Ingar Brinck | Lund University (original) (raw)

Papers by Ingar Brinck

We have reached the position that the meaning of ‘I’-tokens is constituted by an individual conce... more We have reached the position that the meaning of ‘I’-tokens is constituted by an individual concept. The individual concept is formed from two elements: a fundamental (stable and intuitive) self-concept and a contextual sense: the de re sense. The former element constitutes what I have called a primary identification of oneself, that is, an indubitable identification that underlies all other identifications. Perhaps it is wrong to call this intuition an identification, since it does not involve a bringing together of different terms or concepts, but only the thinker’s or speaker’s insight that she* is a subject of experiences and sensations. The primary identification consists in an intuition of oneself that precedes identifications of oneself as somebody or something and that springs from apprehending oneself as the subject of experience.

Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications, Jan 9, 2023

Infant and Child Development, 2013

ABSTRACT In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss... more ABSTRACT In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Interest contagion in violation-of-expectation-based

Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture, 2017

The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy ... more The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced and differentiated treatment than currently exists, distinguishing it from the idea of a ‘common ground’ and discerning multiple senses of ‘we-ness’. At an empirical level, beginning from the shared history of human evolution and prenatal existence, a simple sense of pre-reflective we-ness, we argue, emerges from second-person I-you engagement in earliest infancy. Developmentally, experientially and conceptually, engagement remains fundamental to the we throughout its many forms, characterized by reciprocal interaction an...

2019 Joint IEEE 9th International Conference on Development and Learning and Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob), 2019

We argue that mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool,... more We argue that mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires that the robot is susceptible to similar environmental cues and behaviour patterns as humans are. Recognition, or the acknowledgement of the other as individual, is fundamental to mutually adaptive interaction. Recognition leads to a dynamic coupling of human and robot such that they become one system. This process has both cognitive and phenomenological aspects. The cognitive aspects concern perceptual identification and reciprocal validation, resulting in mutual expectations and entrainment. The phenomenological aspects relate to responsiveness and complementarity that lead to mutual engagement and commitment. We propose that mutual recognition is key to successful cooperation with robots and HRI would benefit from implementing recognition as a fundamental ability of any social robot.

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To improvise together for the pure curiosity, joy, and beauty of it constitutes a central but oft... more To improvise together for the pure curiosity, joy, and beauty of it constitutes a central but often neglected ability of human beings. Integrating pragmatic, practical, and technical skills with conceptual understanding, improvisation is adaptive and collaborative. It seems made to counter the challenges of living in a fleeting present, unconstrained by physical and historical boundaries, and very likely has deep evolutionary roots. I present an account of joint improvisation in the performative arts based in reviews of empirical research in the cognitive sciences, phenomenology, neuroscience, and philosophy, using examples from modern dance and jazz music. The account may be used for generating cross-disciplinary hypotheses about improvisation for investigation within a multitude of fields and is meant to encourage interdisciplinary work and collaboration between practitioners and academic researchers. The major goal is to elucidate the interaction dynamics that underlies joint imp...

En kort presentation av boken och dess forfattare Filosofer och kognitionsforskare, samhallsvetar... more En kort presentation av boken och dess forfattare Filosofer och kognitionsforskare, samhallsvetare och en professor i konstruktionsteknik belyser i den har boken riskproblem i olika manskliga sammanhang. Risk och det levande manskliga inleds med att Asa Boholm tar oss med till Hallandsasen. Dar framfors motstridiga riskbedomningar och riskhanteringsstrategier, av Banverket och dess experter a ena sidan och av berord lokalbefolkning a den andra. Boholm later exemplet illustrera hennes tes att riskbedomningar utgar ifran outtalade forutsattningar om hur varlden ar beskaffad, vad den bestar av och hur den ar sammansatt. Riskbedomningarna grundar sig i ontologiska och epistemologiska antaganden. Nagra sadana skillnader mellan huvudaktorerna lyfts ocksa fram. Bade exemplet och problematiken aterkommer i Lena Wahlberg och Johannes Perssons kapitel, dar olika former av robusthet undersoks. Man skulle kunna tro att en situation med riskbedomningar som bygger pa helt olika antaganden leder till kunskapsinstabilitet. Men i kapitlet observerar forfattarna via en jamforelse med moralisk och juridisk robusthet att skillnader i antaganden ibland okar stabiliteten i vara bedomningar. Ett mer genomgripande alternativ till traditionell beslutsteori, dar kunskap representeras med sannolikheter, diskuteras i Peter Gardenfors bidrag. En teori om fallbaserade beslut presenteras, dar likheten till tidigare beslut och deras utfall utgor den kunskap man anvander i beslutssituationen. I kapitlet jamfors sedan de bada satten att representera kunskap. Det argumenteras for att kunskap baserad pa likhet i manga fall ar naturligare som beslutsunderlag an kunskap baserad pa sannolikhet. Nagra paralleller mellan beslutsfattande och begreppsbildning lyfts ocksa fram. Sven Ove Hansson problematiserar i sin tur det allmant accepterade antagandet att risk och nytta ska vagas mot varandra. Det finns olika satt att gora denna avvagning. I konventionell riskanalys accepteras ett projekt om summan nytta for alla individer uppvager summan av riskerna for alla individer. Men i praxis som utgar fran klinisk medicin, till exempel etiska bedomningar av kliniska provningar, ar kriteriet i stallet att riskerna for varje enskild individ ska uppvagas av nyttan for just den individen. Melissa Finucane tar liksom Boholm sin utgangspunkt i en aktuell riskfraga. Finucane valjer bioteknologin dar manga olika intressegrupper och en mangd varden blir relevanta att ta hansyn till. Att forst synliggora vilka varden som finns och sedan overbrygga vardeklyftorna ar Finucanes recept for att undvika polarisering i riskfragorna. Kapitlet fokuserar pa hur ett narrativt instrument kan sattas i arbete inom bioteknologisk riskhantering samt hur man kan hantera de kunskapsrisker som ett sadant instrument i sin tur for med sig. Ingar Brinck utgar ocksa fran skillnader mellan aktorerna i ett risksammanhang. Kapitlet handlar om malen for riskkommunikation och hur de kan uppnas. Brinck havdar att riskkommunikation har det epistemiska malet att informera och det pragmatiska malet att andra mottagarens beteende. Tva slags omsesidigt beroende redskap kan anvandas for att forandra mottagarens kunskapslage och darigenom hennes beteende: tekniska och psykologiska. Redskapen forandrar mottagarens yttre respektive inre miljoer. De presenteras mot bakgrund av en syn pa kunskap och kognitiva processer som konkret forankrade i den yttre miljon. Det foreslas att riskinformation bor utformas utifran mottagarens lokala yttre miljo, vilken indirekt ger tilltrade till hennes inre forestallningsvarld. Bade Soren Hallden och Anna-Sofia Maurin behandlar pa olika satt svarigheterna med att avgransa riskfragor fran kontexten de forekommer i. Hallden utgar fran att undersokningen av en risksituation i allmanhet riktar sig mot nagot begransat och valdefinierat, men argumenterar sedan for att bedomningen i praktiken kommer att galla nagot annat som ar bade innehallsrikt och svargripbart. Han havdar att en vidare risksituation maste betraktas, och att riskregler pa hogre niva bor begrundas. Hallden foreslar aven att nya varden aktualiseras, liksom att osakerheten hanteras. Maurin skriver om implementering av evidensbaserade rekommendationer i sjukvarden. Tron pa evidensbaserade rekommendationer vilar pa flera viktiga antaganden. Ett ar antagandet att enskilda beslutsproblem enkelt kan avskiljas fran sin omgivning och sedan behandlas separat fran denna. Ett annat ar forutsattningen att nar val ett valavgransat problem har identifierats, sa har detta problem alltid en och samma rationellt optimala losning. Maurin visar att bada forutsattningarna ar problematiska. Niklas Vareman och Persson tar sig an distinktionen mellan riskbedomning och riskhantering som, alltsedan den introducerades 1983, varit en viktig del av samhallelig riskanalys. Riskbedomning, en vetenskaplig verksamhet, blir inte trovardig om den inte ar fri fran riskhanteringens varderingar; riskhantering, som ar vardebaserad och riktad mot…

The Indexical ‘I’, 1997

The discussion in the last chapter showed that self-reference requires that one in some sense kno... more The discussion in the last chapter showed that self-reference requires that one in some sense knows who one is, and that direct reference did not accommodate this fact. Cognitive significance will be a central topic of the present chapter. The focus of the theory of indirect reference lies on how the referent can be semantically mediated. The aim is to find such a way that can take on the role of cognitive significance. As I have defined it, something is cognitively significant if it has a bearing on cognition and reasoning. According to the theory of indirect reference, meaning is cognitively significant if it influences the role of referring expressions in reasoning and agency by the way it presents the referent. An account of the cognitive significance of ‘I’ should explain how the speaker is presented with herself. The position that the speaker is presented to herself de re, without any mediating conception, was found wanting in the last chapter. In this chapter, the topic will be descriptive presentations.

Citation for published version (APA): Brinck, I. (1999). Attention and tool-use in the evolution ... more Citation for published version (APA): Brinck, I. (1999). Attention and tool-use in the evolution of language. Spinning Ideas- Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on his fiftieth Birthday. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim....

Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications, Jan 9, 2023

Infant and Child Development, 2013

Interest contagion in violation-of-expectation-based

Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture, 2017

2019 Joint IEEE 9th International Conference on Development and Learning and Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob), 2019

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The Indexical ‘I’, 1997

Philosophy & Technology, 2020

Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires ... more Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires that the robot is susceptible to similar environmental cues and behavior patterns as humans are. Recognition, or the acknowledgement of the other as individual , is fundamental to mutually adaptive interaction between humans. We discuss what recognition involves and its behavioral manifestations, and describe the benefits of implementing it in HRI.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020

Taking a psychological and philosophical outlook, we approach making as an embodied and embedded ... more Taking a psychological and philosophical outlook, we approach making as an embodied and embedded skill via the skilled artisan’s experience of having a corporeal, nonlinguistic dialogue with the material while working with it. We investigate the dynamic relation between maker and material through the lens of pottery as illustrated by wheel throwing, claiming that the experience of dialogue signals an emotional involvement with clay. The examination of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of habit, the skilled intentionality framework, and material engagement theory show that while these theories explain complementary aspects of skilful engagement with the material world, they do not consider the dialogic dimension. By way of explanation, we submit that the artisan’s emotional engagement with the material world is based in openness and recognition and involves dialogue with the material. Drawing on the intimate relationship between movement and emotion, it promotes an open-ended manner of working and permits experiencing with the material, acting into its inherent possibilities. In conclusion, we suggest that dialogue, whether verbal or nonverbal, constitutes a primary means for making sense of the world at large, animate and inanimate.

Philosophy & Technology, 2020

Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires ... more Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires that the robot is susceptible to similar environmental cues and behavior patterns as humans are. Recognition, or the acknowledgement of the other as individual, is fundamental to mutually adaptive interaction between humans. We discuss what embodied recognition involves and its behavioral manifestations, and describe the benefits of implementing it in HRI.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2017

We evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation. We conclude that t... more We evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation. We conclude that there is good reason to conceive of the mind as satisficing, geared towards reliability instead of truth-tracking, and guided by representations that are good enough as opposed to complete or corresponding to the facts. We end with some methodological remarks concerning the risk of cognitive biases in interdisciplinary research that brings together empirical and philosophical claims

Cognitive Processing, 2018

A recent version of the view that aesthetic experience is based in empathy as inner imitation exp... more A recent version of the view that aesthetic experience is based in empathy as inner imitation explains aesthetic experience as the automatic simulation of actions, emotions, and bodily sensations depicted in an artwork by motor neurons in the brain. Criticizing the simulation theory for committing to an erroneous concept of empathy and failing to distinguish regular from aesthetic experiences of art, I advance an alternative, dynamic approach and claim that aesthetic experience is enacted and skillful, based in the recognition of others' experiences as distinct from one's own. In combining insights from mainly psychology , phenomenology, and cognitive science, the dynamic approach aims to explain the emergence of aesthetic experience in terms of the reciprocal interaction between viewer and artwork. I argue that aesthetic experience emerges by participatory sense-making and revolves around movement as a means for creating meaning. While entrainment merely plays a preparatory part in this, aesthetic engagement constitutes the phenomenological side of coupling to an artwork and provides the context for exploration, and eventually for moving, seeing, and feeling with art. I submit that aesthetic experience emerges from bodily and emotional engagement with works of art via the complementary processes of the perception–action and motion–emotion loops. The former involves the embodied visual exploration of an artwork in physical space, and progressively structures and organizes visual experience by way of perceptual feedback from body movements made in response to the artwork. The latter concerns the movement qualities and shapes of implicit and explicit bodily responses to an artwork that cue emotion and thereby modulate overall affect and attitude. The two processes cause the viewer to bodily and emotionally move with and be moved by individual works of art, and consequently to recognize another psychological orientation than her own, which explains how art can cause feelings of insight or awe and disclose aspects of life that are unfamiliar or novel to the viewer.

UC Irvine: A Body of Knowledge Conference Proceedings, 2018

To improvise together for the pure curiosity, joy, and beauty of it constitutes a central but oft... more To improvise together for the pure curiosity, joy, and beauty of it constitutes a central but often neglected ability of human beings. Integrating pragmatic, practical, and technical embodied and embedded skills with conceptual understanding, improvisation is adaptive and collaborative -- an intelligent cognitive skill associated with meta-awareness and open to monitoring and control. It seems made to counter the challenges of living in a fleeting present, unconstrained by physical and historical boundaries, and very likely has deep evolutionary roots. I present an account of joint improvisation in the performative arts based in reviews of empirical research in the cognitive sciences, phenomenology, neuroscience, and philosophy, using examples from modern dance and jazz music. The major goal is to elucidate the interaction dynamics that underlies joint improvisation by considering the variety of processes that lead to the coordination and synchronization of behavior. The account may be used for generating cross-disciplinary hypotheses about improvisation for investigation within a multitude of fields and is meant to encourage interdisciplinary work and collaboration between practitioners and academic researchers.

What Social Robots Can and Should Do. Robophilosophy2016/TRANSOR2016, Proceedings. Eds:Johanna Seibt, Marco Nørskov, Søren Schack Andersen, 2016

We argue that social robots should be designed to behave similarly to humans , and furthermore th... more We argue that social robots should be designed to behave similarly to humans , and furthermore that social norms constitute the core of human interaction. Whether robots can be designed to behave in human-like ways turns on whether they can be designed to organize and coordinate their behavior with others' social expectations. We suggest that social norms regulate interaction in real time, where agents relies on dynamic information about their own and others' attention, intention and emotion to perform social tasks.

Theory & Psychology, Oct 31, 2014

The first part of the article examines some recent studies on the early development of social nor... more The first part of the article examines some recent studies on the early development of social norms that examine young children’s understanding of codified rule games. It is argued that the constitutive rules that define the games cannot be identified with social norms and therefore the studies provide limited evidence about socio-normative development. The second part Reviews data on children’s play in natural settings that show that children do not understand norms as codified or rules of obligation, and that the norms that guide social interaction are dynamic, situated, and heterogeneous. It is argued that normativity is intersubjective and negotiable and
starts to develop in the first year, emerging as a practical skill that depends on participatory engagement. Three sources of compliance are discussed: emotional engagement, nonverbal
agreement, and conversation.

Infant and Child Development 22: 85–101 (2013)

We explain metacognition as a management of cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorit... more We explain metacognition as a management of cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to the goal, agents engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions often are physical and involve other people, and so are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, we suggest that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and others' cognitions by emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining, and achieving turns make proto-conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables caregiver and infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher that comments on and corrects the infant's efforts, and as the infant's cognitive resource in its own right.

Infant and Child Development 22(1): 111–117 (2013), Feb 2013

In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the dist... more In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it.

PsycEXTRA Database APA, Jan 2014

Apperly’s and Butterfill’s (2009) theory about belief reasoning is taken as a starting-point for ... more Apperly’s and Butterfill’s (2009) theory about belief reasoning is taken as a starting-point for a discussion of how we make sense of other people’s actions in real time. More specifically, the focus lies on how we can understand others’ actions in terms of their epistemic states on an implicit level of processing. First, the relevant parts of Apperly’s and Butterfill’s theory are summarized. Then, their account of implicit theory of mind in terms of registration ascription and perceptual encountering is discussed and rejected. While accepting Apperly’s and Butterfill’s general epistemic account of belief reasoning, I suggest that implicit theory of mind involves visuomotor, second-person pragmatic representations. Moreover, I emphasize the central place of interaction, claiming that perceptual intentions-to-interact are fundamental to social understanding. Via the mechanism of social attention, social intentions automatically prompt agents to share and exchange sensorimotor, pragmatic information.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Jun 15, 2015

Searle's notion of constitutive rule is discussed and replaced by an alternative view that takes ... more Searle's notion of constitutive rule is discussed and replaced by an alternative view that takes its starting-point in Glüer and Pagin's (1999) distinction among knowing a rule, believing it to be in force, and being motivated by it. Initially, an experimental paradigm that purports to test young children’s understanding of social norms is examined. The paradigm models norms on Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule. The experiments and the reasons provided for their design are discussed. It is argued that the experiments do not provide direct evidence about the development of social norms and that the concepts of a social norm and constitutive rule are distinct. The experimental data are re-interpreted, and suggestions for how to deal with the present criticism are presented that do not require abandoning the paradigm as such. Then the conception of normativity that underlies the experimental paradigm is rejected. It is argued that normativity emerges from interaction and engagement, and that learning to comply with social norms involves understanding the distinction between their content, enforcement, and acceptance. As opposed to rule-based accounts that picture the development of an understanding of social norms as one-directional and based in enforcement, the present view emphasizes that normativity is situated, reciprocal, and interactive.

Frontiers in Psychology 5:23, Jan 30, 2014

In the debate about how to interpret Violation-of-Expectation (VoE) based false-belief experiment... more In the debate about how to interpret Violation-of-Expectation (VoE) based false-belief experiments, it has been suggested that infants are predicting the actions of the agent based on more or less sophisticated cognitive means. We present an alternative, more parsimonious interpretation, exploring the possibility that the infants’ reactions are not governed by rational expectation but rather of memory strength due to differences in the allocation of cognitive resources earlier in the experiment. Specifically, it is argued that (1) infants’ have a tendency to find more interest in events that observed agents are attending to as opposed to unattended events (“interest contagion”), (2) the object-location configurations that result from such interesting events are remembered more strongly by the infants, and (3) the VoE contrast arises as a consequence of the difference in memory strength between more and less interesting object-location configurations. We discuss two published experiments, one which we argue that our model can explain (Kovács et al., 2010), and one which we argue cannot be readily explained by our model (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).

Against boredom : 17 essays., 2015

How should the development of creativity be approached? Many accounts of children’s creativity fo... more How should the development of creativity be approached? Many accounts of children’s creativity focus on the relation between creativity and pretend play, placing make-believe and the mental exploration of possible scenarios about the world at the fore. Often divergent thinking and story-telling are used to measure creativity with fluency, originality, and flexibility as indicators. I will argue that the strong focus on conceptual processes and higher-order thought leaves procedural forms of creativity in the dark and hinders a proper investigation of the development of creativity. Creativity involves both strategic and procedural elements and the mental and physical manipulation of ideas are equally important. Sahlin’s notion of rule-based creativity might serve as the starting-point for an approach to the development of creativity that is neutral as to the underlying nature of creativity and that permits investigating creativity independently of language. On this approach, creativity is characterized by the violation and subsequent replacement of a rule or norm that underlies a given activity with a novel strategy or procedure. When, where, and how children will manifest creativity is conditional on the kind of rule or norm that is violated.

Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel edited by Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan, Jan 2014

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the role of value uncertainty and value instability in d... more The purpose of this paper is to clarify the role of value uncertainty
and value instability in decision-making that concerns morally controversial issues. Value uncertainty and value instability are distinguished from moral uncertainty, and several types of value uncertainty and value instability are defined and discussed. The relations between value uncertainty and value instability are explored, and value uncertainty is illustrated with examples drawn from the social sciences, medicine and everyday life. Several types of factor producing value uncertainty and/or value instability are then identified. They are grouped into three categories and discussed under the headings ‘value framing’, ‘ambivalence’ and ‘lack of self-knowledge’. The paper then discusses the role of value uncertainty in decision-making. The concluding remarks summarize what has been achieved and what remains to be done
in this area.

Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan., 2014

This chapter discusses the concept of explanation in metaphysics. We explain in science. We expla... more This chapter discusses the concept of explanation in metaphysics. We explain in science. We explain in everyday life. But do we explain in metaphysics? This paper argues that we shouldn’t help ourselves to an affirmative answer — at least, not without a good deal of hesitation. However, as we shall make clear later on, denying that we explain in metaphysics does not imply that there are no metaphysical explanations.