pluralistic (original) (raw)
Trump’s not gonna protect workers from forced labor
ALT
If you’d like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here’s a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:
https://pluralistic.net/2025/07/03/states-rights-trumps-wrongs/#mamdani
As fascism burns across America, it’s important to remember that Trump and his policies are not popular. Sure, the racism and cruelty excites a minority of (very broken) people, but every component of the Trump agenda is extremely unpopular with the American people, from tax cuts for billionaires to kidnapping our neighbors and shipping them to concentration camps.
Keeping this fact in mind is essential if we are to nurture hope’s embers, and fan them into the flames of change. Trumpism is a coalition of people who hate each other, who agree on almost nothing, whose fracture lines are one deft tap away from shattering:
https://pluralistic.net/2024/07/14/fracture-lines/#disassembly-manual
The vast unpopularity of Trumpism presents endless opportunities for breaking off parts of his coalition. Take noncompete “agreements”: contractual clauses that ban workers from taking a job with any of their employers’ competitors for years. One in 18 Americans has been captured by a noncompete, and the median noncompete victim is a minimum-wage fast-food worker whose small business tyrant boss wants to be sure that she doesn’t quit working the register at Wendy’s and start making $0.25/hour more flipping burgers at McDonald’s.
The story of noncompetes is bullshit from top to bottom. The argument goes, “Your boss invests heavily in training you, and lets you in on all his valuable trade-secrets. When you walk out the door and go to work for a competitor, you’re stealing all that training and knowledge. Without noncompetes, no boss will invest in the knowledge-intensive industries that are the future of our economy.”
Now, like I said, the vast majority of people under noncompetes are working low-waged, menial jobs with little to no training, and no proprietary trade secrets to speak of. Which makes sense: workers with less bargaining power end up signing worse contracts. That’s half the case against noncompetes.
Here’s the other half: the most IP-intensive, profitable, knowledge-based industries in America operate without any noncompetes. California’s state constitution bans noncompetes, which means that every worker in Hollywood and Silicon Valley is free to quit their job and walk across the street and join a rival.
How much (little) are the AI companies making?
ALT
I’m in the home stretch of my 24-city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS . Catch me in LONDON TODAY (July 1) with TRASHFUTURE’S RILEY QUINN and then a big finish in MANCHESTER TOMORROW (July 2) .
If there’s one area where tech has shown a consistent aptitude for innovation, it’s in accounting tricks that make money-losing companies appear wildly profitable. And AI is the greatest innovator of all (when it comes to accounting gimmicks).
Since the dotcom era, tech companies have boasted about giving stuff away but “making it up in volume,” inventing an ever-sweatier collection of shell-games that let them hide the business’s true profit and loss.
The all-time world champeen of this kind of finance fraud is Masayoshi Son, the founder of Softbank, who acts as the bagman for the Saudi royals’ personal investments. Remember last decade when the tech press was all abuzz about “unicorns” – startups that were worth 1b?ThatwasSon:hewouldtakeastartuplikeWework,declareitsbrandtobeworth1b? That was Son: he would take a startup like Wework, declare its brand to be worth 1b?ThatwasSon:hewouldtakeastartuplikeWework,declareitsbrandtobeworth1b, invest an infinitesimal fraction of $1b in the company based on that valuation (sometimes with a rube co-investor) and declare the valuation to be “market-based.” A whole string of garbage companies achieved unicornhood by means of this unbelievably stupid trick:
https://pluralistic.net/2022/05/27/voluntary-carbon-market/#trust-me
Of course, every finance bro is familiar with Stein’s Law: “anything that can’t go on forever eventually stops.” Sure, the Saudi royals could be tapped to piss away 31bonUber,losing31b on Uber, losing 31bonUber,losing0.41 on every dollar for 13 years, but eventually they’re going to turn off the money spigot and attempt to flog their shares to retail and institutional suckers. To make that work, they have to invent new accounting tricks, like when Uber “sold” its failing overseas ride-hailing businesses to international rivals in exchange for stock, then declared that these companies’ illiquid stock had skyrocketed in value, tipping Uber into the black:
https://pluralistic.net/2022/08/05/a-lousy-taxi/#a-giant-asterisk
Even companies that are actually profitable (in the sense of bringing in more revenue than it costs to keep the business’s lights on) love to juice their stats, and the worst offenders are the Big Tech companies, who reap a vast commercial reward from creating the illusion that they are continuing to grow, even after they’ve dominated their sector.
Take Google: once the company attained a 90% global search market-share, there were no more immediate prospects for growth. I mean, sure, they could raise a billion new humans to maturity and train them to be Google customers (e.g., the business plan for Google Classroom), but that takes more than a decade, and Google needed growth right away. So the company hatched a plan to make search worse, so that its existing users would have to search multiple times to get the information they sought, and each additional search would give Google another chance to show you an ad:
https://pluralistic.net/2024/04/24/naming-names/#prabhakar-raghavan
But that was small potatoes. What Google – and the rest of the tech sector – needed was a massive growth story, a story about how their companies, worth trillions of dollars, could double or triple in size in the coming years. There’s a kind of reflexive anti-capitalist critique that locates the drive to tell growth stories in ideology: “endless growth is the ideology of a tumor,” right?
But spinning an endless growth story isn’t merely ideological. It’s a firmly materialistic undertaking. Companies that appear to be growing have market caps that are an order of magnitude larger than companies that are considered “mature” and at the end of their growth phase. For every dollar that Ford brings in, the market is willing to spend 8.60onitsstock.ForeverydollarTeslabringsin,themarketiswillingtospend8.60 on its stock. For every dollar Tesla brings in, the market is willing to spend 8.60onitsstock.ForeverydollarTeslabringsin,themarketiswillingtospend118 on its stock.
Antitrust defies politics’ law of gravity
ALT
I’m in the home stretch of my 24-city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS . Catch me in LONDON NEXT TUESDAY (July 1) with TRASHFUTURE’S RILEY QUINN and then a big finish in MANCHESTER NEXT WEDNESDAY (July 2) .
In 2014, I read a political science paper that nearly convinced me to quit my lifelong career as an activist: “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” published in Perspectives on Politics:
The paper’s authors are Martin Gilens, a UCLA professor of Public Policy; and Northwestern’s Benjamin Page, a professor of Decision Making. Gilens and Page studied a representative sample of 1,779 policy issues, analyzing the effect that the preferences of different groups of people had on the outcome. They wanted to find out what drove policy: money, or popularity?
It’s money. It’s totally, utterly money. When billionaires want something, it literally doesn’t matter how much the rest of us hate it, they’re gonna get their way. When billionaires hate something, it doesn’t matter how popular it is with the rest of us, we’re not gonna get it. As Gilens and Page put it:
economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.
I know the cynics out there are hollering “no duh” at their computers right now, but bear with me here. Gilens and Page’s research shows that you and I have no voice in policy outcomes. Based on these findings, the only way we can change society is to try and woo oligarchs so they champion our cause. This reduces democracy to a competition to see who can pour the most honey into a plutocrat’s ear. Mass mobilizations – millions of people in the streets – only matter to the extent that they bring a tear to a billionaire’s eye.
This just shattered me. I’ve been haunted by it ever since. I’ve tried some tactical gambits based on this data, but honestly, I don’t want to improve the world by swaying the ultra-rich. Mostly, I’ve spent the decade since I read the Gilens/Page paper working on mass mobilizations and mass opionion-influencing. I reasoned (or maybe rationalized) that while oligarchs were running the nation now, that was subject to change, and that was a change that I was sure wouldn’t come from America’s plutocrats committing mass class-suicide.
Then, something incredible happened. All this decade, a tide of antitrust vigor has swept the planet. The EU has passed big, muscular tech competition laws like the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act, and has by God enforced them, and have patched the enforcement weaknesses in the GDPR. EU member-states – France, Germany, Spain – have passed their own big, ambitious national laws that go further than DSA/DMA. Even Ireland – a country that deliberately prostrated itself to US Big Tech – is getting in on the act, with the country’s Social Media Czar railing against the “enshittification” of tech:
Bill Griffith’s ‘Three Rocks’
ALT
I’m in the home stretch of my 24-city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS. Catch me in LONDON NEXT TUESDAY (July 1) with TRASHFUTURE’S RILEY QUINN and then a big finish in MANCHESTER on July 2.
What better format for a biography of Ernie Bushmiller, creator of the daily Nancy strip, than a graphic novel? And who better to write and draw it than Bill Griffith, creator of Zippy the Pinhead, a long-running and famously surreal daily strip?
https://store.abramsbooks.com/products/three-rocks
Three Rocks: The Story of Ernie Bushmiller, the Man Who Created Nancy is more than a biography, though. Griffith is carrying on the work of Scott McCloud, whose definitive Understanding Comics used the graphic novel form to explain the significance and method of sequential art, singling out Nancy for special praise:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Understanding_Comics
For Griffith – and a legion of comics legends who worship Bushmiller – the story of Bushmiller’s life and the story of Nancy and its groundbreaking methodology are inseparable. We watch as Bushmiller starts out as a teenaged dropout copy-boy in the bullpen at a giant news syndicate, running errands for the paper’s publisher and, eventually, its cartoonists. Bushmiller burns to get into the funnies, and he’s got a good head for gags, but his draftsmanship needs work. He secretly enrolls in a life-drawing class, which does him little good, but he applies himself and applies himself, and eventually is given his big break: taking over Fritzi Ritz, a daily cartoon serial about a sexy flapper.
Bushmiller’s run on Fritzi Ritz outlasts flappers, and, as he struggles to keep the character relevant amidst changing times, he eventually hits on a “Cousin Oliver” gambit: adding in a sassy niece named Nancy:
https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/CousinOliver
Cousin Oliverae are rarely successful, but Nancy turned out to be the exception that proved the rule. Nancy took over the strip, and “Aunt Fritzi” receded in importance, taking a backstage to Nancy and her pal Sluggo.
Surveillance is inequality’s stabilizer
I’m in the home stretch of my 24-city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS. Catch me in LONDON NEXT TUESDAY (July 1) with TRASHFUTURE’S RILEY QUINN and then a big finish in MANCHESTER on July 2.
The “dictator’s dilemma” pits a dictator’s desire to create social stability by censoring public communications in order to prevent the spread of anti-regime messages with the dictator’s need to know whether powerful elites are becoming restless and plotting a coup:
https://pluralistic.net/2023/07/26/dictators-dilemma/#garbage-in-garbage-out-garbage-back-in
Closely related to the dictator’s dilemma is “authoritarian blindness,” where an autocrat’s censorship regime keeps them from finding out about important, socially destabilizing facts on the ground, like whether a corrupt local official is comporting themself so badly that the people are ready to take to the streets:
https://pluralistic.net/2020/02/24/pluralist-your-daily-link-dose-24-feb-2020/#thatswhatxisaid
The modern Chinese state has done more to skillfully navigate the twin hazards of the dictator’s dilemma and authoritarian blindness than any other regime in history. Take Xi Jinping’s 2012-2015 anticorruption purge, which helped him secure another ten year term as Party Secretary. Xi targeted legitimately corrupt officials in this this sweeping purge, but – crucially – he only targeted corrupt officials in the power-base of his rivals for Party leader, while leaving corrupt officials in his own power base unscathed:
How did Xi accomplish this feat? Through intense, fine-grained surveillance, another area in which modern China excels. Chinese online surveillance is often paired with censorship, both petty (banning Winnie the Pooh, whom Xi is often mocked for resembling) and substantial (getting Apple to modify Airdrop for every user in the world in order to prevent the spread of anti-regime messages before a key Party leadership contest).
But there are a lot of instances where China spies on its people but doesn’t censor them, even if they are expressing dissatisfaction with the government. Chinese censors allow a surprising amount of complaint about official incompetence, overreach and corruption, but they completely suppress any calls for mobilization to address these complaints. You can be as angry as you want with the government online, but you can’t call for protests to do something about it:
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1251722
This makes perfect sense in the context of “authoritarian blindness”: by allowing online complaint, an autocrat can locate the hot-spots where things are reaching a boiling-over point, and by blocking public manifestations, the autocrat can prevent the public from turning their failings into a flashpoint that endangers the autocracy.
In other words, autocrats can reserve to themselves the power to decide how to defuse public anger: they can suppress it, using surveillance data about the people who led the online debate about official failures to figure out who to intimidate, arrest, or disappear. Or they can address it through measures like firing corrupt local officials or funding local social programs (toxic waste cleanups, smokestack regulation, building schools and hospitals, etc) that make people feel better about their government.
Autocracy is an inherently unstable social situation. No society can deliver everything that everyone in it desires: if you tear down existing low-density housing and build apartment blocks to decrease a housing shortage, you’ll delight people who are un- or under-housed, and you’ll infuriate people who are happily housed under the status quo. In every society, there’s always someone getting their way at the expense of someone else.
What’s a “public internet?”
ALT
I’m in the home stretch of my 24-city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS. Catch me in LONDON (July 1) with TRASHFUTURE’S RILEY QUINN and then a big finish in MANCHESTER on July 2.
The “Eurostack” is a (long overdue) project to publicly fund a European “stack” of technology that is independent from American Big Tech (as well as other powers’ technology that has less hold in Europe, such as Chinese and Russian tech):
But “technological soveriegnty” is a slippery and easily abused concept. Policies like “national firewalls” and “data localization” (where data on a country’s population need to be kept on onshore servers) can be a means to different ends. Data localization is important if you want to keep an American company from funneling every digital fact about everyone in your country to the NSA. But it’s also a way to make sure that your secret police can lay hands on population-scale data about anyone they might want to kidnap and torture:
https://doctorow.medium.com/theyre-still-trying-to-ban-cryptography-33aa668dc602
At its worst, “technological sovereignty” is a path to a shattered internet with a million dysfunctional borders that serve as checkpoints where thuggish customs inspectors can stop you from availing yourself of privacy-preserving technology and prevent you from communicating with exiled dissidents and diasporas.
But at its best, “technological sovereignty” is a way to create world-girding technology that can act as an impartial substrate on which all manner of domestic and international activities can play out, from a group of friends organizing a games night, to scientists organizing a symposium, to international volunteer corps organizing aid after a flood.
In other words, “technological sovereignty” can be a way to create a public internet that the whole public controls – not just governments, but also people, individuals who can exercise their own technological self-determination, controlling crucial aspects of their own technology usage, like “who will see this thing I’m saying?” and “whose communications will I see, and which ones can I block?”
A “public internet” isn’t the same thing as “an internet that is operated by your government,” but you can’t get a public internet without government involvement, including funding, regulation, oversight and direct contributions.
Here’s an example of different ways that governments can involve themselves in the management of one part of the internet, and the different ways in which this will create more or less “public” internet services: fiber optic lines.
Fiber is the platinum standard for internet service delivery. Nothing else comes even close to it. A plastic tube under the road that is stuffed with fiber optic strands can deliver billions of times more data than copper wires or any form of wireless, including satellite constellations like Starlink:
https://pluralistic.net/2021/03/30/fight-for-44/#slowpokes
(Starlink is the most antifuturistic technology imaginable – a vision of a global internet that gets slower and less reliable as more people sign up for it. It makes the dotcom joke of “we lose money on every sale but make it up in volume” look positively bankable.)
The private sector cannot deliver fiber. There’s no economical way for a private entity to secure the rights of way to tear up every street in every city, to run wires into every basement or roof, to put poles on every street corner. Same goes for getting the rights of way to string fiber between city limits across unincorporated county land, or across the long hauls that cross national and provincial or state borders.
Fiber itself is cheap like borscht – it’s literally made out of sand – but clearing the thicket of property rights and political boundaries needed to get wire everywhere is a feat that can only be accomplished through government intervention.
Fiber’s opponents rarely acknowledge this. They claim, instead, that the physical act of stringing wires through space is somehow transcendentally hard, despite the fact that we’ve been doing this with phone lines and power cables for more than a century, through the busiest, densest cities and across the loneliest stretches of farmland. Wiring up a country is not the lost art of a fallen civilization, like building pyramids without power-tools or embalming pharoahs. It’s something that even the poorest counties in America can manage, bringing fiber across forbidden mountain passes on the back of a mule named “Ole Bub”: