Robert Prentner | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (original) (raw)
Papers by Robert Prentner
Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2021
Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empir... more Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.
In his book “Galileo’s Error”, Philip Goff lays out what he calls “foundations for a new science ... more In his book “Galileo’s Error”, Philip Goff lays out what he calls “foundations for a new science of consciousness”, which are decidedly anti-physicalist (panpsychist), motivated by a critique of Galileo’s distinction into knowable objective and unknowable subjective properties and Arthur Eddington’s argument for the limitation of purely structural (physical) knowledge. Here we outline an alternative theory, premised on the Interface Theory of Perception, that too subscribes to a “post-Galilean” research programme. However, interface theorists disagree along several lines. 1. They note that Galileo’s distinction should be replaced by a truly non-dual account, referring to a difference of degree only. 2. They highly appreciate the role of mathematics, in particular when it comes to actually engaging scientifically with consciousness. Some notable features of the interface theory are its skepticism towards our epistemic capacities and its rejection of the existence of a public, mind-in...
ArXiv, 2020
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex be... more The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world, that individual fitness needs not to be the most important criteria of success, and that some strategies are very strong in a direct confrontation but could still perform poorly on average or are evolutionarily unstable. In this contribution, we present a strategy -- PREDICTOR -- which appears to be "sentient" and chooses to cooperate when playing against some strategies, but defects when playing against others, without the need to record "tags" for its opponents or an involved decision-making mechanism. To be able to operate in the highly-contextual environment, as modeled by the iterated prisoner's dilemma, PREDICTOR learns from its experience to choose optimal actions by modeling its opponent and predicting a (ficti...
arXiv: General Mathematics, 2020
In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Inste... more In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Instead of positing a singular principle, telos, or essence as noumenon, we model it as plurality accessible through multiple forms of awareness ("n-awareness"). In contrast to many other approaches, our model is committed to pluralist thinking. The noumenon is plural, and reality is neither reducible nor irreducible. Nothing dies out in meaning making. We begin by mathematizing the concept of awareness by appealing to the mathematical formalism of higher category theory. The beauty of higher category theory lies in its universality. Pluralism is categorical. In particular, we model awareness using the theories of derived categories and (infty,1)(\infty, 1)(infty,1)-topoi which will give rise to our meta-language. We then posit a "grammar" ("n-declension") which could express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal ontology ("n-time"). Our framework allows us to rev...
Author Institution: Physical Chemistry, Eth ZUrich, Ch-8093 ZUrich, Switzerland; SWISS LIGHT SOUR... more Author Institution: Physical Chemistry, Eth ZUrich, Ch-8093 ZUrich, Switzerland; SWISS LIGHT SOURCE, PAUL-SCHERRER-INSTITUTE, CH-5232; Villigen, Switzerland
ArXiv, 2020
This document gives a specification for the model used in [1]. It presents a simple way of optimi... more This document gives a specification for the model used in [1]. It presents a simple way of optimizing mutual information between some input and the attractors of a (noisy) network, using a genetic algorithm. The nodes of this network are modeled as simplified versions of the structures described in the "interface theory of perception" [2]. Accordingly, the system is referred to as a "perceptual network". The present paper is an edited version of technical parts of [1] and serves as accompanying text for the Python implementation PerceptualNetworks, freely available under [3]. 1. Prentner, R., and Fields, C.. Using AI methods to Evaluate a Minimal Model for Perception. OpenPhilosophy 2019, 2, 503-524. 2. Hoffman, D. D., Prakash, C., and Singh, M.. The Interface Theory of Perception. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 2015, 22, 1480-1506. 3. Prentner, R.. PerceptualNetworks. this https URL. (accessed September 17 2020)
Proceedings of the 72nd International Symposium on Molecular Spectroscopy, Jun 20, 2017
Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2021
Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empir... more Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021
In his book "Galileo's Error", Philip Goff lays out what he calls "foundations for a new science ... more In his book "Galileo's Error", Philip Goff lays out what he calls "foundations for a new science of consciousness", which are decidedly anti-physicalist (panpsychist), motivated by a critique of Galileo's distinction into knowable objective and unknowable subjective properties and Arthur Eddington's argument for the limitation of purely structural (physical) knowledge. Here we outline an alternative theory, premised on the Interface Theory of Perception, that too subscribes to a "post-Galilean" research programme. However, interface theorists disagree along several lines. 1. They note that Galileo's distinction should be replaced by a truly non-dual account, referring to a difference of degree only. 2. They highly appreciate the role of mathematics, in particular when it comes to actually engaging scientifically with consciousness. Some notable features of the interface theory are its skepticism towards our epistemic capacities and its rejection of the existence of a public, mind-independent reality. In addition, some interface theorists further employ a thin concept of "conscious agency" to ground their theory. The interface theory leaves open many of the problems of consciousness science (e.g. what is a "self"?) as questions for further (scientific, mathematical) research.
Philosophies, 2018
A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is una... more A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is unable to account for experiential phenomena and in particular for consciousness in all its varieties. We shall outline the concept of experiencing which should figure as a new conceptual primitive in natural philosophy. Experiencing refers to a process which comprises the interaction of an agent with its world through action based on phenomenal experience. This process can be viewed under two different aspects. One regards the subjective aspect of experiencing, the other one regards it in terms of physical objects. The first case illustrates the "what-it-is-likeness" of experiencing, the second illustrates how experiencing gets "objectified" in nature. We furthermore wish to delineate our concept of experiencing from the concept of (meta-cognitive) awareness. Scientific theories that explain how awareness comes about in sufficiently organized brains should respect the distinction between experiencing and awareness. We also sketch how experiencing could be related to theoretical biology in terms of information processing by organisms. Experiencing is non-exclusive; it refers to a primitive and a-personal natural process and not to a property possessed only by humans or other persons.
Philosophies
This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousn... more This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousness. Opposed to the consensus view, we argue that the molecular organization of biological systems is key to arrive at a thorough understanding of the dynamics correlated to the phenomenology of consciousness in complex organisms. This is indicated by the fact that the molecular sciences either provide one or more mechanisms directly related to phenomenology or otherwise describe the dynamics of the underlying substrate. In addition, we discuss substrate-independence in information-processing theories of consciousness and the issue of combination in panpsychist theories of consciousness, both from the angle of the molecular sciences. In any case, molecular details matter.
Entropy
A theory of consciousness, whatever else it may do, must address the structure of experience. Our... more A theory of consciousness, whatever else it may do, must address the structure of experience. Our perceptual experiences are richly structured. Simply seeing a red apple, swaying between green leaves on a stout tree, involves symmetries, geometries, orders, topologies, and algebras of events. Are these structures also present in the world, fully independent of their observation? Perceptual theorists of many persuasions—from computational to radical embodied—say yes: perception veridically presents to observers structures that exist in an observer-independent world; and it does so because natural selection shapes perceptual systems to be increasingly veridical. Here we study four structures: total orders, permutation groups, cyclic groups, and measurable spaces. We ask whether the payoff functions that drive evolution by natural selection are homomorphisms of these structures. We prove, in each case, that generically the answer is no: as the number of world states and payoff values g...
Open Philosophy
The relationship between philosophy and research on artificial intelligence (AI) has been difficu... more The relationship between philosophy and research on artificial intelligence (AI) has been difficult since its beginning, with mutual misunderstanding and sometimes even hostility. By contrast, we show how an approach informed by both philosophy and AI can be productive. After reviewing some popular frameworks for computation and learning, we apply the AI methodology of “build it and see” to tackle the philosophical and psychological problem of characterizing perception as distinct from sensation. Our model comprises a network of very simple, but interacting agents which have binary experiences of the “yes/no”-type and communicate their experiences with each other. When does such a network refer to a single agent instead of a distributed network of entities? We apply machine learning techniques to address the following related questions: i) how can the model explain stability of compound entities, and ii) how could the model implement a single task such as perceptual inference? We th...
Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2021
Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empir... more Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.
In his book “Galileo’s Error”, Philip Goff lays out what he calls “foundations for a new science ... more In his book “Galileo’s Error”, Philip Goff lays out what he calls “foundations for a new science of consciousness”, which are decidedly anti-physicalist (panpsychist), motivated by a critique of Galileo’s distinction into knowable objective and unknowable subjective properties and Arthur Eddington’s argument for the limitation of purely structural (physical) knowledge. Here we outline an alternative theory, premised on the Interface Theory of Perception, that too subscribes to a “post-Galilean” research programme. However, interface theorists disagree along several lines. 1. They note that Galileo’s distinction should be replaced by a truly non-dual account, referring to a difference of degree only. 2. They highly appreciate the role of mathematics, in particular when it comes to actually engaging scientifically with consciousness. Some notable features of the interface theory are its skepticism towards our epistemic capacities and its rejection of the existence of a public, mind-in...
ArXiv, 2020
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex be... more The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world, that individual fitness needs not to be the most important criteria of success, and that some strategies are very strong in a direct confrontation but could still perform poorly on average or are evolutionarily unstable. In this contribution, we present a strategy -- PREDICTOR -- which appears to be "sentient" and chooses to cooperate when playing against some strategies, but defects when playing against others, without the need to record "tags" for its opponents or an involved decision-making mechanism. To be able to operate in the highly-contextual environment, as modeled by the iterated prisoner's dilemma, PREDICTOR learns from its experience to choose optimal actions by modeling its opponent and predicting a (ficti...
arXiv: General Mathematics, 2020
In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Inste... more In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Instead of positing a singular principle, telos, or essence as noumenon, we model it as plurality accessible through multiple forms of awareness ("n-awareness"). In contrast to many other approaches, our model is committed to pluralist thinking. The noumenon is plural, and reality is neither reducible nor irreducible. Nothing dies out in meaning making. We begin by mathematizing the concept of awareness by appealing to the mathematical formalism of higher category theory. The beauty of higher category theory lies in its universality. Pluralism is categorical. In particular, we model awareness using the theories of derived categories and (infty,1)(\infty, 1)(infty,1)-topoi which will give rise to our meta-language. We then posit a "grammar" ("n-declension") which could express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal ontology ("n-time"). Our framework allows us to rev...
Author Institution: Physical Chemistry, Eth ZUrich, Ch-8093 ZUrich, Switzerland; SWISS LIGHT SOUR... more Author Institution: Physical Chemistry, Eth ZUrich, Ch-8093 ZUrich, Switzerland; SWISS LIGHT SOURCE, PAUL-SCHERRER-INSTITUTE, CH-5232; Villigen, Switzerland
ArXiv, 2020
This document gives a specification for the model used in [1]. It presents a simple way of optimi... more This document gives a specification for the model used in [1]. It presents a simple way of optimizing mutual information between some input and the attractors of a (noisy) network, using a genetic algorithm. The nodes of this network are modeled as simplified versions of the structures described in the "interface theory of perception" [2]. Accordingly, the system is referred to as a "perceptual network". The present paper is an edited version of technical parts of [1] and serves as accompanying text for the Python implementation PerceptualNetworks, freely available under [3]. 1. Prentner, R., and Fields, C.. Using AI methods to Evaluate a Minimal Model for Perception. OpenPhilosophy 2019, 2, 503-524. 2. Hoffman, D. D., Prakash, C., and Singh, M.. The Interface Theory of Perception. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 2015, 22, 1480-1506. 3. Prentner, R.. PerceptualNetworks. this https URL. (accessed September 17 2020)
Proceedings of the 72nd International Symposium on Molecular Spectroscopy, Jun 20, 2017
Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2021
Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empir... more Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021
In his book "Galileo's Error", Philip Goff lays out what he calls "foundations for a new science ... more In his book "Galileo's Error", Philip Goff lays out what he calls "foundations for a new science of consciousness", which are decidedly anti-physicalist (panpsychist), motivated by a critique of Galileo's distinction into knowable objective and unknowable subjective properties and Arthur Eddington's argument for the limitation of purely structural (physical) knowledge. Here we outline an alternative theory, premised on the Interface Theory of Perception, that too subscribes to a "post-Galilean" research programme. However, interface theorists disagree along several lines. 1. They note that Galileo's distinction should be replaced by a truly non-dual account, referring to a difference of degree only. 2. They highly appreciate the role of mathematics, in particular when it comes to actually engaging scientifically with consciousness. Some notable features of the interface theory are its skepticism towards our epistemic capacities and its rejection of the existence of a public, mind-independent reality. In addition, some interface theorists further employ a thin concept of "conscious agency" to ground their theory. The interface theory leaves open many of the problems of consciousness science (e.g. what is a "self"?) as questions for further (scientific, mathematical) research.
Philosophies, 2018
A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is una... more A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is unable to account for experiential phenomena and in particular for consciousness in all its varieties. We shall outline the concept of experiencing which should figure as a new conceptual primitive in natural philosophy. Experiencing refers to a process which comprises the interaction of an agent with its world through action based on phenomenal experience. This process can be viewed under two different aspects. One regards the subjective aspect of experiencing, the other one regards it in terms of physical objects. The first case illustrates the "what-it-is-likeness" of experiencing, the second illustrates how experiencing gets "objectified" in nature. We furthermore wish to delineate our concept of experiencing from the concept of (meta-cognitive) awareness. Scientific theories that explain how awareness comes about in sufficiently organized brains should respect the distinction between experiencing and awareness. We also sketch how experiencing could be related to theoretical biology in terms of information processing by organisms. Experiencing is non-exclusive; it refers to a primitive and a-personal natural process and not to a property possessed only by humans or other persons.
Philosophies
This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousn... more This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousness. Opposed to the consensus view, we argue that the molecular organization of biological systems is key to arrive at a thorough understanding of the dynamics correlated to the phenomenology of consciousness in complex organisms. This is indicated by the fact that the molecular sciences either provide one or more mechanisms directly related to phenomenology or otherwise describe the dynamics of the underlying substrate. In addition, we discuss substrate-independence in information-processing theories of consciousness and the issue of combination in panpsychist theories of consciousness, both from the angle of the molecular sciences. In any case, molecular details matter.
Entropy
A theory of consciousness, whatever else it may do, must address the structure of experience. Our... more A theory of consciousness, whatever else it may do, must address the structure of experience. Our perceptual experiences are richly structured. Simply seeing a red apple, swaying between green leaves on a stout tree, involves symmetries, geometries, orders, topologies, and algebras of events. Are these structures also present in the world, fully independent of their observation? Perceptual theorists of many persuasions—from computational to radical embodied—say yes: perception veridically presents to observers structures that exist in an observer-independent world; and it does so because natural selection shapes perceptual systems to be increasingly veridical. Here we study four structures: total orders, permutation groups, cyclic groups, and measurable spaces. We ask whether the payoff functions that drive evolution by natural selection are homomorphisms of these structures. We prove, in each case, that generically the answer is no: as the number of world states and payoff values g...
Open Philosophy
The relationship between philosophy and research on artificial intelligence (AI) has been difficu... more The relationship between philosophy and research on artificial intelligence (AI) has been difficult since its beginning, with mutual misunderstanding and sometimes even hostility. By contrast, we show how an approach informed by both philosophy and AI can be productive. After reviewing some popular frameworks for computation and learning, we apply the AI methodology of “build it and see” to tackle the philosophical and psychological problem of characterizing perception as distinct from sensation. Our model comprises a network of very simple, but interacting agents which have binary experiences of the “yes/no”-type and communicate their experiences with each other. When does such a network refer to a single agent instead of a distributed network of entities? We apply machine learning techniques to address the following related questions: i) how can the model explain stability of compound entities, and ii) how could the model implement a single task such as perceptual inference? We th...