Helen Steward | University of Leeds (original) (raw)
Papers by Helen Steward
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 8, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 23, 2000
This chapter looks at the account of events offered by Lawrence Lombard in Events: A Metaphysical... more This chapter looks at the account of events offered by Lawrence Lombard in Events: A Metaphysical Study. Lombard thinks that events are changes, which is a view which fits well with the particularity constraint. It is therefore quite promising as a candidate for a view of events which might permit them to perform the sort of role which they ought to play in the philosophy of mind. It is also undeniable that it is a very natural view. But it is argued that, its appeal notwithstanding, it cannot be quite right. There seem to be events which cannot be fitted into Lombard's account; and reflection on these examples reveals that it is not change, but something else, which is really fundamental to the category.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Oct 1, 2008
Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2011
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 8, 2012
Philosophical Explorations, Jun 1, 2009
Routledge eBooks, Sep 12, 2022
The Philosophers’ Magazine, 2017
This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and consid... more This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and considers some different ways in which philosophers have attempted to answer the question ‘What is it to have a mind?’ Some problems with what is now a popular strategy, making use of the notion of representational content, are raised, focusing particularly on Tyler Burge’s attempt to utilise facts gleaned from perceptual (and in particular visual) psychology in order to make tractable the question which animals, exactly, may be said to have states which possess such content. I suggest, in brief outline, an alternative approach, based rather on the suggestion that animals which can track objects visually are creatures which can bear the relation of seeing to those objects – and that this is already enough to separate out such creatures from mere sentients, but without the need to import a full-blown notion of representational content.
Think
Do we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive appr... more Do we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive approach to the philosophical puzzle concerning free will vs determinism. Steward rejects determinism, but not because she denies that we are not material beings (because, for example, we have Cartesian, immaterial souls that have physical effects). Her reasons for rejecting determinism are very different.
Human Affairs
This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in ‘Freedom: An Impossible Rea... more This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in ‘Freedom: An Impossible Reality’ is not, as Tallis claims, a compatibilist view, but actually a version of libertarianism. While endorsing many aspects of that libertarian view itself, the paper raises questions about how one of the central arguments for Tallis’s view is supposed to work, and queries whether it really follows from the fact that we need to stand apart from nature in a certain sense, in order to develop the kind of abstract knowledge that is constituted by the body of scientific law, that our own actions are not mere manifestations of what Tallis calls the ‘habits of nature’. It is also suggested that while a strong case can be made for many varieties of human exceptionalism, Tallis’s view of animal behaviour may be too simple and that there are examples of animal agency which cannot be explained merely by the associative learning which appears to be the highest grade of animal cognition that Tallis...
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, 2021
Think, 2021
In this article, I argue that we need to reconsider some of the stylistic principles that (explic... more In this article, I argue that we need to reconsider some of the stylistic principles that (explicitly or implicitly) govern writing in analytic philosophy. I suggest that the rules are (i) much more difficult to justify than might be thought at first sight; and (ii) may possibly be gendered, given what we know about the reading preferences and writing styles of men and women.
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2017
This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and consid... more This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and considers some different ways in which philosophers have attempted to answer the question ‘What is it to have a mind?’ Some problems with what is now a popular strategy, making use of the notion of representational content, are raised, focusing particularly on Tyler Burge’s attempt to utilise facts gleaned from perceptual (and in particular visual) psychology in order to make tractable the question which animals, exactly, may be said to have states which possess such content. I suggest, in brief outline, an alternative approach, based rather on the suggestion that animals which can track objects visually are creatures which can bear the relation of seeing to those objects – and that this is already enough to separate out such creatures from mere sentients, but without the need to import a full-blown notion of representational content.
The Ontology of Mind, 2000
This chapter considers two theories of events which connect the category of event quite closely t... more This chapter considers two theories of events which connect the category of event quite closely to the category of property by utilizing the notion of a property exemplification. Both Jaegwon Kim and Jonathan Bennett have defended views according to which events are exemplifications of properties; and though there are significant differences between the two accounts, both share the thought that events relate to properties not merely by having them, in the ordinary way in which anything which is characterizable in any manner at all can be said to have properties, but in a special way, whereby the event is deemed to be something whose identity is actually tied to some particular property (Kim) or to a collection of properties (Bennett). It is argued that views of this sort result in a conception of events on which they have really ceased to have any status as genuine particulars. Kim's events despite his frequent claim that they are particulars, are better classified as fact-like ...
Mind, 2021
The contents of Causation in Psychology may not be quite what you're expecting. It's neither abou... more The contents of Causation in Psychology may not be quite what you're expecting. It's neither about the empirical treatment which the topics of causal perception and cognition have received from psychologists, nor about the standard metaphysical questions concerning type and token identity, supervenience, grounding, causal exclusion, and so on, which dominate the huge philosophical literature on mental causation-although there is a final chapter on the mind-body problem in which some of these issues are broached. I venture to suggest, indeed (with apologies to authors thereby unjustly disparaged) that Campbell's book is far more original, distinctive and groundbreaking than a book focused on either of these more familiar topics would be likely to be. Its main aims are (i) to establish the existence of an utterly sui generis kind of psychological causation to which we have no epistemic access except by way of our imaginative understanding of the way in which certain thoughts and feelings naturally give rise to others; and then (ii) to show that this kind of causation has deep connections both to our conception of human freedom and to our sense of what truly matters. Campbell calls the relevant kind of causation 'singular psychological causation' and over four chapters, he explains why he believes in its irreducible distinctiveness and how recognising its existence might contribute to big questions such as free will and-yes-even the meaning of life. A hugely intriguing and highly innovative chapter on social robots, in particular, reflects upon the reasons why we might feel uneasy and dissatisfied with the prospect of having our social needs for conversation, sympathy, support and so on met by what may well be the incredibly well-designed social robots of the future, instead of by our conspecifics. Campbell's suggestion is that these interactions, however well they might simulate-or even in many respects improve immensely upon-interactions with real-life human beings, will feel ultimately meaningless to us, unless these robots become capable of instantiating (and also of imaginatively understanding) singular psychological causation. What, then, is 'singular psychological causation'? Let's start with 'singular causation' and postpone for the time being the question what Campbell means to add, exactly, with the designation 'psychological'. Campbell kicks
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1996
In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one t... more In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one time, to call the book Philosophical Physicalism. In the end, he writes, he rejected that title, partly for fear that the term "physicalism" might have suggested commitment to a metaphysical position tied closely to the ontology and categories dictated by current physics, a commitment he is anxious not to incur; and partly because the concerns of the book as a whole are wider than would have been suggested by the rejected title. Nevertheless, the early chapters of the book make it clear that the first choice of title would have been, in some ways, a more accurate guide to the character of Papineau's convictions about a number of central issues in metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Specifically, Papineau's views about the relationships between what he calls "the special" and the physical in general, and between the psychological and the physical in particular, fall into a sector of naturalist territory that is indisputably physicalistic. I shall concentrate here on two lines of thought from these early chapters: the first, Papineau's characterisation of physicalism, by means of the two doctrines he calls "supervenience" and "token congruence", in Chapter 1; the second, a puzzle he raises in Chapter 2 for those who are content with a physicalism sufficiently weak to allow for variable realisation.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 8, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 23, 2000
This chapter looks at the account of events offered by Lawrence Lombard in Events: A Metaphysical... more This chapter looks at the account of events offered by Lawrence Lombard in Events: A Metaphysical Study. Lombard thinks that events are changes, which is a view which fits well with the particularity constraint. It is therefore quite promising as a candidate for a view of events which might permit them to perform the sort of role which they ought to play in the philosophy of mind. It is also undeniable that it is a very natural view. But it is argued that, its appeal notwithstanding, it cannot be quite right. There seem to be events which cannot be fitted into Lombard's account; and reflection on these examples reveals that it is not change, but something else, which is really fundamental to the category.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Oct 1, 2008
Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2011
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 8, 2012
Philosophical Explorations, Jun 1, 2009
Routledge eBooks, Sep 12, 2022
The Philosophers’ Magazine, 2017
This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and consid... more This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and considers some different ways in which philosophers have attempted to answer the question ‘What is it to have a mind?’ Some problems with what is now a popular strategy, making use of the notion of representational content, are raised, focusing particularly on Tyler Burge’s attempt to utilise facts gleaned from perceptual (and in particular visual) psychology in order to make tractable the question which animals, exactly, may be said to have states which possess such content. I suggest, in brief outline, an alternative approach, based rather on the suggestion that animals which can track objects visually are creatures which can bear the relation of seeing to those objects – and that this is already enough to separate out such creatures from mere sentients, but without the need to import a full-blown notion of representational content.
Think
Do we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive appr... more Do we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive approach to the philosophical puzzle concerning free will vs determinism. Steward rejects determinism, but not because she denies that we are not material beings (because, for example, we have Cartesian, immaterial souls that have physical effects). Her reasons for rejecting determinism are very different.
Human Affairs
This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in ‘Freedom: An Impossible Rea... more This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in ‘Freedom: An Impossible Reality’ is not, as Tallis claims, a compatibilist view, but actually a version of libertarianism. While endorsing many aspects of that libertarian view itself, the paper raises questions about how one of the central arguments for Tallis’s view is supposed to work, and queries whether it really follows from the fact that we need to stand apart from nature in a certain sense, in order to develop the kind of abstract knowledge that is constituted by the body of scientific law, that our own actions are not mere manifestations of what Tallis calls the ‘habits of nature’. It is also suggested that while a strong case can be made for many varieties of human exceptionalism, Tallis’s view of animal behaviour may be too simple and that there are examples of animal agency which cannot be explained merely by the associative learning which appears to be the highest grade of animal cognition that Tallis...
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, 2021
Think, 2021
In this article, I argue that we need to reconsider some of the stylistic principles that (explic... more In this article, I argue that we need to reconsider some of the stylistic principles that (explicitly or implicitly) govern writing in analytic philosophy. I suggest that the rules are (i) much more difficult to justify than might be thought at first sight; and (ii) may possibly be gendered, given what we know about the reading preferences and writing styles of men and women.
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2017
This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and consid... more This short article is intended to be comprehensible to an interested general audience, and considers some different ways in which philosophers have attempted to answer the question ‘What is it to have a mind?’ Some problems with what is now a popular strategy, making use of the notion of representational content, are raised, focusing particularly on Tyler Burge’s attempt to utilise facts gleaned from perceptual (and in particular visual) psychology in order to make tractable the question which animals, exactly, may be said to have states which possess such content. I suggest, in brief outline, an alternative approach, based rather on the suggestion that animals which can track objects visually are creatures which can bear the relation of seeing to those objects – and that this is already enough to separate out such creatures from mere sentients, but without the need to import a full-blown notion of representational content.
The Ontology of Mind, 2000
This chapter considers two theories of events which connect the category of event quite closely t... more This chapter considers two theories of events which connect the category of event quite closely to the category of property by utilizing the notion of a property exemplification. Both Jaegwon Kim and Jonathan Bennett have defended views according to which events are exemplifications of properties; and though there are significant differences between the two accounts, both share the thought that events relate to properties not merely by having them, in the ordinary way in which anything which is characterizable in any manner at all can be said to have properties, but in a special way, whereby the event is deemed to be something whose identity is actually tied to some particular property (Kim) or to a collection of properties (Bennett). It is argued that views of this sort result in a conception of events on which they have really ceased to have any status as genuine particulars. Kim's events despite his frequent claim that they are particulars, are better classified as fact-like ...
Mind, 2021
The contents of Causation in Psychology may not be quite what you're expecting. It's neither abou... more The contents of Causation in Psychology may not be quite what you're expecting. It's neither about the empirical treatment which the topics of causal perception and cognition have received from psychologists, nor about the standard metaphysical questions concerning type and token identity, supervenience, grounding, causal exclusion, and so on, which dominate the huge philosophical literature on mental causation-although there is a final chapter on the mind-body problem in which some of these issues are broached. I venture to suggest, indeed (with apologies to authors thereby unjustly disparaged) that Campbell's book is far more original, distinctive and groundbreaking than a book focused on either of these more familiar topics would be likely to be. Its main aims are (i) to establish the existence of an utterly sui generis kind of psychological causation to which we have no epistemic access except by way of our imaginative understanding of the way in which certain thoughts and feelings naturally give rise to others; and then (ii) to show that this kind of causation has deep connections both to our conception of human freedom and to our sense of what truly matters. Campbell calls the relevant kind of causation 'singular psychological causation' and over four chapters, he explains why he believes in its irreducible distinctiveness and how recognising its existence might contribute to big questions such as free will and-yes-even the meaning of life. A hugely intriguing and highly innovative chapter on social robots, in particular, reflects upon the reasons why we might feel uneasy and dissatisfied with the prospect of having our social needs for conversation, sympathy, support and so on met by what may well be the incredibly well-designed social robots of the future, instead of by our conspecifics. Campbell's suggestion is that these interactions, however well they might simulate-or even in many respects improve immensely upon-interactions with real-life human beings, will feel ultimately meaningless to us, unless these robots become capable of instantiating (and also of imaginatively understanding) singular psychological causation. What, then, is 'singular psychological causation'? Let's start with 'singular causation' and postpone for the time being the question what Campbell means to add, exactly, with the designation 'psychological'. Campbell kicks
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1996
In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one t... more In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one time, to call the book Philosophical Physicalism. In the end, he writes, he rejected that title, partly for fear that the term "physicalism" might have suggested commitment to a metaphysical position tied closely to the ontology and categories dictated by current physics, a commitment he is anxious not to incur; and partly because the concerns of the book as a whole are wider than would have been suggested by the rejected title. Nevertheless, the early chapters of the book make it clear that the first choice of title would have been, in some ways, a more accurate guide to the character of Papineau's convictions about a number of central issues in metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Specifically, Papineau's views about the relationships between what he calls "the special" and the physical in general, and between the psychological and the physical in particular, fall into a sector of naturalist territory that is indisputably physicalistic. I shall concentrate here on two lines of thought from these early chapters: the first, Papineau's characterisation of physicalism, by means of the two doctrines he calls "supervenience" and "token congruence", in Chapter 1; the second, a puzzle he raises in Chapter 2 for those who are content with a physicalism sufficiently weak to allow for variable realisation.
In: The Things that Really Matter, ed. Michael Hauskeller, London: UCL Press 2022, 27-45.
A conversation with the Leeds-based philosopher Helen Steward, occasioned by her wonderful book "... more A conversation with the Leeds-based philosopher Helen Steward, occasioned by her wonderful book "A Metaphysics for Freedom" (Oxford University Press 2012).
What is the thesis of determinism? Though it is obvious that in principle there is more than one ... more What is the thesis of determinism? Though it is obvious that in principle there is more than one possible thesis that might be given this name, it seems to be the case that philosophers working on the free will problem have gradually gravitated towards a more-or-less standard definition, minor variations on which can now be found widely scattered through the free will literature. I call it the ‘entailment definition’ and it states, roughly, that determinism is the thesis that for any given time, a complete statement of the facts about that time, together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to what happens after that time. In this paper, I argue that acceptance of the entailment definition has been a mistake – and that we need a definition of determinism which, by contrast with the entailment definition, makes explicit mention of the notion of natural necessity.