Relevance, warrants, backing, inductive support (original) (raw)
Abstract
We perceive relevance by virtue of inference habits, which may be expressed as Pierce's leading principles or as Toulmin's warrants. Hence relevance in a descriptive sense is a ternary relation between two statements and a set of inference rules. For a normative sense, the warrants must be properly backed. Different types of warrant to empirical generalizations, we introduce L.J. Cohen's notion of inductive support. A to empirical generalizations, we introduce L.J. Cohen's notion of inductive support. A generalization H is supported by evidence E to degree i/in iff E indicates that H passes canonical test i, where there are n canonical tests. In a canonical test, one or more relevant variables, factors which may falsify H, are varied. H passes a test if it is not falsified. The tests are cumulative. Degree of support is relative to the canonical test, and may be modeled as relative to a point in a dialectical situation. A value of a variable at which H is falsified is a rebutting value. A is normatively relevant to B with respect to W iff sup[associated generalization(W), E] = i/n and for j > i, there is a presumption that the values of j are non-rebuting.
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Authors and Affiliations
- Department of Philosophy, Hunter College/CUNY, 695 Park Avenue, 10021, New York, NY, U.S.A.
James B. Freeman
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Freeman, J.B. Relevance, warrants, backing, inductive support.Argumentation 6, 219–275 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154327
- Issue date: May 1992
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154327