Steven Hurst | Manchester Metropolitan University (original) (raw)

Papers by Steven Hurst

This book represents the first comprehensive overview of the US-Iraqi relationship since 1979 and... more This book represents the first comprehensive overview of the US-Iraqi relationship since 1979 and the first attempt to place the 2003 American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in that wider historical context. Using a modified version of World Systems Theory, the book places American policy toward Iraq at the centre of a number of dynamics, including America's dominant role in managing the world capitalist system, the fundamental importance of Persian Gulf oil to that system, and long-term change in the American political system. It argues that American policy towards Iraq since 1979 has been shaped above all by the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the world economy and the consequent need to restore America's position as regional hegemon and guarantor of the global oil supply, which had been destabilized by the Iranian revolution. It also emphasizes the role of American domestic politics and above all the 'conservative ascendancy' which brought George W. Bush to the presidency, as a critical factor in explaining the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The Trump Administration, 2022

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme, 2018

Chapter three explores developments under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. It examin... more Chapter three explores developments under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. It examines the continued development of the Iranian nuclear programme, US efforts to curtail it, and the broader course of US-Iranian relations. The chapter demonstrates how domestic politics on both sides continued to prevent coherent policy-making and resolution of the conflict. Leaders with an interest in dialogue found their efforts to engage the other government undercut by the actions and opposition of hard liners in both countries. The need to pander to domestic (and Israeli) pressures also undermined the efficacy of US efforts to curtail the Iranian nuclear programme by driving them down a path of unilateral coercion that was completely ineffective. Consequently, the Iranian nuclear programme continued to develop largely unhindered by the United States.

Journal of American Studies, 2014

's Energy and US Foreign Policy is an examination of America's post-Cold War foreign oil policy. ... more 's Energy and US Foreign Policy is an examination of America's post-Cold War foreign oil policy. He states in his introduction that his work is an extension of the analyses of William Appleman Williams and Gabriel Kolkowhich characterized American foreign policy as the pursuit of an "open door" for American economic intereststo the specific field of energy resources. Whilst the title implies that this is a study of post-Cold war policy, it is in reality a study of the policies of the administration of George W. Bush. The first chapter does survey the policies of the elder Bush and Bill Clinton, but the next three chapters all focus on the second Bush administration. Mahdi rationalizes this focus by claiming that the importance of oil to the maintenance of the US "empire" rose to new heights under George W. Bush and that no previous administration had made the securing of foreign oil so central to its foreign policy. Whilst the securing of oil and gas is at the core of the argument, however, Mahdi seeks to place that goal in the context of the larger purpose of maintaining and extending the American "empire." He see the Iraq War as the point of convergence for a number of "strands" of that policy, including energy security, global military superiority and antiterrorism. This is an ambitious effort, but it doesn't come off. Despite the fact that the book is based on a PhD thesis, there is no serious discussion of the literaturewhether that relating to the work of Williams or Kolko et al., or to the place of oil in US foreign policy. There are a few pages on the work of the Cold War revisionists but they are superficial and tokenistic. The details of their arguments are not discussed and the extensive critique of those arguments might as well not exist as far as this book is concerned. Mahdi thus claims to be extending and confirming an argument which is never specified and whose weaknesses are never acknowledged. He refers repeatedly to Presidents pursuing an open-door policy or "economic openness" without ever telling us what that actually means in anything but the vaguest terms. The result is that the argument at the broadest level never goes beyond mere assertion. There are also problems with the more specific arguments. Whilst the book is peppered with footnotes, key points are often unsupported by evidence and where citation is provided the reference is typically to a secondary source rather than to a primary one (clearly, there are limitations on access to primary material given the contemporary nature of the topic, but there are far more available than are used here). Much of the time, citations and quotations are used not to provide evidence so much as to present a list of other authors saying the same thing as this author, albeit in slightly different ways. Saying that Noam Chomsky, Michael Klare and four other people agree with you does not amount to a convincing argument, however, unless you are already a fan of those authors. In addition, there is a tendency to cherry-pick evidence and to ignore anything which doesn't fit with the argument. Yes, you can find a set of quotes from US policymakers post-/ in which they say that terrorism is a threat to the open global economic system. You can also find a whole range of other reasons given for initiating the War on Terror that are not cited here. A compelling reason (such as a

International Politics, 2016

Scholars generally agree that most congressional decision-making behaviour has become characteriz... more Scholars generally agree that most congressional decision-making behaviour has become characterized by partisan polarization. One area to which this consensus does not extend, however, is decision-making on foreign and national security issues. While a majority of scholars believe congressional foreign policy voting is now polarized, others insist that bipartisanship remains the norm. Examining roll-call votes in the House of Representatives from 1970 to 2012, this paper brings three new elements to bear on the dispute. Using a more comprehensive range of indicators, we reexamine the longitudinal data previously presented by scholars; we add an analysis of the roll-call data for the 2004-2013 period, and we utilize a static measure of polarization. Our analysis of the data reveals a cyclical trend of increasing and decreasing polarization and we conclude that it is too simplistic to characterize congressional voting on foreign and national security issues since 1970 as either partisan or bipartisan.

Policy Studies

ABSTRACT The long-run consequences of the Trump presidency on US foreign policy have been a subje... more ABSTRACT The long-run consequences of the Trump presidency on US foreign policy have been a subject of debate. Policy towards China is one arena in which observers have argued that Trump's impact has been significant and is likely to outlast him. Indeed, it might be considered transformational. Many of the commentaries have, however, been largely anecdotal. So as to provide a more rigorous analysis of policy transformation we employ a previously developed framework that focuses on ideational shifts, the development of new or reconfigured interests that are allied to a particular policy, and institutional changes as a basis for change to be considered transformational and thereby enduring. Applying these criteria to Trump's China policy we argue that while there has been a paradigmatic change structured around the embrace of “strategic competition”, there have been some, but rather more limited, shifts in the character of interest configurations and institutional structures. We nonetheless conclude that while policy transformation is incomplete the changes that the Trump White House wrought have been profound and are very likely to shape the actions of future administrations.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

Chronologically, Chapter Two focuses on the 1980s, but the main theme of the chapter is the devel... more Chronologically, Chapter Two focuses on the 1980s, but the main theme of the chapter is the development of mutual antipathy between Iran and the United States. This development is traced through an examination of their interactions from the 1953 coup to the Iran-Iraq War. The chapter emphasizes how the experiences of the 1953 coup in Iran, the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War contributed to the development of a profound and widespread mutual hostility between the two countries that would subsequently come to act as a major constraint on policy-makers on both sides. The chapter also examines the origins of the IRI's nuclear programme and its connection to the emerging conflict with the USA.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme, 2018

Chapter Four looks at US policy during the administration of George W. Bush. The revelations that... more Chapter Four looks at US policy during the administration of George W. Bush. The revelations that focused international attention on the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 exposed divisions within the Iranian elite over the nuclear programme, with the pragmatists and reformists who controlled policy-making until 2005 making repeated efforts to pursue a negotiated solution. Hard line conservatives in the Bush administration, however, had no interest in compromise with Iran. They were committed to regime change (at best) or compelling Tehran to abandon its pursuit of the fuel cycle (at worst). Once again, however, the policy was incoherent and ineffective. It contained no meaningful incentives for Tehran while the coercive measures employed were ineffectual, with Washington's continued unilateralism undermining its efforts to bring effective pressure to bear. Bush's rejection of the outreach of the Khatami government, moreover, contributed to the discrediting of the latter and ...

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to acc... more The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to accelerate Iran's nuclear programme, creating tensions with the USA. This short period witnessed the emergence of a number of key features of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship: The divergence of perspectives on proliferation and the fuel cycle quickly became clear. Even in a context in which the two were Cold War allies, Iranian nationalism and ambition and American fear of proliferation produced deadlock in their nuclear negotiations. The American refusal to provide Iran with fuel cycle technology was, moreover, strongly influenced by pressure from Congress, which was able to exploit the need for its ratification of any nuclear agreement to great effect. Finally, the chapter reveals a tension between unilateralism and multilateralism that would recur in US policy, as it tried to persuade the other nuclear powers to join it in not transferring sensitive nuclear technology whilst also ...

Let's take our time now the end of the Cold War German reunification the Gulf Crisis - Desert... more Let's take our time now the end of the Cold War German reunification the Gulf Crisis - Desert Shield the Gulf Crisis - Desert Storm a new world order? the end of the USSR promoting free trade new world disorder?

Global Affairs

In examining the Trump administration’s foreign policy practice and strategy, it is all too easy ... more In examining the Trump administration’s foreign policy practice and strategy, it is all too easy to fixate on the constant flow of outrageous comments made by Trump and treat this as the best route...

Global Affairs

ABSTRACT While there has been debate about the extent to which US foreign policy has been transfo... more ABSTRACT While there has been debate about the extent to which US foreign policy has been transformed since President Trump first took office in 2017, the concept of transformational policy change has not been defined with any degree of precision. The purpose of this article is, primarily, to establish such a definition. It does this by drawing upon a number of the literatures that address domestic policy processes, in particular the work of Karl Polanyi, to suggest that transformational change rests upon paradigmatic shifts, the reconfiguration of interests, large scale institutional re-ordering and changed logics. Application of the definition to the Trump foreign policy leads us to conclude that while the Trump foreign policy owes much to the militant internationalism of the Bush years its understanding of nations and “globalism” and abandonment of a defining moral purpose represent, although incipient, partial and variegated, the beginnings of transformational change.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian ... more The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US…

Diplomacy & Statecraft

ABSTRACT In July 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations, the international community and ... more ABSTRACT In July 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations, the international community and Iran finally reached agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme. All of the work that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] was nearly undone, however, by the United States Congress, which came close to killing the agreement. This episode emphasises the fact that international negotiations are “two-level games” in which policy-makers must take into account not only their own objectives and those of their interlocutors but also the interests of domestic constituencies if they are to secure the “ratification” of an agreement. In many cases, securing the consent of those constituencies is unproblematic, whether because the matter at hand is uncontroversial, domestic interests are disengaged, or policy-makers have sufficient autonomy from them to ignore their objections. In other cases, however, the domestic game can play a huge part in determining the eventual outcome of the negotiating process. As the intensity of the debate within the United States in 2015 and the narrowness of the margin by which the JCPOA survived suggest, the American–Iranian dimension of the nuclear negotiations falls into the latter category.

The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, 2016

The American decision to ratify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abandoning the demand tha... more The American decision to ratify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abandoning the demand that Iran forego the right to enrich uranium, represented a significant change in US foreign policy. We seek to explain that change, employing a theory derived from the Foreign Policy Analysis literature on policy change. Having explained the lack of change in US policy from 2003 to 2013 as the effect of a number of “inertial” factors, we go on to argue that the Obama administration’s decision to change course can be explained by the combination of four factors: repeated policy failure (and the imminence of major losses resulting from that failure), Obama’s recognition of that failure, the availability of an alternative policy and the “multilateralization” of US policy toward Iran.

Germany since Unification, 2001

To this day historians continue to debate the origins of Germany’s division after World War II, a... more To this day historians continue to debate the origins of Germany’s division after World War II, and whether or not it was the inevitable and logical consequence of the war itself, the product of communist intransigence or, as has recently been argued, the result of an ‘American decision’ to secure the more important Western part of the country against Soviet influence (Eisenberg, 1996). What they do not seem to question however is that once the country had been divided, there seemed to be little inclination thereafter to undo what had been done in the critical years between 1945 and 1949. Indeed, each time it looked as if the new status quo was under threat — as it certainly appeared to be in 1953 when workers rose up in the East, and then later in 1961 when East Germany began to haemorrhage badly — the Western powers appeared to be far more concerned to shore up the situation than to challenge it. Of course, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, there were a number of reasons why the main powers were unwilling or unable to reunite Germany, one being the logic of the superpower conflict itself (Gaddis, 1997: 113–51). However, there were also historical considerations. While Germany’s division could easily be explained and justified in terms of Cold War realities, policy-makers privately agreed that underlying their attachment to the new arrangement was a concern to prevent Germany rising up again and threatening the peace. Some policy-makers did not even bother to hide their true feelings, and at times influential Americans such as Dean Acheson, George Ball and Henry Kissinger openly conceded that Germany’s division and West Germany’s integration into NATO was the only basis upon which to build a new European order; and those like George Kennan who challenged this essential truth were simply utopian schemers with little understanding of the real world.

narratives-of-the-effects-of-partisan-polarization-in-congress-on-foreign-policyissues-are-too-si... more narratives-of-the-effects-of-partisan-polarization-in-congress-on-foreign-policyissues-are-too-simplistic/ Existing narratives of the effects of partisan polarization in Congress on foreign policy issues are too simplistic. Contemporary politics in America have become riven by the high level of partisan polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties. But has this polarization had an impact on foreign policy? In new research that analysis votes in the U.S. House of Representatives over the past 40 years, Steven Hurst and Andrew Wroe find that while the House was polarized on foreign policy issues after the 1970s, this largely disappeared by the early 2000s, only to reappear more recently. With this in mind, they argue that more sophisticated models are needed to capture the effects of partisan polarization on foreign policy.

The Carter Administration and Vietnam, 1996

The Vietnamese leadership wasted no time in translating their decision to accelerate the normalis... more The Vietnamese leadership wasted no time in translating their decision to accelerate the normalisation process with the United States into action. Even before the critical Central Committee meeting in June, Hanoi had begun to send up trial balloons to test the American response. The Inquirer of 13 May 1978 noted an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review which claimed that, ‘in a discreet message to Washington … Hanoi has expressed its willingness to shelve the issue of American aid in healing the wounds of war and to proceed with normalisation of diplomatic and commercial relations.’1

This book represents the first comprehensive overview of the US-Iraqi relationship since 1979 and... more This book represents the first comprehensive overview of the US-Iraqi relationship since 1979 and the first attempt to place the 2003 American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in that wider historical context. Using a modified version of World Systems Theory, the book places American policy toward Iraq at the centre of a number of dynamics, including America's dominant role in managing the world capitalist system, the fundamental importance of Persian Gulf oil to that system, and long-term change in the American political system. It argues that American policy towards Iraq since 1979 has been shaped above all by the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the world economy and the consequent need to restore America's position as regional hegemon and guarantor of the global oil supply, which had been destabilized by the Iranian revolution. It also emphasizes the role of American domestic politics and above all the 'conservative ascendancy' which brought George W. Bush to the presidency, as a critical factor in explaining the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The Trump Administration, 2022

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme, 2018

Chapter three explores developments under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. It examin... more Chapter three explores developments under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. It examines the continued development of the Iranian nuclear programme, US efforts to curtail it, and the broader course of US-Iranian relations. The chapter demonstrates how domestic politics on both sides continued to prevent coherent policy-making and resolution of the conflict. Leaders with an interest in dialogue found their efforts to engage the other government undercut by the actions and opposition of hard liners in both countries. The need to pander to domestic (and Israeli) pressures also undermined the efficacy of US efforts to curtail the Iranian nuclear programme by driving them down a path of unilateral coercion that was completely ineffective. Consequently, the Iranian nuclear programme continued to develop largely unhindered by the United States.

Journal of American Studies, 2014

's Energy and US Foreign Policy is an examination of America's post-Cold War foreign oil policy. ... more 's Energy and US Foreign Policy is an examination of America's post-Cold War foreign oil policy. He states in his introduction that his work is an extension of the analyses of William Appleman Williams and Gabriel Kolkowhich characterized American foreign policy as the pursuit of an "open door" for American economic intereststo the specific field of energy resources. Whilst the title implies that this is a study of post-Cold war policy, it is in reality a study of the policies of the administration of George W. Bush. The first chapter does survey the policies of the elder Bush and Bill Clinton, but the next three chapters all focus on the second Bush administration. Mahdi rationalizes this focus by claiming that the importance of oil to the maintenance of the US "empire" rose to new heights under George W. Bush and that no previous administration had made the securing of foreign oil so central to its foreign policy. Whilst the securing of oil and gas is at the core of the argument, however, Mahdi seeks to place that goal in the context of the larger purpose of maintaining and extending the American "empire." He see the Iraq War as the point of convergence for a number of "strands" of that policy, including energy security, global military superiority and antiterrorism. This is an ambitious effort, but it doesn't come off. Despite the fact that the book is based on a PhD thesis, there is no serious discussion of the literaturewhether that relating to the work of Williams or Kolko et al., or to the place of oil in US foreign policy. There are a few pages on the work of the Cold War revisionists but they are superficial and tokenistic. The details of their arguments are not discussed and the extensive critique of those arguments might as well not exist as far as this book is concerned. Mahdi thus claims to be extending and confirming an argument which is never specified and whose weaknesses are never acknowledged. He refers repeatedly to Presidents pursuing an open-door policy or "economic openness" without ever telling us what that actually means in anything but the vaguest terms. The result is that the argument at the broadest level never goes beyond mere assertion. There are also problems with the more specific arguments. Whilst the book is peppered with footnotes, key points are often unsupported by evidence and where citation is provided the reference is typically to a secondary source rather than to a primary one (clearly, there are limitations on access to primary material given the contemporary nature of the topic, but there are far more available than are used here). Much of the time, citations and quotations are used not to provide evidence so much as to present a list of other authors saying the same thing as this author, albeit in slightly different ways. Saying that Noam Chomsky, Michael Klare and four other people agree with you does not amount to a convincing argument, however, unless you are already a fan of those authors. In addition, there is a tendency to cherry-pick evidence and to ignore anything which doesn't fit with the argument. Yes, you can find a set of quotes from US policymakers post-/ in which they say that terrorism is a threat to the open global economic system. You can also find a whole range of other reasons given for initiating the War on Terror that are not cited here. A compelling reason (such as a

International Politics, 2016

Scholars generally agree that most congressional decision-making behaviour has become characteriz... more Scholars generally agree that most congressional decision-making behaviour has become characterized by partisan polarization. One area to which this consensus does not extend, however, is decision-making on foreign and national security issues. While a majority of scholars believe congressional foreign policy voting is now polarized, others insist that bipartisanship remains the norm. Examining roll-call votes in the House of Representatives from 1970 to 2012, this paper brings three new elements to bear on the dispute. Using a more comprehensive range of indicators, we reexamine the longitudinal data previously presented by scholars; we add an analysis of the roll-call data for the 2004-2013 period, and we utilize a static measure of polarization. Our analysis of the data reveals a cyclical trend of increasing and decreasing polarization and we conclude that it is too simplistic to characterize congressional voting on foreign and national security issues since 1970 as either partisan or bipartisan.

Policy Studies

ABSTRACT The long-run consequences of the Trump presidency on US foreign policy have been a subje... more ABSTRACT The long-run consequences of the Trump presidency on US foreign policy have been a subject of debate. Policy towards China is one arena in which observers have argued that Trump's impact has been significant and is likely to outlast him. Indeed, it might be considered transformational. Many of the commentaries have, however, been largely anecdotal. So as to provide a more rigorous analysis of policy transformation we employ a previously developed framework that focuses on ideational shifts, the development of new or reconfigured interests that are allied to a particular policy, and institutional changes as a basis for change to be considered transformational and thereby enduring. Applying these criteria to Trump's China policy we argue that while there has been a paradigmatic change structured around the embrace of “strategic competition”, there have been some, but rather more limited, shifts in the character of interest configurations and institutional structures. We nonetheless conclude that while policy transformation is incomplete the changes that the Trump White House wrought have been profound and are very likely to shape the actions of future administrations.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

Chronologically, Chapter Two focuses on the 1980s, but the main theme of the chapter is the devel... more Chronologically, Chapter Two focuses on the 1980s, but the main theme of the chapter is the development of mutual antipathy between Iran and the United States. This development is traced through an examination of their interactions from the 1953 coup to the Iran-Iraq War. The chapter emphasizes how the experiences of the 1953 coup in Iran, the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War contributed to the development of a profound and widespread mutual hostility between the two countries that would subsequently come to act as a major constraint on policy-makers on both sides. The chapter also examines the origins of the IRI's nuclear programme and its connection to the emerging conflict with the USA.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme, 2018

Chapter Four looks at US policy during the administration of George W. Bush. The revelations that... more Chapter Four looks at US policy during the administration of George W. Bush. The revelations that focused international attention on the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 exposed divisions within the Iranian elite over the nuclear programme, with the pragmatists and reformists who controlled policy-making until 2005 making repeated efforts to pursue a negotiated solution. Hard line conservatives in the Bush administration, however, had no interest in compromise with Iran. They were committed to regime change (at best) or compelling Tehran to abandon its pursuit of the fuel cycle (at worst). Once again, however, the policy was incoherent and ineffective. It contained no meaningful incentives for Tehran while the coercive measures employed were ineffectual, with Washington's continued unilateralism undermining its efforts to bring effective pressure to bear. Bush's rejection of the outreach of the Khatami government, moreover, contributed to the discrediting of the latter and ...

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to acc... more The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to accelerate Iran's nuclear programme, creating tensions with the USA. This short period witnessed the emergence of a number of key features of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship: The divergence of perspectives on proliferation and the fuel cycle quickly became clear. Even in a context in which the two were Cold War allies, Iranian nationalism and ambition and American fear of proliferation produced deadlock in their nuclear negotiations. The American refusal to provide Iran with fuel cycle technology was, moreover, strongly influenced by pressure from Congress, which was able to exploit the need for its ratification of any nuclear agreement to great effect. Finally, the chapter reveals a tension between unilateralism and multilateralism that would recur in US policy, as it tried to persuade the other nuclear powers to join it in not transferring sensitive nuclear technology whilst also ...

Let's take our time now the end of the Cold War German reunification the Gulf Crisis - Desert... more Let's take our time now the end of the Cold War German reunification the Gulf Crisis - Desert Shield the Gulf Crisis - Desert Storm a new world order? the end of the USSR promoting free trade new world disorder?

Global Affairs

In examining the Trump administration’s foreign policy practice and strategy, it is all too easy ... more In examining the Trump administration’s foreign policy practice and strategy, it is all too easy to fixate on the constant flow of outrageous comments made by Trump and treat this as the best route...

Global Affairs

ABSTRACT While there has been debate about the extent to which US foreign policy has been transfo... more ABSTRACT While there has been debate about the extent to which US foreign policy has been transformed since President Trump first took office in 2017, the concept of transformational policy change has not been defined with any degree of precision. The purpose of this article is, primarily, to establish such a definition. It does this by drawing upon a number of the literatures that address domestic policy processes, in particular the work of Karl Polanyi, to suggest that transformational change rests upon paradigmatic shifts, the reconfiguration of interests, large scale institutional re-ordering and changed logics. Application of the definition to the Trump foreign policy leads us to conclude that while the Trump foreign policy owes much to the militant internationalism of the Bush years its understanding of nations and “globalism” and abandonment of a defining moral purpose represent, although incipient, partial and variegated, the beginnings of transformational change.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian ... more The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US…

Diplomacy & Statecraft

ABSTRACT In July 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations, the international community and ... more ABSTRACT In July 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations, the international community and Iran finally reached agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme. All of the work that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] was nearly undone, however, by the United States Congress, which came close to killing the agreement. This episode emphasises the fact that international negotiations are “two-level games” in which policy-makers must take into account not only their own objectives and those of their interlocutors but also the interests of domestic constituencies if they are to secure the “ratification” of an agreement. In many cases, securing the consent of those constituencies is unproblematic, whether because the matter at hand is uncontroversial, domestic interests are disengaged, or policy-makers have sufficient autonomy from them to ignore their objections. In other cases, however, the domestic game can play a huge part in determining the eventual outcome of the negotiating process. As the intensity of the debate within the United States in 2015 and the narrowness of the margin by which the JCPOA survived suggest, the American–Iranian dimension of the nuclear negotiations falls into the latter category.

The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, 2016

The American decision to ratify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abandoning the demand tha... more The American decision to ratify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abandoning the demand that Iran forego the right to enrich uranium, represented a significant change in US foreign policy. We seek to explain that change, employing a theory derived from the Foreign Policy Analysis literature on policy change. Having explained the lack of change in US policy from 2003 to 2013 as the effect of a number of “inertial” factors, we go on to argue that the Obama administration’s decision to change course can be explained by the combination of four factors: repeated policy failure (and the imminence of major losses resulting from that failure), Obama’s recognition of that failure, the availability of an alternative policy and the “multilateralization” of US policy toward Iran.

Germany since Unification, 2001

To this day historians continue to debate the origins of Germany’s division after World War II, a... more To this day historians continue to debate the origins of Germany’s division after World War II, and whether or not it was the inevitable and logical consequence of the war itself, the product of communist intransigence or, as has recently been argued, the result of an ‘American decision’ to secure the more important Western part of the country against Soviet influence (Eisenberg, 1996). What they do not seem to question however is that once the country had been divided, there seemed to be little inclination thereafter to undo what had been done in the critical years between 1945 and 1949. Indeed, each time it looked as if the new status quo was under threat — as it certainly appeared to be in 1953 when workers rose up in the East, and then later in 1961 when East Germany began to haemorrhage badly — the Western powers appeared to be far more concerned to shore up the situation than to challenge it. Of course, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, there were a number of reasons why the main powers were unwilling or unable to reunite Germany, one being the logic of the superpower conflict itself (Gaddis, 1997: 113–51). However, there were also historical considerations. While Germany’s division could easily be explained and justified in terms of Cold War realities, policy-makers privately agreed that underlying their attachment to the new arrangement was a concern to prevent Germany rising up again and threatening the peace. Some policy-makers did not even bother to hide their true feelings, and at times influential Americans such as Dean Acheson, George Ball and Henry Kissinger openly conceded that Germany’s division and West Germany’s integration into NATO was the only basis upon which to build a new European order; and those like George Kennan who challenged this essential truth were simply utopian schemers with little understanding of the real world.

narratives-of-the-effects-of-partisan-polarization-in-congress-on-foreign-policyissues-are-too-si... more narratives-of-the-effects-of-partisan-polarization-in-congress-on-foreign-policyissues-are-too-simplistic/ Existing narratives of the effects of partisan polarization in Congress on foreign policy issues are too simplistic. Contemporary politics in America have become riven by the high level of partisan polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties. But has this polarization had an impact on foreign policy? In new research that analysis votes in the U.S. House of Representatives over the past 40 years, Steven Hurst and Andrew Wroe find that while the House was polarized on foreign policy issues after the 1970s, this largely disappeared by the early 2000s, only to reappear more recently. With this in mind, they argue that more sophisticated models are needed to capture the effects of partisan polarization on foreign policy.

The Carter Administration and Vietnam, 1996

The Vietnamese leadership wasted no time in translating their decision to accelerate the normalis... more The Vietnamese leadership wasted no time in translating their decision to accelerate the normalisation process with the United States into action. Even before the critical Central Committee meeting in June, Hanoi had begun to send up trial balloons to test the American response. The Inquirer of 13 May 1978 noted an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review which claimed that, ‘in a discreet message to Washington … Hanoi has expressed its willingness to shelve the issue of American aid in healing the wounds of war and to proceed with normalisation of diplomatic and commercial relations.’1