Jack Casey | The University of Manchester (original) (raw)

Drafts by Jack Casey

PhD Thesis This thesis is an investigation into the implications of the introduction of ground... more PhD Thesis

This thesis is an investigation into the implications of the introduction of grounding into established debates on the laws of nature, focussing mainly on the implications for David Lewis’s Humean account, and David Armstrong’s universals account.

In chapter 2, I flesh out the notion of grounding that I use throughout the thesis. Grounding is intended to capture the notion of metaphysical dependence. Previously, metaphysical dependence was thought of as being the relation of supervenience. I explain the reasons for the rejection of supervenience in favour of the primitive notion of grounding. Having done so, I then explore grounding’s formal features, how best to regiment grounding talk, what the relata of grounding might be, and the relations connection to explanation. I then move on to discuss how universal generalisations are grounded, whether grounding is ontologically innocent (whether we pay an ontological price for grounded entities, beyond that paid for their grounds) and lastly, argue that ontological dependence should be understood as a species of grounding.

In chapter 3, I then employ the notion of grounding to assess Armstrong’s theory (1978) of universals. I explain how grounding might be employed to solve the problem of unity (the problem of how particulars and universals are held together in states of affairs), and how doing so provides significant theoretical benefits. Having argued that employing grounding is beneficial for Armstrong’s account, I then use grounding to demonstrate an underlying tension in Armstrong’s account that is visible once the account is stated in terms of grounding. Armstrong requires, to solve the problem of unity, that states of affairs ground their constituents. The consequence of this, however, is that his account of laws says that laws are constituents of states of affairs. As such, it appears instances of laws (being states of affairs) ground laws themselves. This is particularly problematic for Armstrong, given that he accords laws a governing role; if laws are grounded by their instances, what mechanism remains for them to govern those same instances?

In chapter 4, I explore the implications for Lewis’s (1973) Humean account of the laws of nature. I explain the motivations for the contemporary Humean’s famous denial of necessary connections, concluding that contemporary Humeans would be reluctant to commit to an irreducibly modal notion like grounding as a result of the denial. I then argue, however, that without a notion like grounding, Humeanism collapses into an interminably expensive position, ontologically. Furthermore, shorn of any notion of dependence other than supervenience, I demonstrate the counterintuitiveness of the resulting position, in so far as it requires that we sacrifice any notion of fundamentality, and offers no account of how laws explain their instances. I finally highlight a separate problem for Humeanism, in that, despite the frequency with which one hears the claim, Humean laws don’t actually appear to supervene on their instances.

Papers by Jack Casey

University of Manchester, 2020

(1) says that whether a bond should be enforced depends on his-whoever he may be-subsequent condu... more (1) says that whether a bond should be enforced depends on his-whoever he may be-subsequent conduct. One thing, presumably the legality of the enforcement of the bond, is dependent on another thing, namely, the man's conduct. (2) says that the value of a book, a property that that book has, doesn't depend on its size. The size of a book is irrelevant to its value. The book's value depends on its features, whatever these might be, but its size is not amongst those features that its value depends on. (3) says that, it is in virtue of the office he held, that he had the liberty to pass through the palace garden. That liberty depends on his holding of the office. The very first example of the use of 'depends'-or rather, 'dependeth'-in English, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, appears in a narrative that is peculiarly illustrative in drawing out what is common to claims like (1)-(3). The author 3 begins by asking how it is that God is both three beings-the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost-and one. The interlocutor makes a comparison with perfect works. He claims that a person must have three attributes to create a "perfect work": 'myght' or 'might', roughly meaning power or physical ability; 'connyge' or 'ability'/'skill'/'wisdom', meaning the requisite degree of skill, ability, or craftsmanship to create such a work; and 'wyt' or 'will', the very will or desire to undertake such a task. The author asks whether one could have might, but lack both skill and will. The interlocutor denies this possibility, saying: 3 I will use the term 'the author' as it is controversial as to who the author actually was. The following passages are taken from a translation of the 14 th-century French poem Le Pèlerinage de l'Âme (The Pilgrimage of the Soul) by Guillaume de Deguileville. The translator is thought to be John Lydgate (Cust, 1859: iv), though Thomas Hoccleve, Lydgate's fellow disciple of Chaucer, has also been put forth as a possible candidate. 10 Koslicki herself is probably best characterised as a sceptic of the notion of grounding (thanks to Tuomas Takho for pointing this out).

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Jan 27, 2022

Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations.... more Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations. A number of key differences between the two relations are usually cited in support of this claim: ontological dependence's unique connection to existence, differing respective connections to metaphysical necessitation, and a divergence in their formal features. Alongside reshaping some of the examples used to maintain the distinction between the two, I argue that the additional resources offered by the increased attention the notion of grounding has received in recent years potentially offer us a way to unite the two relations, promising the attendant benefits parsimony offers, as a result.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association

Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations.... more Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations. A number of key differences between the two relations are usually cited in support of this claim: ontological dependence's unique connection to existence, differing respective connections to metaphysical necessitation, and a divergence in their formal features. Alongside reshaping some of the examples used to maintain the distinction between the two, I argue that the additional resources offered by the increased attention the notion of grounding has received in recent years potentially offer us a way to unite the two relations, promising the attendant benefits parsimony offers, as a result.

PhD Thesis This thesis is an investigation into the implications of the introduction of ground... more PhD Thesis

This thesis is an investigation into the implications of the introduction of grounding into established debates on the laws of nature, focussing mainly on the implications for David Lewis’s Humean account, and David Armstrong’s universals account.

In chapter 2, I flesh out the notion of grounding that I use throughout the thesis. Grounding is intended to capture the notion of metaphysical dependence. Previously, metaphysical dependence was thought of as being the relation of supervenience. I explain the reasons for the rejection of supervenience in favour of the primitive notion of grounding. Having done so, I then explore grounding’s formal features, how best to regiment grounding talk, what the relata of grounding might be, and the relations connection to explanation. I then move on to discuss how universal generalisations are grounded, whether grounding is ontologically innocent (whether we pay an ontological price for grounded entities, beyond that paid for their grounds) and lastly, argue that ontological dependence should be understood as a species of grounding.

In chapter 3, I then employ the notion of grounding to assess Armstrong’s theory (1978) of universals. I explain how grounding might be employed to solve the problem of unity (the problem of how particulars and universals are held together in states of affairs), and how doing so provides significant theoretical benefits. Having argued that employing grounding is beneficial for Armstrong’s account, I then use grounding to demonstrate an underlying tension in Armstrong’s account that is visible once the account is stated in terms of grounding. Armstrong requires, to solve the problem of unity, that states of affairs ground their constituents. The consequence of this, however, is that his account of laws says that laws are constituents of states of affairs. As such, it appears instances of laws (being states of affairs) ground laws themselves. This is particularly problematic for Armstrong, given that he accords laws a governing role; if laws are grounded by their instances, what mechanism remains for them to govern those same instances?

In chapter 4, I explore the implications for Lewis’s (1973) Humean account of the laws of nature. I explain the motivations for the contemporary Humean’s famous denial of necessary connections, concluding that contemporary Humeans would be reluctant to commit to an irreducibly modal notion like grounding as a result of the denial. I then argue, however, that without a notion like grounding, Humeanism collapses into an interminably expensive position, ontologically. Furthermore, shorn of any notion of dependence other than supervenience, I demonstrate the counterintuitiveness of the resulting position, in so far as it requires that we sacrifice any notion of fundamentality, and offers no account of how laws explain their instances. I finally highlight a separate problem for Humeanism, in that, despite the frequency with which one hears the claim, Humean laws don’t actually appear to supervene on their instances.

University of Manchester, 2020

(1) says that whether a bond should be enforced depends on his-whoever he may be-subsequent condu... more (1) says that whether a bond should be enforced depends on his-whoever he may be-subsequent conduct. One thing, presumably the legality of the enforcement of the bond, is dependent on another thing, namely, the man's conduct. (2) says that the value of a book, a property that that book has, doesn't depend on its size. The size of a book is irrelevant to its value. The book's value depends on its features, whatever these might be, but its size is not amongst those features that its value depends on. (3) says that, it is in virtue of the office he held, that he had the liberty to pass through the palace garden. That liberty depends on his holding of the office. The very first example of the use of 'depends'-or rather, 'dependeth'-in English, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, appears in a narrative that is peculiarly illustrative in drawing out what is common to claims like (1)-(3). The author 3 begins by asking how it is that God is both three beings-the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost-and one. The interlocutor makes a comparison with perfect works. He claims that a person must have three attributes to create a "perfect work": 'myght' or 'might', roughly meaning power or physical ability; 'connyge' or 'ability'/'skill'/'wisdom', meaning the requisite degree of skill, ability, or craftsmanship to create such a work; and 'wyt' or 'will', the very will or desire to undertake such a task. The author asks whether one could have might, but lack both skill and will. The interlocutor denies this possibility, saying: 3 I will use the term 'the author' as it is controversial as to who the author actually was. The following passages are taken from a translation of the 14 th-century French poem Le Pèlerinage de l'Âme (The Pilgrimage of the Soul) by Guillaume de Deguileville. The translator is thought to be John Lydgate (Cust, 1859: iv), though Thomas Hoccleve, Lydgate's fellow disciple of Chaucer, has also been put forth as a possible candidate. 10 Koslicki herself is probably best characterised as a sceptic of the notion of grounding (thanks to Tuomas Takho for pointing this out).

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Jan 27, 2022

Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations.... more Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations. A number of key differences between the two relations are usually cited in support of this claim: ontological dependence's unique connection to existence, differing respective connections to metaphysical necessitation, and a divergence in their formal features. Alongside reshaping some of the examples used to maintain the distinction between the two, I argue that the additional resources offered by the increased attention the notion of grounding has received in recent years potentially offer us a way to unite the two relations, promising the attendant benefits parsimony offers, as a result.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association

Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations.... more Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations. A number of key differences between the two relations are usually cited in support of this claim: ontological dependence's unique connection to existence, differing respective connections to metaphysical necessitation, and a divergence in their formal features. Alongside reshaping some of the examples used to maintain the distinction between the two, I argue that the additional resources offered by the increased attention the notion of grounding has received in recent years potentially offer us a way to unite the two relations, promising the attendant benefits parsimony offers, as a result.