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Articles by Matt Barnard

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2019

In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Mart... more In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being” (Ermächtigung des Seins). This article will show that this early understanding of power is related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” (Seinlassen) are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”.

Philosophy Now, 2018

A short article for the popular philosophy magazine Philosophy Now

Conference and Invited Papers by Matt Barnard

The movement variously known as ‘speculative realism’, ‘speculative materialism’, and ‘the new ma... more The movement variously known as ‘speculative realism’, ‘speculative materialism’, and ‘the new materialisms’ often defines itself against phenomenology. Phenomenology, within this nascent tradition, is seen as a species of what Quentin Meillassoux names ‘correlationism’, which is to say idealism in the broadest possible sense. Phenomenology is said to be limited to the description of inner life. It fails to escape the sphere of subjective consciousness to the objectivity of the external world. Or, in some more nuanced accounts, it claims to escape to the external world but has no ontological or epistemological arguments to prove this claim.

I believe this critique is unsound, although I think it is understandable that those who have not engaged closely and extensively with phenomenology would believe that it is subjective. Phenomenology represents a radical ontological and epistemological breakthrough, and its proponents have not always signalled this radicality as strongly as they could have.

In this paper, I will restate the case for phenomenology’s “epistemological” and “ontological” claims through a confrontation with Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism in After Finitude with particular focus on his claim that correlationisms cannot account for the phenomenon of ancestrality: the factual evidence of beings that existed before humanity and which exist absolutely beyond the possibility of any human encounter. I will argue not only that phenomenology can account for these phenomena but that only a phenomenological account can do us.

Human Sciences Seminar, 2019

Matt Barnard (Manchester Metropolitan University): ‘Dread and Dialectic: Heidegger, Sartre and th... more Matt Barnard (Manchester Metropolitan University): ‘Dread and Dialectic: Heidegger, Sartre and the Interface of Freedom and History’

Date: Thursday 17th January 2018
Time: 5pm - 7pm
Location: Geoffrey Manton, GM303
Tickets: Free - Just turn up!

This is part of the Human Sciences Seminar Series, which is a research seminar organised by the Philosophy section of Manchester Metropolitan University’s department of History, Politics and Philosophy. Meetings are held regularly in the autumn and spring times for talks given by speakers from multiple disciplines from across the world.
The HSS lectures are generously supported by the Royal Institute of Philosophy, and are free and open to all

In Being and Time and the texts written in the years following it, Heidegger develops a conceptio... more In Being and Time and the texts written in the years following it, Heidegger develops a conception of freedom far removed from traditional discussions of “free will and determinism”. Heidegger argues that freedom is not a property of some faculty of the human, nor indeed of the human as a whole. Rather, the human is a property of freedom. Freedom, the essence of truth, reveals being to Dasein as something it can win or lose, as its ownmost possibility. However, the concept of freedom is much less frequently discussed by Heidegger in the 1930s and beyond, as part of the turn towards the history of beyng. This has sometimes been described as a transition from a ‘freedom of Dasein’ to a ‘freedom of being’, or, according to some, a transition from an early voluntarism to a later historical determinism. Even where this transition is taken to be less abrupt, the link between the two periods, and the reason for the shift away from the language of freedom to the language of history requires interpretation and explanation. In this paper, I will argue that the critique of Being and Time found in the Überlegungen II provides new context for this transition, revealing a transformative continuity rather than an absolute break with the work of the late 1920s. In particular, the concept of ‘empowerment of being’ (Seinsmächtigung) found in the notebooks functions as a ‘missing link’ between freedom and the history of being.

In this paper, I wish to argue that the difference between Heidegger and Sartre’s interpretation ... more In this paper, I wish to argue that the difference between Heidegger and Sartre’s interpretation of the concept of anxiety lead to two different concepts of existential freedom. These differences have their basis in their distinct understanding of the nature of existence and the self, leading Sartre into an absolute negative conception freedom and Heidegger into a limited and difficult to obtain positive conception of freedom. For Sartre, in L'Être et le néant, anxiety reveals the nothingness that stands between me and what I can do. Nothing, not even my own being, is an obstacle to freedom. Indeed, every time I adequately perceive my own being, I negate it, and am condemned to be able to overcome it. Anxiety is an experience of our capacity: the fact of negative freedom.

For Heidegger, in Sein und Zeit, anxiety reveals nothingness as the consequence, not manifestation, of freedom. Rather than an absence of an obstacle in front of us, anxiety reveals the wake of lost opportunities behind us, things we could have and should have done. Anxiety therefore reveals the charge from our authentic self: “Guilty!”. For Heidegger, anxiety expresses our existential responsibility, not to overcome our self, but to make "the choice to choose oneself”. For Sartre, anxiety reveals the potency of the will to negate the self. For Heidegger, it calls us back to our self. This disagreement provides a case study in the different phenomenological priorities of two highly
influential thinkers. In explaining why they are able to disagree so fundamentally about the same phenomenon, I wish to lend weight to Heidegger's claim that phenomenology is not a set of theoretical discoveries, but a practice.

Book Reviews by Matt Barnard

Books by Matt Barnard

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2019

In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Mart... more In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being” (Ermächtigung des Seins). This article will show that this early understanding of power is related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” (Seinlassen) are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”.

Philosophy Now, 2018

A short article for the popular philosophy magazine Philosophy Now

The movement variously known as ‘speculative realism’, ‘speculative materialism’, and ‘the new ma... more The movement variously known as ‘speculative realism’, ‘speculative materialism’, and ‘the new materialisms’ often defines itself against phenomenology. Phenomenology, within this nascent tradition, is seen as a species of what Quentin Meillassoux names ‘correlationism’, which is to say idealism in the broadest possible sense. Phenomenology is said to be limited to the description of inner life. It fails to escape the sphere of subjective consciousness to the objectivity of the external world. Or, in some more nuanced accounts, it claims to escape to the external world but has no ontological or epistemological arguments to prove this claim.

I believe this critique is unsound, although I think it is understandable that those who have not engaged closely and extensively with phenomenology would believe that it is subjective. Phenomenology represents a radical ontological and epistemological breakthrough, and its proponents have not always signalled this radicality as strongly as they could have.

In this paper, I will restate the case for phenomenology’s “epistemological” and “ontological” claims through a confrontation with Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism in After Finitude with particular focus on his claim that correlationisms cannot account for the phenomenon of ancestrality: the factual evidence of beings that existed before humanity and which exist absolutely beyond the possibility of any human encounter. I will argue not only that phenomenology can account for these phenomena but that only a phenomenological account can do us.

Human Sciences Seminar, 2019

Matt Barnard (Manchester Metropolitan University): ‘Dread and Dialectic: Heidegger, Sartre and th... more Matt Barnard (Manchester Metropolitan University): ‘Dread and Dialectic: Heidegger, Sartre and the Interface of Freedom and History’

Date: Thursday 17th January 2018
Time: 5pm - 7pm
Location: Geoffrey Manton, GM303
Tickets: Free - Just turn up!

This is part of the Human Sciences Seminar Series, which is a research seminar organised by the Philosophy section of Manchester Metropolitan University’s department of History, Politics and Philosophy. Meetings are held regularly in the autumn and spring times for talks given by speakers from multiple disciplines from across the world.
The HSS lectures are generously supported by the Royal Institute of Philosophy, and are free and open to all

In Being and Time and the texts written in the years following it, Heidegger develops a conceptio... more In Being and Time and the texts written in the years following it, Heidegger develops a conception of freedom far removed from traditional discussions of “free will and determinism”. Heidegger argues that freedom is not a property of some faculty of the human, nor indeed of the human as a whole. Rather, the human is a property of freedom. Freedom, the essence of truth, reveals being to Dasein as something it can win or lose, as its ownmost possibility. However, the concept of freedom is much less frequently discussed by Heidegger in the 1930s and beyond, as part of the turn towards the history of beyng. This has sometimes been described as a transition from a ‘freedom of Dasein’ to a ‘freedom of being’, or, according to some, a transition from an early voluntarism to a later historical determinism. Even where this transition is taken to be less abrupt, the link between the two periods, and the reason for the shift away from the language of freedom to the language of history requires interpretation and explanation. In this paper, I will argue that the critique of Being and Time found in the Überlegungen II provides new context for this transition, revealing a transformative continuity rather than an absolute break with the work of the late 1920s. In particular, the concept of ‘empowerment of being’ (Seinsmächtigung) found in the notebooks functions as a ‘missing link’ between freedom and the history of being.

In this paper, I wish to argue that the difference between Heidegger and Sartre’s interpretation ... more In this paper, I wish to argue that the difference between Heidegger and Sartre’s interpretation of the concept of anxiety lead to two different concepts of existential freedom. These differences have their basis in their distinct understanding of the nature of existence and the self, leading Sartre into an absolute negative conception freedom and Heidegger into a limited and difficult to obtain positive conception of freedom. For Sartre, in L'Être et le néant, anxiety reveals the nothingness that stands between me and what I can do. Nothing, not even my own being, is an obstacle to freedom. Indeed, every time I adequately perceive my own being, I negate it, and am condemned to be able to overcome it. Anxiety is an experience of our capacity: the fact of negative freedom.

For Heidegger, in Sein und Zeit, anxiety reveals nothingness as the consequence, not manifestation, of freedom. Rather than an absence of an obstacle in front of us, anxiety reveals the wake of lost opportunities behind us, things we could have and should have done. Anxiety therefore reveals the charge from our authentic self: “Guilty!”. For Heidegger, anxiety expresses our existential responsibility, not to overcome our self, but to make "the choice to choose oneself”. For Sartre, anxiety reveals the potency of the will to negate the self. For Heidegger, it calls us back to our self. This disagreement provides a case study in the different phenomenological priorities of two highly
influential thinkers. In explaining why they are able to disagree so fundamentally about the same phenomenon, I wish to lend weight to Heidegger's claim that phenomenology is not a set of theoretical discoveries, but a practice.