Karen Young | London School of Economics and Political Science (original) (raw)
Papers by Karen Young
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Issue Paper #2, 2016, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 2016.
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Gulf Affairs, Oxford University Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies (OxGAPS) Spring 2016 "GCC Secu... more Gulf Affairs, Oxford University Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies (OxGAPS) Spring 2016 "GCC Security Amid Regional Crises"
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In the Gulf states, efforts to consolidate national identity have coincided with a state-building... more In the Gulf states, efforts to consolidate national identity have coincided with a state-building project that is troubled by extreme demographic pressures on a small citizen population surrounded by a diverse and politically syncretic expatriate community. For most professional-class expatriates, to live and work in the UAE is to keep politics private and to concentrate on stability, financial security and the education of one’s children. The Arab uprisings of 2011 pushed beliefs, affinities and practices of social belonging into a wider public sphere, con- necting life in the UAE to life in the broader region.
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There is a shift occurring within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in which new regional leader... more There is a shift occurring within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in which new regional leaders are emerging, buoyed by a decade of unprecedented wealth generation from the 2000s commodi- ties boom and increased foreign investment. Specifically, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have emerged as activist states in their interest and willingness to intervene both militarily and financially in the politics of neighbouring Arab states. Contrary to their collective and individual foreign policies of the last 40 years, the GCC states have intervened in each other’s domestic poli- tics and in the domestic politics and revolutions of the wider Middle East and North Africa region. While Saudi Arabia enjoyed a period of dominance among its Gulf Arab neighbours for many years, even occasionally threatening the borders of Qatar and the UAE, the prevailing policy of Gulf states has been non-interference and support for Arab leaders, as a principle of religion and politics. In essence, the evolving nature of interventionism in the GCC is moving away from Saudi dominance towards the emergence of new actors willing to engage in the region and on the international stage. We can trace this policy shift through the simultaneous yet separate evolution of domestic, regional and international political economy. This paper argues that shifts in leadership at the national levels have coincided with larger trends in the regional and international economy which have enabled different, yet both assertive, interventionist foreign policies to emerge from Qatar and the UAE. The result is a moment of financial and military interventionism unprecedented in Arab Gulf politics.
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The foreign policy literature on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is plentiful, and cer- tainly... more The foreign policy literature on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is plentiful, and cer- tainly has a rich and volatile sample to consider. Foreign policy analysis of the Gulf, however, is often hindered by the ‘black box’ of leadership within the Gulf Arab states. Our theories, including rentierism, simplify rather than tease out the idiosyncrasies between Gulf states and their mechanisms of policy making. The purpose of this workshop1 and the papers presented here is to address drivers of foreign policy within GCC member-states, and sub- sequent interaction and effect of these policies in neighbouring countries. What we might also achieve is some shared conceptual clarity on frameworks for analysing foreign policy in the subregion, and to put forward some hypotheses about how the process of state-building in the region is changing both the agents and the practice of policy making.
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The institutional design of the Arab Gulf states sought to build economic capacity, social servic... more The institutional design of the Arab Gulf states sought to build economic capacity, social services, and basic infrastructure for small citizen populations. The reality, however, is that the states are regional drivers of economic growth and regional economic stability. Their outward placement of foreign investment, cash, and in-kind (often oil and gas) donations to unstable governments, and their support of regional economies via remittances, offer a wide net of support to states and citizens across the wider Middle East and North Africa region.
In effect, the Arab Gulf states are at the center of debate on two related policy dilemmas. The first is creating coherent immigration and human rights policy toward refugees and economic migrants. The second is in crafting foreign policy responses, often in collaboration with allies, to intervene financially or militarily in neighboring conflicts and political transitions. It is the conflict, and the failed governance that precedes it, that creates the demand for refuge, both political and economic.
The choices that Arab Gulf states will make in the coming years in foreign policy will have wide reaching effects on the lives of existing refugees and the creation of new ones (from Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and beyond). Recent interventions in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen demonstrate that the Gulf Cooperation Council states are prepared to use both economic and military force.
The choices that Arab Gulf states make in their domestic policies are equally important. Choices on fiscal policy will continue to stir debate on the relationship between citizen and government, from food and energy subsidies, entitlements to health care and housing, as well as public employment. A contraction in state spending on large infrastructure projects, including real estate and tourism, will have wide-reaching effects on economic migration and remittance patterns in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. There could be fewer jobs and remittance flows back to the states (and refugee camps) where foreign currency is so dear.
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Institutionalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is proceeding within the financ... more Institutionalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is proceeding within the financial sector in many ways as a result of economic growth, rather than as a precursor or foundation of economic growth. This paper gives an overview of the archi- tecture of financial governance in the GCC states, situating financial governance in the context of domestic state-building, global capital flows and energy markets. The paper argues that demand for new financial services often originates in the global business and finance communities, while domestic financial institutions dominated by state and ruling family interests may prefer less diversity and range (and requisite regulation). When GCC states do regulate markets, they are able to move quickly, which often priv- ileges state priorities over market depth and diversification. As Gulf states create new economic institutions to govern their markets, they are also creating a framework that enables broader political goals of financial and economic statecraft.
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The Arab Gulf States (AGS), or the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, K... more The Arab Gulf States (AGS), or the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), have historically used foreign aid and humanitarian aid as a quiet tool of their respective foreign policies within the wider Middle East. More recently, however, we have seen targeted financial aid and military assistance by these states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, towards neighbours in crisis. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have used financial and military aid to jockey for influence within Egypt’s evolving political leadership, to attempt to remove Syria’s Assad from power, to counter the growth of Islamic State movement in Iraq, to influence political battles in Libya, and even in newly democratic Tunisia. Windfalls in wealth generated from the rapid ascent of oil and gas prices between 2009 and 2014 allowed budgets to expand for both military expenditure and financial aid. The dramatic fall in oil prices in late 2014 raises questions about the ability of these states to continue their generosity and the exercise of economic statecraft in the MENA region. The article tracks the expansion of Arab Gulf State aid in the wider region after 2011, with attempts to correlate the movement of oil prices with financial aid and more interventionist foreign policy historically since the 1970s. From this it engages with theoretical debates about how effective aid can be as a foreign policy tool. We would expect as Gulf aid is dependent on the ability of states to earn income from natural resources, the price of carbon energy should have some effect on aid allocations. The evidence presented here reflects a more nuanced relationship between energy markets and Gulf Arab state aid. The politics of Gulf Arab state aid is, above all else, strategic. Political goals can override economic prudence.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Issue Paper #2, 2016, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 2016.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Gulf Affairs, Oxford University Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies (OxGAPS) Spring 2016 "GCC Secu... more Gulf Affairs, Oxford University Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies (OxGAPS) Spring 2016 "GCC Security Amid Regional Crises"
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
In the Gulf states, efforts to consolidate national identity have coincided with a state-building... more In the Gulf states, efforts to consolidate national identity have coincided with a state-building project that is troubled by extreme demographic pressures on a small citizen population surrounded by a diverse and politically syncretic expatriate community. For most professional-class expatriates, to live and work in the UAE is to keep politics private and to concentrate on stability, financial security and the education of one’s children. The Arab uprisings of 2011 pushed beliefs, affinities and practices of social belonging into a wider public sphere, con- necting life in the UAE to life in the broader region.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
There is a shift occurring within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in which new regional leader... more There is a shift occurring within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in which new regional leaders are emerging, buoyed by a decade of unprecedented wealth generation from the 2000s commodi- ties boom and increased foreign investment. Specifically, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have emerged as activist states in their interest and willingness to intervene both militarily and financially in the politics of neighbouring Arab states. Contrary to their collective and individual foreign policies of the last 40 years, the GCC states have intervened in each other’s domestic poli- tics and in the domestic politics and revolutions of the wider Middle East and North Africa region. While Saudi Arabia enjoyed a period of dominance among its Gulf Arab neighbours for many years, even occasionally threatening the borders of Qatar and the UAE, the prevailing policy of Gulf states has been non-interference and support for Arab leaders, as a principle of religion and politics. In essence, the evolving nature of interventionism in the GCC is moving away from Saudi dominance towards the emergence of new actors willing to engage in the region and on the international stage. We can trace this policy shift through the simultaneous yet separate evolution of domestic, regional and international political economy. This paper argues that shifts in leadership at the national levels have coincided with larger trends in the regional and international economy which have enabled different, yet both assertive, interventionist foreign policies to emerge from Qatar and the UAE. The result is a moment of financial and military interventionism unprecedented in Arab Gulf politics.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The foreign policy literature on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is plentiful, and cer- tainly... more The foreign policy literature on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is plentiful, and cer- tainly has a rich and volatile sample to consider. Foreign policy analysis of the Gulf, however, is often hindered by the ‘black box’ of leadership within the Gulf Arab states. Our theories, including rentierism, simplify rather than tease out the idiosyncrasies between Gulf states and their mechanisms of policy making. The purpose of this workshop1 and the papers presented here is to address drivers of foreign policy within GCC member-states, and sub- sequent interaction and effect of these policies in neighbouring countries. What we might also achieve is some shared conceptual clarity on frameworks for analysing foreign policy in the subregion, and to put forward some hypotheses about how the process of state-building in the region is changing both the agents and the practice of policy making.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The institutional design of the Arab Gulf states sought to build economic capacity, social servic... more The institutional design of the Arab Gulf states sought to build economic capacity, social services, and basic infrastructure for small citizen populations. The reality, however, is that the states are regional drivers of economic growth and regional economic stability. Their outward placement of foreign investment, cash, and in-kind (often oil and gas) donations to unstable governments, and their support of regional economies via remittances, offer a wide net of support to states and citizens across the wider Middle East and North Africa region.
In effect, the Arab Gulf states are at the center of debate on two related policy dilemmas. The first is creating coherent immigration and human rights policy toward refugees and economic migrants. The second is in crafting foreign policy responses, often in collaboration with allies, to intervene financially or militarily in neighboring conflicts and political transitions. It is the conflict, and the failed governance that precedes it, that creates the demand for refuge, both political and economic.
The choices that Arab Gulf states will make in the coming years in foreign policy will have wide reaching effects on the lives of existing refugees and the creation of new ones (from Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and beyond). Recent interventions in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen demonstrate that the Gulf Cooperation Council states are prepared to use both economic and military force.
The choices that Arab Gulf states make in their domestic policies are equally important. Choices on fiscal policy will continue to stir debate on the relationship between citizen and government, from food and energy subsidies, entitlements to health care and housing, as well as public employment. A contraction in state spending on large infrastructure projects, including real estate and tourism, will have wide-reaching effects on economic migration and remittance patterns in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. There could be fewer jobs and remittance flows back to the states (and refugee camps) where foreign currency is so dear.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Institutionalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is proceeding within the financ... more Institutionalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is proceeding within the financial sector in many ways as a result of economic growth, rather than as a precursor or foundation of economic growth. This paper gives an overview of the archi- tecture of financial governance in the GCC states, situating financial governance in the context of domestic state-building, global capital flows and energy markets. The paper argues that demand for new financial services often originates in the global business and finance communities, while domestic financial institutions dominated by state and ruling family interests may prefer less diversity and range (and requisite regulation). When GCC states do regulate markets, they are able to move quickly, which often priv- ileges state priorities over market depth and diversification. As Gulf states create new economic institutions to govern their markets, they are also creating a framework that enables broader political goals of financial and economic statecraft.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The Arab Gulf States (AGS), or the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, K... more The Arab Gulf States (AGS), or the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), have historically used foreign aid and humanitarian aid as a quiet tool of their respective foreign policies within the wider Middle East. More recently, however, we have seen targeted financial aid and military assistance by these states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, towards neighbours in crisis. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have used financial and military aid to jockey for influence within Egypt’s evolving political leadership, to attempt to remove Syria’s Assad from power, to counter the growth of Islamic State movement in Iraq, to influence political battles in Libya, and even in newly democratic Tunisia. Windfalls in wealth generated from the rapid ascent of oil and gas prices between 2009 and 2014 allowed budgets to expand for both military expenditure and financial aid. The dramatic fall in oil prices in late 2014 raises questions about the ability of these states to continue their generosity and the exercise of economic statecraft in the MENA region. The article tracks the expansion of Arab Gulf State aid in the wider region after 2011, with attempts to correlate the movement of oil prices with financial aid and more interventionist foreign policy historically since the 1970s. From this it engages with theoretical debates about how effective aid can be as a foreign policy tool. We would expect as Gulf aid is dependent on the ability of states to earn income from natural resources, the price of carbon energy should have some effect on aid allocations. The evidence presented here reflects a more nuanced relationship between energy markets and Gulf Arab state aid. The politics of Gulf Arab state aid is, above all else, strategic. Political goals can override economic prudence.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact