Catherine (Katie) Kendig | Michigan State University (original) (raw)
Papers by Catherine (Katie) Kendig
Philosophy of Science
This version may be subject to change during the production process.
Science, 2022
A letter in Science arguing for a U.S. commission to discuss and review ethical issues in food an... more A letter in Science arguing for a U.S. commission to discuss and review ethical issues in food and agricultural technology.
The idea of a natural kind purports to be of something that constitutes "the world's joints" and ... more The idea of a natural kind purports to be of something that constitutes "the world's joints" and is captured in good explanations. Traditionally, natural kinds are assumed to be "mind-independent." But a plausible account of explanation takes it to be a practice of asking and answering questions. Explanations should be evaluated as answers to legitimate questions; good answers are not always in terms of "mindindependent" kinds. Drawing on the example of sex, this paper explores some of the ways differences in the word are either marked or created by us, and how these differences matter for our explanatory purposes. I argue, following Epstein (2015), that explanatory kinds can be both anchored and grounded in social facts and, moreover, that explanatory projects-like other practical projects-depend on theoretical scaffolds to provide means toward our ends.
Perspectives on Classification in Synthetic Sciences
Hypatia, 2021
This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic a... more This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic and provides a structure to think about ethical decision-making in times of extreme uncertainty. We identify three different but interwoven domains within which speculative anticipation can be found: global, local, and projective anticipation. Our analysis aims to open possibilities of seeing the situatedness of others both locally and globally in order to address larger social issues that have been laid bare by the presence of SARS-CoV-2. Our account of speculative anticipation builds on the analyses of the gendered impact of anticipation in technoscience by Vincanne Adams, Michelle Murphy and Adele Clarke; studies in cultural anthropology by Ann Laura Stoler; and the recent research on speculative fiction by Esther Jones. Like theirs, ours is intended to be useful. We offer it as a tool to recast questions and revisit assumptions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is hoped that by using the frame of the ethics of speculative anticipation, one might be able to consider how to avoid those futures that reproduce inequity, and instead actively and responsibly envision those futures that are informed by equity and sustainability.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. , 2020
Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatur... more Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatures and exploring ways that retain alternative naming practices. However, how (and whether) comparison of nomenclatures is possible remains a subject of discussion. The comparison of diverse nomenclatural practices introduces a suite of epistemic and ontological difficulties and considerations. Different nomenclatures may depend on whether the communities using them rely on formalized naming conventions; cultural or spiritual valuations; or worldviews. Because of this, some argue that the different naming practices may not be comparable if the ontological commitments employed differ. Comparisons between different nomenclatures cannot assume that either the naming practices or the object to which these names are intended to apply identifies some universally agreed upon object of interest. Investigating this suite of philosophical problems, I explore the role grey nomenclatures play in
classification. ‘Grey nomenclatures’ are defined as those that employ names that are either intentionally or accidentally non-Linnaean. The classification of the lichen thallus (a symbiont) has been classified outside the Linnaean system by botanists relying on the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants (ICN). But, I argue, the use of grey names is not isolated and does not occur exclusively within institutionalized naming practices. I suggest, ‘grey names’ also aptly describe nomenclatures employed by indigenous communities such as the Samí of Northern Finmark, the Sherpa of Nepal, and the Okanagan First Nations. I pay particular attention to how naming practices are employed in these communities; what ontological commitments they hold; for what
purposes are these names used; and what anchors the community's nomenclatural practices. Exploring the history of lichen naming and early ethnolichenological research, I then investigate the stakes that must be considered for any attempt to preserve, retain, integrate, or compare the knowledge contained in both academically formalized grey names and indigenous nomenclatures in a way that preserves their source-specific informational content.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 42: 40-51. , 2020
Virtues as Integral to Science Education: Understanding the Intellectual, Moral, and Civic Value of Science and Scientific Inquiry., 2020
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2019
The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separa... more The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, (i) the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and (ii) this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster of properties without taking stock of the metaphysical picture used to account for that stability. Thus, even on the stable property cluster account, the epistemic value of natural kinds remains partly grounded in their metaphysical status.
Perspectives on Classification in Synthetic Sciences: Unnatural Kinds, 2019
Metabolic engineering and genome editing techniques like MAGE, PACE,, and CRISPR/Cas9 may suggest... more Metabolic engineering and genome editing techniques like MAGE, PACE,, and CRISPR/Cas9 may suggest a reconfiguration of what it is to be a natural kind – or perhaps what might be better referred to as a “synthetic kind”. But what does it mean to call something a “synthetic kind”? We might conceive of a synthetic kind as a form of life (or at least a life-like thing) whose construction is the result of human-assisted engineering. In this way, we are partitioning those entities which might be candidates to be described as synthetic biological kinds , in virtue of their origin. For instance, we might suggest that an E. coli population harboring a synthetic DNA plasmid might be considered to be a synthetic kind. Synthetic DNA may be derived from entirely non-living sources, but may be considered living once integrated into the host. This system consists of a combination of the wild-type host organism and the synthetic plasmid. Because of the different causal origins of the system – as being the result of both engineered and evolved parts and processes evolved – it owes its existence to both engineered and native, wild-type sources. We consider there to be several broad categories of synthetic biology, the consideration of whose diverse causal origins may suggest a new synthetic (or semi-synthetic) category of biological kindhood.
Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10(13): 1-15, 2018
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the probl... more The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the problem of marked variation. Negatively marked differences are those natural variations that are used to cleave human beings into different categories (e.g., of disablement, of medicalized pathology, of subnormalcy, or of deviance). The problem of marked variation is: Why are some rather than other variations marked as epistemically or culturally significant or as a diagnostic of pathology, and What is the epistemic background that makes these—rather than other variations—marked as subnormal? For Wilson (2018a), critical examination of the problem of marked variation is central to understanding the epistemology of medicalized pathology that made the history of eugenics possible. My aim is to explore the role marked variation plays in eugenic and other problematic classifications and the inferences they appear to license. I pay particular attention to the normative valuations of marked variations, how these valuations affect the inferences that are made by others about those possessing the variation, and how those possessing the variation perceive themselves. In the final sections, I illustrate this by critically discussing three putative kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as disability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative racial ascriptions to individuals and groups. Lastly, I suggest that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is dependent upon sorting or classifying.
Part of an author-meets-critics book symposium on The Eugenic Mind Project by Robert A. Wilson (MIT Press, 2018) with Wilson 2018c and Love 2018.
In Hauke Riesch, Nathan Emmerich & Steven Wainwright (eds.) Philosophies and Sociologies of Bioethics: Crossing the Divides. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 41-64. , 2018
Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions p... more Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions pursued, the kind of engineering techniques used, and on the ethical impact of the products produced. However, little work has been done to investigate the processes by which these epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical forms of inquiry arise in the course of synthetic biology research. An attempt at this work relying on a particular area of synthetic biology will be the aim of this chapter. I focus on the reengineering of metabolic pathways through the manipulation and construction of small DNA-based devices and systems synthetic biology. Rather than focusing on the engineered products or ethical principles that result, I will investigate the processes by which these arise. As such, the attention will be directed to the activities of practitioners, their manipulation of tools, and the use they make of techniques to construct new metabolic devices. Using a science-in-practice approach, I investigate problems at the intersection of science, philosophy of science, and sociology of science. I consider how practitioners within this area of synthetic biology reconfigure biological understanding and ethical categories through active modelling and manipulation of known functional parts, biological pathways for use in the design of microbial machines to solve problems in medicine, technology, and the environment. We might describe this kind of problem-solving as relying on what Helen Longino referred to as “social cognition” or the type of scientific work done within what Hasok Chang calls “systems of practice”. My aim in this chapter will be to investigate the relationship that holds between systems of practice within metabolic engineering research and social cognition. I will attempt to show how knowledge and normative valuation are generated from this particular network of practitioners. In doing so, I suggest that the social nature of scientific inquiry is ineliminable to both knowledge acquisition and ethical evaluations.
Reengineering Metaphysics: Modularity, Parthood, and Evolvability in Metabolic Engineering. Part of a special issue, Ontologies of Living Beings, guest-edited by A. M. Ferner and omas Pradeu, 2017
The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of practice... more The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of practice. We understand that the biological world is modular because we can manipulate different parts of organisms in ways that would only work if there were discrete parts that were interchangeable. This is the foundation of the BioBrick assembly method widely used in synthetic biology. It is one of a number of methods that allows practitioners to construct and reconstruct biological pathways and devices using DNA libraries of standardized parts with known functions. In this paper, we investigate how the practice of synthetic biology reconfigures biological understanding of the key concepts of modularity and evolvability. We illustrate how this practice approach takes engineering knowledge and uses it to try to understand biological organization by showing how the construction of functional parts and processes can be used in synthetic experimental evolution. We introduce a new approach within synthetic biology that uses the premise of a parts-based ontology together with that of organismal self-organization to optimize orthogonal metabolic pathways in E. coli. We then use this and other examples to help characterize semisynthetic categories of modularity, parthood, and evolvability within the discipline.
Editorial introduction by A. M. Ferner and Thomas Pradeu: Catherine Kendig and Todd Eckdahl defend and illustrate a practice based view of metaphysics of science. The target of their paper is the emerging and fascinating field of synthetic biology—a bioengineering domain that focuses on designing and assembling biological entities. The challenge they discuss is the following: What happens, ontologically-speaking, when as well as describing biological entities we start manufacturing new ones?
Homology is a natural kind concept, but one that has been notoriously elusive to pin down. There ... more Homology is a natural kind concept, but one that has been notoriously elusive to pin down. There has been sustained debate over the nature of correspondence and the units of comparison. But this continued debate over its meaning has focused on defining homology rather than on its use in practice. The aim of this chapter is to concentrate on the practices of homologizing. I define “homologizing” to be a concept-in-use. Practices of homologizing are kinds of rule following, the satisfaction of which demarcates a category—that of being a homologue. Identifying, explaining, discovering, and understanding are exchanges that connect practice to concept through the performance of a rule by practitioners. These practices are constitutive of natural kinding activities. If homologizing is a kind of kinding, consideration of these practices of discovery, tracking, and identification not only clarify its meaning, use, and progression of the concept of homology, but provides further understanding of the processes and progression of natural kinds and kinding practices in general
Science and Engineering Ethics DOI:10.1007/s11948-015-9654-0 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-015-9654-0?wt\_mc=email.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst, 2015
‘‘Proof of concept’’ is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program an... more ‘‘Proof of concept’’ is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program announcements, in experimental studies, and in the marketing of new technologies. It is often coupled with either a short definition or none at all, its meaning assumed to be fully understood. This is problematic. As a phrase with potential implications for research and technology, its assumed meaning requires some analysis to avoid it becoming a descriptive category that refers to all things scientifically exciting. I provide a short analysis of proof of concept research and offer an example of it within synthetic biology. I suggest that not only are there activities that circumscribe new epistemological categories but there are also associated normative ethical categories or principles linked to the research. I examine these and provide an outline for an alternative ethical account to describe these activities that I refer to as ‘‘extended agency ethics’’. This view is used to explain how the type of research described as proof of concept also provides an attendant proof of principle that is the result of decision-making that extends across practitioners, their tools, techniques, and the problem solving activities of other research groups.
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0929-4\_124
This essay begins with a short historical background that focuses on initial ethical support and ... more This essay begins with a short historical background that focuses on initial ethical support and justification for synthetic biofuel research, the impact of this research on public discussion of synthetic biology, and the distinction between it and genetic engineering. The distinction between first and second generation biofuels is introduced. This is followed by a survey of current research innovations using various microbial factories, including: bacteria, yeast, and oil (oleaginous) algae.
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0929-4\_421
This essay provides an overview of the impact of hybridity on agriculture. It includes an histori... more This essay provides an overview of the impact of hybridity on agriculture. It includes an historical sketch that traces the early horticulturalists’ and naturalists’ investigations of hybrids beginning with the observations of Thomas Fairchild and Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon; and leads to the explanation of its mechanism by Gregor Mendel, James Watson and Francis Crick, and Ernst Mayr; and the eventual manipulation of hybrids and hybridization by Barbara McClintock.
Recent research that attempts to ascertain the role of hybridization in adaptive change is introduced. This includes research on the evolution of crop species, increased biodiversity, and the use of hybrids to manipulate phenotypically desirable traits in agricultural crops. The focus of the discussion is on a particularly significant type of naturally occurring hybridization, polyploidy hybridization. Polyploids are organisms which have more than two complete genomes in each cell. This kind of hybridization is ubiquitous among crop plants. The role of polyploidy in plant evolution and the affects of polyploidy on plants and animals will be reviewed. A critical discussion of its agricultural value in the production of fertile polyploid hybrids highlights key epistemological, ontological, and ethical issues. These are illuminated with reference to the distinct processes of artificial and natural hybridization. A survey of these different kinds of hybridization includes the ethical and economic impacts of hybridity on global nutrition, the environment, and considerations of some practical implications for the agricultural industry.
Species concepts aim to define the species category. Many of these rely on defining species in te... more Species concepts aim to define the species category. Many of these rely on defining species in terms of natural lineages and groupings. A dominant gene-centred metaconception has shaped notions of what constitutes both a natural lineage and a natural grouping. I suggest that relying on this metaconception provides an incomplete understanding of what constitute natural lineages and groupings. If we take seriously the role of epigenetic, behavioural, cultural, and ecological inheritance systems, rather than exclusively genetic inheritance, a broader notion of what constitutes a natural grouping or lineage may be required. I conclude by outlining an alternative metaconception that is a de-centred metaschema for species.
Hasok Chang (Sci Educ 20:317–341, 2011) shows how the recovery of past experimental knowledge, th... more Hasok Chang (Sci Educ 20:317–341, 2011) shows how the recovery of past experimental knowledge, the physical replication of historical experiments, and the extension of recovered knowledge can increase scientific understanding. These activities can also play an important role in both science and history and philosophy of science education. In this paper I describe the implementation of an integrated learning project that I initiated, organized, and structured to complement a course in history and philosophy of the life sciences (HPLS). The project focuses on the study and use of descriptions, observations, experiments, and recording techniques used by early microscopists to classify various species of water flea. The first published illustrations and descriptions of the water flea were included in the Dutch naturalist Jan Swammerdam’s, Historia Insectorum Generalis (1669) (Algemeene verhandeling van de bloedeloose dierkens. t’Utrrecht, Meinardus van Dreunen, ordinaris Drucker van d’Academie). After studying these, we first used the descriptions, techniques, and nomenclature recovered to observe, record, and classify the specimens collected from our university ponds. We then used updated recording techniques and image-based keys to observe and identify the specimens. The implementation of these newer techniques was guided in part by the observations and records that resulted from our use of the recovered historical methods of investigation. The series of HPLS labs constructed as part of this interdisciplinary project provided a space for students to consider and wrestle with the many philosophical issues that arise in the process of identifying an unknown organism and offered unique learning opportunities that engaged students’ curiosity and critical thinking skills.
![Research paper thumbnail of Kendig, Catherine (2011). “Race as a Physiosocial Phenomenon.” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33(2): 191–222. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23335116 [Awarded Honorable Mention for the American Philosophical Association 2012 Article Prize]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/30435053/thumbnails/1.jpg)
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Philosophy of Science
This version may be subject to change during the production process.
Science, 2022
A letter in Science arguing for a U.S. commission to discuss and review ethical issues in food an... more A letter in Science arguing for a U.S. commission to discuss and review ethical issues in food and agricultural technology.
The idea of a natural kind purports to be of something that constitutes "the world's joints" and ... more The idea of a natural kind purports to be of something that constitutes "the world's joints" and is captured in good explanations. Traditionally, natural kinds are assumed to be "mind-independent." But a plausible account of explanation takes it to be a practice of asking and answering questions. Explanations should be evaluated as answers to legitimate questions; good answers are not always in terms of "mindindependent" kinds. Drawing on the example of sex, this paper explores some of the ways differences in the word are either marked or created by us, and how these differences matter for our explanatory purposes. I argue, following Epstein (2015), that explanatory kinds can be both anchored and grounded in social facts and, moreover, that explanatory projects-like other practical projects-depend on theoretical scaffolds to provide means toward our ends.
Perspectives on Classification in Synthetic Sciences
Hypatia, 2021
This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic a... more This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic and provides a structure to think about ethical decision-making in times of extreme uncertainty. We identify three different but interwoven domains within which speculative anticipation can be found: global, local, and projective anticipation. Our analysis aims to open possibilities of seeing the situatedness of others both locally and globally in order to address larger social issues that have been laid bare by the presence of SARS-CoV-2. Our account of speculative anticipation builds on the analyses of the gendered impact of anticipation in technoscience by Vincanne Adams, Michelle Murphy and Adele Clarke; studies in cultural anthropology by Ann Laura Stoler; and the recent research on speculative fiction by Esther Jones. Like theirs, ours is intended to be useful. We offer it as a tool to recast questions and revisit assumptions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is hoped that by using the frame of the ethics of speculative anticipation, one might be able to consider how to avoid those futures that reproduce inequity, and instead actively and responsibly envision those futures that are informed by equity and sustainability.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. , 2020
Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatur... more Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatures and exploring ways that retain alternative naming practices. However, how (and whether) comparison of nomenclatures is possible remains a subject of discussion. The comparison of diverse nomenclatural practices introduces a suite of epistemic and ontological difficulties and considerations. Different nomenclatures may depend on whether the communities using them rely on formalized naming conventions; cultural or spiritual valuations; or worldviews. Because of this, some argue that the different naming practices may not be comparable if the ontological commitments employed differ. Comparisons between different nomenclatures cannot assume that either the naming practices or the object to which these names are intended to apply identifies some universally agreed upon object of interest. Investigating this suite of philosophical problems, I explore the role grey nomenclatures play in
classification. ‘Grey nomenclatures’ are defined as those that employ names that are either intentionally or accidentally non-Linnaean. The classification of the lichen thallus (a symbiont) has been classified outside the Linnaean system by botanists relying on the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants (ICN). But, I argue, the use of grey names is not isolated and does not occur exclusively within institutionalized naming practices. I suggest, ‘grey names’ also aptly describe nomenclatures employed by indigenous communities such as the Samí of Northern Finmark, the Sherpa of Nepal, and the Okanagan First Nations. I pay particular attention to how naming practices are employed in these communities; what ontological commitments they hold; for what
purposes are these names used; and what anchors the community's nomenclatural practices. Exploring the history of lichen naming and early ethnolichenological research, I then investigate the stakes that must be considered for any attempt to preserve, retain, integrate, or compare the knowledge contained in both academically formalized grey names and indigenous nomenclatures in a way that preserves their source-specific informational content.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 42: 40-51. , 2020
Virtues as Integral to Science Education: Understanding the Intellectual, Moral, and Civic Value of Science and Scientific Inquiry., 2020
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2019
The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separa... more The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, (i) the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and (ii) this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster of properties without taking stock of the metaphysical picture used to account for that stability. Thus, even on the stable property cluster account, the epistemic value of natural kinds remains partly grounded in their metaphysical status.
Perspectives on Classification in Synthetic Sciences: Unnatural Kinds, 2019
Metabolic engineering and genome editing techniques like MAGE, PACE,, and CRISPR/Cas9 may suggest... more Metabolic engineering and genome editing techniques like MAGE, PACE,, and CRISPR/Cas9 may suggest a reconfiguration of what it is to be a natural kind – or perhaps what might be better referred to as a “synthetic kind”. But what does it mean to call something a “synthetic kind”? We might conceive of a synthetic kind as a form of life (or at least a life-like thing) whose construction is the result of human-assisted engineering. In this way, we are partitioning those entities which might be candidates to be described as synthetic biological kinds , in virtue of their origin. For instance, we might suggest that an E. coli population harboring a synthetic DNA plasmid might be considered to be a synthetic kind. Synthetic DNA may be derived from entirely non-living sources, but may be considered living once integrated into the host. This system consists of a combination of the wild-type host organism and the synthetic plasmid. Because of the different causal origins of the system – as being the result of both engineered and evolved parts and processes evolved – it owes its existence to both engineered and native, wild-type sources. We consider there to be several broad categories of synthetic biology, the consideration of whose diverse causal origins may suggest a new synthetic (or semi-synthetic) category of biological kindhood.
Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10(13): 1-15, 2018
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the probl... more The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the problem of marked variation. Negatively marked differences are those natural variations that are used to cleave human beings into different categories (e.g., of disablement, of medicalized pathology, of subnormalcy, or of deviance). The problem of marked variation is: Why are some rather than other variations marked as epistemically or culturally significant or as a diagnostic of pathology, and What is the epistemic background that makes these—rather than other variations—marked as subnormal? For Wilson (2018a), critical examination of the problem of marked variation is central to understanding the epistemology of medicalized pathology that made the history of eugenics possible. My aim is to explore the role marked variation plays in eugenic and other problematic classifications and the inferences they appear to license. I pay particular attention to the normative valuations of marked variations, how these valuations affect the inferences that are made by others about those possessing the variation, and how those possessing the variation perceive themselves. In the final sections, I illustrate this by critically discussing three putative kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as disability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative racial ascriptions to individuals and groups. Lastly, I suggest that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is dependent upon sorting or classifying.
Part of an author-meets-critics book symposium on The Eugenic Mind Project by Robert A. Wilson (MIT Press, 2018) with Wilson 2018c and Love 2018.
In Hauke Riesch, Nathan Emmerich & Steven Wainwright (eds.) Philosophies and Sociologies of Bioethics: Crossing the Divides. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 41-64. , 2018
Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions p... more Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions pursued, the kind of engineering techniques used, and on the ethical impact of the products produced. However, little work has been done to investigate the processes by which these epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical forms of inquiry arise in the course of synthetic biology research. An attempt at this work relying on a particular area of synthetic biology will be the aim of this chapter. I focus on the reengineering of metabolic pathways through the manipulation and construction of small DNA-based devices and systems synthetic biology. Rather than focusing on the engineered products or ethical principles that result, I will investigate the processes by which these arise. As such, the attention will be directed to the activities of practitioners, their manipulation of tools, and the use they make of techniques to construct new metabolic devices. Using a science-in-practice approach, I investigate problems at the intersection of science, philosophy of science, and sociology of science. I consider how practitioners within this area of synthetic biology reconfigure biological understanding and ethical categories through active modelling and manipulation of known functional parts, biological pathways for use in the design of microbial machines to solve problems in medicine, technology, and the environment. We might describe this kind of problem-solving as relying on what Helen Longino referred to as “social cognition” or the type of scientific work done within what Hasok Chang calls “systems of practice”. My aim in this chapter will be to investigate the relationship that holds between systems of practice within metabolic engineering research and social cognition. I will attempt to show how knowledge and normative valuation are generated from this particular network of practitioners. In doing so, I suggest that the social nature of scientific inquiry is ineliminable to both knowledge acquisition and ethical evaluations.
Reengineering Metaphysics: Modularity, Parthood, and Evolvability in Metabolic Engineering. Part of a special issue, Ontologies of Living Beings, guest-edited by A. M. Ferner and omas Pradeu, 2017
The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of practice... more The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of practice. We understand that the biological world is modular because we can manipulate different parts of organisms in ways that would only work if there were discrete parts that were interchangeable. This is the foundation of the BioBrick assembly method widely used in synthetic biology. It is one of a number of methods that allows practitioners to construct and reconstruct biological pathways and devices using DNA libraries of standardized parts with known functions. In this paper, we investigate how the practice of synthetic biology reconfigures biological understanding of the key concepts of modularity and evolvability. We illustrate how this practice approach takes engineering knowledge and uses it to try to understand biological organization by showing how the construction of functional parts and processes can be used in synthetic experimental evolution. We introduce a new approach within synthetic biology that uses the premise of a parts-based ontology together with that of organismal self-organization to optimize orthogonal metabolic pathways in E. coli. We then use this and other examples to help characterize semisynthetic categories of modularity, parthood, and evolvability within the discipline.
Editorial introduction by A. M. Ferner and Thomas Pradeu: Catherine Kendig and Todd Eckdahl defend and illustrate a practice based view of metaphysics of science. The target of their paper is the emerging and fascinating field of synthetic biology—a bioengineering domain that focuses on designing and assembling biological entities. The challenge they discuss is the following: What happens, ontologically-speaking, when as well as describing biological entities we start manufacturing new ones?
Homology is a natural kind concept, but one that has been notoriously elusive to pin down. There ... more Homology is a natural kind concept, but one that has been notoriously elusive to pin down. There has been sustained debate over the nature of correspondence and the units of comparison. But this continued debate over its meaning has focused on defining homology rather than on its use in practice. The aim of this chapter is to concentrate on the practices of homologizing. I define “homologizing” to be a concept-in-use. Practices of homologizing are kinds of rule following, the satisfaction of which demarcates a category—that of being a homologue. Identifying, explaining, discovering, and understanding are exchanges that connect practice to concept through the performance of a rule by practitioners. These practices are constitutive of natural kinding activities. If homologizing is a kind of kinding, consideration of these practices of discovery, tracking, and identification not only clarify its meaning, use, and progression of the concept of homology, but provides further understanding of the processes and progression of natural kinds and kinding practices in general
Science and Engineering Ethics DOI:10.1007/s11948-015-9654-0 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-015-9654-0?wt\_mc=email.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst, 2015
‘‘Proof of concept’’ is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program an... more ‘‘Proof of concept’’ is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program announcements, in experimental studies, and in the marketing of new technologies. It is often coupled with either a short definition or none at all, its meaning assumed to be fully understood. This is problematic. As a phrase with potential implications for research and technology, its assumed meaning requires some analysis to avoid it becoming a descriptive category that refers to all things scientifically exciting. I provide a short analysis of proof of concept research and offer an example of it within synthetic biology. I suggest that not only are there activities that circumscribe new epistemological categories but there are also associated normative ethical categories or principles linked to the research. I examine these and provide an outline for an alternative ethical account to describe these activities that I refer to as ‘‘extended agency ethics’’. This view is used to explain how the type of research described as proof of concept also provides an attendant proof of principle that is the result of decision-making that extends across practitioners, their tools, techniques, and the problem solving activities of other research groups.
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0929-4\_124
This essay begins with a short historical background that focuses on initial ethical support and ... more This essay begins with a short historical background that focuses on initial ethical support and justification for synthetic biofuel research, the impact of this research on public discussion of synthetic biology, and the distinction between it and genetic engineering. The distinction between first and second generation biofuels is introduced. This is followed by a survey of current research innovations using various microbial factories, including: bacteria, yeast, and oil (oleaginous) algae.
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0929-4\_421
This essay provides an overview of the impact of hybridity on agriculture. It includes an histori... more This essay provides an overview of the impact of hybridity on agriculture. It includes an historical sketch that traces the early horticulturalists’ and naturalists’ investigations of hybrids beginning with the observations of Thomas Fairchild and Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon; and leads to the explanation of its mechanism by Gregor Mendel, James Watson and Francis Crick, and Ernst Mayr; and the eventual manipulation of hybrids and hybridization by Barbara McClintock.
Recent research that attempts to ascertain the role of hybridization in adaptive change is introduced. This includes research on the evolution of crop species, increased biodiversity, and the use of hybrids to manipulate phenotypically desirable traits in agricultural crops. The focus of the discussion is on a particularly significant type of naturally occurring hybridization, polyploidy hybridization. Polyploids are organisms which have more than two complete genomes in each cell. This kind of hybridization is ubiquitous among crop plants. The role of polyploidy in plant evolution and the affects of polyploidy on plants and animals will be reviewed. A critical discussion of its agricultural value in the production of fertile polyploid hybrids highlights key epistemological, ontological, and ethical issues. These are illuminated with reference to the distinct processes of artificial and natural hybridization. A survey of these different kinds of hybridization includes the ethical and economic impacts of hybridity on global nutrition, the environment, and considerations of some practical implications for the agricultural industry.
Species concepts aim to define the species category. Many of these rely on defining species in te... more Species concepts aim to define the species category. Many of these rely on defining species in terms of natural lineages and groupings. A dominant gene-centred metaconception has shaped notions of what constitutes both a natural lineage and a natural grouping. I suggest that relying on this metaconception provides an incomplete understanding of what constitute natural lineages and groupings. If we take seriously the role of epigenetic, behavioural, cultural, and ecological inheritance systems, rather than exclusively genetic inheritance, a broader notion of what constitutes a natural grouping or lineage may be required. I conclude by outlining an alternative metaconception that is a de-centred metaschema for species.
Hasok Chang (Sci Educ 20:317–341, 2011) shows how the recovery of past experimental knowledge, th... more Hasok Chang (Sci Educ 20:317–341, 2011) shows how the recovery of past experimental knowledge, the physical replication of historical experiments, and the extension of recovered knowledge can increase scientific understanding. These activities can also play an important role in both science and history and philosophy of science education. In this paper I describe the implementation of an integrated learning project that I initiated, organized, and structured to complement a course in history and philosophy of the life sciences (HPLS). The project focuses on the study and use of descriptions, observations, experiments, and recording techniques used by early microscopists to classify various species of water flea. The first published illustrations and descriptions of the water flea were included in the Dutch naturalist Jan Swammerdam’s, Historia Insectorum Generalis (1669) (Algemeene verhandeling van de bloedeloose dierkens. t’Utrrecht, Meinardus van Dreunen, ordinaris Drucker van d’Academie). After studying these, we first used the descriptions, techniques, and nomenclature recovered to observe, record, and classify the specimens collected from our university ponds. We then used updated recording techniques and image-based keys to observe and identify the specimens. The implementation of these newer techniques was guided in part by the observations and records that resulted from our use of the recovered historical methods of investigation. The series of HPLS labs constructed as part of this interdisciplinary project provided a space for students to consider and wrestle with the many philosophical issues that arise in the process of identifying an unknown organism and offered unique learning opportunities that engaged students’ curiosity and critical thinking skills.
Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice, Jan 2016
Editor's Introduction: (2016) “Activities of kinding in scientific practice” In Natural Kinds a... more Editor's Introduction: (2016) “Activities of kinding in scientific practice” In Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. London: Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/products/9781848935402
This edited volume of 13 new essays aims to turn past discussions of natural kinds on their head.... more This edited volume of 13 new essays aims to turn past discussions of natural kinds on their head. Instead of presenting a metaphysical view of kinds based largely on an unempirical vantage point, it pursues questions of kindedness which take the use of kinds and activities of kinding in practice as significant in the articulation of them as kinds. It brings philosophical study of current and historical episodes and case studies from various scientific disciplines to bear on natural kinds as traditionally conceived of within metaphysics. Focusing on these practices reveals the different knowledge-producing activities of kinding and processes involved in natural kind use, generation, and discovery.
An esteemed group of contributors who are specialists in their field use diverse empirically responsive approaches to explore the nature of kindhood using detailed case studies that exemplify kinding in use. Each chapter is written specifically for this volume and engages with the activities of kinding across a variety of disciplines. Chapters address the nature of kinds, kindhood, kinding, and kind-making in linguistics, chemical classification, neuroscience, gene and protein classification, colour theory in applied mathematics, homology in comparative biology, sex and gender identity theory, memory research, race, extended cognition, symbolic algebra, cartography, and geographic information science.
The volume seeks to open up an as-yet unexplored area within the emerging field of philosophy of science in practice, and constitutes a valuable addition to the philosophy and history of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
Contributions from a diverse group of established and junior scholars in the fields of Philosophy and History and Philosophy of Science including Hasok Chang, Jordi Cat, Sally Haslanger, Joyce C. Havstad Catherine Kendig, Bernhard Nickel, Josipa Petrunic, Samuli Pöyhönen, Thomas A. C. Reydon Quayshawn Spencer, Jackie Sullivan, Michael Wheeler, and Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther. Preface by John Dupré .
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2021
We introduce a novel form of experimental knowledge that is the result of institutionally structu... more We introduce a novel form of experimental knowledge that is the result of institutionally structured communication practices between farmers and university-and local community-based agronomists (agricultural extension specialists). This form of knowledge is exemplified in these communities' uses of the concept of grower standard. Grower standard is a widely used but seldom discussed benchmark concept underpinning protocols used within agricultural experiments. It is not a one-size-fits-all standard but the product of local and active interactions between farmers and agricultural extension specialists. Grower standard is in some ways similar to more familiar epistemic objects discussed in philosophy of experiment, such as controls or background conditions. However, we argue that grower standard is epistemically novel, due to how knowledge arising from it is coproduced by farmers and agricultural extension specialists. Further, in the United States, this knowledge coproduction is institutionally structured by federal legislature dating back to the 19th century. We use our analysis of grower standard to focus a discussion of the positionality of the coproducers as well as the epistemic products of this form of knowledge coproduction, and we explore the role extension work plays in shaping agricultural science more broadly.