Paul Dicken | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (original) (raw)
My research is in the philosophy of science, and in particular, the scientific realism debate. I have recently published a book on van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, and am currently working on the logical positivists. I also have interests in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of history.
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Carnap"s mature philosophy of science is an attempt to dissolve the scientific realism debate alt... more Carnap"s mature philosophy of science is an attempt to dissolve the scientific realism debate altogether as a philosophical pseudo-question. His argument depends upon a logico-semantic thesis regarding the structure of a scientific theory, and more importantly, a meta-ontological thesis regarding the explication of existence claims. The latter commits Carnap to a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, which was allegedly refuted by Quine. The contemporary philosophy of science has therefore sought to distance itself from logicosemantic considerations, and has pursued the scientific realism debate as an essentially epistemological thesis. I show however that one of the most prominent positions in this recent debate -van Fraassen"s constructive empiricismnot only ends up in very close proximity to Carnap"s attempted dissolution, but even provides the resources for extending and refining his programme. Rather than a historical footnote, Carnap"s mature philosophy of science offers a live-option in the current debate. 1. Introduction 2. Pseudo-Questions in the Philosophy of Science 3. The Analytic and the Synthetic 4. The New Empiricism and the New Epistemology 5. Conclusion: A Plea for Tolerance
Constructive empiricism -as formulated by Bas van Fraassen -makes no epistemological claims about... more Constructive empiricism -as formulated by Bas van Fraassen -makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen's broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may offer various advantages in defending the epistemic relevance of constructive empiricism, I show how it also offers various disadvantages in maintaining its internal coherence.
Carnap"s mature philosophy of science is an attempt to dissolve the scientific realism debate alt... more Carnap"s mature philosophy of science is an attempt to dissolve the scientific realism debate altogether as a philosophical pseudo-question. His argument depends upon a logico-semantic thesis regarding the structure of a scientific theory, and more importantly, a meta-ontological thesis regarding the explication of existence claims. The latter commits Carnap to a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, which was allegedly refuted by Quine. The contemporary philosophy of science has therefore sought to distance itself from logicosemantic considerations, and has pursued the scientific realism debate as an essentially epistemological thesis. I show however that one of the most prominent positions in this recent debate -van Fraassen"s constructive empiricismnot only ends up in very close proximity to Carnap"s attempted dissolution, but even provides the resources for extending and refining his programme. Rather than a historical footnote, Carnap"s mature philosophy of science offers a live-option in the current debate. 1. Introduction 2. Pseudo-Questions in the Philosophy of Science 3. The Analytic and the Synthetic 4. The New Empiricism and the New Epistemology 5. Conclusion: A Plea for Tolerance
Constructive empiricism -as formulated by Bas van Fraassen -makes no epistemological claims about... more Constructive empiricism -as formulated by Bas van Fraassen -makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen's broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may offer various advantages in defending the epistemic relevance of constructive empiricism, I show how it also offers various disadvantages in maintaining its internal coherence.