Martin Rechenauer | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (original) (raw)
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Papers by Martin Rechenauer
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008
It is often claimed that the relations of weak preference and strict preference are symmetrical t... more It is often claimed that the relations of weak preference and strict preference are symmetrical to each other in the sense that weak preference is complete and transitive if and only if strict preference is asymmetric and negatively transitive. The equivalence proof relies on a definitional connection between them, however, that already implies completeness of weak preference. Weakening the connection in order to avoid this leads to a breakdown of the symmetry which gives reason to accept weak preference as the more fundamental relation.
Unter den Bedingungen der zweiten, reflexiv gewordenen Moderne werden Entscheidungssituationen zu... more Unter den Bedingungen der zweiten, reflexiv gewordenen Moderne werden Entscheidungssituationen zunehmend uneindeutig. So treten vermehrt Fälle auf, in denen es keine klaren Kriterien dafür gibt, wie eine rationale Entscheidung ausfallen könnte. Entsprechend werden Rationalitätsprinzipien zurückgefahren: Man entscheidet nicht mehr auf der Basis klar umrissener Prinzipien, sondern läßt die Dinge irgendwie laufen. Entscheiden muss man, aber es gibt eben nicht mehr die eindeutig vorgegebenen Rahmungen, die eine Anwendung klassischer Rationalitätskonzeptionen zulassen.
Erkenntnis, 1997
Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mi... more Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind are insufficient because they rely on the assumption that that-clauses uniquely capture psychological content. He tried to show that this is not the use of that-clauses in philosophical psychology. I argue that he does not succeed in his argument. That-clauses sometimes capture psychological content, if our system of mental ascription is to be workable at all. I argue further that individualism tends to be at odds with a requirement of intersubjective shareability of contents and that Loar is alternative conception of psychological content is beset with difficulties.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008
It is often claimed that the relations of weak preference and strict preference are symmetrical t... more It is often claimed that the relations of weak preference and strict preference are symmetrical to each other in the sense that weak preference is complete and transitive if and only if strict preference is asymmetric and negatively transitive. The equivalence proof relies on a definitional connection between them, however, that already implies completeness of weak preference. Weakening the connection in order to avoid this leads to a breakdown of the symmetry which gives reason to accept weak preference as the more fundamental relation.
Unter den Bedingungen der zweiten, reflexiv gewordenen Moderne werden Entscheidungssituationen zu... more Unter den Bedingungen der zweiten, reflexiv gewordenen Moderne werden Entscheidungssituationen zunehmend uneindeutig. So treten vermehrt Fälle auf, in denen es keine klaren Kriterien dafür gibt, wie eine rationale Entscheidung ausfallen könnte. Entsprechend werden Rationalitätsprinzipien zurückgefahren: Man entscheidet nicht mehr auf der Basis klar umrissener Prinzipien, sondern läßt die Dinge irgendwie laufen. Entscheiden muss man, aber es gibt eben nicht mehr die eindeutig vorgegebenen Rahmungen, die eine Anwendung klassischer Rationalitätskonzeptionen zulassen.
Erkenntnis, 1997
Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mi... more Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind are insufficient because they rely on the assumption that that-clauses uniquely capture psychological content. He tried to show that this is not the use of that-clauses in philosophical psychology. I argue that he does not succeed in his argument. That-clauses sometimes capture psychological content, if our system of mental ascription is to be workable at all. I argue further that individualism tends to be at odds with a requirement of intersubjective shareability of contents and that Loar is alternative conception of psychological content is beset with difficulties.