Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions (original) (raw)

Abstract

In Peleg's investigation of the representation of a simple game by a social choice function, it is shown that a special kind of proper symmetric simple game has its representation by employing the elimination procedure. In this paper, we consider a representation of a characteristic function game and explore general conditions under which the elimination procedure works effectively.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Systems Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro-Ku, 152, Tokyo, Japan
    S. Ishikawa
  2. Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro-Ku, 152, Tokyo, Japan
    K. Nakamura

Authors

  1. S. Ishikawa
  2. K. Nakamura

Additional information

Professor_Kenjiro Nakamura_ died on October 27, 1979 at the age of 32.

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Ishikawa, S., Nakamura, K. Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions.Int J Game Theory 9, 191–199 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01771425

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