4. Minimal manipulability and local strategy-proofness (original) (raw)

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, 13210, Syracuse, NY, USA
   J. S. Kelly

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Kelly, J.S. 4. Minimal manipulability and local strategy-proofness.Soc Choice Welfare 5, 81–85 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435499

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• Issue date: March 1988
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435499

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