Conference structures and fair allocation rules (original) (raw)

Abstract

To describe how the outcome of a cooperative game might depend on which groups of players hold cooperative planning conferences, we study allocation rules, which are functions mapping conference structures to payoff allocations. An allocation rule is fair if every conference always gives equal benefits to all its members. Any characteristic function game without sidepayments has a unique fair allocation rule. The fair allocation rule also satisfies a balanced contributions formula, and is closely related to Harsanyi's generalized Shapley value for games without sidepayments. If the game is superadditive, then the fair allocation rule also satisfies a stability condition.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 60201, Evanston, IL, USA
   R. B. Myerson

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This paper was written while the author was a visitor at the Zentrum für interdisziplinare Forschung, in the University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany.

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Myerson, R.B. Conference structures and fair allocation rules.Int J Game Theory 9, 169–182 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01781371

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• Received: 15 May 1979
• Revised: 15 May 1980
• Issue date: September 1980
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01781371

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