Adina Akbik | Leiden University (original) (raw)

Monograph by Adina Akbik

Cambridge University Press, 2022

Since the euro crisis, the European Parliament has new powers to scrutinize EU executive actors i... more Since the euro crisis, the European Parliament has new powers to scrutinize EU executive actors in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). How do parliamentary committees exercise these powers in practice? This book provides the first in-depth empirical study of the European Parliament’s practices of legislative oversight in the EMU and its contribution to political accountability at the EU level. Building on an innovative analytical framework for the study of parliamentary questions and answers, the book sheds light on the European Parliament’s possibilities and limitations to hold EU executive bodies accountable more generally. The case studies cover the period from 2012 to 2019 and include the European Central Bank in banking supervision, the European Commission, the Eurogroup, and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. The book is open access.

EMU Accountability by Adina Akbik

West European Politics, 2024

The parliamentary oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) is frequently criticised for its l... more The parliamentary oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) is frequently criticised for its lack of focus in both monetary policy and banking supervision. While Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can publicly question ECB decisions in these fields, they often use committee hearings for other purposes, such as expressing political positions on issues that may or may not be related to ECB activities. This article aims to conceptualise such variation by expanding the seminal distinction between ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ to include two novel categories – ‘planning bureaus’ and ‘ambulance chasers’. To illustrate the applicability of our typology, the article provides the first systematic comparison of the Monetary and the Banking Dialogues (2014–2021), combining a qualitative content analysis of 1,504 parliamentary questions with insights from interviews with MEPs. The findings highlight the pervasiveness of fire alarms and ambulance chasing in the parliamentary practice of overseeing the ECB.

Substantive Accountability in Europe's New Economic Governance, 2023

As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has ... more As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has faced continuous demands to improve its accountability record since the euro crisis. One reform introduced to meet these demands were the Economic Dialogue – a regular exchange of views between the European Parliament and the President of the Eurogroup designed to ‘ensure greater transparency and accountability’ in the EMU. This chapter investigates the practical functioning of the Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup between 2013 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. Applying the theoretical framework of the introduction, the purpose is to examine the extent to which the Parliament focuses on procedural or substantive accountability when questioning the Eurogroup President. Moreover, the chapter investigates the reasoning of parliamentary questions in line with the four accountability goods identified at the outset (openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness). The findings show that Members of the European Parliament are eager to question the extent to which Eurogroup decisions are substantively open and effective, and to a lesser extent whether they are arbitrary or protect EU interests more generally. The analysis is based on fourteen transcripts of Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup President, which took place between 2013 and 2019.

Substantive Accountability in Europe's New Economic Governance, 2023

This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new a... more This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new approaches to accountability are needed, arguing that accountability literature has reached a stalemate as a result of an impasse between deductive and inductive approaches to accountability in the EU. It then argues that overcoming the stalemate requires developing a generalised framework of what accountability is for, deriving four accountability goods to be used in subsequent chapters. The chapter argues that each of the goods can be delivered in procedural or substantive ways, focusing either on the process by which decisions are made or the substantive worth of decisions themselves. The chapter concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both varieties of accountability before mapping out how the concepts will be applied across policy fields and institutions in subsequent chapters.

European Parliament's Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), 2022

This study evaluates the European Parliament's accountability instruments in the Single Superviso... more This study evaluates the European Parliament's accountability instruments in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in light of their comparability to existing arrangements in monetary policy. The analysis shows that the Inter-Institutional Agreement with the European Central Bank in banking supervision did not result in a significantly different accountability relationship than the one between the two institutions in monetary policy. The results are based on interviews with Members of the European Parliament and an examination of questions asked in public hearings with the Chair of the Supervisory Board.

This document was prepared at the request of the ECON Committee.

Regulation & Governance, 2021

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in re... more This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2020

The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the abi... more The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the ability of the European Parliament (EP) to hold the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable for its decisions. This article examines the accountability interactions between the two institutions in the first years of the functioning of the SSM (2013–18). The focus is on the extent to which the EP contests ECB supervisory decisions in practice through letters and public hearings. The analysis shows a frequently-used infrastructure of political accountability that is however limited in ensuring the contestation of ECB conduct in banking supervision. The study identifies problems with the performance of the EP as an accountability forum and with the tight confidentiality rules of the SSM, which allow the ECB to silence contestation on many politically salient issues. The findings are based on an innovative analytical framework on the study of accountability interactions.

Journal of European Public Policy, 2021

This article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Un... more This article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Union’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The framework is anchored in four normative ‘goods’ that accountability is supposed to ensure: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness. All of these can be achieved in a procedural or substantive way, depending on whether actors are held accountable for the quality of their decision-making processes or for the actual merit of their decisions. Transposed to EMU, this conceptualisation shows both the payoffs and trade-offs of prioritising procedural accountability. Using different examples across EMU governance, the article illustrates how current mechanisms of political, legal, and administrative accountability predominantly evaluate the procedures followed by EU institutions when performing their tasks. While such an approach can bring clarity, predictability, and autonomy for the actors involved, it distracts attention from the substantive assessment of EMU decisions. The article contributes to the EMU accountability literature by going beyond principal-agent expectations of democratic control rooted in the nation-state or legal debates about principles for accountable behaviour found in EU Treaties. The EMU, and the EU more broadly, need a different perspective on accountability focused on generally-applicable standards for holding power to account.

European Law Journal, 2019

This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European C... more This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European Central Bank (ECB). It contrasts procedural and substantive concepts of accountability, and challenges the mainstream idea that independence and accountability can be reconciled through narrow mandates, the indiscriminate increase of transparency, the creation of multiple channels of accountability, and the active use of judicial review. These assumptions form the pillars of a procedural type of accountability that promises to resolve the independence/accountability dilemma but fails to do so in practice. The article brings evidence to show how ECB accountability has become a complex administrative exercise that focuses on the procedural steps leading up to monetary and supervisory decisions while simultaneously limiting substantive accountability. The failure to acknowledge the trade‐off between independence and accountability (said to be ‘two sides of the same coin’) has resulted in a tendency to privilege the former over the latter.

Policy Paper 19 November, Jacque Delors Institute Berlin/Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018

In the aftermath of the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) took over responsibilities f... more In the aftermath of the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) took over responsibilities for banking supervision in the euro area in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). This expansion of the original ECB mandate in monetary policy was coupled with the establishment of additional accountability mechanisms to balance the newly acquired competences. In terms of political accountability, the relationship with the European Parliament (EP) was placed front and centre—with regular interactions between the two institutions since late 2013.

This paper analyses the accountability interactions between the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee and ECB Banking Supervision in the first 4.5 years of the functioning of the SSM. In particular, it aims to: 1) situate the relationship between the ECB and the EP in the broader context of political accountability in banking supervision; 2) provide an overview of the frequency and patterns of interactions between the two institutions, describing types of questions asked and answers provided; and 3) identify strengths and weaknesses in the process, with a forward-looking focus on prospects for improvement.

EU agencies by Adina Akbik

West European Politics, 2023

European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementatio... more European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementation in the member states, creating a new domain of differentiation in EU governance. What brings about such differentiation, and how does it vary across policy fields? Drawing on theories of differentiated integration, this article argues that differentiated implementation occurs at the intersection of postfunctional obstacles (politicisation) and functional pressures for joint implementation (interdependence). There are two identified dimensions of direct implementation, a territorial one referring to states’ participation in such activities, and a procedural one capturing the degree of uniformity in the guidelines for organising implementation. The resulting typology is applied to direct implementation activities (DIAs) conducted by EU agencies alongside national authorities. The qualitative analysis reveals that differentiated participation is a stable feature of DIAs in politicised fields, and although there is a tendency to create more uniform procedures over time and across policy fields, higher uniformity prevails under symmetric interdependence.

Comparative Political Studies, 2022

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tas... more This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).

EU migration and asylum by Adina Akbik

Journal of European Integration, 2021

This article aims to understand the lack of consensus at the European Union (EU) level during the... more This article aims to understand the lack of consensus at the European Union (EU) level during the refugee crisis based on the discursive polarization of the main governmental and institutional actors involved in decision-making. Drawing on de Wilde’s representative claims analysis, the goal is to trace competing claims of representation made on ‘Europe’s behalf’ by multiple actors claiming to defend EU values or the interests of citizens. The analysis covers Politico Europe articles published during 2015–16, capturing the height of the crisis. The findings illustrate the self-understandings of actors on a humanitarian-communitarian axis that became intertwined with concerns for internal EU solidarity and the survival of the Schengen Area. The analysis contributes to the literature on EU politicization and discursive framing during the refugee crisis, showing how the actors involved in EU decision-making had very different conceptions of what was at stake in the episode.

Comparative European Politics, 2019

This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework ex... more This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework explaining mechanisms of European Union (EU) politicization during immigration crises. Since most existing studies on the politicization of EU crisis situations focus on the Euro crisis, it is unclear if and how the politicization of EU immigration crises differs. Drawing on a 2011 crisis with legislative implications for the free movement of people in the Schengen Area, the article illustrates that immigration crises are politicized along exclusionary identities rather than along pro-/anti-European lines-as expected by democratic functionalism. Moreover, unlike in the Euro crisis, the 2011 case illustrates how the media can be instrumentalized by governments during immigration crises, with little political mobilization from the public. This case is relevant given the widespread politicization of the 2015 refugee crisis, which conversely attracted close media attention and caused serious public concern. As it stands, democratic functionalism is shown to lack a conceptualization of how much and for how long an issue needs to be contested in the European public sphere for the mechanisms of EU politicization described by the theory to hold.

PhD Thesis, Central European University, 2016

CEU eTD Collection i COPYRIGHT NOTICE I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials acc... more CEU eTD Collection i COPYRIGHT NOTICE I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Legislative studies by Adina Akbik

European Union Politics

Although parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight, there is limited... more Although parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight, there is limited research on their variation in holding governments accountable. In this article, we analyse a new dataset of 1393 oral questions posed by Members of the European Parliament during the 8 th parliamentary term. After distinguishing between questions asking for information, justification, or rectification of conduct, we explain their variation in connection to the formal oversight relationship between parliaments and scrutinised actors, and to the type of policy activity carried out by the latter. We find that Members of the European Parliament are more likely to address rectification questions and less likely to ask information questions the fewer legal controls they have. Moreover, information questions are more likely to occur in the oversight of policy formulation, while justification questions are prevalent in the oversight of policy execution. The findings flag the importance of structural factors in the practice of legislative oversight.

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2022

What drives the behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in legislative oversight? ... more What drives the behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in legislative oversight? In this article, we explore the interplay between the ideology and nationality of MEPs in policy fields where the two dimensions are likely to come into conflict. Focusing on EU socioeconomic governance, we collect an original dataset of parliamentary questions asked during the Economic Dialogues with the European Commission (2012-2019). By means of content analysis, we detect variation in MEPs' preferences relating to two dimensions central to this field, that is, economic effectiveness and social inequality. We argue that the variation in MEPs' concerns can be explained to different degrees by their ideology and nationality. We find that ideology plays a highly significant role in shaping the type of questions posed in legislative oversight; however, the nationality of MEPs is also an important driver of behaviour, especially when a member state is disproportionately affected by EU measures.

European Journal of Political Research, 2021

Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to wh... more Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal–agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the ‘Q&A approach to legislative oversight’ based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the micro-level as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step-by-step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013–2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions.

Papers by Adina Akbik

European Parliament study IPOL STU(2024)760125 EN, 2024

This study examines the evolving role of the European Council in the EU’s constitutional structur... more This study examines the evolving role of the European Council in the EU’s constitutional structure. As the study demonstrates, the increasing tendency of the European Council to instruct other EU institutions and its limited accountability have established an increasing gap between its de jure role under the EU Treaties and its de facto power in the larger system of EU governance. This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee.

Cambridge University Press, 2022

Since the euro crisis, the European Parliament has new powers to scrutinize EU executive actors i... more Since the euro crisis, the European Parliament has new powers to scrutinize EU executive actors in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). How do parliamentary committees exercise these powers in practice? This book provides the first in-depth empirical study of the European Parliament’s practices of legislative oversight in the EMU and its contribution to political accountability at the EU level. Building on an innovative analytical framework for the study of parliamentary questions and answers, the book sheds light on the European Parliament’s possibilities and limitations to hold EU executive bodies accountable more generally. The case studies cover the period from 2012 to 2019 and include the European Central Bank in banking supervision, the European Commission, the Eurogroup, and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. The book is open access.

West European Politics, 2024

The parliamentary oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) is frequently criticised for its l... more The parliamentary oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) is frequently criticised for its lack of focus in both monetary policy and banking supervision. While Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can publicly question ECB decisions in these fields, they often use committee hearings for other purposes, such as expressing political positions on issues that may or may not be related to ECB activities. This article aims to conceptualise such variation by expanding the seminal distinction between ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ to include two novel categories – ‘planning bureaus’ and ‘ambulance chasers’. To illustrate the applicability of our typology, the article provides the first systematic comparison of the Monetary and the Banking Dialogues (2014–2021), combining a qualitative content analysis of 1,504 parliamentary questions with insights from interviews with MEPs. The findings highlight the pervasiveness of fire alarms and ambulance chasing in the parliamentary practice of overseeing the ECB.

Substantive Accountability in Europe's New Economic Governance, 2023

As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has ... more As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has faced continuous demands to improve its accountability record since the euro crisis. One reform introduced to meet these demands were the Economic Dialogue – a regular exchange of views between the European Parliament and the President of the Eurogroup designed to ‘ensure greater transparency and accountability’ in the EMU. This chapter investigates the practical functioning of the Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup between 2013 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. Applying the theoretical framework of the introduction, the purpose is to examine the extent to which the Parliament focuses on procedural or substantive accountability when questioning the Eurogroup President. Moreover, the chapter investigates the reasoning of parliamentary questions in line with the four accountability goods identified at the outset (openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness). The findings show that Members of the European Parliament are eager to question the extent to which Eurogroup decisions are substantively open and effective, and to a lesser extent whether they are arbitrary or protect EU interests more generally. The analysis is based on fourteen transcripts of Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup President, which took place between 2013 and 2019.

Substantive Accountability in Europe's New Economic Governance, 2023

This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new a... more This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new approaches to accountability are needed, arguing that accountability literature has reached a stalemate as a result of an impasse between deductive and inductive approaches to accountability in the EU. It then argues that overcoming the stalemate requires developing a generalised framework of what accountability is for, deriving four accountability goods to be used in subsequent chapters. The chapter argues that each of the goods can be delivered in procedural or substantive ways, focusing either on the process by which decisions are made or the substantive worth of decisions themselves. The chapter concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both varieties of accountability before mapping out how the concepts will be applied across policy fields and institutions in subsequent chapters.

European Parliament's Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), 2022

This study evaluates the European Parliament's accountability instruments in the Single Superviso... more This study evaluates the European Parliament's accountability instruments in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in light of their comparability to existing arrangements in monetary policy. The analysis shows that the Inter-Institutional Agreement with the European Central Bank in banking supervision did not result in a significantly different accountability relationship than the one between the two institutions in monetary policy. The results are based on interviews with Members of the European Parliament and an examination of questions asked in public hearings with the Chair of the Supervisory Board.

This document was prepared at the request of the ECON Committee.

Regulation & Governance, 2021

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in re... more This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2020

The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the abi... more The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the ability of the European Parliament (EP) to hold the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable for its decisions. This article examines the accountability interactions between the two institutions in the first years of the functioning of the SSM (2013–18). The focus is on the extent to which the EP contests ECB supervisory decisions in practice through letters and public hearings. The analysis shows a frequently-used infrastructure of political accountability that is however limited in ensuring the contestation of ECB conduct in banking supervision. The study identifies problems with the performance of the EP as an accountability forum and with the tight confidentiality rules of the SSM, which allow the ECB to silence contestation on many politically salient issues. The findings are based on an innovative analytical framework on the study of accountability interactions.

Journal of European Public Policy, 2021

This article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Un... more This article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Union’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The framework is anchored in four normative ‘goods’ that accountability is supposed to ensure: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness. All of these can be achieved in a procedural or substantive way, depending on whether actors are held accountable for the quality of their decision-making processes or for the actual merit of their decisions. Transposed to EMU, this conceptualisation shows both the payoffs and trade-offs of prioritising procedural accountability. Using different examples across EMU governance, the article illustrates how current mechanisms of political, legal, and administrative accountability predominantly evaluate the procedures followed by EU institutions when performing their tasks. While such an approach can bring clarity, predictability, and autonomy for the actors involved, it distracts attention from the substantive assessment of EMU decisions. The article contributes to the EMU accountability literature by going beyond principal-agent expectations of democratic control rooted in the nation-state or legal debates about principles for accountable behaviour found in EU Treaties. The EMU, and the EU more broadly, need a different perspective on accountability focused on generally-applicable standards for holding power to account.

European Law Journal, 2019

This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European C... more This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European Central Bank (ECB). It contrasts procedural and substantive concepts of accountability, and challenges the mainstream idea that independence and accountability can be reconciled through narrow mandates, the indiscriminate increase of transparency, the creation of multiple channels of accountability, and the active use of judicial review. These assumptions form the pillars of a procedural type of accountability that promises to resolve the independence/accountability dilemma but fails to do so in practice. The article brings evidence to show how ECB accountability has become a complex administrative exercise that focuses on the procedural steps leading up to monetary and supervisory decisions while simultaneously limiting substantive accountability. The failure to acknowledge the trade‐off between independence and accountability (said to be ‘two sides of the same coin’) has resulted in a tendency to privilege the former over the latter.

Policy Paper 19 November, Jacque Delors Institute Berlin/Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018

In the aftermath of the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) took over responsibilities f... more In the aftermath of the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) took over responsibilities for banking supervision in the euro area in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). This expansion of the original ECB mandate in monetary policy was coupled with the establishment of additional accountability mechanisms to balance the newly acquired competences. In terms of political accountability, the relationship with the European Parliament (EP) was placed front and centre—with regular interactions between the two institutions since late 2013.

This paper analyses the accountability interactions between the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee and ECB Banking Supervision in the first 4.5 years of the functioning of the SSM. In particular, it aims to: 1) situate the relationship between the ECB and the EP in the broader context of political accountability in banking supervision; 2) provide an overview of the frequency and patterns of interactions between the two institutions, describing types of questions asked and answers provided; and 3) identify strengths and weaknesses in the process, with a forward-looking focus on prospects for improvement.

West European Politics, 2023

European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementatio... more European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementation in the member states, creating a new domain of differentiation in EU governance. What brings about such differentiation, and how does it vary across policy fields? Drawing on theories of differentiated integration, this article argues that differentiated implementation occurs at the intersection of postfunctional obstacles (politicisation) and functional pressures for joint implementation (interdependence). There are two identified dimensions of direct implementation, a territorial one referring to states’ participation in such activities, and a procedural one capturing the degree of uniformity in the guidelines for organising implementation. The resulting typology is applied to direct implementation activities (DIAs) conducted by EU agencies alongside national authorities. The qualitative analysis reveals that differentiated participation is a stable feature of DIAs in politicised fields, and although there is a tendency to create more uniform procedures over time and across policy fields, higher uniformity prevails under symmetric interdependence.

Comparative Political Studies, 2022

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tas... more This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).

Journal of European Integration, 2021

This article aims to understand the lack of consensus at the European Union (EU) level during the... more This article aims to understand the lack of consensus at the European Union (EU) level during the refugee crisis based on the discursive polarization of the main governmental and institutional actors involved in decision-making. Drawing on de Wilde’s representative claims analysis, the goal is to trace competing claims of representation made on ‘Europe’s behalf’ by multiple actors claiming to defend EU values or the interests of citizens. The analysis covers Politico Europe articles published during 2015–16, capturing the height of the crisis. The findings illustrate the self-understandings of actors on a humanitarian-communitarian axis that became intertwined with concerns for internal EU solidarity and the survival of the Schengen Area. The analysis contributes to the literature on EU politicization and discursive framing during the refugee crisis, showing how the actors involved in EU decision-making had very different conceptions of what was at stake in the episode.

Comparative European Politics, 2019

This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework ex... more This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework explaining mechanisms of European Union (EU) politicization during immigration crises. Since most existing studies on the politicization of EU crisis situations focus on the Euro crisis, it is unclear if and how the politicization of EU immigration crises differs. Drawing on a 2011 crisis with legislative implications for the free movement of people in the Schengen Area, the article illustrates that immigration crises are politicized along exclusionary identities rather than along pro-/anti-European lines-as expected by democratic functionalism. Moreover, unlike in the Euro crisis, the 2011 case illustrates how the media can be instrumentalized by governments during immigration crises, with little political mobilization from the public. This case is relevant given the widespread politicization of the 2015 refugee crisis, which conversely attracted close media attention and caused serious public concern. As it stands, democratic functionalism is shown to lack a conceptualization of how much and for how long an issue needs to be contested in the European public sphere for the mechanisms of EU politicization described by the theory to hold.

PhD Thesis, Central European University, 2016

CEU eTD Collection i COPYRIGHT NOTICE I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials acc... more CEU eTD Collection i COPYRIGHT NOTICE I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

European Union Politics

Although parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight, there is limited... more Although parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight, there is limited research on their variation in holding governments accountable. In this article, we analyse a new dataset of 1393 oral questions posed by Members of the European Parliament during the 8 th parliamentary term. After distinguishing between questions asking for information, justification, or rectification of conduct, we explain their variation in connection to the formal oversight relationship between parliaments and scrutinised actors, and to the type of policy activity carried out by the latter. We find that Members of the European Parliament are more likely to address rectification questions and less likely to ask information questions the fewer legal controls they have. Moreover, information questions are more likely to occur in the oversight of policy formulation, while justification questions are prevalent in the oversight of policy execution. The findings flag the importance of structural factors in the practice of legislative oversight.

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2022

What drives the behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in legislative oversight? ... more What drives the behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in legislative oversight? In this article, we explore the interplay between the ideology and nationality of MEPs in policy fields where the two dimensions are likely to come into conflict. Focusing on EU socioeconomic governance, we collect an original dataset of parliamentary questions asked during the Economic Dialogues with the European Commission (2012-2019). By means of content analysis, we detect variation in MEPs' preferences relating to two dimensions central to this field, that is, economic effectiveness and social inequality. We argue that the variation in MEPs' concerns can be explained to different degrees by their ideology and nationality. We find that ideology plays a highly significant role in shaping the type of questions posed in legislative oversight; however, the nationality of MEPs is also an important driver of behaviour, especially when a member state is disproportionately affected by EU measures.

European Journal of Political Research, 2021

Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to wh... more Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal–agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the ‘Q&A approach to legislative oversight’ based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the micro-level as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step-by-step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013–2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions.

European Parliament study IPOL STU(2024)760125 EN, 2024

This study examines the evolving role of the European Council in the EU’s constitutional structur... more This study examines the evolving role of the European Council in the EU’s constitutional structure. As the study demonstrates, the increasing tendency of the European Council to instruct other EU institutions and its limited accountability have established an increasing gap between its de jure role under the EU Treaties and its de facto power in the larger system of EU governance. This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee.