Joseph Melia | University of Leeds (original) (raw)
Papers by Joseph Melia
Presentists and eternalists make competing claims about temporal ontology. According to presentis... more Presentists and eternalists make competing claims about temporal ontology. According to presentism, only present things exist. According to eternalism, past and future things, such as dinosaurs and human outposts on Mars, exist as well.1 These are theories about what there is, just like actualism, possibil-ism, Platonism, nominalism, Meinongianism, idealism, materialism, theism, atheism, the atomic theory of matter, and the belief in extra-terrestrials. Presentists and eternalists seem to disagree, for instance over whether:2 (1) There exist dinosaurs ∃xDx But according to a certain sort of skeptic — my opponent in this paper — the disagreement is merely verbal, and as a result, inquiry into temporal ontology is fundamentally misguided. The skeptic argues as follows:3 ∗This paper began as comments on Dean Zimmerman’s “What does it take to be an A-
Philosophical Topics, 2015
ABSTRACT:In this paper, I discuss Moore’s assessment of Lewis’s metaphysical theorizing. While I ... more ABSTRACT:In this paper, I discuss Moore’s assessment of Lewis’s metaphysical theorizing. While I am sympathetic to Moore’s complaint that much contemporary metaphysics lacks the scope and reach of older metaphysical theories, I take issue with Moore’s diagnosis: neither lack of self-consciousness, nor Quinean naturalism, nor the post-Quinean restitution of necessity is to blame. Rather, the lack of impact of Lewis’s system should be attributed to the very high weight he attaches to conservatism: the preservation of commonsense and ordinary thought and talk. Yet one can agree with Quine that there should be no first philosophy without, as Lewis does, putting philosophy last. Finally, I argue against Moore that, for the Quinean naturalist, there is no conflict between the metaphysician’s armchair methodology and the view that the truths so discovered are on a par with science.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2006
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one... more Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. We examine various ways in which the structural realist may respond, and conclude that the best way of blocking the model theoretic argument involves formulating his Ramseyfied theories using intensional operators. 1 Introduction 2 The model theoretic arguments 3 On Ramseyfying away predicates 4 The model theoretic argument bites back 5 Restricting the second order quantifiers 5.1 Naturalness 5.2 Intrinsic 5.3 Qualitative 5.4 Contingent and causal 6 Intensional operators and relations between properties 7 Conclusion
Mind, 2010
Daly and Langford 2010 contains the complaint that my formulation of the comprehension schema for... more Daly and Langford 2010 contains the complaint that my formulation of the comprehension schema for mereological sums is inadequate. A replacement is proposed: Although simpler and more attractive than the version they criticise, this axiom fails to characterize R as the sum of Fs. ...
Analysis, 2009
Lewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dya... more Lewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dyadic relation R is identified with the set of actual and possible pairs of things that are related by R; and so on (1986: 5069). 1 Egan has argued that the fact that some properties have ...
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2013
In his paper, Leuenberger (2013) discerns two salient conceptions of logical validity. Strikingly... more In his paper, Leuenberger (2013) discerns two salient conceptions of logical validity. Strikingly, neither of these conceptions involves modality. He goes on to use these conceptions as a framework to explore certain recent investigations in the logic of modality, where he ingeniously articulates and proves interesting theses about the logic of contingentism. While I think there’s much of interest in Leuenberger’s results, and that his conception of de facto validity gives a unified account of philosophers’ talk of the logic of time and modality, in this note I suggest that perhaps he is too hasty to dismiss the modal conception of validity and that, moreover, his concept of de facto validity may be too inclusive.
Modality, 2003
In this chapter we meet the modal languages and modal logics that philosophers and logicians use ... more In this chapter we meet the modal languages and modal logics that philosophers and logicians use to formalize modal thought and talk. In order to understand the significance of the model theory for modal languages, we shall also examine model theory for non-modal first-order language. Finally, we'll see that there are limitations to the expressive resources of these modal systems: certain natural modal theses cannot be expressed in straightforward modal languages – although they can be expressed in a first-order language that quantifies over worlds and possibilia. This will be the first sign of support for possible worlds theory. Quantified modal language Some philosophers think that any fact can be captured in a language containing only names and predicates. Others argue that there are some true thoughts whose correct expression involves quantification over things – and only things: the first-order predicate calculus is the correct logical framework. Still others believe that, since first-order formulations of mathematical theories such as arithmetic and set theory have clearly non-standard models, second-order logic is required. And yet others maintain that none of these languages is capable of expressing modal facts. First- and second-order languages have been extensively studied by logicians. These languages can be presented in formal systems whose grammatical and syntactical rules are precisely defined. Deductive systems for these logics have also been studied and there exist precisely defined semantic systems for these logics. Students and researchers alike are well trained at translating English sentences into first-order languages, and sentences of first-order languages into English.
Analysis, 1995
Yet I fear I cannot just leave (1) to (3) out of BT. For I fear that by omit-ting sentence (1) (s... more Yet I fear I cannot just leave (1) to (3) out of BT. For I fear that by omit-ting sentence (1) (say) I may miss out some truth about the concrete part of the world. For (1) not only entails that the average mum exists - in the right circumstances it will also entail many truths about how ...
British Journal For the Philosophy of Science, 2000
Many philosophers have been impressed by possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds semantics has... more Many philosophers have been impressed by possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds semantics has shed light upon a wide range of modal notions, has helped us understand counterfactuals and answered questions about the validity and soundness of modal logics. But many ...
Presentists and eternalists make competing claims about temporal ontology. According to presentis... more Presentists and eternalists make competing claims about temporal ontology. According to presentism, only present things exist. According to eternalism, past and future things, such as dinosaurs and human outposts on Mars, exist as well.1 These are theories about what there is, just like actualism, possibil-ism, Platonism, nominalism, Meinongianism, idealism, materialism, theism, atheism, the atomic theory of matter, and the belief in extra-terrestrials. Presentists and eternalists seem to disagree, for instance over whether:2 (1) There exist dinosaurs ∃xDx But according to a certain sort of skeptic — my opponent in this paper — the disagreement is merely verbal, and as a result, inquiry into temporal ontology is fundamentally misguided. The skeptic argues as follows:3 ∗This paper began as comments on Dean Zimmerman’s “What does it take to be an A-
Philosophical Topics, 2015
ABSTRACT:In this paper, I discuss Moore’s assessment of Lewis’s metaphysical theorizing. While I ... more ABSTRACT:In this paper, I discuss Moore’s assessment of Lewis’s metaphysical theorizing. While I am sympathetic to Moore’s complaint that much contemporary metaphysics lacks the scope and reach of older metaphysical theories, I take issue with Moore’s diagnosis: neither lack of self-consciousness, nor Quinean naturalism, nor the post-Quinean restitution of necessity is to blame. Rather, the lack of impact of Lewis’s system should be attributed to the very high weight he attaches to conservatism: the preservation of commonsense and ordinary thought and talk. Yet one can agree with Quine that there should be no first philosophy without, as Lewis does, putting philosophy last. Finally, I argue against Moore that, for the Quinean naturalist, there is no conflict between the metaphysician’s armchair methodology and the view that the truths so discovered are on a par with science.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2006
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one... more Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. We examine various ways in which the structural realist may respond, and conclude that the best way of blocking the model theoretic argument involves formulating his Ramseyfied theories using intensional operators. 1 Introduction 2 The model theoretic arguments 3 On Ramseyfying away predicates 4 The model theoretic argument bites back 5 Restricting the second order quantifiers 5.1 Naturalness 5.2 Intrinsic 5.3 Qualitative 5.4 Contingent and causal 6 Intensional operators and relations between properties 7 Conclusion
Mind, 2010
Daly and Langford 2010 contains the complaint that my formulation of the comprehension schema for... more Daly and Langford 2010 contains the complaint that my formulation of the comprehension schema for mereological sums is inadequate. A replacement is proposed: Although simpler and more attractive than the version they criticise, this axiom fails to characterize R as the sum of Fs. ...
Analysis, 2009
Lewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dya... more Lewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dyadic relation R is identified with the set of actual and possible pairs of things that are related by R; and so on (1986: 5069). 1 Egan has argued that the fact that some properties have ...
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2013
In his paper, Leuenberger (2013) discerns two salient conceptions of logical validity. Strikingly... more In his paper, Leuenberger (2013) discerns two salient conceptions of logical validity. Strikingly, neither of these conceptions involves modality. He goes on to use these conceptions as a framework to explore certain recent investigations in the logic of modality, where he ingeniously articulates and proves interesting theses about the logic of contingentism. While I think there’s much of interest in Leuenberger’s results, and that his conception of de facto validity gives a unified account of philosophers’ talk of the logic of time and modality, in this note I suggest that perhaps he is too hasty to dismiss the modal conception of validity and that, moreover, his concept of de facto validity may be too inclusive.
Modality, 2003
In this chapter we meet the modal languages and modal logics that philosophers and logicians use ... more In this chapter we meet the modal languages and modal logics that philosophers and logicians use to formalize modal thought and talk. In order to understand the significance of the model theory for modal languages, we shall also examine model theory for non-modal first-order language. Finally, we'll see that there are limitations to the expressive resources of these modal systems: certain natural modal theses cannot be expressed in straightforward modal languages – although they can be expressed in a first-order language that quantifies over worlds and possibilia. This will be the first sign of support for possible worlds theory. Quantified modal language Some philosophers think that any fact can be captured in a language containing only names and predicates. Others argue that there are some true thoughts whose correct expression involves quantification over things – and only things: the first-order predicate calculus is the correct logical framework. Still others believe that, since first-order formulations of mathematical theories such as arithmetic and set theory have clearly non-standard models, second-order logic is required. And yet others maintain that none of these languages is capable of expressing modal facts. First- and second-order languages have been extensively studied by logicians. These languages can be presented in formal systems whose grammatical and syntactical rules are precisely defined. Deductive systems for these logics have also been studied and there exist precisely defined semantic systems for these logics. Students and researchers alike are well trained at translating English sentences into first-order languages, and sentences of first-order languages into English.
Analysis, 1995
Yet I fear I cannot just leave (1) to (3) out of BT. For I fear that by omit-ting sentence (1) (s... more Yet I fear I cannot just leave (1) to (3) out of BT. For I fear that by omit-ting sentence (1) (say) I may miss out some truth about the concrete part of the world. For (1) not only entails that the average mum exists - in the right circumstances it will also entail many truths about how ...
British Journal For the Philosophy of Science, 2000
Many philosophers have been impressed by possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds semantics has... more Many philosophers have been impressed by possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds semantics has shed light upon a wide range of modal notions, has helped us understand counterfactuals and answered questions about the validity and soundness of modal logics. But many ...