Juta Kawalerowicz | Linköping University (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Juta Kawalerowicz

Aim: Country of birth data contained in registers are often aggregated to create broad ancestry g... more Aim: Country of birth data contained in registers are often aggregated to create broad ancestry group categories. We examine how measures of residential segregation vary according to levels of aggregation. Method: We use Swedish register data to calculate pairwise dissimilarity indices from 1990-2012 for ancestry groups defined at four, nested levels of aggregation: 1) micro-groups containing 50 categories 2) meso-groups containing 16 categories, 3) macro-groups containing 6 categories, and 4) a broad “Western/Non-Western” binary. Results: We find variation in segregation levels between ancestry groups that is obscured by data aggregation. Conclusion: This study demonstrates that the practice of aggregating country of birth statistics in register data can hinder the ability to identify highly segregated groups, and, therefore, design effective policy to remedy both inter-group and intergenerational inequalities.

Some regions of the United Kingdom present more fertile grounds for consecutive incarnations of e... more Some regions of the United Kingdom present more fertile grounds for consecutive incarnations of extreme right parties than others. In a study by Goodwin, Ford and Cutts the authors found evidence of the legacy effect, where an earlier cycle of activism by the National Front (NF), an extreme right political party active in the 1970s, emerged as a strong and significant predictor of membership in the British National Party (BNP) three decades later. While their study speaks to the supply-side arguments for extreme right success (organizational continuity and local cultural traditions in particular), here we examine whether a similar legacy effect can be observed with respect to demand for extreme right politics. As we are going to show there is some overlap between the share of votes cast for the NF and the BNP, yet there are a number of constituencies that do not adhere to this pattern. We conclude that while the supply-side legacy effect is not ruled out, the legacy effect hypothesis does not find support for demand-side explanation of extreme right support.

The renewed interested in the connection between immigration and electoral politics can be traced... more The renewed interested in the connection between immigration and electoral politics can be traced to the spectacular rise of UK Independence Party. Even though the party secured just one seat in 2015 General Elections, its anti-immigration rhetoric resonated strongly among certain sections of Britain's electorate – UKIP polled 13% of the vote and came second in 120 out of 624 contested seats. Although the party originally focused around Conservative euroscepticism rather than anti-immigration per se, in comparison to those supporting other parties UKIP sympathisers today are much more likely to see immigration as the single most important issue facing the country. Aside from party rhetoric, exemplified by Nigel Farage asserting that parts of Britain were becoming like a ‘foreign land’, is there evidence that UKIP support is channelled by local concerns about the influx of immigrants?

August 2011, with the police losing control of parts of the city for four days. This event was no... more August 2011, with the police losing control of parts of the city for four days. This event was not an ethnic riot: participants were ethnically diverse and did not discriminate in choosing targets for looting or destruction. Whereas the sociological literature has focused on variation in rioting across cities, we examine variation within London by mapping the residential addresses of 1,620 people subsequently charged with rioting on to 25,022 neighbourhoods. Rioters tended to come from economically deprived areas. Rioters were more likely to come from neighbourhoods where ethnic fractionalization was high, which can be interpreted as evidence for social disorganization. These findings run counter to the literature's rejection of deprivation and disorganization as explanations for rioting. In addition, rioting was motivated by political grievances, as rioters tended to come from boroughs where police were perceived as disrespectful.

Social Forces, Mar 8, 2015

Thousands rioted in London in August 2011, with the police losing control of parts of the city f... more Thousands rioted in London in August 2011, with the police losing control of parts of
the city for four days. This event was not an ethnic riot: participants were ethnically
diverse and did not discriminate in choosing targets for looting or destruction.
Whereas the sociological literature has focused on variation in rioting across
cities, we examine variation within London by mapping the residential addresses of
1,620 rioters—who were subsequently arrested and charged—on to 25,022 neighborhoods.
Our findings challenge the orthodoxy that rioting is not explained by deprivation
or by disorganization. Rioters were most likely to come from economically disadvantaged
neighborhoods. Rioters also tended to come from neighborhoods where ethnic
fractionalization was high, and from areas with few charitable organizations. Political
grievances also emerge as important. Rioters were more likely to come from boroughs
where the police had previously been perceived as disrespectful.

As more Conservative MPs defect to UKIP and Labour strategist start worrying about voters in thei... more As more Conservative MPs defect to UKIP and Labour strategist start worrying about voters in their area defecting too, the question arises whether the growing support for UKIP is a black swan, or a continuation of a long-time trend of some areas supporting the far right. Electoral boost attributed to far right legacy was recently documented by Matthew Goodwin, David Cutts and Robert Ford who used statistical modelling to show that BNP membership was higher in areas which could be characterized by a long running history of support for far right organizations such as the notorious National Front in the 1970s. The link between UKIP and the far right is a subject of ongoing debate i . As maintained by party leadership, UKIP's candidates are screened to ensure they have no history of far-right activism, yet can we see a far right legacy effect for voting, with consecutive anti-immigration parties enjoying an electoral boost in regions where parties with similar profile were successful in the past? The three maps shows differences in the geographic distribution of support in general elections in England and Wales ii for the three most successful anti-immigrant parties at the peak of their electoral performance: National Front in 1979, British National Party in 2005 and UK Independence Party in 2010. To map the strongholds of anti-immigration vote, I divided constituencies into five classes representing the strength of support for each party relative to the overall levels of support iii . For each election, constituencies with the lightest shading have negligible levels of support while dark blue areas represent the strongholds. Generally, we see the maps show little continuity with previous far right vote, which is most evident for London, North West, Yorkshire and Humber. In fact there seems to be more similarities between NF and BNP support bases than between BNP and UKIP. Thus we should be cautious about the view that UKIP are "the BNP in blazers" iv . Parts of Lancashire, West Yorkshire, West Midlands and Warwickshire where the BNP polled strongly in 2005 proved inhospitable for UKIP in 2010. Meanwhile many constituencies which have emerged as consistent in their support of UKIP have no history of BNP supportof the top 10 UKIP constituencies in 2010 general elections, six showed negligible levels of support for the BNP in both 2005 and 2010 elections.

Conference Presentations by Juta Kawalerowicz

Poland’s visual art academies are extremely feminised as places of study while exceptionally masc... more Poland’s visual art academies are extremely feminised as places of study while exceptionally masculinised as places of work. The gender discrepancy between these two career stages – being a student and being a teacher – comparable only to that observed in theological schools, surprised us and became the main focus of this research.

The Katarzyna Kozyra Foundation is pleased to present the findings from an inquiry into the presence of women at public art academies in Poland. The report aims to identify cultural, environmental and psychological factors that contribute to women’s exodus from the system of higher art education.

three sets of hypotheses have been tested:
1. aspirations, priorities and strategies;
2. psychological factors;
3. relations between students and academic teachers.

Methodology:
We researched nine major institutions offering visual art training. These are mostly, but not exclusively, Fine Art Academies (ASP). Data has been collected from three sources: freedom of information requests, 966 surveys and 32 in-depth interviews.

Key findings:
- Male students are more likely to receive encouragements from teachers (both male and female) while female students are more likely to be recipients of negative comments
- Male students are more likely to receive assistantship offers from teachers; this gender gap is not explained by scholarship status
- Female and male students have similar aspirations; for both the most desired prospect is to be an active artist or to find employment in a profession related to art, the least attractive prospects are: change of qualifications and employment in a profession unrelated to art.
- 58% of female respondents and 52% of male respondents declared that they would not be willing to give up their artistic aspirations for the sake of the family
- Female students find employment at art academies less attractive; employment at art university as a prospect for future career is evaluated as attractive by 47% of women and 66% of men. The gender gap in evaluation of this prospect increases between 1st and 5th (final) year students
- On average students do not see ‘taking care of the family’ as an prospect for the future, and this evaluation applies as much to women as to men.
- Only 7% of female art students and 16% of male art students agreed with the statement that ‘women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of a family’.
- Students generally tend to agree with the statement that ‘men should take as much responsibility as women for home and children’, even though more women (89%) tended to agree than men (78%)

Social Forces, Mar 8, 2015

three sets of hypotheses have been tested:
1. aspirations, priorities and strategies;
2. psychological factors;
3. relations between students and academic teachers.