Mark Sentesy | Loyola University Maryland (original) (raw)

Books by Mark Sentesy

Northwestern University Press, 2020

This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception ... more This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change.
Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reex¬amination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary d... more Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary discussion it is no less central. In addition to the history of philosophy's extensive investigations of language, analytic and continental philosophy too have focused intensively on the matter. But since most inquiries into language remain enclosed in their own methodology, terminology, and tradition, the multiplicity of approaches is often accompanied by their mutual isolation. This book shows that these traditions can, however, speak meaningfully to each other on language: rather than preventing dialogue, their differences provide opportunities for fruitful inquiry.
The essays in this volume each treat a central topic in the contemporary study of language. Part One addresses how expression determines thought according to Humboldt, the use of paraphrase in Quine's semantic ascent, and the non-ambiguity of the Frege-Russell senses of is. Part Two includes treatments of the possibility and impossibility of promising in Nietzsche, and Derrida's re-working of Saussure's distinction between language and world. Topics in Part Three include the origin and end of language for Heidegger and Foucault, and the mutual sharpening of logic and ordinary speech in Anselm.
This book fills a gap in current scholarship by bringing together nine essays that, through rejecting the debilitating yet often unquestioned divisions between disciplines, are able to illuminate the fundamental nature of language.

'In each part of this thought-provoking volume on the nature of language, there are essays that demonstrate the immense intellectual potential of writing that refuses to see any decisive distinction between the present of philosophy and its history, or between the ways in which Kant s work has been inherited in Anglo-American and Franco-German traditions.'
--Stephen Mulhall, New College, Oxford University, author of Wittgenstein's Private Language

'With its robust range of complementary topics, each subjected to penetrating examination, this collection of essays makes a welcome contribution to the philosophy of language, past and present.'
--Daniel Dahlstrom, Boston University, author of Heidegger's Concept of Truth

'The contributions to this impressive volume ignore traditional divides between analytic and continental, historical and systematic philosophy. This enables the authors to put a number of key issues in the philosophy of language into a striking new light.... Fully accessible to the advanced undergraduate in philosophy, the book also contains many provocative ideas for the specialist.'
--Martin Kusch, University of Cambridge, author of Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium

Papers by Mark Sentesy

History of philosophy & logical analysis, Feb 16, 2024

Aristotle argues that time depends on soul to count it, yet closes with the claim that motion, wh... more Aristotle argues that time depends on soul to count it, yet closes with the claim that motion, which makes time what it is, may be independent of soul. The claim that time depends on soul or mind implies that there is at least one measurable property of natural beings that exists because of the mind's activity. This paper argues that for Aristotle time depends partly on soul, but more importantly on motion, which defines a continuum. Thus, in contrast to modern philosophy of physics, for Aristotle the continuum of motion is prior in being, while the continuum of time is a hybrid of real and ideal. This argument clears the way for a robust response to Zeno’s paradox that eludes modern physics.

This project sets out to answer the following question: what does movement contribute to or chang... more This project sets out to answer the following question: what does movement contribute to or change about being according to Aristotle? The first part works through the argument for the existence of movement in the Physics. This argument includes distinctive innovations in the structure of being, notably the simultaneous unity and manyness of being: while material and form are one thing, they are two in being. This makes it possible for Aristotle to argue that movement is not intrinsically related to what is not: what comes to be does not emerge from non-being, it comes from something that is in a different sense. The second part turns to the Metaphysics to show that and how the lineage of potency and activity the inquiry into movement. A central problem is that activity or actuality, energeia, does not at first seem to be intrinsically related to a completeness or end, telos. With the unity of different senses of being at stake, Aristotle establishes that it is by showing that activity or actuality is movement most of all, and that movement has and is a complete end. Thus, it is movement that leads Aristotle to conclude that substance and form are energeia, and that unity of being is possible.

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018

The belief that Aristotle opposes potency (dunamis) to actuality (energeia or entelecheia) has go... more The belief that Aristotle opposes potency (dunamis) to actuality (energeia or entelecheia) has gone untested. This essay defines and distinguishes forms of the Opposition Hypothesis-the Actualization, Privation, and Modal-examining the texts and arguments adduced to support them. Using Aristotle's own account of opposition, the texts appear instead to show that potency and actuality are compatible, while arguments for their opposition produce intractable problems. Notably, Aristotle's refutation of the Megarian Identity Hypothesis applies with equal or greater force to the Opposition Hypothesis. For Aristotle, then, potency and actuality are compatible.

Research in Phenomenology, 2011

The subject of this essay is the thing itself, examined through the fantastic character of phenom... more The subject of this essay is the thing itself, examined through the fantastic character of phenomenality, that is, through the coming into being or opening up of the world. The world of appearance emerges from a simple, absolute nothing: there is nothing behind or before the world. There are right away many things, a world: one thing implies others, since for one to be it must distinguish itself from another. Thus, if ‘to be’ means ‘to distinguish,’ Being begins with the parting of things that makes their connection possible. Thus the thing in itself is straightaway the undergoing of its own parting; being is a passion. The Imago, then, is not a picture or figure, but the arriving in presence, which imagination elicits or welcomes by advancing in response. Imagination, then, is not first of all open to an image, but to world. It opens itself to the Thing, to the possibility of something, to parting, and in so doing brings itself toward creation.

Ancient philosophy today, Oct 1, 2022

Are all forms of difference contained in what is, or is there some form of difference that escape... more Are all forms of difference contained in what is, or is there some form of difference that escapes, negates, or constitutes what is? Parmenides and Heraclitus may have had the greatest effect on how philosophy has answered this question. This paper shows that Heraclitus is not a partisan of difference: identity and difference are mutually generative and equally fundamental. For his part, Parmenides both makes an argument against opposing being and non-being in the False Road Story, and then uses precisely this opposition to put up signs on the Way of Truth. The paper responds to this impasse by making the case that the poem’s philosophical character is didactic, rhetorical, and mythological, which is why both these signs, and the opposition between non-being and being, are presented as names created by mortals.

Apeiron, Jun 26, 2018

This paper reconstructs Aristotle's account of the now to clarify the relationship between motion... more This paper reconstructs Aristotle's account of the now to clarify the relationship between motion and the number of time. If time is the number of motion, then the priority of motion can be grasped by examining his theory of number. The paper gives a systematic overview of the now in relation to motion, to the constitution of units, and to number in general. This shows that, for Aristotle, the now is not itself an extended unit, and defends his view against claims that time is implicitly prior to motion. The temporal number is co-constituted by the soul and motion, and the now is key to understanding how this occurs. This paper shows that, just as numbers are generated by the soul, time emerges through the soul's articulation of motion using a now. The now is a limit that marks out and sets up the abstraction of a temporal unit from its underlying motion. This reconstruction provides a strong basis for the claim that time is ontologically dependent on motion, and secondarily on the soul.

The ethical neutrality of technology has been widely questioned, for example, in the case of the ... more The ethical neutrality of technology has been widely questioned, for example, in the case of the creation and continued existence of weapons. At stake is whether technology changes the ethical character of our experience: compare the experience of seeing a beating to videotaping it. Interpreting and elaborating on the work of George Grant and Marshall McLuhan, this paper consists of three arguments: 1) the existence of technologies determines the structures of civilization that are imposed on the world, 2) technologies shape what we do and determine how we do it, and 3) technology, unlike any other kind of thing, seems not to make moral demands of us: it is morally neutral. This means that they offer us the freedom of imposing on something that does not impose back. The introduction of this experience of freedom changes the way we experience the world in general by introducing a new way of relating to the good, namely by introducing the act of subjective valuation. Each of these points implies that technology structurally changes or interferes with our ethical relationship with things, with the result that through subjective valuation the experience of the obligation to act can be suspended. Example and the Problem Picture for a moment a person watching a news program on television, hearing about an injustice. Let's say he feels powerless to do anything about it. It is important to realize that he is not powerless, since he knows how to start to do something about it, how to find out more, what people might advise or help him, and so on, so it is his free decision to do something else and not about that. There are two paths this decision can take: if there is such thing as conscience, when a person feels or sees injustice he will feel an impulse to act-"that is wrong! That should not have happened!"-in the form of a righteous outrage. If he chooses to do nothing to remedy it, this impulse is not expressed. He turns it around onto himself, and becomes outraged at himself, and then cynical about the world. If he continues to watch, his conscience will continue to press for action, and he will become more and more bitter. The other path offers him a simple solution: he turns off the television, removing the source of his irritation, or changes the channel and distracts himself with something else. In the remarks that follow it may seem like I am concentrating on this second path, but I am addressing both, because, as it seems to me, they are the same phenomenon. The situation is defined by a tension between justice and control: in the first path, a man feels obligated to act, but powerless, in the second, he avoids his obligation by deciding what he experiences. In what follows, I will How Technology Changes Our Idea of the Good Mark Sentesy 2 argue that technology-in this case, the television-determines in advance that these are his options. I will argue, further, that this means technology changes our experience of and therefore our idea of the good.

Of Aristotle's core terms, potency (dunamis) and actuality (energeia) are among the most importan... more Of Aristotle's core terms, potency (dunamis) and actuality (energeia) are among the most important. But when we attempt to understand what they mean, we face the following problem: their primary meaning is movement, as a source (dunamis) or as movement itself (energeia). We therefore have to understand movement in order to understand them. But the structure of movement is itself articulated using these terms: it is the activity of a potential being, as potent. This paper examines this hermeneutic circle, and works out a strategy for reading Aristotle based on his conception of our epistemological predicament. This hermeneutic approach helps us gain access to the phenomena of movement and its sources (potency, and energeia). The paper closes with a review of the conceptual resources we deploy to think about movement: homogeneity, space and time, impulse, relativity, the blend of sameness and difference, and being and non-being. Showing that Aristotle uses none of these clears the landscape for a fresh inquiry into his account of movement. To get underway in the study of dunamis and energeia it is necessary to examine movement. Aristotle devotes book IX of the Metaphysics specifically to dunamis and energeia, yet it is not possible to start the study there, for the argument of that book begins with the sense of dunamis proper to movement, its primary sense, and with the sense of energeia that is movement, and from there works out how they from there extend to other things. Thus, to understand dunamis and energeia it is necessary to understand movement, and their function in movement. When we turn to Aristotle's account of movement, however, we do not find an explanation of these words through an appeal to movement. Instead, we find a proof of the existence of movement through an appeal to them. After all, Aristotle defines movement as the being-at-work (energeia) of a potent thing (tou dunamei ontos), as such. Thus, he expresses the structure of movement using the very terms we hoped movement would clarify; instead of making the meaning of any of these, more obvious, Aristotle brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk provided by PhilPapers seems to make it less accessible by referring them to one another, making of them a kind of circle. We cannot undertake the understanding of dunamis and energeia without movement, but movement is not grasped through concepts that are readily available to us: it can only be grasped through understanding dunamis and energeia. The turn to movement, therefore, is not merely preliminary to the study of dunamis and energeia: to study one is to study the other. This circle, however, is not a closed circle. Three things hold it open: the words dunamis and energeia themselves, the experience of movement, and the differences and relationships between the words, as expressed in the structure of movement. After some general remarks on why this hermeneutic circle is not closed, we shall work out more precisely both this difficulty and how to get out of it. §1: Why This Hermeneutic Circle is Open The first reason, then, that movement (kinēsis) does not form a closed circle with dunamis and energeia is that dunamis, energeia, and entelekheia have meanings that we can partly recognize. One cannot suppose that the meanings of these words are those of ordinary Greek: consider Aristotle's complex relationship with inherited opinions (endoxa), and consider also that he created the words energeia and entelekheia from ordinary Greek words. Nevertheless, though we have reasons to say that the common meanings of each of these words are of limited usefulness, they nevertheless would have made some sense on their own. Thankfully, Aristotle goes out of his way to say something about their meaning, though not much, as we shall see. So while it will not be possible to grasp their meanings solely on philological grounds, it will be possible to gain some insight this way. The complex relationship between Aristotle's terms and ordinary Greek has a loose resemblance to the relationship between these terms and our English translations: what he tries to communicate is and can be expressed in ordinary Greek or in ordinary English, but only roughly. 1 For us this means that in many cases key terms should remain untranslated, except where elucidation would be very helpful; such elucidation, while it can be accurate, is usually provisional and will not survive being generalized or removed from its context. The distinctions Aristotle makes between them, and the relationships between them, however, are more likely to apply elsewhere, though here too one must be cautious. The second reason that it could actually be helpful to put kinēsis, on the one hand, and dunamis and energeia on the other, into a circle of inquiry, is that we have ample experience of movement. This experience is continuous, unrelenting; it is unclear at first whether there is anything to be distinguished from it, because it seems as though the whole of the cosmos moves. Even what appears to have ceased moving and be resting is in its most basic character something that moves. To be motionless, therefore, has two relevant meanings: to be at rest, and to be beyond movement and rest altogether. For rest has its meaning only as a moment of a moving thing, as "a deprivation in what admits of motion," (Physics V.2 226b10-18). But it is not at all obvious whether or not there is anything that transcends movement and rest altogether. The matter is complicated by our own natural constitution: we are living things, and for us to live is (also) to move: if nothing appears to be moving, nevertheless our hearts beat, our blood circulates continuously. If we grasp eternal ideas, such as Gödel's incompleteness theorems, we do so as moving things, whose minds will soon turn to something else. If movement seems to be indeterminate or difficult to grasp, it is in part because it is difficult to distinguish from anything in our experience. 1 Take, for example, the ongoing disagreement over how to translate entelekheia, e.g. as complete reality, full actuality, being-atwork-staying-itself, being-in-its-end, and being-at-its-end. A similar disagreement over how to translate energeia-sometimes it can only be translated activity, and other times actuality, e.g. NE VII.12 1153a12, Pro III.5 204a20, III.6 206a14-led Beere to argue against translating it at all. Cf. the introduction to Jonathan Beere, Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).

Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary d... more Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary discussion it is no less central. In addition to the history of philosophy's extensive investigations of language, analytic and continental philosophy too have focused intensively on the matter. But since most inquiries into language remain enclosed in their own methodology, terminology, and tradition, the multiplicity of approaches is often accompanied by their mutual isolation. This book shows that these traditions can, however, speak meaningfully to each other on language: rather than preventing dialogue, their differences provide opportunities for fruitful inquiry. The essays in this volume each treat a central topic in the contemporary study of language. Part One addresses how expression determines thought according to Humboldt, the use of paraphrase in Quine's semantic ascent, and the non-ambiguity of the Frege-Russell senses of 'is.' Part Two includes treatments of the possibility and impossibility of promising in Nietzsche, and Derrida's re-working of Saussure's distinction between language and world. Topics in Part Three include the origin and end of language for Heidegger and Foucault, and the mutual sharpening of logic and ordinary speech in Anselm. This book fills a gap in current scholarship by bringing together nine essays that, through rejecting the debilitating yet often unquestioned divisions between disciplines, are able to illuminate the fundamental nature of language.

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Jul 16, 2019

This paper clarifies the way Aristotle uses generation (γένεσις) to establish the priority of act... more This paper clarifies the way Aristotle uses generation (γένεσις) to establish the priority of activity (ἐνέργεια) in time and in being. It opens by examining the concept of genetic priority. The argument for priority in beinghood has two parts. The first part is a synthetic argument that accomplishment (τέλος) is the primary kind of source (ἀρχή), an argument based on the structure of generation. The second part engages three critical objections to the claim that activity could be an accomplishment: (i) activity appears to lack its own structure; (ii) activity is different in kind from the object it accomplishes; and (iii) activity is external to its accomplishment. Aristotle responds to these objections by analyzing the structure of generation. In the course of the argument, Aristotle establishes that beinghood and form are activity.

Research in Phenomenology, 2010

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis, 2023

Ancient Philosophy Today

The Epic of Gilgamesh presents the cultural dawn of the Anthropocene. In its pivotal act, the rej... more The Epic of Gilgamesh presents the cultural dawn of the Anthropocene. In its pivotal act, the rejection of the goddess of natural fertility and change, Gilgamesh identifies three core phenomena: our dependence on nature, the imperfect fit between animal and ecosystem, and the re-incorporation of what dies into cycles of life. The paper first outlines what we know about the ecological history of Gilgamesh's culture, sketching its role in the Epic. It then analyzes the structure of the poem to identify this central problem, and traces out the argument of the rest of the poem, namely that the rejection of Ishtar must be overcome, and the goddess placed back at the heart of civilization.

Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology, 2019

The moral neutrality of technology has been widely asserted and widely challenged. I argue that w... more The moral neutrality of technology has been widely asserted and widely challenged. I argue that what is at stake in this debate is not whether technology is morally neutral but whether it changes the ethical character of our experience: compare the experience of seeing a beating to videotaping it. This paper consists of three arguments: 1) the technologies we use impose definite structures of human activity on the world, 2) technologies structure what we do and how we do it, and 3) the moral neutrality of technology is due to a positive character of technological objects, namely that they offer new possibilities for action, but unlike any other kind of thing, technology seems not to make moral demands of us. Hence its moral neutrality. This means that technology offers us the freedom of imposing on something that does not impose back. The introduction of this experience of freedom changes the way we experience the world in general by introducing a new way of relating to the good, namely by introducing the act of subjective valuation, that is, of imposing value on something that does not impose back. In conclusion, technology structurally changes our ethical relationship with things, with the result that through subjective valuation the experience of the obligation to act can be suspended.

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

The Protagoras examines how community can occur between people who have nothing in common. Commun... more The Protagoras examines how community can occur between people who have nothing in common. Community, Protagoras holds, has no natural basis. The good is therefore not a theoretical object, but a matter of agreement. This position follows from his claim that "man is the measure of all things." For Socrates community is based on a natural good, which is sought through theoretical inquiry. They disagree about what community is, and what its bases and goals are. But Plato illustrates the seriousness of Protagoras's position through the repeated breakdown of their conversation. The dialogue leads us to question both speakers' assumptions about community. Socrates must face the problem that not everything can be brought to language. Protagoras must recognize that there is a basis of community even in what cannot be shared. Community is generated through dialogue in an event that is both natural and not up to individual speakers.

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018

Northwestern University Press, 2020

History of philosophy & logical analysis, Feb 16, 2024

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018

Research in Phenomenology, 2011

Ancient philosophy today, Oct 1, 2022

Apeiron, Jun 26, 2018

Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary d... more Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary discussion it is no less central. In addition to the history of philosophy's extensive investigations of language, analytic and continental philosophy too have focused intensively on the matter. But since most inquiries into language remain enclosed in their own methodology, terminology, and tradition, the multiplicity of approaches is often accompanied by their mutual isolation. This book shows that these traditions can, however, speak meaningfully to each other on language: rather than preventing dialogue, their differences provide opportunities for fruitful inquiry. The essays in this volume each treat a central topic in the contemporary study of language. Part One addresses how expression determines thought according to Humboldt, the use of paraphrase in Quine's semantic ascent, and the non-ambiguity of the Frege-Russell senses of 'is.' Part Two includes treatments of the possibility and impossibility of promising in Nietzsche, and Derrida's re-working of Saussure's distinction between language and world. Topics in Part Three include the origin and end of language for Heidegger and Foucault, and the mutual sharpening of logic and ordinary speech in Anselm. This book fills a gap in current scholarship by bringing together nine essays that, through rejecting the debilitating yet often unquestioned divisions between disciplines, are able to illuminate the fundamental nature of language.

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Jul 16, 2019

Research in Phenomenology, 2010

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis, 2023

Ancient Philosophy Today

Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology, 2019

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018

Apeiron, 2018

This paper reconstructs Aristotle’s account of the now to clarify the relationship between motion... more This paper reconstructs Aristotle’s account of the now to clarify the relationship between motion and the number of time. If time is the number of motion, then the priority of motion can be grasped by examining his theory of number. The paper gives a systematic overview of the now in relation to motion, to the constitution of units, and to number in general. This shows that, for Aristotle, the now is not itself an extended unit, and defends his view against claims that time is implicitly prior to motion. The temporal number is co-constituted by the soul and motion, and the now is key to understanding how this occurs. This paper shows that, just as numbers are generated by the soul, time emerges through the soul’s articulation of motion using a now. The now is a limit that marks out and sets up the abstraction of a temporal unit from its underlying motion. This reconstruction provides a strong basis for the claim that time is ontologically dependent on motion, and secondarily on the ...

Apeiron, 2018

This paper reconstructs the relationship between the now, motion, and number in Aristotle to clar... more This paper reconstructs the relationship between the now, motion, and number in Aristotle to clarify the nature of the now, and, thereby, the relationship between motion and time. Although it is clear that for Aristotle motion, and, more generally, change, are prior to time, the nature of this priority is not clear. But if time is the number of motion, then the priority of motion can be grasped by examining his theory of number. This paper aims to show that, just as numbers are generated by the soul, time is not presupposed by motion, but emerges through the soul’s articulation of motion. Time is co-constituted by the soul and motion. The now is the key to understanding both the contribution of motion and soul to the being of time. The now is part of the soul’s articulation of motion, and sets the stage for an act that distinguishes a unit from its underlying motion. The now, then, sets up an abstraction by which the soul generates the temporal number from motion. Reconstructing this account of abstraction allows us to formulate more strongly Aristotle’s claim to the ontological dependence of time on motion. The paper then gives a systematic overview of the relationships between the now and number in order to address the question of whether the now might be extended. It closes with an examination of the possibility that motion depends on time, and how universal time is possible.

This paper explores the proposition that Hardin’s concept of the Tragedy of the Commons only appl... more This paper explores the proposition that Hardin’s concept of the Tragedy of the Commons only applies to cultures whose concept of private property is defined by a market, and examines how this view intersects with European colonial legal and philosophical concepts of property. The first section examines the concept of property contained in Hardin’s argument for the Tragedy of the Commons, connecting the “relentless logic” of the tragedy to the profit motive introduced by an exchange market. The second section traces out the legal and philosophical basis of colonial appropriation of indigenous land to show how property was defined first through the goal of plunder, and later through the goal of profit on a market. This analysis shows how Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons is rooted in a colonial concept of property defined by exclusion, economic exchange, and extraction for profit.

Climate change is an ethical, social, political, economic, and environmental problem at the same ... more Climate change is an ethical, social, political, economic, and environmental problem at the same time. This presentation gives an overview of climate impacts due to heat stress, air pollution, disease vulnerability, food and water scarcity, migration and international security, through the lens of inequality and environmental justice.

In any examination of intersubjectivity we confront the following problem: what does it mean for ... more In any examination of intersubjectivity we confront the following problem: what does it mean for an individual to be unique? How is this uniqueness related to others? The difficulty is that if we answer the first question too easily, we could find ourselves without much to say about the second. An immediate result of such answers is that they obscure the uniqueness of this person here. A good answer to the question of uniqueness, then, cannot avoid showing the uniqueness of this person. This paper works out what this uniqueness is, arguing on phenomenological grounds that the first and third-person perspectives cannot point out the unique thing as origin.

How, then, does this uniqueness arise in our experience? First, it is not immediately clear how in principle I could ever be distinguished from the objects that I perceive, if the first-person perspective were the only one available to me. Second, it is not clear how in principle this difference that distinguishes perspectives—a difference I care about and am attached to—could emerge from an indifferent and detached third-person perspective.

Hegel’s analysis of desire confirms this result: the uniqueness that characterizes me is not available to me without others. An analysis of the experience of skin colour forces us to conclude that uniqueness comes to light in a peculiar way: something about the other that is inaccessible to the other reveals what about me is inaccessible to me.

The analysis of the experience of the other’s gaze in Sartre and Levinas points to an inescapable result: that which is inaccessible to me and which individuates me pre-reflectively are not my physical or mental features, and not my death, but my life. If we wrongly assumed that the way life individuates is obvious, we still face the question how my life or the life of the other discloses uniqueness? Through an analysis of place, we conclude that being there in the world is disclosure, but only if it is understood as this living principle of action here and as a ‘second-person’ being.

In 1910, through their first Technical Manifesto, Futurist painters took it upon themselves to ex... more In 1910, through their first Technical Manifesto, Futurist painters took it upon themselves to express movement in art. But movement was conceived according to what they took to be its essence, namely its energetic and spiritual heart, the élan vital. For these artists, living movement is the ontological character of beings, and energy or light is their way of appearing. Futurist art was an attempt to make movement visible through an investigation and decomposition of form. Their investigations into the “living outlines” of an object are attempts to decompose the apparent, static form of the object to reveal its dynamic essence, “its breathing or heartbeat.” Their interest in line and form is thus not an interest in “fixed boundaries”, but instead an interest in transgression and synthesis, namely dynamic and temporal transcendence. According to Boccioni, “Lines and outlines only exist as forces bursting forth from the dynamic action of the bodies.”
The painterly technique of the divided stroke went hand in hand with the decomposition of forms Boccioni sought to reveal the dynamism of life. The decomposition of form through the divisionist technique turned it into light. On the other hand, the decomposition of form revealed the movement of life. In a word, futurist decomposition reveals the unity of light-energy and movement.
Divisionism at work in the act of painting brings forth the dynamism of things. It offers us an experience of the basic moved character of light, the basically illuminative character of motion, by setting the spectator into that motion. In Boccioni’s words, “We Futurists are right inside the object, and we live out its evolutionary concept… we live out the object in the motion of its inner forces.” They sought the destruction of the materiality of bodies, the revelation of things as movement and light, to set the soul of the spectator into motion.

The problems confronting the science of nature change depending on how its practitioners conceive... more The problems confronting the science of nature change depending on how its practitioners conceive of the parts of things. In this paper I discuss two ways of thinking about parts: the Ancient Greek conception of elements as letters, and the Modern conception of things as machines.
The discovery of the elements in Greek Philosophy is a revolution in the conception of parts and wholes and therefore of science, so the first part of this paper discusses the way that Plato uses written words as models for the way parts fit together into whole things. The first recognizably scientific accounts of things were accomplished by drawing an analogy between writing and things: the word for ‘element’ is the word for ‘letter.’
The second part of this paper works out how the machine changes the concept of nature and its parts. Early Modern science is recognizable through a new metaphor for the workings of nature: the machine and its correlative concepts of force, cause and effect. The paper closes with a sketch of our current model of the physical world—indefinite energy—and discusses possible implications of this conception of things.

Chapter 5 of the book Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle, in progress.

This is a draft of Chapter 4 of my manuscript Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle. C... more This is a draft of Chapter 4 of my manuscript Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine the terms involved in the definition of change: being-at-work (energeia), being-complete (entelecheia), and potency (dunamis).

Chapter 3 addressed energeia and entelecheia, and argued that change and potency both admit of being complete in one respect and incomplete in another.

This chapter examines what dunamis (potency, capacity) is. It argues first that to be a source is to set to work in certain conditions. Potency is the kind of source that only works with others. A particular capacity is always in principle capable of doing something other than it is currently doing, with the exception of capacities that have been completed, e.g. being a violinist, being a living thing. Beings take on the name of their completed potencies. The chapter closes with an examination of how the process of completion is a change into what one was in potency.

Chapter 5 examines the ontology of the process of generation. It argues that Aristotle's claim that natures only exist at the end of a genetic process means that generation is complete once a source of change, (i.e. a nature, a being), has come to be.

This is Chapter 3 of my book Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle, which is in progres... more This is Chapter 3 of my book Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle, which is in progress.
The previous chapter examined the definition of change, arguing that it is, in fact, a proof that change admits of being.
This chapter begins with an examination of the terms energeia and entelecheia, and ends with an examination of the senses in which change can be complete and incomplete. I distinguish between the categorical properties of changes and the sources of change, and argue that the proper sense of completeness and incompleteness of change must be related to its sources.

This is a draft of Chapter 2 of my manuscript Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle. C... more This is a draft of Chapter 2 of my manuscript Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle.

Chapter 1 argued that if change exists, being must be multiple.
Chapter 2 argues that the definition of change in Physics III is a proof for the existence of change--the proof that Physics I did not provide. The definition of change uses the terms potency, activity, and fulfillment. But to make it possible to define change, Aristotle needs to distinguish sharply between two primary senses of being, namely the categorical, and the "energetic" sense. He also needs to distinguish the being insofar as it is the subject of change (i.e. the being-in-potency), from the same being insofar as it is a categorical object bearing properties. In doing so he shows that potency has an ontological sense.
The proof goes as follows: buildable planks exist, but their buildability refers to something makes them buildable, namely the activity of building. Therefore the being of something that evidently exists depends on change in order to be what it is. Change, therefore, exists.

This is a draft of Chapter 1 of my manuscript Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle. T... more This is a draft of Chapter 1 of my manuscript Ontological Consequences of Change in Aristotle.

The core claim is this: Aristotle's response to the argument that change cannot exist does not establish the existence of change, but makes coherent descriptions of change possible. But for such descriptions to be possible, being must be multiple in aspect, divided into form, underlying, and privation. Change requires being to be multiple. Moreover, this very multiplicity is Aristotle's answer to how many being is.

Chapter 2 argues that the definition of change in Physics III is a proof for the existence of change--the proof that Physics I did not provide.

The Ontology of Change in Aristotle, 2019

This paper clarifies the way Aristotle uses generation (γένεσις) to establish the priority of act... more This paper clarifies the way Aristotle uses generation (γένεσις) to establish the priority of activity (ἐνέργεια) in time and in being. It opens by examining the concept of genetic priority. The argument for priority in beinghood has two parts: the first part is a synthetic argument that accomplishment (τέλος) is the primary kind of source (ἀρχή), and it is based on the structure of generation. The second part engages three critical objections to the claim that activity could be an accomplishment: i) activity appears to lack its own structure, ii) activity is different in kind from the object it accomplishes, and iii) activity is external to its accomplishment. Aristotle responds to these objections by analyzing the structure of generation. In the course of the argument, Aristotle establishes that beinghood and form are activity.

The Ontology of Change in Aristotle, 2019

The task of this book is to examine what change is and what it contributes to ontology in the wor... more The task of this book is to examine what change is and what it contributes to ontology in the work of Aristotle. Ontology studies all things insofar as they are, which is why it takes a position on the being or non-being of change. This book investigates two parts of ontology: the part of ontology that studies the being of change and its concepts, and the part that discovers and develops the principles of being. It examines the ontology of change with the goal of discerning what it leads us to discover about ontological principles. Broadly put, the question is: what does change tell us about being? But no matter how we answer that question, if change is to exist, some things must be true of being. The work of Aristotle is an exemplar of what we can discover about being through the study of change.

Eth-ICTs: Ethics and the New Information and Communication Technologies, 2011

Husserl’s controversial distinction between meaning and indication in the Logical Investigations ... more Husserl’s controversial distinction between meaning and indication in the Logical Investigations has been attacked by Derrida and others. In this paper I investigate the nature of this distinction, its meaning, and its implications for the philosophy of language and phenomenology. Husserl takes signs, in the sense of a Kantian transcendental clue, as evidence for the structure of the subjective acts that constitute them. Thus, Husserl’s investigation into the ambiguity in the ‘sign’ leads us to the mind, for only the mind can distinguish between the indicative and meaning-functions of signs. Thus I use the resources in Husserl’s account to articulate the structure of indication, sketching how we have access to the structure of subjectivity by examining indication in interpersonal communication.

Plato gives an account of community both in the doctrines presented through the dialogue, and in ... more Plato gives an account of community both in the doctrines presented through the dialogue, and in the relationships enacted in the dialogue. The Protagoras presents a philosophically troubling and fruitful example of the breakdown of community, which points back to and criticizes the principles of relationship that the interlocutors are enacting. The dialogue stands out for its examination of how community can occur between people who have nothing in common, not even a human nature or a community. On the one hand, not everything can be brought to language. On the other hand, what escapes language makes relationship possible.

The central effort of this essay is to reassert the beautiful as singular. A short analysis of ho... more The central effort of this essay is to reassert the beautiful as singular. A short analysis of how Diotima distinguishes love and its object shows that she does not distinguish a man’s love from Eros himself, nor what he loves from the beautiful itself. To the contrary, she explicitly equates them. Here she is faithful to the double meaning of to kalon: this beauty, and the beautiful. The relation of dissimilarity between a beautiful thing and the beautiful gives the equation of this beauty and the beautiful its analogical force, for it underlines how beauty 1) is wholly there in that woman, and 2) already beyond the her in the world, and too much for the world. It is not that the beauty of a woman has no relationship to what is around her, but that it is too related to grasp.
With no analogy between beauty and things, the beautiful itself is likely to be reduced to the sea of beauty: safe, stable, interchangeable and the opposite of singularity. However, for Plato to portray Socrates as irreducibly unique and followed by several mad lovers, is to suggest that the beautiful itself cannot be reduced to this sea. In the ascent to the beautiful, Diotima rises through three stages, each with a different account of singularity. Lack does not give us an account of a whole being, for the self is not an abyss to Diotima. Rather, lack describes a separation from a particular good it can possess. With possession comes happiness, and a wholeness that consists of good things. Her account of love and pregnancy, in contrast, is of a double being that senses and desires its own continuity in time.
The brilliance of this dialogue is that Plato describes an ascent to the beautiful, and then gives such a vivid example of someone who loves it. Alcibiades’ desire for satisfaction (his common eros) is indeed unreformed: he says philosophy burns his soul like snakebite because of these faults (217e-218a). Yet Socrates eros is also unfinished. While interpreters dismiss Alcibiades or show that he is unstable, the vehemence with which they do so suggests that he is also right about something. For he sees Socrates as the statue of a god.

What role does technology play in ethics? The question is not answered by working out how agents ... more What role does technology play in ethics? The question is not answered by working out how agents choose to use particular technologies, but by asking whether technology changes the infrastructure of our ethical experience and decisions. This paper argues that it does, in three ways: 1) the technologies we use impose definite structures of human activity on the world, 2) technologies structure what we do and how we do it by changing what possibilities are available to us, and therefore how we experience the world, and 3) unlike any other kind of thing, technology seems not to make moral demands of us: it seems morally neutral. This gives us a peculiar way of relating to the good: instead of experiencing the ethical demand others place on us, it puts the value of things in our hands. It offers us the freedom of imposing on something that does not impose back. In these three ways, then, technology structurally changes our ethical relationship with and experience of the world.

Parmenides' most enduring legacy may be the identity thesis, namely, the identification of samene... more Parmenides' most enduring legacy may be the identity thesis, namely, the identification of sameness with being. Two other propositions indicate, and therefore differ from, the identity thesis, namely the theses that difference is identified with non-being, and that these are opposed to being. Yet these three have been received as a trinity. The absolute self-coincidence of ontological identity has motivated a series of critiques of metaphysics, but these have not meaningfully shaken the supposition that difference, and movement, its key phenomenon, are forms of negation. The belief in this trinity, I shall argue, distorts our interpretation of both Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy

The Protagoras examines how community can occur between people who have nothing in common. Commun... more The Protagoras examines how community can occur between people who have nothing in common. Community, Protagoras holds, has no natural basis. Seeking the good is therefore not a theoretical project, but a matter of agreement. This position follows from his claim that “man is the measure of all things.” For Socrates community is based on a natural good, which is sought through theoretical inquiry. They disagree about what community is, and what its bases and goals are. But Plato illustrates the seriousness of Protagoras’s position through the repeated breakdown of their conversation. The dialogue leads us to question both speakers’ assumptions about community. Socrates must face the problem that not everything can be brought to language. Protagoras must recognize that there is a basis of community even in what cannot be shared. Community is grounded in an event that is both natural and not up to us, and cultural and articulate.

The notorious penultimate passage of the Theaetetus seems to be aporetic. The aim of this paper i... more The notorious penultimate passage of the Theaetetus seems to be aporetic. The aim of this paper is to show that its form emphasizes an important contribution to the study of parts and wholes, and in addition raises an important problem of how to begin making distinctions in things through speech: is speech meant to be a model for the structure of beings? I argue that if it is, the example of letters and syllables is more complex than it appears to be, and we face a pair of problems concerning the epistemology of structure. What is at stake in these problems is the character of and knowledge of beings, both in particular and in general.

A version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the Kent State University May 4th Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 2008

In interpreting Aristotle, the only tenable way of thinking the relationship between time and mot... more In interpreting Aristotle, the only tenable way of thinking the relationship between time and motion is that time is not motion, but is inseparable from and belongs to motion. This paper works out what this means: what makes time both different from and dependent on motion is that it is the number of motion. But in counting time we are not counting whatever we use to count with, namely, the ‘now,’ we are counting time. For Aristotle, all motion is basically articulated, and when we mark off these articulations as limits or ‘nows,’ the number that arises from them is time. Put otherwise, movement is related to number because it generates a
before and after, a ‘now’. Movement itself, however, is not numerable: by marking off movement, the before and after have delimited that which we number, namely, time. That is, we mark off movement with before and after, but in doing so we do not count movement, nor do we count the ‘nows’ with which we number; instead, we count time. Thus Aristotle’s account of time does not presuppose the existence of time, nor does it reduce time to motion. It does not assume that time is linear or composed of discrete moments. It grapples with and gives an account of the original generation of time.

An analysis of Newton's three laws of motion, concentrating on the concept of inertia, leads to a... more An analysis of Newton's three laws of motion, concentrating on the concept of inertia, leads to an investigation of the concept of deprivation (steresis) in Aristotle. At stake is whether we can sill assume that all motion is impressed on inert bodies from outside, or whether self-moving things are compatible with modern physics. The answer to the first: the concept of inertia must be re-evaluated. The answer to the second: yes, but... we would have to reintegrate physics with metaphysics, motion with being.

Question: What did you like most about this course?  Overall, I feel this great sense of motivat... more Question: What did you like most about this course?  Overall, I feel this great sense of motivation to be more aware of how I personally impact the planet I leave in. This class has challenged my way of thinking and has instilled core knowledge about the real world I live in day to day. I hope to put some action from the knowledge I gained.  Material was very interesting and professor used clips daily which was great.  Everyone contributing and all opinions and views being shared and listened to.  I enjoyed Professor Sentesy as an instructor. I'm not a business or philosophy major, and he managed to make all the material interesting and engaging.  the discussions we had in class  I like the course format. Mr. Sentesy is well prepared to thoroughly discuss any of the readings, and he is well read. It is obvious he spends much time preparing for class discussion and presentation. I like how everyone in the class gets to ask questions and converse on the lecture arguments.  I LOVE PROFESSOR SENTESY! He's amazing. This is my first quarter at DePaul, and this is by far my favorite class yet. He's really approachable and knows how to make class fun, but also ensures that we learn the material. If we don't understand something, he's more than willing to review. The classroom environment that he has created is also friendly, and I made all of my current friends at DePaul from this class. LOVE LOVE LOVE HIM AND THE COURSE.  The professor is very knowledgeable I would recommend him to all new students  The professor's passion of the subject and how he related the material to current pop culture  Professor Sentesy's passion for teaching. You could really tell he loves what he is doing and loves teaching his students. He really engaged the class.  I liked how there were discussion boards because it made it more convenient to get your opinion across and to better understand the material.  The instructor and the course materials. I felt enthusiastic to attend class every time. Students were engaged at their own will and didn't look like they were forced to participate. Compelling discussions and clear detailed explanations were provided. He never moved on unless he thought everyone understood the content being discussed. He gauged the pace of the class very well. When you hear students still talking about class after class, you know he's doing something right. He made us think and that's all I expected. Thank you Mr. Sentesy for a great experience.

This course is not a survey of existentialism. It aims, instead, to engage with core problems tha... more This course is not a survey of existentialism. It aims, instead, to engage with core problems that motivate existentialism, broadly conceived. The historical roots of these problems include: the crisis produced by the appropriation of experience by modern natural science and the physicalist account of the cosmos, the expansion and implosion of Western Civilization in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the transformation of citizens into managed populations or masses by technologies of nationalism and social engineering.
Existentialism is an attempt to think again, from the start, the human condition of action. The self-destruction of Western Civilization in the two World Wars was linked to radical attempts to control and produce individuals for mass society. Partly through the work of existentialist thinkers, these crises removed the moral authority of society, and revealed it to be an enemy of individuality. Thus freedom without guidance, the existence of others, and the nature of responsibility come to be central concerns of existentialist thinkers. By investigating human identity and its relationship with action in the world, they changed the individual’s relationship with society.
The rejection of experience by natural science, or rather, the act of shifting this experience onto external instruments, has not yet been fully incorporated into western culture. Existentialism attempted to measure what is lost in this shift, and to resist it, on the one hand, by arguing for the priority of practical and bodily experience over theoretical-scientific experience, and, on the other, by insisting on the individual’s inalienable authority to explore, express, and give meaning to experience.
The world of matter and force posited by scientific materialism is not a home for meaning. Its increasing presence in practical life is therefore directly proportional to the urgency of grasping whether, what, and where meaning is. Existentialism diagnoses and resists this crisis of nihilism or meaninglessness in human culture by engaging it fully. Some thinkers situate meaning in a natural life that animates and distorts it, while others oppose meaning to nature and biological life and place it entirely within human thought and action.

The subject of this course is the ethics of business. Our thoughts and practices, and therefore o... more The subject of this course is the ethics of business. Our thoughts and practices, and therefore our ethical life, are shaped by the social, political, and environmental situation into which we are born. In just the same way, we are shaped by the practices and concepts of business. To understand the relationship between business and ethics, then, it is necessary to investigate how business shapes us, that is, how we fit into it, how it fits in the world in which we live, and whether it does these well, that is, ethically.
The first unit examines ethical life from the point of view of how it is shaped by our actions and beliefs. We frequently interact with people in a partial way, for example, when we make use of a cashier or a co-worker, knowing nothing about their lives. The partial way we interact can be determined by our job, without us really being aware of it. This partiality can be ethically disastrous, however, especially if it is unconscious. How do we learn the principles that determine the way we interact?
The second unit looks at key principles of our northern economic system: the individual as the basis of institutions, the faith that unadulterated self-interest will produce the common good, that the value of money is determined by labor, but if a business turns a profit the value of labor-power necessarily exceeds wages, the implications of money being created by financial institutions, corporate personhood, and the profit-motive of corporations.
The final unit examines how these business principles fit within the complex of human activities and natural systems. The key themes are: social and environmental justice, the limit of economic growth, principles of radical design, and the plenitude economy.

One of the greatest gifts that philosophy can offer to human beings is the ability to see things ... more One of the greatest gifts that philosophy can offer to human beings is the ability to see things completely and with uncompromising clarity. Philosophers strive to think rigorously, and through this to learn to see. Therefore, this course aims to cultivate in students the ability to identify core questions and problems by looking at phenomena through philosophical description and theoretical engagement with the following themes: the ethical responsibility to think as you see, the effects of seeing on oneself and on others, what seeing is, and how science is possible. The assignments aim to produce intelligent reading and writing skills, while class participation develops the ability to think clearly through working with others, and the exams develop the understanding of concepts and arguments.

In this course we study what a person is by examining the nature of civilization. The course prep... more In this course we study what a person is by examining the nature of civilization. The course prepares students for philosophical research on the themes of the course by engaging key concepts and developing core skills. The course helps students learn to think, speak, read, and write well through concrete engagement with texts and media. There is a special emphasis on classroom participation, regular assignments, and group work. The course consists of four units. In the first unit we examine and begin to question four founding myths of civilization: human helplessness, war, free will, and the fall from perfection. Each of these, or the response to them, is related to law. In the second unit, we focus on how to discover premises or laws of our lives and our civilization, challenge them, and respond to them. These premises form a systematic unity or structure that we can examine, and which actively determines our thought and action. In the third unit, we discuss what particular technologies are by looking at their effects. In particular we look at how their structures necessarily relieve, reconfigure, numb, and control their users. In the fourth and final unit we examine the relationship between technology and civilization, concentrating on the novelty of the concept of technology, and its effect on the concept of justice and the experience of the good. Since nature and civilization are inseparable realities, to get a grip on them we take up the central question of their relationship, and challenge the viability of the distinction between them.

The course as a whole encourages students to become aware of the nature of responsibility and eth... more The course as a whole encourages students to become aware of the nature of responsibility and ethical action, and how action shapes what a person is. In this course we study what a person is by examining freedom and agency.
It seems self-evident that human beings are free. But what it means to be free is not at all clear. Freedom is a inescapable political reality: each person is herself a source of action who cannot be predicted or confined, and whose identity cannot be separated from her actions. But when science seeks the causes of phenomena it is unable to find freedom: freedom seems to escape thought.
This means that political freedom has an ambiguous relationship with morality. Is this dangerous? Or is the excellence we strive for in public enough to stabilize the political realm? On the other hand, freedom is also an inner experience, the experience of free will. Are we truly free to choose either good or evil, or can we only fully choose good, or are we ourselves the source of the good?
There is something about the structure of freedom that demands that we are true to ourselves, that we do not conflict with ourselves. And when we are true to ourselves, we are determined by a law at the heart of our freedom. If morality is possible, it cannot be relative, but instead must be universal: what is it about freedom that is universal?
As an inner accord, free-will never seems to appear in the world. How then could it be related to action? If freedom is to be irreducibly part of the world, then it must be impossible to escape in all circumstances: we do not choose to exist, but once we are, we are condemned to choose, and every moment we are responsible for the value we place on the world. Therefore we are irrevocably responsible for what happens, for ourselves, for wars around us, even for genocide. Such a burden seems impossible to bear, but to excuse ourselves from it is to come into conflict with ourselves, to act as though we were not free, but merely events or portions of the world.
Is there a self at all if it utterly belongs to the world, or does belonging allow us another kind of freedom? How can we flow with the events around us, be at peace with them, and bring them into harmony?
Finally, to fit with things and with people appropriately is to be an excellent human being. But excellence requires the training of desire and the cultivation of habits. This is not achieved through knowledge or reflection, but through action: you must play the guitar to become good at it, and you must be good at it to be free with it. Is this cultivated engagement with things and with other people at the core of how we come to agreement with ourselves?

Research in Phenomenology, Jan 1, 2010

Research in Phenomenology, 2011

... 17) [As above, the word montre (show) is indistinguishable from monstre (monster) in the word... more ... 17) [As above, the word montre (show) is indistinguishable from monstre (monster) in the words 'demonstration' and 'monstration.']. 18) [Thanks to Marjolaine LaPointe and Reham Elnory for their help thinking through some of the more difficult phrases.].

Bergson and Phenomenology, 2010