and his cosmopolitanism, followed by a reply from Cochrane. Next, Josh Milburn explores the place of wild animals in Cochrane's sentientist cosmopolitan democracy, and Cochrane offers a reply.

Environmental Philosophy

Appeals to beauty are relatively mainstream in environmental philosophy. Animal ethicists, howeve... more Appeals to beauty are relatively mainstream in environmental philosophy. Animal ethicists, however, treat them with suspicion-respect for an animal shouldn't depend on whether we find her beautiful. Indeed, humans often treat beautiful animals badly because they're beautiful. Trophy hunting, fur farming, and the pet trade spring to mind. Samantha Vice, the author of The Ethics of Animal Beauty, is aware of these challenges. Nonetheless, she worries that philosophers overlook the role that beauty could play in animal ethics-though, crucially, Vice aims to complement existing accounts of animal ethics, rather than challenge them. It's this ethical issue, at least as much as a desire to shine light on an overlooked corner of natural aesthetics, that motivates her project. At its core, The Ethics of Animal Beauty asks: 1) In virtue of which properties are animals beautiful? And, 2) How should agents appropriately respond to that beauty/those properties?

Between the Species, 2023

It's tricky to find decent defences of meat-eating. I don't mean defences of eating (say) roadkil... more It's tricky to find decent defences of meat-eating. I don't mean defences of eating (say) roadkill or cultivated meat. I mean defences of the meat-eating practiced by most westerners. This is jarring when putting together reading lists. I was thus intrigued to pick up two short books defending meat-eating. Dan Shahar's Why It's Ok to Eat Meat (2022) is in Routledge's series of short books called Why It's OK: The Ethics and Aesthetics of How We Live. Per Bauhn's Animal Suffering, Human Rights, and the Virtue of Justice (2023) is from Palgrave Pivot, which publishes books falling somewhere between journal articles and monographs. Shahar's book is worth reading: it's well-written, raising interesting questions, and offering a coherent defence of meat. I don't recommend Bauhn's book.

Utilitas, 2023

Questions about animals have been mainstream in ethics since the 1970s and Peter Singer's Animal ... more Questions about animals have been mainstream in ethics since the 1970s and Peter Singer's Animal Liberation. But for decades, wild animal suffering was something of an embarrassment for animal ethicists. With only a few exceptions (Steve Sapontzis comes to mind), animal ethicists avoided talking about the harms that animals face in the wild. When it did come up, critics used it as a reductio of the pro-animal position. The animal liberationist, the critic pressed, was committed to absurd-sounding conclusions about protecting wild animals from their wild predators, feeding wild animals who went hungry, and providing healthcare for every wild animal on the planet. Thought about in this way, it was the animal ethicist's job to come up with an explanation of how the liberationist position commits us to (for example) veganism, while at the same time not committing us to meddling in ecosystems. But this framing is starting to sound old-fashioned. Through work from philosophers like Martha Nussbaum, Jeff McMahan, Oscar Horta, and Kyle Johannsen-plus organisations like Wild Animal Initiative and Animal Ethics-the idea that, contrary to initial expectations, we should intervene in nature to reduce wild animal suffering is now an established possibility. It's against this background that Catia Faria's Animal Ethics in the Wild emerges. It's not the first book-length case for intervention in nature (that title probably goes to Johannsen's 2021 Wild Animal Ethics), but it is surely the most detailed. Animal Ethics in the Wild is neither a manifesto nor a how-to. The book has the precise, rigorous, systematic, and dispassionate character of an extended philosophical argument. Faria is undoubtedly a deeply capable philosopher who is intimately familiar with this topic. The book begins with a case for intervention. First, 'suffering is bad' (p. 1). Second, if we can prevent bad things, then-obvious caveats aside-we should do so. There is suffering in nature, and we could minimize it. So we are obliged to intervene in nature. Most of the book focuses on categorizing and responding to challenges to this simple argument. To begin, however, Faria addresses the moral considerability of animals (chapter 1) and the concept of speciesism (chapter 2), which, rather surprisingly, she claims is 'strikingly overlooked' (p. 34). These analyses are proficient and up-to-date. In chapter 3, Faria addresses wild animal suffering head-on. Death, she argues, can be a proxy for suffering in measurements of aggregate wellbeing. Wild animals frequently die in

Environmental Ethics, 2023

In Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves, Jeff Sebo argues that we should consider animals in our heal... more In Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves, Jeff Sebo argues that we should consider animals in our health and environmental advocacy and policy far more than we do. In doing this, we would take a large step towards a society better for humans and animals. Chapter 1 establishes the tone of the book. Sebo calls (10-12) for an approach that is multidisciplinary, as his questions concern the physical sciences, social sciences, and humanities; pluralistic, as both deontological and consequentialist ethics can contribute; and holistic, as the challenges we face require structural solutions.

Food Ethics, 2023

This article reviews Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach by ... more This article reviews Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach by Anne Barnhill and Matteo Bonotti, published by Oxford University Press in 2022. The book moves beyond debates about paternalism in the ethics of healthy eating policy to argue that public reason provides tools to understand which policy interventions are legitimate. Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy is an excellent book that will be valuable to academics and students from a range of disciplines. It has the potential to impact food policy for the better if read by policymakers, and we have every reason to think it might be. But, important as debates about healthy-eating policies are, they need to be contextualised. And the key context for this debate, this review argues, is a food system which is unsustainable and
radically destructive of the environment, of animals, and of humans.

Between the Species, 2022

Environmental Politics, 2020

Between the Species, 2020

Metapsychology Online Reviews, 2019

Journal of Animal Ethics, 2018

Political Studies Review

Welfare State by Joachim Wündisch. Munster: Mentis Verlag Gmbh, 2014. 181pp., £18.99 (p/b), ISBN ... more Welfare State by Joachim Wündisch. Munster: Mentis Verlag Gmbh, 2014. 181pp., £18.99 (p/b), ISBN 978-3897858442

Journal of Animal Ethics

Presenting a series of powerful arguments, Robert Garner proposes that animal rights must be cons... more Presenting a series of powerful arguments, Robert Garner proposes that animal rights must be considered within the discourse on justice. The book offers an ideal theory of animal rights as well as a more achievable nonideal theory which we must use to get to the ideal, rejecting an array of alternative positions. The work contains much that is of value to animal ethicists, such as a novel consideration of the argument from marginal cases, and much that will be convincing for those political thinkers and ethicists not already convinced of the moral significance of nonhuman animals. The text occasionally falls into an unfortunate "us and them" dynamic, and practical considerations are, in places, underdeveloped. These shortcomings do not detract from the value of the work, and the book comes highly recommended: It is readable, rigorous and, most importantly, highly convincing.

The Vegan, 2024

Two philosophers ask whether there's a vegan case for controlling grey squirrel populations.

The Philosopher's Magazine, 2023

An interview with Josh Milburn, a philosopher and the host of the podcast Knowing Animals, with T... more An interview with Josh Milburn, a philosopher and the host of the podcast Knowing Animals, with The Philosophers' Magazine.

Persuasion, 2023

Animal products are fundamental to many people's visions of the good life. Think of the patisseri... more Animal products are fundamental to many people's visions of the good life. Think of the patisserie chef who finds good, life-defining work baking with dairy and eggs. Think of the foodie for whom the pursuit of new tastes and textures represents the height of aesthetic appreciation. Think of the Jew who understands chicken soup as part of their cultural and spiritual practice. And yet, to produce dairy, eggs, meat, and more, we inflict immense harm upon animals. Every year, some seventy billion terrestrial vertebrates are killed for food globally. We don't have precise numbers for fish, but the best estimates suggest trillions of fish are killed annually. Many of these animals live short lives of intense suffering. They are closely confined, physically mutilated, and selectively bred for fast growth. Cows need to be kept pregnant to produce milk, and the dairy industry needs very few bullocks. They-and the male chicks of laying hens-are killed when young. And older, less "productive" hens and cows are a drain on resources. They, too, are killed.

Global Research Network, 2022

Ukrainian refugees with their companion animals on the Ukraine-Poland border. Photo copyright Mil... more Ukrainian refugees with their companion animals on the Ukraine-Poland border. Photo copyright Milos Bicanski-We Animals Media. Used with permission. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, heartrending images of Ukrainian refugees and their companion animals fleeing Russian forces circulated among Western media, and the press covered stories of organisations and individuals traveling into Ukraine to feed or rescue the animals left behind. The impact of war on animals became an issue difficult to ignore. Companion animals are not the only ones impacted by war. Disturbing stories about harm to Ukraine's farmed animals appeared, while Ukraine's zookeepers faced difficult choices about whether to evacuate animals. The war's impact on wild animals is, currently, unknown. War has always affected animals. Soldiers have always used animals as transport, guards, and mascots. Armies have always staged battles in places where animals live. And For the published version of this piece, see https://thinktank.grn.global/animals-and-the-ethics-of-war-a-callfor-an-inclusive-just-war-theory/.

SHARC blog, 2021

A few years ago, I was flicking through a book called The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. It c... more A few years ago, I was flicking through a book called The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. It contains lots of great essays, but one title in particular caught my eye-Donald Bruckner's 'Strict Vegetarianism is Immoral'. I remember being sceptical. I'd read plenty of arguments saying that we don't have to be vegan-most of them pretty terrible-but it's hard to think of an argument saying that it's wrong to be vegan. Maybe (I remember thinking) it was going to forward a trite religious argument, saying that we denied 'God's bounty' when we refused to kill animals for food? Maybe it was going to employ warped environmentalist logic, saying that refusing to kill and eat animals 'alienated' us from nature? It does neither. Bruckner's argument is something different. It is something that, I think, might be the best argument against veganism I've read-and I've been working on the ethics of veganism, and a vegan, for years.

SHARC, 2021

Here in the UK, as in many liberal democracies, there are laws against hate speech. The Public Or... more Here in the UK, as in many liberal democracies, there are laws against hate speech. The Public Order Act of 1986, for example, makes it a criminal offence to publish or distribute 'written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting', when intending 'thereby to stir up racial hatred' or 'having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby'. Across many states, laws protect people from speech targeting their racial or ethnic origin; sexuality, sex, or gender; disability status; and so on.

The Vegan Society Expert Series, 2020

The Vegan Society Expert Series, 2019

In the second of our new Expert Series, RAC member Dr Josh Milburn from the University of York re... more In the second of our new Expert Series, RAC member Dr Josh Milburn from the University of York reflects on whether in vitro meat is something to be welcomed or something to be rejected from the point of view of animals, animal advocates, and vegans.

Between the Species, 2018

Between the Species Volume 21, Issue 1 (2018) Tom Regan: In Memoriam Articles Reflections on Tom... more Between the Species
Volume 21, Issue 1 (2018) Tom Regan: In Memoriam
Articles

Reflections on Tom Regan and the Animal Rights Movement That Once Was
Gary L. Francione

"Subjects-of-a-Life," Entelechy, and Intrinsic Teleology
Josephine Donovan

Nozick’s Libertarian Critique of Regan
Josh Milburn

Harming (Respectfully) Some to Benefit Others: Animal Rights and the Moral Imperative of Trap-Neuter-Release Programs
Cheryl E. Abbate

Chasing Secretariat's Consent: The Impossibility of Permissible Animal Sports
James Rocha

We Are All Noah: Tom Regan's Olive Branch to Religious Animal Ethics
Matthew C. Halteman

Demystifying Animal Rights
Mylan Engel Jr.

Xenotransplantation, Subsistence Hunting and the Pursuit of Health: Lessons for Animal Rights-Based Vegan Advocacy
Nathan M. Nobis

Animal Rights and Incredulous Stares
Bob Fischer

Tom Regan: A Visionary Changing the World
Carolyn Bailey

Evidence of Sexism and Male Privilege in the Animal Liberation/Rights Movement
Lisa Kemmerer

Book Review

Review of Nathan Nobis's Animals & Ethics 101
Bob Fischer

Social Theory & Practice, 2020

War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the... more War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the justice of military actions. In this paper, we propose a way in which concern for animals can be included within the just-war framework, with a focus on necessity and proportionality. We argue that counting animals in war will not make just-war theory excessively demanding, but it will make just-war theory more humane. By showing how animals can be included in our proportionality and necessity assessments, we provide a crucial first step towards developing an animal-inclusive account of just-war theory.