David Stubbs | University of Life (original) (raw)
Papers by David Stubbs
Canadian Military History, 2021
Canadian Military History, 2015
Desperta Ferro , 2022
Lessons the various belligerents learned from the use of air power in the First World War differe... more Lessons the various belligerents learned from the use of air power in the First World War differed significantly, depending on their military culture and the impact of their defeat or victory.
ISSN-2340 8820
Canadian Military History, 2017
The Culture of Military Organizations, 2019
Canadian Military History, 2019
Canadian Military History, 2016
This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallo... more This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force (raf) portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence of the raf’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in raf doctrine, together with the refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft. The paper rejects claims that the raf’s effort at Dieppe was the natural evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable. T appalling losses suffered during the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942 sparked a controversy that induced many historians to attempt to untangle the proce...
War in History , 2021
America’s leaders were determined that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would end Saddam Hussein’s B... more America’s leaders were determined that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would end Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime with a “light footprint” ground war. This expectation obliged air, land and naval planners to balance their strategic and tactical targeting to concentrate on tactical support to ground forces, delivered at a speed. It was designed to undermine the ability of the Iraqi forces to offer a coherent defence while minimising civilian casualties, but the air campaign plan that emerged has often been misunderstood as blunt instrument.
Journal of Military History, 2020
This article examines how fighter aircraft shortages affected the Royal Air Force’s ability to co... more This article examines how fighter aircraft shortages affected the Royal Air Force’s ability to contest control of the air over the island of Crete in 1941. It shows how dysfunctional personal relations and extended lines of communication combined to obscure decisions, and it unpicks the claim that the loss of Crete was a function of the British army’s inability
to protect the airfields required to sustain viable fighter defenses. Instead, it shows that the key decision-makers in London knew that the fighter aircraft destined for the region would arrive too late to affect the course of events.
The Journal of the Royal Air Force College , 2013
The short paper (pages 19-21) describes the military tendency towards suspicion of those engaged ... more The short paper (pages 19-21) describes the military tendency towards suspicion of those engaged in the conceptual component of war fighting and suggested that, at the time, the RAF had a roadmap to improve the level of conceptual thought in the Service.
Journal of Military History, 2014
This paper examines why the RAF maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prud... more This paper examines why the RAF maintained its view that it would be
neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range
fighter escort until the time, late in the day, when the U.S. Army Air
Forces’ trials to increase the Spitfire fighter’s range proved otherwise.
The paper argues that some senior RAF officers, who believed that
long-range fighters were unnecessary, lacked the conceptual dexterity
needed after the RAF's bombers’ vulnerability to single-engined fighters
became apparent, and that these failings were hidden by a culture of
obedience to perceived wisdom that existed within the RAF.
The Wavell Room, 2019
By following the adversarial format and borrowing part of the title from 'The Spinney Report' thi... more By following the adversarial format and borrowing part of the title from 'The Spinney Report' this piece aimed to provoke a discussion on the future structure of the British military. It main argument is framed in reference to the institutional fear of irrelevance and by the rigid prioritisation of often unaffordable equipment programmes by separate Services reluctant to divine conjoined plans. It can be found on-line at: https://wavellroom.com/2019/05/09/defence-facts-of-life-the-aspiration-reality-mismatch-long-read/
The German invasion of Crete in 1941 and subsequent loss of the airfield at Maleme led, almost im... more The German invasion of Crete in 1941 and subsequent loss of the airfield at Maleme led, almost immediately, to the acceptance of a narrative that suggested significant RAF failure. Criticism, reinforced by the New Zealand official history, bemoaned the lack of fighter aircraft cover and questioned the fighting prowess of RAF ground crew. This article examines the New Zealand commanders’ errors of judgment, which resulted in inappropriate positioning of their soldiers to face the main thrust of the German attack, and argues that RAF airmen became convenient scapegoats for the failings of others. Further, Winston Churchill’s motives in questioning the ability and willingness of airmen to defend airbases are analysed, as is the ensuing political maelstrom, which led to knee jerk reactions and unnecessary reorganisation of RAF ground defence training.
The paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallor... more The paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air
Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence of the RAF’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in RAF doctrine, a naïve willingness to belief pilots kill claims and a refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft.
The paper rejects claims that the raf’s effort at Dieppe was the natural evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable.
Viewpoint piece from 2009 in which Stubbs argues that there is a significant mismatch between the... more Viewpoint piece from 2009 in which Stubbs argues that there is a significant mismatch between the aspirations for UK Defence and the resources allocated to it. For instance, he predicts that the numbers of F-35 fighters will be significantly smaller than that anticipated at the time.
Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece 1941 takes a fascinating, in-de... more Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece
1941 takes a fascinating, in-depth look at how the British intervention in Greece during the early part of the Second World War was a political imperative that was not militarily achievable
given the paucity of resources – not least of which were air assets. The contemporary pull through for military practitioners, academics, civil servants and politicians alike is manifest at
a time when air forces are being reduced in size and capability but political demand for air power is increasing.
An argument from 2009, published in 2010, which suggested the use of air power with adequately pr... more An argument from 2009, published in 2010, which suggested the use of air power with adequately prepared (in terms of forward air controllers) indigenous ground forces
David Stubbs describes how, over the last 100 years, air-derived intelligence had to contend with... more David Stubbs describes how, over the last 100 years, air-derived intelligence had to contend with dysfunctional processing methodologies that degraded the impact of the product delivered. The paper suggests the Combat ISTAR ‘philosophy’ was used to support the RAF’s case for a 5th generation offensive fighter, equipped with what would be an apparently impressive array of intelligence collection capabilities able to benefit from the evolution in data networks. However, the paper argues that the F-35 programme was always likely to cost more than originally anticipated and that the strictures of financial affordability imposed by the new Defence Operating Model will reduce the number of F-35B aircraft purchased. Moreover, the paper suggests a by-product of the prioritisation of funding for the F-35 has led to the downgrading of the the associated programme to provide quicker and flatter processing of intelligence and that the combination of fewer aircraft and sub-optimal processing methodologies will affect the size and capability of the UK’s involvement in future coalition activities.
Book Reviews by David Stubbs
Journal of Military History , 2019
Book Review
Canadian Military History, 2019
A review of Mike Bechthold's book about the trials and tribulations of Raymond Collishaw in the N... more A review of Mike Bechthold's book about the trials and tribulations of Raymond Collishaw in the North African campaign during the early part of the Second World War.Canadian Military History: Vol. 28 : Iss. 1 , Article 19. Available at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss1/19
Canadian Military History, 2021
Canadian Military History, 2015
Desperta Ferro , 2022
Lessons the various belligerents learned from the use of air power in the First World War differe... more Lessons the various belligerents learned from the use of air power in the First World War differed significantly, depending on their military culture and the impact of their defeat or victory.
ISSN-2340 8820
Canadian Military History, 2017
The Culture of Military Organizations, 2019
Canadian Military History, 2019
Canadian Military History, 2016
This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallo... more This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force (raf) portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence of the raf’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in raf doctrine, together with the refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft. The paper rejects claims that the raf’s effort at Dieppe was the natural evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable. T appalling losses suffered during the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942 sparked a controversy that induced many historians to attempt to untangle the proce...
War in History , 2021
America’s leaders were determined that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would end Saddam Hussein’s B... more America’s leaders were determined that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would end Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime with a “light footprint” ground war. This expectation obliged air, land and naval planners to balance their strategic and tactical targeting to concentrate on tactical support to ground forces, delivered at a speed. It was designed to undermine the ability of the Iraqi forces to offer a coherent defence while minimising civilian casualties, but the air campaign plan that emerged has often been misunderstood as blunt instrument.
Journal of Military History, 2020
This article examines how fighter aircraft shortages affected the Royal Air Force’s ability to co... more This article examines how fighter aircraft shortages affected the Royal Air Force’s ability to contest control of the air over the island of Crete in 1941. It shows how dysfunctional personal relations and extended lines of communication combined to obscure decisions, and it unpicks the claim that the loss of Crete was a function of the British army’s inability
to protect the airfields required to sustain viable fighter defenses. Instead, it shows that the key decision-makers in London knew that the fighter aircraft destined for the region would arrive too late to affect the course of events.
The Journal of the Royal Air Force College , 2013
The short paper (pages 19-21) describes the military tendency towards suspicion of those engaged ... more The short paper (pages 19-21) describes the military tendency towards suspicion of those engaged in the conceptual component of war fighting and suggested that, at the time, the RAF had a roadmap to improve the level of conceptual thought in the Service.
Journal of Military History, 2014
This paper examines why the RAF maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prud... more This paper examines why the RAF maintained its view that it would be
neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range
fighter escort until the time, late in the day, when the U.S. Army Air
Forces’ trials to increase the Spitfire fighter’s range proved otherwise.
The paper argues that some senior RAF officers, who believed that
long-range fighters were unnecessary, lacked the conceptual dexterity
needed after the RAF's bombers’ vulnerability to single-engined fighters
became apparent, and that these failings were hidden by a culture of
obedience to perceived wisdom that existed within the RAF.
The Wavell Room, 2019
By following the adversarial format and borrowing part of the title from 'The Spinney Report' thi... more By following the adversarial format and borrowing part of the title from 'The Spinney Report' this piece aimed to provoke a discussion on the future structure of the British military. It main argument is framed in reference to the institutional fear of irrelevance and by the rigid prioritisation of often unaffordable equipment programmes by separate Services reluctant to divine conjoined plans. It can be found on-line at: https://wavellroom.com/2019/05/09/defence-facts-of-life-the-aspiration-reality-mismatch-long-read/
The German invasion of Crete in 1941 and subsequent loss of the airfield at Maleme led, almost im... more The German invasion of Crete in 1941 and subsequent loss of the airfield at Maleme led, almost immediately, to the acceptance of a narrative that suggested significant RAF failure. Criticism, reinforced by the New Zealand official history, bemoaned the lack of fighter aircraft cover and questioned the fighting prowess of RAF ground crew. This article examines the New Zealand commanders’ errors of judgment, which resulted in inappropriate positioning of their soldiers to face the main thrust of the German attack, and argues that RAF airmen became convenient scapegoats for the failings of others. Further, Winston Churchill’s motives in questioning the ability and willingness of airmen to defend airbases are analysed, as is the ensuing political maelstrom, which led to knee jerk reactions and unnecessary reorganisation of RAF ground defence training.
The paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallor... more The paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air
Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence of the RAF’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in RAF doctrine, a naïve willingness to belief pilots kill claims and a refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft.
The paper rejects claims that the raf’s effort at Dieppe was the natural evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable.
Viewpoint piece from 2009 in which Stubbs argues that there is a significant mismatch between the... more Viewpoint piece from 2009 in which Stubbs argues that there is a significant mismatch between the aspirations for UK Defence and the resources allocated to it. For instance, he predicts that the numbers of F-35 fighters will be significantly smaller than that anticipated at the time.
Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece 1941 takes a fascinating, in-de... more Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece
1941 takes a fascinating, in-depth look at how the British intervention in Greece during the early part of the Second World War was a political imperative that was not militarily achievable
given the paucity of resources – not least of which were air assets. The contemporary pull through for military practitioners, academics, civil servants and politicians alike is manifest at
a time when air forces are being reduced in size and capability but political demand for air power is increasing.
An argument from 2009, published in 2010, which suggested the use of air power with adequately pr... more An argument from 2009, published in 2010, which suggested the use of air power with adequately prepared (in terms of forward air controllers) indigenous ground forces
David Stubbs describes how, over the last 100 years, air-derived intelligence had to contend with... more David Stubbs describes how, over the last 100 years, air-derived intelligence had to contend with dysfunctional processing methodologies that degraded the impact of the product delivered. The paper suggests the Combat ISTAR ‘philosophy’ was used to support the RAF’s case for a 5th generation offensive fighter, equipped with what would be an apparently impressive array of intelligence collection capabilities able to benefit from the evolution in data networks. However, the paper argues that the F-35 programme was always likely to cost more than originally anticipated and that the strictures of financial affordability imposed by the new Defence Operating Model will reduce the number of F-35B aircraft purchased. Moreover, the paper suggests a by-product of the prioritisation of funding for the F-35 has led to the downgrading of the the associated programme to provide quicker and flatter processing of intelligence and that the combination of fewer aircraft and sub-optimal processing methodologies will affect the size and capability of the UK’s involvement in future coalition activities.
Journal of Military History , 2019
Book Review
Canadian Military History, 2019
A review of Mike Bechthold's book about the trials and tribulations of Raymond Collishaw in the N... more A review of Mike Bechthold's book about the trials and tribulations of Raymond Collishaw in the North African campaign during the early part of the Second World War.Canadian Military History: Vol. 28 : Iss. 1 , Article 19. Available at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss1/19
Canadian Military History, 2017
Review of the book about General Montgomery's application and adaptation of doctrine to develop t... more Review of the book about General Montgomery's application and adaptation of doctrine to develop the capabilities of his army in World War Two.
David Isby's Decisive Duel attempts to fill a gap in the Spitfire's busy narrative by providing a... more David Isby's Decisive Duel attempts to fill a gap in the Spitfire's busy narrative by providing a thorough and fascinating exposition of the comparative evolution of the aircraft with its main German opponent, the Bf 109.
Review of a book by KCL HCSC academic
On 28 June 2017, at Lincoln University, the panel of three people discussed the topic of Lack of ... more On 28 June 2017, at Lincoln University, the panel of three people discussed the topic of Lack of Morale Fibre and the effect stress had on aircrew in the Second World War.
A presentation to the Royal Aeronautical Society at RAF Cranwell
A lecture to an audience at the University of Lincoln for the International Bomber Command Centre... more A lecture to an audience at the University of Lincoln for the International Bomber Command Centre. Available soon as a podcast from the IBCC site.
A lecture which questioned the relevance of the RAF as an independent Service.
Unpublished. An updated but short examination of some of the factors involved in the British deci... more Unpublished. An updated but short examination of some of the factors involved in the British decision to continue fight on against Germany in the Second World War after the fall of France.
The Culture of Military Organisations, Ed Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray, 2019
This chapter describes how the world’s first independent air force, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir ... more This chapter describes how the world’s first independent air force, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, reacted to the threats to its existence by maximizing the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) operational utility and financial efficiency, while simultaneously contriving a credible narrative about its future strategic potential. In pursuing these twin narratives, the RAF developed a unique culture of beliefs and taken-for-granted attitudes that thrived because of the conceptually incurious nature of the men it selected to become officers. Few of these technically able "practical men" were willing to challenge their superiors’ intuitive and speculative belief that the morale of civilian populations was especially vulnerable to bombing. Instead, like their leaders, they became consciously complicit in acceding to the societal prophecies, articulated in books, films, and newspapers, that bombing would have apocalyptic effects, and that civil societies subjected to its effects would wish to sue for peace. The chapter concludes by analyzing how this culture impeded the realization that the anticipated outcomes were not being achieved and explains how this stymied options to pursue alternative strategies.
Wavell Room , 2021
This piece discusses the rationale for the United Kingdom's decision to send one of its two aircr... more This piece discusses the rationale for the United Kingdom's decision to send one of its two aircraft carriers to the South China Sea.