Fei Song | Lingnan University (original) (raw)
Conference Proceedings by Fei Song
Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., ... more Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm) or a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied across different moral dilemmas. The present paper explored if the variation can be explained by the differentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities. We generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the classical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and investigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive to the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the majority of subjects, including both those who initially chose a deontological decision and those who initially chose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to outcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive to the probabilities was invariant across different dilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across different dilemmas might be associated with the variation of the estimated outcome probabilities.
Book Reviews by Fei Song
Journal Publication by Fei Song
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 2019
In this article, I argue for a distinct and novel right-based account of risks and I call it the ... more In this article, I argue for a distinct and novel right-based account of risks and I call it the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis. I argue that there is a distinction between rights-infringing risk impositions and no-rights-infringing risk impositions. An action imposing a high risk of harm infringes rights, whereas an act imposing a low risk of harm does not. I also suggest three principles that govern the permissibility of highly risky actions. If a highly risky action meets the conditions specified by any of these three principles, it can be justified. These principles are the consent principle, the prevent disaster principle* and the reciprocity principle. I show that the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis is, in general, better than the alternative Risk-thesis defended by McCarthy.
Judgment and Decision Making , 2017
Previous studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions var... more Previous studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions varied across different variants of the trolley dilemma. In this paper, we explored whether moral choices were associated with beliefs about outcome probabilities in different moral dilemmas. Results of two experiments showed that participants’ perceptions of outcome probabilities were different between two dilemmas that were similar to the classical switch case and footbridge case. Participants’ judgments of the outcome probabilities were associated with their moral choices. The results suggested that participants might not accept task instructions and thus did not perceive the outcomes in the dilemmas as certain. We argued that researchers who endorse descriptive tasks in moral reasoning research should be cautious about the findings and should take participants’ beliefs in the outcomes into account.
Papers by Fei Song
Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., ... more Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm) or a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied across different moral dilemmas. The present paper explored if the variation can be explained by the differentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities. We generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the classical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and investigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive to the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the majority of subjects, including both those who initially chose a deontological decision and those who initially chose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to outcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive to the probabilities was invariant across different dilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across different dilemmas might be associated with the variation of the estimated outcome probabilities.
Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., ... more Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm) or a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied across different moral dilemmas. The present paper explored if the variation can be explained by the differentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities. We generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the classical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and investigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive to the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the majority of subjects, including both those who initially chose a deontological decision and those who initially chose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to outcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive to the probabilities was invariant across different dilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across different dilemmas might be associated with the variation of the estimated outcome probabilities.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 2019
In this article, I argue for a distinct and novel right-based account of risks and I call it the ... more In this article, I argue for a distinct and novel right-based account of risks and I call it the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis. I argue that there is a distinction between rights-infringing risk impositions and no-rights-infringing risk impositions. An action imposing a high risk of harm infringes rights, whereas an act imposing a low risk of harm does not. I also suggest three principles that govern the permissibility of highly risky actions. If a highly risky action meets the conditions specified by any of these three principles, it can be justified. These principles are the consent principle, the prevent disaster principle* and the reciprocity principle. I show that the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis is, in general, better than the alternative Risk-thesis defended by McCarthy.
Judgment and Decision Making , 2017
Previous studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions var... more Previous studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions varied across different variants of the trolley dilemma. In this paper, we explored whether moral choices were associated with beliefs about outcome probabilities in different moral dilemmas. Results of two experiments showed that participants’ perceptions of outcome probabilities were different between two dilemmas that were similar to the classical switch case and footbridge case. Participants’ judgments of the outcome probabilities were associated with their moral choices. The results suggested that participants might not accept task instructions and thus did not perceive the outcomes in the dilemmas as certain. We argued that researchers who endorse descriptive tasks in moral reasoning research should be cautious about the findings and should take participants’ beliefs in the outcomes into account.
Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., ... more Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm) or a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied across different moral dilemmas. The present paper explored if the variation can be explained by the differentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities. We generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the classical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and investigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive to the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the majority of subjects, including both those who initially chose a deontological decision and those who initially chose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to outcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive to the probabilities was invariant across different dilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across different dilemmas might be associated with the variation of the estimated outcome probabilities.