John Sutton | Macquarie University (original) (raw)
Papers by John Sutton
Topoi, 2024
Traces of many past events are often layered or superposed, in brain, body, and world alike. This... more Traces of many past events are often layered or superposed, in brain, body, and world alike. This often poses challenges for individuals and groups, both in accessing specific past events and in regulating or managing coexisting emotions or attitudes. We sometimes struggle, for example, to find appropriate modes of engagement with places with complex and difficult pasts. More generally, there can appear to be a tension between what we know about the highly constructive nature of remembering, whether it is drawing on neural or worldly resources or both, and the ways that we need and use memory to make claims on the past, and to maintain some appropriate causal connections to past events. I assess the current state of work on situated affect and distributed memory, and the recent criticisms of the 'dogma of harmony' in these fields. I then deploy these frameworks to examine some affective dimensions of place memory, sketching a strongly distributed conception of places as sometimes partly constituting the processes and activities of feeling and remembering. These approaches also offer useful perspectives on the problems of how to engage-politically and aesthetically-with difficult pasts and historically burdened heritage. In assessing artistic interventions in troubled places, we can seek responsibly to do justice to the past while fully embracing the dynamic and contested constructedness of our present emotions, memories, and activities.
Comments and enthusiastic examples or conversations about collaborative embodied cognition and pe... more Comments and enthusiastic examples or conversations about collaborative embodied cognition and performance, and related theoretical insights and implications, very welcome. The topic: thinking with our feet People move together, and do things together, all the time. We play and work and talk and suffer together, finding ease or joy, sharing pleasure or grief. We discover challenge, thrill, and risk. Such joint actions may involve physical, manual, or technical skill, and may rely on tools, technologies and ordinary old objects. Collaborative actions also involve situated intelligence, a dynamic, lively, and social form of cognition. This book is a celebration and exploration of these things: the dizzying variety of remarkable ways that people move and think together, in unique places and settings, at a time and over time.
Cognitive Processing, 2006
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2013
Scripts and information units in future planning: Interactions between a past and a future planning task
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2015
Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to cre... more Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to create future thoughts, but has not yet examined the role of semantic scripts. In this study, participants recalled how they planned a past camping trip in Australia (past planning task) and imagined how they would plan a future camping trip (future planning task), set either in a familiar (Australia) or unfamiliar (Antarctica) context. Transcripts were segmented into information units that were coded according to semantic category (e.g., where, when, transport, material, actions). Results revealed a strong interaction between tasks and their presentation order. Starting with the past planning task constrained the future planning task when the context was familiar. Participants generated no new information when the future camping trip was set in Australia and completed second (after the past planning task). Conversely, starting with the future planning task facilitated the past planning task. Participants recalled more information units of their past plan when the past planning task was completed second (after the future planning task). These results shed new light on the role of scripts in past and future thinking and on how past and future thinking processes interact.
Synthese, 2020
To investigate the unique kinds of mentality involved in skilled performance, this paper explores... more To investigate the unique kinds of mentality involved in skilled performance, this paper explores the performance ecology of the Māori haka, a ritual form of song and dance of the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand. We respond to a recent proposal to program robots to perform a haka as 'cultural preservationists' for 'intangible cultural heritage'. This 'Robot Māori Haka' proposal raises questions about the nature of skill and the transmission of embodied knowledge; about the cognitive and affective experiences cultivated in indigenous practices like haka; and about the role of robots in the archival aspirations of human societies. Reproducing haka, we suggest, requires more than copying physical actions; preserving the 'intangible' entails more than programming postures and movements. To make this case, we discuss the history of European responses to the haka, and analyse its diverse performance features in cultural context. Arguing that indigenous movement practices incorporate genuinely embodied knowledge, we claim that skilled performance of haka is deeply mindful, embodying and transmitting dynamic, culturally shared understandings of the natural and social world. The indigenous psychologies incorporated in haka performance are animated by a shared history integrated with its environment. Examining haka performance through the lens of 4E cognitive skill theory for mutual benefit, we discuss the effects of synchrony in collective action, the social and environmental scaffolding of affect and emotion, and the multilayered relations between past and present. Culturally-embedded systems of skilled movement like the Māori haka may, we suggest, constitute specific ways of thinking and feeling.
International Journal of Wellbeing, 2020
In some musical genres, professional performers play live shows many times a week. Arduous tourin... more In some musical genres, professional performers play live shows many times a week. Arduous touring schedules bring encounters with wildly diverse audiences across many different performance ecologies. We investigate the kinds of creativity involved in such repeated live performance, kinds of creativity that are quite unlike songwriting and recording, and examine the central factors that influence musicians’ wellbeing over the course of a tour. The perspective of the professional musician has been underrepresented in research on relations between music and wellbeing, with little attention given to the experience of touring. In this case study, we investigate influences on positive and negative performance experiences for the four professional musicians of Australian pop/rock band Cloud Control. Geeves conducted intensive cognitive ethnographic fieldwork with Cloud Control members over a two-week national Australian tour for their second album, Dream Cave (2013). Adapting a Grounded Theory approach to data analysis, we found the level of wellbeing musicians reported and displayed on tour to be intimately linked to their creative performance experiences through the two emergent, overarching and interdependent themes of Performance Headspace (PH) and Connection with Audience (CA). We explore these themes in detail and provide examples to demonstrate how PH and CA can feed off each other in virtuous ways that positively shape musicians’ wellbeing, or loop in vicious ways that negatively shape musicians’ wellbeing. We argue that their creative practice, in thus re-enacting musical performance afresh in each venue’s distinctive setting, emerges within unique constraints each night, and is in a sense a co-creation of the crowd and the band.
*Memento*: philosophers on film, 2009
Mind, Language, and Action: proceedings of the 36th Wittgenstein symposium, eds D. Moyal-Sharrock, V.A. Munz, & A. Coliva, 2015
Remembering in everyday life is deeply embedded in complex, circumstance-dependent webs of signif... more Remembering in everyday life is deeply embedded in complex, circumstance-dependent webs of significance and social practice. This paper compares a 'distributed cognitive ecologies' framework for studying remembering as public practice with Wittgenstein’s remarks on remembering, especially as interpreted in a prominent recent tradition of 'radical' Wittgensteinian enactivism. I argue that even in subtle recent reinterpretations of Wittgenstein, the kinds of engagement with science on show are too heavily weighted towards a critical mode. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy offers rich resources for live topics and debates of intense cross-disciplinary interest. But this has been obscured by the dominance of polemic in the field, leading in some quarters to unfortunate indifference to and ignorance of Wittgenstein. I argue for an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on memory and remembering which supports a strongly integrative, cooperative version of engagement between philosophy and the sciences. Philosophy and the sciences of memory – the social sciences as well as the cognitive sciences – can operate together in complementary projects within common frameworks. I focus on 'radical' forms of Wittgensteinian enactivism because much of what these philosophers say about remembering is interesting and reasonable. Where they go astray is partly in their in their claims about what psychologists and cognitive scientists do and believe, and partly in their choice of criticisms, or their sense of which issues matter most. I argue that the issues about mental representation and content on which these enactivists focus are quite distinct from the issues about individualism which lie at the heart of the major revisionary movements in contemporary cognitive theory in which both enactivism and the distributed cognitive ecologies framework have arisen. After going back to work through the key critical themes of Wittgenstein’s remarks on memory, I then survey the recent history and contemporary landscape of the sciences of memory. Here, in clearing the ground for a direct evaluation of Wittgensteinian enactivism and the distributed cognitive ecologies framework, I set both against truly opposing views in classical cognitivism and reductionist neuroscience, but I complicate the enactivists’ critical assessment of the broader psychology and cognitive science of memory. Both because they focus so exclusively on problems about representation, and because they mischaracterize some of the ‘mainstream’ views under attack, Wittgensteinian enactivists maintain an unnecessarily divisive attitude towards the sciences of memory in general, and as a result tend to overemphasise the revolutionary novelty of their critiques. I argue instead that on many key theoretical points, both Wittgensteinian and enactivist accounts of memory are compatible with large swathes of mainstream work in philosophy and cognitive science. But once we focus more productively on questions about individualism rather than exclusively on problems of content, Wittgensteinian themes can indeed usefully redirect, temper, or illumine certain residual and significant challenges in the interdisciplinary study of memory. As yet, though, as I argue in the concluding section, Wittgensteinian enactivists still set unnecessary limits to constructive theory-development.
Philosophy and Memory Traces defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewilderin... more Philosophy and Memory Traces defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewildering historical view of memories as dynamic patterns in fleeting animal spirits, nervous fluids which rummaged through the pores of brain and body. The other is new connectionism, in which memories are ‘stored’ only superpositionally, and are reconstructed rather than reproduced. Both models depart from static archival metaphors by employing distributed representation, which brings interference and confusion between memory traces. Both raise urgent issues about control of the personal past, and about relations between self and body.
The book’s historical argument is anchored by a reinterpretation of Descartes’ dynamic physiology of memory and strange philosophy of the body. English critics of Descartes’ view of memories as motions complained that mechanistic neurophilosophy could not guarantee order in memory, and instead sought techniques for controlling the brain. In a new account of 18th-century philosophers’ fears of confusion in remembering, the author demonstrates the role of bizarre body fluids in moral physiology, as philosophers from Locke to Reid and Coleridge struggled to control their own innards and impose cognitive discipline on ‘the phantasmal chaos of association’. Finally, in a defence of connectionism against Jerry Fodor and against phenomenological and Wittgensteinian critics of passive mental representations, the author shows how problems of the self are implicated in contemporary sciences of mind. The book is an experiment in historical cognitive science, based on a belief that the interdisciplinary study of memory can exemplify the simultaneous attention to brain, body, and culture towards which psychological sciences must aim.
CONTENTS (Download at http://www.johnsutton.net/PhilosophyandMemoryTraces.htm)
1 Introduction: traces, brains, and history
Appendix: memory and connectionism
Part I Animal spirits and memory traces
Introduction to Part I: Animal Spirits and Memory Traces
2 Wriggle-work: the quick and nimble animal spirits
3 Memory and 'the Cartesian philosophy of the brain'
Appendix 1: nerves, spirits, and traces in Descartes
Appendix 2: Malebranche on memory
Part II Inner discipline
Introduction to Part II: Inner Discipline
4 Spirit sciences, memory motions
5 Cognition, chaos, and control in English responses to Descartes' theory of memory
6 Local and distributed representations
7 John Locke and the neurophilosophy of self
Appendix: memory and self in Essay II.27
8 The puzzle of survival
9 Spirits, body, and self
10 The puzzle of elimination
Part III 'The phantasmal chaos of association'
Introduction to Part III: 'The phantasmal chaos of association'
11 Fodor, connectionism, and cognitive discipline
12 Associationism and neo-associationism
13 Hartley's distributed model of memory
14 Attacks on neurophilosophy: Reid and Coleridge
Part IV Connectionism and the philosophy of memory
Introduction to Part IV: connectionism and the philosophy of memory
15 Representations, realism, and history
16 Attacks on traces
17 Order, confusion, remembering
References
Index
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, 2018
One significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence. To greater or lesser ... more One significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence. To greater or lesser extents, and across diverse cultural contexts, our cognitive and affective states are related to those of others around us. We act alongside and share experiences with partners, family members, friends, workmates, and other people with whom we are connected in our daily lives. And as a result, what each of us feels and remembers, what matters to each of us about the present and the past, and the way we imagine and plan for the future, can be influenced by what those others feel, remember, and care about. This chapter integrates four recent trends in philosophy of memory and philosophy of cognitive science, all addressing such phenomena of psychological interdependence. Because memory is often in use when it is not explicitly in question, theorists whose primary attention is on another domain may not see just how heavily it is implicated. A range of interacting forms of remembering are involved in the phenomena of ‘distributed affectivity’ (Slaby, 2016) . I make this case in Section 2 by picking out four relevant features of distributed affectivity. These are features of interest in their own right that collectively confirm the close links in these contexts between emotion and memory. I then home in, in Section 3, on a specific question about what exactly is shared in shared remembering, in such socially distributed systems: again considering emotion and memory together, I argue that complementary relations between different people are often more significant than convergence or synchrony across interacting individuals.
Consciousness, Creativity and Self at the Dawn of Settled Life: the test case of Çatalhöyük , 2020
‘The Çatalhöyük evidence as a whole’, write Hodder and Pels, ‘gives many indications that, indeed... more ‘The Çatalhöyük evidence as a whole’, write Hodder and Pels, ‘gives many indications that, indeed, people began to link themselves to specific pasts, by burying pots, tools, humans and hunting trophies in ways that indicate particular memories rather than a generic reference to a group’. Such striking claims about Neolithic cognitive change seem to chime neatly with the other ambitious hypotheses explored in this volume, intended to link measurable changes in the archaeological record to historical changes in consciousness, creativity, and self. In this essay I return to memory as a test case for evaluating claims about cognitive change in the Neolithic, trying to flesh out and generalise Hodder’s suggestive remarks about memory at Çatalhöyük by setting them in the context of a broad theoretical approach to personal memory which might both make sense of and in turn be buttressed and developed by the archaeological case study. I proceed by first explaining and defending the possibility of historical changes in autobiographical memory, anchoring this exercise in speculative cognitive archaeology and cognitive history in the picture of the ‘scaffolded mind’ suggested by the ‘distributed cognition’ framework. In section 3, I discuss features of autobiographical memory and its components which are highlighted in various domains of recent science and theory, and which taken together reveal personal remembering as a rich and complex set of learned and enculturated skills. Section 4 lays out the background conditions for the putative historical changes, in or before the Neolithic, before I go on in section 5 to sketch a picture of the nature, causes, and implications of the hypothesised changes in memory capacities and practices.
Mindful Aesthetics: literature and the science of mind, eds C. Danta & H. Groth, 2014
Lloyd Jones’s *The Book of Fame*, a novel about the stunningly successful 1905 British tour of th... more Lloyd Jones’s *The Book of Fame*, a novel about the stunningly successful 1905 British tour of the New Zealand rugby team, represents both skilled group action and the difficulty of capturing it in words. The novel’s form is as fluid and deceptive, as adaptable and integrated, as the sweetly shaped play of the team that became known during this tour for the first time as the All Blacks. It treats sport on its own terms as a rich world, a set of bodily skills, and an honest profession in itself. A reading of *The Book of Fame* can contribute to the interdisciplinary study of literature and cognition, exemplifying two-way ‘exchange values’. On the one hand, we gain insights into the nature of skilful group agency, of distinct forms and at distinct timescales, by focussing on the precise forms taken by the All Blacks’ creation of space. Here, we treat The Book of Fame as a brilliant evocation of features of collective thought, movement, and emotion that both everyday and scientific inquiry can easily miss. On the other hand, we also read back into the novel a subtle, fascinated interrogation of the mechanisms by which small groups form, evolve, and act. In this more ambitious mode of analysis, we use independently motivated theoretical concerns to help us see real features of the literary work that might otherwise remain invisible. We focus on the relationship between skilful performance and collective action. These topics fall outside the ambit of much current work by literary theorists using cognitive research, who tend to focus on theory of mind and modularity, metaphor and blending, emotion and empathy, consciousness and concepts, representation and so on. But skilled performance and collective action comprise surprisingly lively research fields across the sciences, from neuropsychology to philosophy of mind and cognitive anthropology. These areas of inquiry may provide even more productive avenues for future work in the interfield of literary and cultural theory and the cognitive sciences.
Creative Editing: Svilova and Vertov's Distributed Cognition
Apparatus, 2018
The film editor Elizaveta Svilova (1900-1975), wife, and lifelong collaborator of the filmmaker D... more The film editor Elizaveta Svilova (1900-1975), wife, and lifelong collaborator of the filmmaker Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), lingers to the side of scholarship on her famous husband’s films, hidden behind the historical neglect of both of women and of editors. This article addresses the silence surrounding Svilova by applying research in film history, cognitive philosophy, and creative practice to her montage filmmaking collaboration with Vertov. We aim to recuperate Svilova’s position as creative contributor to what are known as Vertov’s works of genius by showing that editing processes are the expert work of a distributed cognitive system. Using the distributed cognitive framework, which understands the work of mind to be the integrated work of brains, bodies and the world (Clark and Chalmers 1998), we analyse a particular instance of Svilova at work. This framework for analysis reveals her editing as an embodied form of expertise. The intended outcome of this approach is to ground a fresh model of creativity in film in empirical evidence that is uniquely available in the works and documents of the Svilova-Vertov collaboration. We propose that understanding editing as an instance of distributed cognition provides insight into editing expertise and its creative contribution to films. We conclude that this understanding of editing as the work of distributed cognitive systems may have profound implications for the re-evaluation of the work of otherwise invisible women and editors.
The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, 2014
Introduction: the diversity of embodied remembering Experiences of embodied remembering are famil... more Introduction: the diversity of embodied remembering Experiences of embodied remembering are familiar and diverse. We settle bodily into familiar chairs or find our way easily round familiar rooms. We inhabit our own kitchens or cars or workspaces effectively and comfortably, and feel disrupted when our habitual and accustomed objects or technologies change or break or are not available. Hearing a particular song can viscerally bring back either one conversation long ago, or just the urge to dance. Some people explicitly use their bodies to record, store, or cue memories. Others can move skilfully, without stopping to think, in complex and changing environments thanks to the cumulative expertise accrued in their history of fighting fires, or dancing, or playing hockey. The forms of memory involved in these cases may be distinct, operating at different timescales and levels, and by way of different mechanisms and media, but they often cooperate in the many contexts of our practices of remembering.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4), 521-560, 2010
This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on coll... more This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive
psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical
debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for
extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which
neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary
properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the
nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive
complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as
“a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as
the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous
systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich
middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism.
Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the
“scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for
understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological
and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary”
metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external
resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or
transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical
results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin.
We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of
memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of
collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical
research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for
mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended,
embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact
with independentlymotivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.
The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, 2009
The case of remembering poses a particular challenge to theories of situated cognition, and its s... more The case of remembering poses a particular challenge to theories of situated cognition, and its successful treatment within
this framework will require a more dramatic integration of levels, fields, and methods than has yet been achieved. The challenge arises from the fact that memory often takes us out of the current situation: in remembering episodes or experiences in my personal
past, for example, I am mentally transported away from the social and physical setting in which I am currently embedded. Our ability
to make psychological contact with events and experiences in the past was one motivation, in classical cognitive science and cognitive psychology, for postulating inner mental representations to hold information across the temporal gap. Theorists of situated cognition thus have to show how such an apparently representation-hungry and decoupled high-level cognitive process may nonetheless be fruitfully understood as embodied, contextualized, and distributed.
Topoi, 2024
Traces of many past events are often layered or superposed, in brain, body, and world alike. This... more Traces of many past events are often layered or superposed, in brain, body, and world alike. This often poses challenges for individuals and groups, both in accessing specific past events and in regulating or managing coexisting emotions or attitudes. We sometimes struggle, for example, to find appropriate modes of engagement with places with complex and difficult pasts. More generally, there can appear to be a tension between what we know about the highly constructive nature of remembering, whether it is drawing on neural or worldly resources or both, and the ways that we need and use memory to make claims on the past, and to maintain some appropriate causal connections to past events. I assess the current state of work on situated affect and distributed memory, and the recent criticisms of the 'dogma of harmony' in these fields. I then deploy these frameworks to examine some affective dimensions of place memory, sketching a strongly distributed conception of places as sometimes partly constituting the processes and activities of feeling and remembering. These approaches also offer useful perspectives on the problems of how to engage-politically and aesthetically-with difficult pasts and historically burdened heritage. In assessing artistic interventions in troubled places, we can seek responsibly to do justice to the past while fully embracing the dynamic and contested constructedness of our present emotions, memories, and activities.
Comments and enthusiastic examples or conversations about collaborative embodied cognition and pe... more Comments and enthusiastic examples or conversations about collaborative embodied cognition and performance, and related theoretical insights and implications, very welcome. The topic: thinking with our feet People move together, and do things together, all the time. We play and work and talk and suffer together, finding ease or joy, sharing pleasure or grief. We discover challenge, thrill, and risk. Such joint actions may involve physical, manual, or technical skill, and may rely on tools, technologies and ordinary old objects. Collaborative actions also involve situated intelligence, a dynamic, lively, and social form of cognition. This book is a celebration and exploration of these things: the dizzying variety of remarkable ways that people move and think together, in unique places and settings, at a time and over time.
Cognitive Processing, 2006
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2013
Scripts and information units in future planning: Interactions between a past and a future planning task
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2015
Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to cre... more Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to create future thoughts, but has not yet examined the role of semantic scripts. In this study, participants recalled how they planned a past camping trip in Australia (past planning task) and imagined how they would plan a future camping trip (future planning task), set either in a familiar (Australia) or unfamiliar (Antarctica) context. Transcripts were segmented into information units that were coded according to semantic category (e.g., where, when, transport, material, actions). Results revealed a strong interaction between tasks and their presentation order. Starting with the past planning task constrained the future planning task when the context was familiar. Participants generated no new information when the future camping trip was set in Australia and completed second (after the past planning task). Conversely, starting with the future planning task facilitated the past planning task. Participants recalled more information units of their past plan when the past planning task was completed second (after the future planning task). These results shed new light on the role of scripts in past and future thinking and on how past and future thinking processes interact.
Synthese, 2020
To investigate the unique kinds of mentality involved in skilled performance, this paper explores... more To investigate the unique kinds of mentality involved in skilled performance, this paper explores the performance ecology of the Māori haka, a ritual form of song and dance of the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand. We respond to a recent proposal to program robots to perform a haka as 'cultural preservationists' for 'intangible cultural heritage'. This 'Robot Māori Haka' proposal raises questions about the nature of skill and the transmission of embodied knowledge; about the cognitive and affective experiences cultivated in indigenous practices like haka; and about the role of robots in the archival aspirations of human societies. Reproducing haka, we suggest, requires more than copying physical actions; preserving the 'intangible' entails more than programming postures and movements. To make this case, we discuss the history of European responses to the haka, and analyse its diverse performance features in cultural context. Arguing that indigenous movement practices incorporate genuinely embodied knowledge, we claim that skilled performance of haka is deeply mindful, embodying and transmitting dynamic, culturally shared understandings of the natural and social world. The indigenous psychologies incorporated in haka performance are animated by a shared history integrated with its environment. Examining haka performance through the lens of 4E cognitive skill theory for mutual benefit, we discuss the effects of synchrony in collective action, the social and environmental scaffolding of affect and emotion, and the multilayered relations between past and present. Culturally-embedded systems of skilled movement like the Māori haka may, we suggest, constitute specific ways of thinking and feeling.
International Journal of Wellbeing, 2020
In some musical genres, professional performers play live shows many times a week. Arduous tourin... more In some musical genres, professional performers play live shows many times a week. Arduous touring schedules bring encounters with wildly diverse audiences across many different performance ecologies. We investigate the kinds of creativity involved in such repeated live performance, kinds of creativity that are quite unlike songwriting and recording, and examine the central factors that influence musicians’ wellbeing over the course of a tour. The perspective of the professional musician has been underrepresented in research on relations between music and wellbeing, with little attention given to the experience of touring. In this case study, we investigate influences on positive and negative performance experiences for the four professional musicians of Australian pop/rock band Cloud Control. Geeves conducted intensive cognitive ethnographic fieldwork with Cloud Control members over a two-week national Australian tour for their second album, Dream Cave (2013). Adapting a Grounded Theory approach to data analysis, we found the level of wellbeing musicians reported and displayed on tour to be intimately linked to their creative performance experiences through the two emergent, overarching and interdependent themes of Performance Headspace (PH) and Connection with Audience (CA). We explore these themes in detail and provide examples to demonstrate how PH and CA can feed off each other in virtuous ways that positively shape musicians’ wellbeing, or loop in vicious ways that negatively shape musicians’ wellbeing. We argue that their creative practice, in thus re-enacting musical performance afresh in each venue’s distinctive setting, emerges within unique constraints each night, and is in a sense a co-creation of the crowd and the band.
*Memento*: philosophers on film, 2009
Mind, Language, and Action: proceedings of the 36th Wittgenstein symposium, eds D. Moyal-Sharrock, V.A. Munz, & A. Coliva, 2015
Remembering in everyday life is deeply embedded in complex, circumstance-dependent webs of signif... more Remembering in everyday life is deeply embedded in complex, circumstance-dependent webs of significance and social practice. This paper compares a 'distributed cognitive ecologies' framework for studying remembering as public practice with Wittgenstein’s remarks on remembering, especially as interpreted in a prominent recent tradition of 'radical' Wittgensteinian enactivism. I argue that even in subtle recent reinterpretations of Wittgenstein, the kinds of engagement with science on show are too heavily weighted towards a critical mode. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy offers rich resources for live topics and debates of intense cross-disciplinary interest. But this has been obscured by the dominance of polemic in the field, leading in some quarters to unfortunate indifference to and ignorance of Wittgenstein. I argue for an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on memory and remembering which supports a strongly integrative, cooperative version of engagement between philosophy and the sciences. Philosophy and the sciences of memory – the social sciences as well as the cognitive sciences – can operate together in complementary projects within common frameworks. I focus on 'radical' forms of Wittgensteinian enactivism because much of what these philosophers say about remembering is interesting and reasonable. Where they go astray is partly in their in their claims about what psychologists and cognitive scientists do and believe, and partly in their choice of criticisms, or their sense of which issues matter most. I argue that the issues about mental representation and content on which these enactivists focus are quite distinct from the issues about individualism which lie at the heart of the major revisionary movements in contemporary cognitive theory in which both enactivism and the distributed cognitive ecologies framework have arisen. After going back to work through the key critical themes of Wittgenstein’s remarks on memory, I then survey the recent history and contemporary landscape of the sciences of memory. Here, in clearing the ground for a direct evaluation of Wittgensteinian enactivism and the distributed cognitive ecologies framework, I set both against truly opposing views in classical cognitivism and reductionist neuroscience, but I complicate the enactivists’ critical assessment of the broader psychology and cognitive science of memory. Both because they focus so exclusively on problems about representation, and because they mischaracterize some of the ‘mainstream’ views under attack, Wittgensteinian enactivists maintain an unnecessarily divisive attitude towards the sciences of memory in general, and as a result tend to overemphasise the revolutionary novelty of their critiques. I argue instead that on many key theoretical points, both Wittgensteinian and enactivist accounts of memory are compatible with large swathes of mainstream work in philosophy and cognitive science. But once we focus more productively on questions about individualism rather than exclusively on problems of content, Wittgensteinian themes can indeed usefully redirect, temper, or illumine certain residual and significant challenges in the interdisciplinary study of memory. As yet, though, as I argue in the concluding section, Wittgensteinian enactivists still set unnecessary limits to constructive theory-development.
Philosophy and Memory Traces defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewilderin... more Philosophy and Memory Traces defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewildering historical view of memories as dynamic patterns in fleeting animal spirits, nervous fluids which rummaged through the pores of brain and body. The other is new connectionism, in which memories are ‘stored’ only superpositionally, and are reconstructed rather than reproduced. Both models depart from static archival metaphors by employing distributed representation, which brings interference and confusion between memory traces. Both raise urgent issues about control of the personal past, and about relations between self and body.
The book’s historical argument is anchored by a reinterpretation of Descartes’ dynamic physiology of memory and strange philosophy of the body. English critics of Descartes’ view of memories as motions complained that mechanistic neurophilosophy could not guarantee order in memory, and instead sought techniques for controlling the brain. In a new account of 18th-century philosophers’ fears of confusion in remembering, the author demonstrates the role of bizarre body fluids in moral physiology, as philosophers from Locke to Reid and Coleridge struggled to control their own innards and impose cognitive discipline on ‘the phantasmal chaos of association’. Finally, in a defence of connectionism against Jerry Fodor and against phenomenological and Wittgensteinian critics of passive mental representations, the author shows how problems of the self are implicated in contemporary sciences of mind. The book is an experiment in historical cognitive science, based on a belief that the interdisciplinary study of memory can exemplify the simultaneous attention to brain, body, and culture towards which psychological sciences must aim.
CONTENTS (Download at http://www.johnsutton.net/PhilosophyandMemoryTraces.htm)
1 Introduction: traces, brains, and history
Appendix: memory and connectionism
Part I Animal spirits and memory traces
Introduction to Part I: Animal Spirits and Memory Traces
2 Wriggle-work: the quick and nimble animal spirits
3 Memory and 'the Cartesian philosophy of the brain'
Appendix 1: nerves, spirits, and traces in Descartes
Appendix 2: Malebranche on memory
Part II Inner discipline
Introduction to Part II: Inner Discipline
4 Spirit sciences, memory motions
5 Cognition, chaos, and control in English responses to Descartes' theory of memory
6 Local and distributed representations
7 John Locke and the neurophilosophy of self
Appendix: memory and self in Essay II.27
8 The puzzle of survival
9 Spirits, body, and self
10 The puzzle of elimination
Part III 'The phantasmal chaos of association'
Introduction to Part III: 'The phantasmal chaos of association'
11 Fodor, connectionism, and cognitive discipline
12 Associationism and neo-associationism
13 Hartley's distributed model of memory
14 Attacks on neurophilosophy: Reid and Coleridge
Part IV Connectionism and the philosophy of memory
Introduction to Part IV: connectionism and the philosophy of memory
15 Representations, realism, and history
16 Attacks on traces
17 Order, confusion, remembering
References
Index
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, 2018
One significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence. To greater or lesser ... more One significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence. To greater or lesser extents, and across diverse cultural contexts, our cognitive and affective states are related to those of others around us. We act alongside and share experiences with partners, family members, friends, workmates, and other people with whom we are connected in our daily lives. And as a result, what each of us feels and remembers, what matters to each of us about the present and the past, and the way we imagine and plan for the future, can be influenced by what those others feel, remember, and care about. This chapter integrates four recent trends in philosophy of memory and philosophy of cognitive science, all addressing such phenomena of psychological interdependence. Because memory is often in use when it is not explicitly in question, theorists whose primary attention is on another domain may not see just how heavily it is implicated. A range of interacting forms of remembering are involved in the phenomena of ‘distributed affectivity’ (Slaby, 2016) . I make this case in Section 2 by picking out four relevant features of distributed affectivity. These are features of interest in their own right that collectively confirm the close links in these contexts between emotion and memory. I then home in, in Section 3, on a specific question about what exactly is shared in shared remembering, in such socially distributed systems: again considering emotion and memory together, I argue that complementary relations between different people are often more significant than convergence or synchrony across interacting individuals.
Consciousness, Creativity and Self at the Dawn of Settled Life: the test case of Çatalhöyük , 2020
‘The Çatalhöyük evidence as a whole’, write Hodder and Pels, ‘gives many indications that, indeed... more ‘The Çatalhöyük evidence as a whole’, write Hodder and Pels, ‘gives many indications that, indeed, people began to link themselves to specific pasts, by burying pots, tools, humans and hunting trophies in ways that indicate particular memories rather than a generic reference to a group’. Such striking claims about Neolithic cognitive change seem to chime neatly with the other ambitious hypotheses explored in this volume, intended to link measurable changes in the archaeological record to historical changes in consciousness, creativity, and self. In this essay I return to memory as a test case for evaluating claims about cognitive change in the Neolithic, trying to flesh out and generalise Hodder’s suggestive remarks about memory at Çatalhöyük by setting them in the context of a broad theoretical approach to personal memory which might both make sense of and in turn be buttressed and developed by the archaeological case study. I proceed by first explaining and defending the possibility of historical changes in autobiographical memory, anchoring this exercise in speculative cognitive archaeology and cognitive history in the picture of the ‘scaffolded mind’ suggested by the ‘distributed cognition’ framework. In section 3, I discuss features of autobiographical memory and its components which are highlighted in various domains of recent science and theory, and which taken together reveal personal remembering as a rich and complex set of learned and enculturated skills. Section 4 lays out the background conditions for the putative historical changes, in or before the Neolithic, before I go on in section 5 to sketch a picture of the nature, causes, and implications of the hypothesised changes in memory capacities and practices.
Mindful Aesthetics: literature and the science of mind, eds C. Danta & H. Groth, 2014
Lloyd Jones’s *The Book of Fame*, a novel about the stunningly successful 1905 British tour of th... more Lloyd Jones’s *The Book of Fame*, a novel about the stunningly successful 1905 British tour of the New Zealand rugby team, represents both skilled group action and the difficulty of capturing it in words. The novel’s form is as fluid and deceptive, as adaptable and integrated, as the sweetly shaped play of the team that became known during this tour for the first time as the All Blacks. It treats sport on its own terms as a rich world, a set of bodily skills, and an honest profession in itself. A reading of *The Book of Fame* can contribute to the interdisciplinary study of literature and cognition, exemplifying two-way ‘exchange values’. On the one hand, we gain insights into the nature of skilful group agency, of distinct forms and at distinct timescales, by focussing on the precise forms taken by the All Blacks’ creation of space. Here, we treat The Book of Fame as a brilliant evocation of features of collective thought, movement, and emotion that both everyday and scientific inquiry can easily miss. On the other hand, we also read back into the novel a subtle, fascinated interrogation of the mechanisms by which small groups form, evolve, and act. In this more ambitious mode of analysis, we use independently motivated theoretical concerns to help us see real features of the literary work that might otherwise remain invisible. We focus on the relationship between skilful performance and collective action. These topics fall outside the ambit of much current work by literary theorists using cognitive research, who tend to focus on theory of mind and modularity, metaphor and blending, emotion and empathy, consciousness and concepts, representation and so on. But skilled performance and collective action comprise surprisingly lively research fields across the sciences, from neuropsychology to philosophy of mind and cognitive anthropology. These areas of inquiry may provide even more productive avenues for future work in the interfield of literary and cultural theory and the cognitive sciences.
Creative Editing: Svilova and Vertov's Distributed Cognition
Apparatus, 2018
The film editor Elizaveta Svilova (1900-1975), wife, and lifelong collaborator of the filmmaker D... more The film editor Elizaveta Svilova (1900-1975), wife, and lifelong collaborator of the filmmaker Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), lingers to the side of scholarship on her famous husband’s films, hidden behind the historical neglect of both of women and of editors. This article addresses the silence surrounding Svilova by applying research in film history, cognitive philosophy, and creative practice to her montage filmmaking collaboration with Vertov. We aim to recuperate Svilova’s position as creative contributor to what are known as Vertov’s works of genius by showing that editing processes are the expert work of a distributed cognitive system. Using the distributed cognitive framework, which understands the work of mind to be the integrated work of brains, bodies and the world (Clark and Chalmers 1998), we analyse a particular instance of Svilova at work. This framework for analysis reveals her editing as an embodied form of expertise. The intended outcome of this approach is to ground a fresh model of creativity in film in empirical evidence that is uniquely available in the works and documents of the Svilova-Vertov collaboration. We propose that understanding editing as an instance of distributed cognition provides insight into editing expertise and its creative contribution to films. We conclude that this understanding of editing as the work of distributed cognitive systems may have profound implications for the re-evaluation of the work of otherwise invisible women and editors.
The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, 2014
Introduction: the diversity of embodied remembering Experiences of embodied remembering are famil... more Introduction: the diversity of embodied remembering Experiences of embodied remembering are familiar and diverse. We settle bodily into familiar chairs or find our way easily round familiar rooms. We inhabit our own kitchens or cars or workspaces effectively and comfortably, and feel disrupted when our habitual and accustomed objects or technologies change or break or are not available. Hearing a particular song can viscerally bring back either one conversation long ago, or just the urge to dance. Some people explicitly use their bodies to record, store, or cue memories. Others can move skilfully, without stopping to think, in complex and changing environments thanks to the cumulative expertise accrued in their history of fighting fires, or dancing, or playing hockey. The forms of memory involved in these cases may be distinct, operating at different timescales and levels, and by way of different mechanisms and media, but they often cooperate in the many contexts of our practices of remembering.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4), 521-560, 2010
This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on coll... more This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive
psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical
debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for
extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which
neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary
properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the
nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive
complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as
“a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as
the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous
systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich
middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism.
Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the
“scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for
understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological
and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary”
metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external
resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or
transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical
results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin.
We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of
memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of
collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical
research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for
mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended,
embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact
with independentlymotivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.
The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, 2009
The case of remembering poses a particular challenge to theories of situated cognition, and its s... more The case of remembering poses a particular challenge to theories of situated cognition, and its successful treatment within
this framework will require a more dramatic integration of levels, fields, and methods than has yet been achieved. The challenge arises from the fact that memory often takes us out of the current situation: in remembering episodes or experiences in my personal
past, for example, I am mentally transported away from the social and physical setting in which I am currently embedded. Our ability
to make psychological contact with events and experiences in the past was one motivation, in classical cognitive science and cognitive psychology, for postulating inner mental representations to hold information across the temporal gap. Theorists of situated cognition thus have to show how such an apparently representation-hungry and decoupled high-level cognitive process may nonetheless be fruitfully understood as embodied, contextualized, and distributed.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, 2020
The skilled performance of experts in complex, culturally-significant settings often involves nav... more The skilled performance of experts in complex, culturally-significant settings often involves navigating dynamic, unpredictable circumstances. In elite sport, professional athletes deal with weather conditions, unfamiliar locations or deteriorating conditions, equipment and new technologies, fatigue, pain and risk, audience expectations and noise, the constraints of collaboration, the actions of other competitors, and strong personal emotions. We set a new agenda for research on skill and expertise, to focus on the embodied experience of real expert performers in real domains of practice, as they deploy richly embedded strategies in full and challenging ecological settings. Studying experts' embodied experience, both over time and at a time, requires expanding standard sources for skill theory, to tap not only specialist work in sport psychology, music cognition, and other rich bodies of applied research, but also practitioners' own fallible but unique self-understandings. We address standard concerns about self-report, surveying related methods from cognitive psychology, sport science, and cognitive ethnography, and home in on apprenticeship methods and work by researcher-practitioners. We conclude with an extended case study of professional cyclist Chloe Hosking's account of the closing stages of her winning ride in the 2016 La Course by Le Tour de France, at the time the highest profile event in women's road cycling. Triangulating Hosking's narrative against other evidence, we identify the multiplicity of diverse cues to which she was responding in on-the-fly decision-making. We can learn much about skill and expertise if we work with real experts in the environments to which they are so intelligently attuned.
Thinking in the World: a reader , 2019
This is a partial reprint of ‘Applying intelligence to the reflexes’ (Sutton et al, Journal of th... more This is a partial reprint of ‘Applying intelligence to the reflexes’ (Sutton et al, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2011)
Philosophical Psychology, 2019
In keeping with the dominant view that skills are largely automatic , the standard view of memory... more In keeping with the dominant view that skills are largely automatic , the standard view of memory systems distinguishes between a representational declarative system associated with cognitive processes and a performance-based procedural system. The procedural system is thought to be largely responsible for the performance of well-learned skilled actions. Here we argue that most skills do not fully automate, which entails that the declarative system should make a substantial contribution to skilled performance. To support this view, we review evidence showing that the declarative system does indeed play a number of roles in skilled action.
Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology, 2019
A central theme of embodied cognition research is the idea that cognition is grounded in the rich... more A central theme of embodied cognition research is the idea that cognition is grounded in the rich interaction processes by which individuals navigate the world—interaction processes that are deeply shaped by the physical structure of bodies and the environment. It is, moreover, often suggested that traditional cognitive science has neglected these interaction processes, and that properly taking them into account has profound conceptual consequences. For obvious reasons skill research and sport psychology are areas of prime interest for embodied cognition theory—advanced skills exemplify highly tuned, richly interactive human abilities. Recently we have proposed a theory of skill called mesh (Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain 2016), and at the kind invitation of the editor, Max Cappuccio, the original paper is reprinted here. In this new introduction we expand on the issues that mesh tries to address and discuss some of the connections between mesh and broader issues in embodied cognition and sport psychology.
We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cognitive processes make an i... more We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cognitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically. Cognitive control is focused on strategic aspects of performance, and plays a greater role as difficulty increases. We offer an analysis of various forms of skill experience and show that the theory provides a better explanation for the full set of these experiences than automatic theories. We further show that the theory can explain experimental evidence for skill automaticity, including evidence that secondary tasks do not interfere with expert performance, and evidence that experts have reduced memory for performance of sensorimotor skills.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8, article 863, 2014
This study focuses in on a moment of live performance in which the entrainment amongst a musical ... more This study focuses in on a moment of live performance in which the entrainment amongst a musical quartet is threatened. Entrainment is asymmetric in so far as there is an ensemble leader who improvises and expands the structure of a last chorus of a piece of music beyond the limits tacitly negotiated during prior rehearsals and performances. Despite the risk of entrainment being disturbed and performance interrupted, the other three musicians in the quartet follow the leading performer and smoothly transition into unprecedented performance territory. We use this moment of live performance to work back through the fieldwork data, building a diachronic study of the development and bases of entrainment in live music performance.We introduce the concept of entrainment and profile previous theory and research relevant to entrainment in music performance. After outlining our methodology, we trace the evolution of the structure of the piece of music from first rehearsal to final performance. Using video clip analysis, interviews and field notes we consider how entrainment shaped and was shaped by the moment of performance in focus. The sense of trust between quartet musicians is established through entrainment processes, is consolidated via smooth adaptation to the threats of disruption. Non-verbal communicative exchanges, via eye contact, gesture, and spatial proximity, sustain entrainment through phase shifts occurring swiftly and on the fly in performance contexts. These exchanges permit smooth adaptation promoting trust. This frees the quartet members to play with the potential disturbance of equilibrium inherent in entrained relationships and to play with this tension in an improvisatory way that enhances audience engagement and the live quality of performance.
Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of contr... more Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the
nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal influences on action outcomes. This allows fine-grained differentiation of the contributions of self and external factors to action outcomes. We further argue that the sense of agency incorporates prospective awareness of actions that are possible in a situation and awareness of the limits of control. These forms of sense of agency enable highly
flexible, context-sensitive strategic control, and are likely to contribute to high interindividual variability in responses to complex tasks.
JBSP: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (1), 78-103, 2011
Journal of Mental Imagery 36 (1/2), 85-95., 2012
This paper addresses relations between memory and imagery in expert sport in relation to visual o... more This paper addresses relations between memory and imagery in expert sport in relation to visual or visuospatial perspective. Imagining, remembering, and moving potentially interact via related forms of episodic simulation, whether future- or past-directed. Sometimes I see myself engaged in action: many experts report switching between such external visual perspectives and an internal, 'own-eyes', or field perspective on their past or possible performance. Perspective in retrieval and in imagery may be flexible and multiple. I raise a range of topics for empirical research on perspective and visualization.
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2013
The Routledge Handbook of Sports Expertise, eds D. Farrow & J. Baker, 2015
Expert athletes seem to have rich and highly-organized knowledge of their specialist domain, whic... more Expert athletes seem to have rich and highly-organized knowledge of their specialist domain, which drives their abilities in perceptual anticipation and complements their motor skill. But although they know more, they can access relevant information fast and effortlessly, and update their models with relevant information during competition. In this chapter we distinguish between the various kinds of knowledge which might be involved in these expert advantages, assessing different views about the relation between declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge. We discuss theories which place much less stress on expert knowledge, and then examine experimental research programs which seek to tap expert knowledge in action. We also mention issues about knowledge in expert teams.
The Routledge Handbook of Sports Expertise, Damian Farrow and Joe Baker (eds), 2015
Expert knowledge in sport takes many forms and is hard to access. Verbal report has had uncertain... more Expert knowledge in sport takes many forms and is hard to access. Verbal report has had uncertain status in sport psychology, with researchers recommending highly constrained methods to access concurrent or immediately retrospective accounts of thoughts during performance. This chapter takes a broader view of the knowledge base driving skill, suggesting that experts in appropriate settings or with the right prompts can access significant parameters and features of their own skilled experience. We introduce a range of qualitative methodologies which can supplement and be integrated with existing research methods. These methods can permit generalization across individuals as well as study of the unique features of expert experience.
submitted to Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, special issue 'Unreflective Action and the Choking Effect'
There is a widespread view that well-learned skills are automated, and that attention to the perf... more There is a widespread view that well-learned skills are automated, and that attention to the performance of these skills is damaging because it disrupts the automatic processes involved in their execution. This idea serves as the basis for an account of choking in high pressure situations. On this view, choking is the result of self-focused attention induced by anxiety. Recent research in sports psychology has produced a significant body of experimental evidence widely interpreted as supporting this account of choking in certain kinds of complex sensorimotor skills. We argue against this interpretation, pointing to problems with both the empirical evidence and the underlying theory. The experimental research fails to provide direct support for the central claims of the self-focus approach, contains inconsistencies, and suffers from problems of ecological validity. In addition, qualitative studies of choking have yielded contrary results. We further argue that in their current forms the self-focus and rival distraction approaches lack the theoretical resources to provide a good theory of choking, and we argue for an expanded approach. Some of the elements that should be in an expanded approach include accounts of the features of pressure situations that influence the psychological response, the processes of situation appraisal, and the ways that attentional control can be overwhelmed, leading to distraction in some cases, and in others, perhaps, to damaging attention to skill execution. We also suggest that choking may sometimes involve performance-impairing mechanisms other than distraction or self-focus.
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2014
Expert skill in music performance involves an apparent paradox. On stage, expert musicians are re... more Expert skill in music performance involves an apparent paradox. On stage, expert musicians are required accurately to retrieve information that has been encoded over hours of practice. Yet they must also remain open to the demands of the ever-changing situational contingencies
with which they are faced during performance. To further explore this apparent paradox and the way in which it is negotiated by expert musicians, this article profiles theories presented by Roger Chaffin, Hubert Dreyfus and Tony and Helga Noice. For Chaffin, expert skill in music performance relies solely upon overarching mental representations, while, for Dreyfus, such representations are needed only by novices, while experts rely on a more embodied form of coping. Between Chaffin and Dreyfus sit the Noices, who argue that both overarching cognitive structures and embodied processes underlie expert skill. We then present the Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes (AIR) approach — a differently nuanced model of expert skill aligned with the integrative spirit of the Noices’ research. The AIR approach suggests that musicians negotiate the apparent paradox of expert skill via a mindedness that allows flexibility of attention during music performance. We offer data from recent doctoral research conducted by the first author of this article to demonstrate at a practical level the usefulness of the AIR approach when attempting to understand the complexities of expert skill in music performance.
Brain Theory: essays in critical neurophilosophy, 2014
Collaborating with others takes intriguing and complex forms. We collaborate with others in a wid... more Collaborating with others takes intriguing and complex forms. We collaborate with others in a wide variety of activities: from team sports to shared labour, from committee work to mass demonstrations, from dancing to reminiscing together about old times. Recently, philosophy of mind and cognitive science has turned to theorizing and studying socio-cognitive interactions of these kinds, asking what kinds of adaptive and shared intelligence are involved in collaborative activities in small groups. Theorists focus on complex and intricate cognitive and affective processes that spread beyond a single individual’s brain – distributed across the body and/or the environment, coopting objects and driving interactions with other individuals. We explore embodied practices of collaboration in sporting and other performance contexts, drawing on rich literatures from cognitive psychology, sports psychology, organisational psychology and social ontology. Our interest in both sport and embodied minds centres on cases in which people are not working or moving alone, but in which individual participants’ unique skills and capacities are coordinated with those of others in service of shared goals. We identify a range of levels of socio-cognitive processes that interact to drive and sustain embodied collaboration in a variety of contexts. By appreciating how such processes interact, we can begin to understand how human collaboration is achieved and maintained.
The collaborative projects described in this e-book have already produced thrilling new dancework... more The collaborative projects described in this e-book have already produced thrilling new danceworks, new technologies, and innovative experimental methods. As the papers collected here show, a further happy outcome is the emergence of intriguing and hybrid kinds of writing. Aesthetic theory, cognitive psychology, and dance criticism merge, as authors are appropriately driven more by the heterogeneous nature of their topics than by any fixed disciplinary affiliation.
Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Ballet, 2021
This work addresses the case of the Ballet National de Marseille (BNM) and the 2017 re-creation o... more This work addresses the case of the Ballet National de Marseille (BNM) and the 2017 re-creation of the piece Passione by Emio Greco and Pieter C. Scholten. This study, informed by a phenomenological approach, adopts ethnographic methods including participant observation, in-depth interviews and one researcher’s direct involvement with the practices of enculturation and enskillment in this dance form. It investigates how the dancers of the Ballet National de Marseille articulate their diverse forms of agency in relation to the choreographer’s artistic vision and demands. By looking at the specific case of the BNM staging of Passione, we can isolate some significant features of Contemporary Ballet’s trajectory as an emergent dance genre on the edge between innovation and tradition.
Psychology of Music, 2015
What is it like for a professional musician to perform music in front of a live audience? We use ... more What is it like for a professional musician to perform music in front of a live audience? We use Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) Grounded Theory to conduct qualitative research with 10 professional musicians to investigate their experience of music performance. We find performance to extend temporally beyond time spent before an audience and to include performers’ rituals of separation from everyday life. Using the abridged version of the model emerging from this data that we present in this article, we investigate how professional musicians’ experience of music performance centers on forging ‘connection’ with an audience and the ways in which this process is facilitated by the preand post-performance routines in which musicians engage. We find musicians’ understandings and experiences of ‘connection’ during performance to differ greatly, being influenced by their positioning on two spectra that emerge in this study and indicate the extent to which, during performance, musicians: a) value attentiveness and/or attunement in an audience and b) are open to variability.
Empirical Musicology Review 9 (3/4), 2014, 247-253, 2014
In this response to Leman and Maes’s paper in this issue, we raise a couple of concerns about the... more In this response to Leman and Maes’s paper in this issue, we raise a couple of concerns about the authors’ particular approach to embodied music cognition, drawing selectively on their other writings to enrich our interpretation of this target article, while pointing to a few of the many other legitimate research paths that can also fall under this label. We explore two underlying dichotomies implicit in the research programme adumbrated by Leman and Maes – cognition/ embodiment and perception/ performance – and discuss the implications of these for their theory of embodied music
cognition. We then examine research that has taken the perspective of the music performer into account in its examination of music performance.
Topics in Cognitive Science, 2019
While we often engage in conversational reminiscing with loved ones, the effects of these convers... more While we often engage in conversational reminiscing with loved ones, the effects of these conversations on our memory performance remain poorly understood. On the one hand, Wegner's transactive memory theory predicts that intimate groups experience benefits from remembering together. On the other hand, research on collaborative recall has shown costs of shared remembering in groups of strangers-at least in terms of number of items recalled-and even in intimate groups there is heterogeneity in outcomes. In the current research, we studied the effects of particular communicative features in determining the outcomes of collaborative recall in intimate groups. We tested 39 older, long-married couples. They completed a non-personal recall task (name all the countries in Europe) and a personal recall task (name all your mutual friends), both separately and together. When they collaborated, we recorded their conversation. We coded for specific "communication variables" and obtained measures of "conversational style." Overall, we found two clusters of communication variables positively associated with collaborative success: (a) cuing each other, responding to cues, and repeating each other; and (b) making positive statements about memory performance and persisting with the task. A negative cluster of behaviors-correcting each other, having uneven expertise, and strategy disagreements-was associated with less interactive, more "monologue" style of collaboration, but not with overall recall performance. We discuss our results in terms of the importance of different conversational processes in driving the heterogeneous outcomes of group remembering in intimate groups, suggesting that a focus on recall output alone limits our understanding of conversational remembering.
Erkenntnis, 2020
In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change ... more In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts from the extended cognition and distributed cognition frameworks and from transactive memory theory to analyse the cognitive relations between humans and the Web. We first argue that while neither of these approaches neatly capture the nature of human-Web interactions, both offer useful concepts to describe aspects of such interactions. We then conceptualize relations between the Web and its users in terms of cognitive integration, arguing that most current Web applications are not deeply integrated and are better seen as a scaffold for memory and cognition. Some highly personalised applications accessed on wearable computing devices, however, may already have the capacity for deep integration. Finally, we draw out some of the epistemic implications of our cognitive analysis.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2013
According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always oc... more According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosophical debate has often remained at some distance from relevant empirical research, while empirical memory research, in particular, has been somewhat slow to incorporate distributed/extended ideas. This situation, however, appears to be changing, as we witness an increasing level of interaction between the philosophy and the empirical research. In this editorial, we provide a high-level historical overview of the development of the debates around the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, as well as relevant theory and empirical research on memory, considering both the role of memory in theoretical debates around distributed/extended ideas and strands of memory research that resonate with those ideas; we emphasize recent trends towards increased interaction, including new empirical paradigms for investigating distributed memory systems. We then provide an overview of the special issue itself, drawing out a number of general implications from the contributions, and conclude by sketching promising directions for future research on distributed memory. K. Michaelian ( ) BilkentÜniversitesi,
Memory Studies 7 (3), 285-297 DOI: 10.1177/1750698014530619., 2014
In everyday life remembering occurs within social contexts, and theories from a number of discipl... more In everyday life remembering occurs within social contexts, and theories from a number of disciplines predict cognitive and social benefits of shared remembering. Recent debates have revolved around the possibility that cognition can be distributed across individuals and material resources, as well as across groups of
individuals. We review evidence from a maturing program of empirical research in which we adopted the lens of distributed cognition to gain new insights into the ways that remembering might be shared in groups. Across four studies, we examined shared remembering in intimate couples. We studied their collaboration on more simple memory tasks as well as their conversations about shared past experiences. We also asked
them about their everyday memory compensation strategies in order to investigate the complex ways that couples may coordinate their material and interpersonal resources. We discuss our research in terms of the costs and benefits of shared remembering, features of the group and features of the remembering task that influence the outcomes of shared remembering, the cognitive and interpersonal functions of shared
remembering, and the interaction between social and material resources. More broadly, this interdisciplinary research program suggests the potential for empirical psychology research to contribute to ongoing interdisciplinary discussions of distributed cognition.
Neurorehabilitation, 2019
BACKGROUND: Intimate couples can become cognitively interdependent over time. If one member of th... more BACKGROUND: Intimate couples can become cognitively interdependent over time. If one member of the couple has a neu-rological condition with associated cognitive impairments, their partner can support or 'scaffold' their cognitive functioning through collaboration. OBJECTIVE: We explored the phenomenon of 'collaborative memory' in a case series of 9 couples in which one member had a neurological condition, specifically an acquired brain injury (ABI; n = 7) or epilepsy (n = 2). METHODS: To investigate collaborative memory, we compared the performance of the patient when remembering alone versus their performance in collaboration with their partner on three memory tasks, assessing anterograde, semantic, and autobiographical memory. RESULTS: We found that across all tasks and participants, collaboration typically increased overall memory performance (total score), but the patient's contribution to the task was typically lower when they collaborated compared with when they performed the task alone. We identified two distinct styles of collaboration which we termed 'survival scaffolding' (where the healthy partner 'takes over' memory recall) and 'stability scaffolding' (where the healthy partner cues and structures the patient's recall). CONCLUSION: This exploratory case series contributes to the sparse literature on memory collaboration in people with neurological conditions. Our findings suggest that there are different styles of collaboration that can both help and hinder memory performance.
Memory, 2017
Two complementary approaches to the study of collaborative remembering have produced contrasting ... more Two complementary approaches to the study of collaborative remembering have produced contrasting results. In the experimental “collaborative recall” approach within cognitive psychology, collaborative remembering typically results in “collaborative inhibition”: laboratory groups recall fewer items than their estimated potential. In the cognitive ageing approach, collaborative remembering with a partner or spouse may provide cueing and support to benefit older adults’ performance on everyday memory tasks. To combine the value of experimental and cognitive ageing approaches, we tested the effects of collaborative remembering in older, long-married couples who recalled a non-personal word list and a personal semantic list of shared trips. We scored amount recalled as well as the kinds of details remembered. We found evidence for collaborative inhibition across both tasks when scored strictly as number of list items recalled. However, we found collaborative facilitation of specific episodic details on the personal semantic list, details which were not strictly required for the completion of the task. In fact, there was a trade-off between recall of specific episodic details and number of trips recalled during collaboration. We discuss these results in terms of the functions of shared remembering and what constitutes memory success, particularly for intimate groups and for older adults.
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
We modified the social contagion of memory paradigm to track whether details mentioned during soc... more We modified the social contagion of memory paradigm to track whether details mentioned during social interaction are transmitted to later individual recall for personal, autobiographical memories. Participants recalled four autobiographical events. A week later, participants described these events to a confederate, who described scripted “memories.” They then summarised each other’s recall. When summarising participants’ memories, confederates inserted two specific new details. Finally, participants recalled the events individually. We scored final individual recall for suggested contagion (new details inserted by confederates) and unsuggested contagion (new details consistent with confederates’ scripted memories but not suggested). We found social contagion for autobiographical memories: at final recall, 30% of participants recalled at least one suggested detail. Notably, at final recall, 90% of participants recalled at least one unsuggested detail from confederates’ scripted memories. Thus, social interaction, even if fairly minimal, can result in the transmission of specific details into memory for personal, autobiographical events.
The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality , 2017
Th ere has been relatively little interaction between research on collective intentionality in ph... more Th ere has been relatively little interaction between research on collective intentionality in philosophy and research on collective memory in psychology and the social sciences. Rather than being due to a lack of mutual relevance-as this chapter will demonstrate, the two traditions are very much relevant to each other-this lack of interaction is due largely to somewhat arbitrary disciplinary barriers. But disciplinary barriers, even when arbitrary, have real consequences, and one message of this chapter is that the lack of interaction has had negative consequences for both fi elds. Psychologists and social scientists have tended not to take advantage of philosophical resources that might sharpen their analyses of collective memory. Philosophers, meanwhile, have oft en presupposed overly simple models of the interactions among group members that are at work in the formation of collective memories and collective intentional states more broadly. Th ere are thus important potential benefi ts to be realized for each fi eld through increased interaction with the other.
Synthese, 2019
Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar... more Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar (Mem Stud 9(4):376–389, 2016) have recently developed the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while collective mental time travel is disanalogous in important respects to individual mental time travel, the concept of collective mental time travel nevertheless provides a useful means of organizing existing findings, while also suggesting promising directions for future research.
Discourse Processes 46 (4), 267-303, 2011
Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memorycan occur when reme... more Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memorycan occur when remembering is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitivepsychology experiments demonstrate that social influences on memory disruptand inhibit individual recall. However, most research in cognitive psychology has focused on groups of strangers recalling relatively meaningless stimuli. This study examined social influences on memory in groups with a shared history, who were recalling a range of stimuli, from word lists to personal, shared memories. The study focused, in detail, on the products and processes of remembering during in-depth interviews with 12 older married couples. These interviews consisted of three recall tasks: (a) word list recall; (b) personal list recall, where stimuli were relevant to the couples’ shared past; and (c) an open-ended autobiographical interview. These tasks individually conducted and then collaboratively conductedtwo weeks later. Across each of the tasks, although some couples demonstrated collaborative inhibition, others demonstrated collaborative facilitation. A number of factors were identified that predicted collaborative success—in particular, group-level strategy use. The results show that collaboration may help or hinder memory,and certain interactions are more likely to produce collaborative benefits.
Prefiguring Cyberculture: an intellectual history, 2002
The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology, 2009
G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (eds) A History of Australasian Philosophy (Springer, 2014), pp. 759-801, 2013
Phenomenology and Science: confrontations and convergences (eds Reynolds & Sebold), 2016
When remembering events from one’s life one often visualises the remembered scene as one original... more When remembering events from one’s life one often visualises the remembered scene as one originally experienced it: from an ‘internal’, ‘own-eyes’, ‘first-person’, or ‘field’ perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the remembered scene: from an ‘external’, ‘third-person’, or ‘observer’ perspective. One puzzling piece of evidence is that the perspective within a single memory can shift from one point of view to the other: a single memory may involve both field and observer perspectives. How would one make sense of this multiperspectival imagery? We apply the insights of phenomenological analysis of mental imagery to the puzzles of point of view in personal memory. We draw on Sartre’s remarks on imagery as a way of making sense of some of the evidence on visual perspective in memory. The key phenomenological idea that the image is an act of consciousness, or a way of thinking about an object or event can help account for what we will describe as the self-presence of observer perspectives in personal memory
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (eds Bernecker & Michaelian), 2017
The imagery involved in remembering past episodes in one’s life often involves visual points of v... more The imagery involved in remembering past episodes in one’s life often involves visual points of view. In this chapter we discuss the phenomena of perspectival memory. While surveying the field, we suggest that visual perspective alone is not a guide to the truth or falsity of memory, and that genuine memories can be recalled from an observer perspective. Such memories can satisfy conditions placed on genuine memory. Observer perspectives can satisfy factivity constraints, and can stand in appropriate causal connections to the past. In the first section we identify the phenomena and provide an overview of some of the empirical evidence related to point of view in personal memory. We articulate some doubts about remembering from an observer perspective, before responding to these worries. We suggest that observer perspectives may retain other forms of internal imagery: there is no neat division between internal and external perspectives. We suggest that external perspectives may help in understanding the past, and question the primacy of egocentricity.
Biological Theory, 2013
I start with a brief assessment of the implications of Sterelny's anti-individualist, anti-intern... more I start with a brief assessment of the implications of Sterelny's anti-individualist, anti-internalist apprentice learning model for a more historical and interdisciplinary cognitive science. In a selective response I then focus on two core features of his constructive account: collaboration and skill. While affirming the centrality of joint action and decision-making, I raise some concerns about the fragility of the conditions under which collaborative cognition brings benefits. I then assess Sterelny's view of skill acquisition and performance, which runs counter to dominant theories which stress the automaticity of skill. I suggest that it may still overestimate the need for and ability of experts to decompose and represent the elements of their own practical knowledge.
Philosophy Compass, Nov 2013
Integrative and naturalistic philosophy of mind can both learn from and contribute to the contemp... more Integrative and naturalistic philosophy of mind can both learn from and contribute to the contemporary cognitive sciences of dreaming. Two related phenomena concerning self-representation in dreams demonstrate the need to bring disparate fields together. In most dreams, the protagonist or dream self who experiences and actively participates in dream events is or represents the dreamer: but in an intriguing minority of cases, self-representation in dreams is displaced, disrupted, or even absent. Working from dream reports in established databanks, we examine two key forms of polymorphism of self-representation: dreams (or dream episodes) in which I take an external visuospatial perspective on myself, and those in which I take someone else’s perspective on events. In remembering my past experiences or imagining future or possible experiences when awake, I sometimes see myself from
an external or ‘observer’ perspective. By relating the issue of perspective in dreams to established research traditions in the study of memory and imagery, and noting the flexibility of perspective in dreams, we identify new lines of enquiry. In other dreams, the dreamer does not appear to figure at all, and the first person perspective on dream events is occupied by someone else, some other person or character. We call these puzzling cases ‘vicarious dreams’ and assess some potential ways to make sense of them. Questions about self-representation and perspectives in dreams are intriguing in their own right and pose empirical and conceptual problems about the nature of self-representation with
implications beyond the case of dreaming.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2011
Beginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition we... more Beginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena, and the role of philosophy in the construction of moral theory. We discuss the problem of distinguishing descriptive and normative issues, and the importance of systematic normative analysis for empirical research. We argue that theories of cognitive architecture should play an important role as a backdrop for investigation into specific aspects of moral cognition, and we consider some of the taxonomic issues that will arise for moral cognition research, including types of moral agents, forms of moral cognition, and the nature of morality itself. Finally, we discuss some key issues in moral development, including the importance of understanding the fine-grained structure of moral motivation and emerging conceptual schemas, and the role of active interpretation and problem solving as children acquire moral skill.
Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning, eds R. Langdon & C. Mackenzie (Psychology Press), 323-343, 2012
Beginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, w... more Beginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in the construction of moral theory. We discuss the problem of distinguishing descriptive and normative issues and the importance of systematic normative analysis for empirical research. We argue that theories of cognitive architecture should play an important role as a backdrop for investigation into specific aspects of moral cognition, and we consider some of the taxonomic issues that will arise for moral cognition research, including types of moral agents, forms of moral cognition, and the nature of morality itself. Finally, we discuss some key issues in moral development, including the importance of understanding the fine-grained structure of moral motivation and emerging conceptual schemas and the role of active interpretation and problem-solving as children acquire moral skill.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2010
Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experience... more Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term ‘‘experience’’ to consciousness we refer to ‘‘abnormal data’’ rather than ‘‘abnormal experience’’. Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is
responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the
ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.
Perspectives on Cognitive Science: theories, experiments, and foundations , 1995
This paper in philosophy of cognitive science discusses Andy Clark's work on representation, redu... more This paper in philosophy of cognitive science discusses Andy Clark's work on representation, reduction, and levels in a connectionist philosophy of mind.
The Geography of Embodiment in Early Modern England, 2017
If remembering, feeling, decision-making and other 'psychological' processes are by nature animat... more If remembering, feeling, decision-making and other 'psychological' processes are by nature animated or embodied processes, then the geography of embodiment also includes a geography of mind. And if, further, such cognitive and affective processes are distributed and ecological processes, in that they sometimes spread across brain, body, and world, then human minds are partly geographical or environmental in nature. On this view, historically and culturally unique landscapes, architectures, technologies, and ecologies are not always simply external to our mental life, not merely settings and stimuli for thought on the one hand, and (on the other) one of many kinds of thing to think about. Instead, in certain circumstances the places we inhabit can partly constitute the processes and activities of feeling, remembering, and so on.
Despite the new mobilities of early modern English society, significant practices of personal and shared remembering continued to be anchored in experienced place. Even as technologies and strategies for dealing with past and future altered, memory was still richly scaffolded by landscapes, artifacts, architecture, and institutions which all themselves bore the traces of individual and cultural intervention. This essay builds on recent social histories of early modern landscape and memory, to explore the nature of embodied place memory. It also aims at an updated assessment of the historical utility of the idea of distributed cognitive ecologies.
The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition, eds Jakob Leth Fink and Seyed Mousavian (Springer, forthcoming), 2018
This essay homes in on two related aspects of Aristotle’s account of memory, one often noted but ... more This essay homes in on two related aspects of Aristotle’s account of memory, one often noted but sometimes discounted, the other of more speculative import. The first feature is Aristotle’s definite and recurrent attention to the specific material constraints on the processes of memory and recollection. Secondly, I suggest that there are unnoticed conceptual connections between Aristotle’s concerns about the stability of the internal fluid motions which underlie memory processes, on the one hand, and his unique approach to the theory of mixtures, on the other hand. I go on to address some historiographic and philosophical consequences of thus treating memory and mixture together.
The Ashgate Research Companion to Material Culture in Early Modern Europe, 2015
This chapter introduces cognitive history as one way to study material culture, or to reconsider ... more This chapter introduces cognitive history as one way to study material culture, or to reconsider what many historians of material culture already study. The version of cognitive history we develop here builds on recent discussions of ‘distributed cognitive ecologies’. On this approach, objects, technologies, places and other people can in certain circumstances, in interaction of many kinds with embodied individuals, be full and complementary components in cognitive processes. This perspective, we suggest, can throw light on a range of historical problems of independent interest. Case studies and examples discussed include navigation, performance, and religious practice, before the final section addresses material culture
in experiment, natural philosophy, and early modern technology. The chapter concludes with an explicit statement of the ways in which our recommended cognitive approach can encourage and promote effective historical work on material culture. We provide extensive references throughout, hoping to encourage historians actively to engage with and participate in these challenging crossdisciplinary conversations.
Descartes' Natural Philosophy, eds S Gaukroger, J Schuster, J Sutton (Routledge, 2000), pp. 697-722, 2000
Does self-knowledge help? A rationalist, presumably, thinks that it does: both that self-knowledg... more Does self-knowledge help? A rationalist, presumably, thinks that it does: both that self-knowledge is possible and that, if gained through appropriate channels, it is desirable. Descartes notoriously claimed that, with appropriate methods of enquiry, each of his readers could become an expert on herself or himself. In this paper I reject the widespread interpretation of Descartes which makes his dualist view of the body as negative or as pathological as that expressed by Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo*. I argue not just that the old moral cosmobiological disgust at the body is absent in Descartes, but that, positively, Descartes *requires* us to contract full intimacy with our own body and our own peculiar past. He does wish for objective knowledge in these difficult domains, but this does not render his neurological ethics a universal prescription, for such objective knowledge is nevertheless knowledge of local phenomena, of the peculiarities of idiosyncratic associations. Civilsing the body, in seeking dominion over it, is a *process*; and, I will argue, Descartes was too firmly convinced that the body constantly changes its nature to have thought consistently that the process could come to an end. My case rests first on an analysis, in the next three sections, of capacities which, according to Descartes, we share with other animals. Sections 2 and 3 argue for strongly dynamic interpretations of Descartes' views on body and on corporeal memory respectively. Then Section 4 backtracks to support more firmly the surprisingly complex form of 'automatic' responses which I attribute to Descartes' beast- and body-machines. Finally, in section 5, I reintroduce the soul and the capacities for reflection which it allows in the human compound, showing how closely Descartes thinks we must work with the body, its habits and its history, in deliberately moulding our associative responses with active mind.
Textual Practice 26 (4), 587-607, 2012
Contemporary critical instincts, in early modern studies as elsewhere in literary theory, often d... more Contemporary critical instincts, in early modern studies as elsewhere in literary theory, often dismiss invocations of mind and cognition as inevitably ahistorical, as performing a retrograde version of anachronism. Arguing that our experience of time is inherently anachronistic and polytemporal, we draw on the frameworks of distributed cognition and extended mind to theorize cognition as itself distributed, cultural, and temporal. Intelligent, embodied action is a hybrid process, involving the coordination of disparate neural, affective, cognitive, interpersonal, ecological, technological, and cultural resources. Because the diverse elements of such coupled systems each have their own histories and dynamics, many distinctive or competing times are built in to the very mechanisms of remembering
and reasoning. We make this argument by means of two distinct case histories: a reading of the site-specific audio walk of Canadian artist Janet Cardiff; and an extended discussion of a famously anachronistic moment in William Shakespeare’s King Lear. These readings reveal the inherent poly-temporalities of human mental and social life.
To refigure anachronism as the mixing or effective confusion of times, rather than error or ignorance, an appropriately dynamic cognitive theory needs to be integrated into our historical and literary critical practices. The blending or interanimation of temporalities is intrinsic to human memory, in all its embodied, social, and affective complexity. Yet our critical instincts, in early modern studies as elsewhere in literary theory, dismiss invocations of mind and cognition as ahistorical. Whether projecting an originary interiority behind the text, or gesturing towards a transhistorical human nature, psychological criticism is often rejected as both universalizing and essentialist. But it is an over-reaction to such individualism to allow the mind to go missing entirely. In a more productive anachronism, we locate the polytemporality of experience in the richly situated nature of cognitive ecologies, context-sensitive systems or assemblages of material, cultural, and bodily resources. Remembering and skilful activity, on this view, involve the coordination of disparate internal and external resources, all with their own histories and dynamics, altering at distinctive or competing timescales. This allows us to put the mind back into time and history. We exemplify our claim that plural or anachronistic temporality is built in to memory and action by analysing both contemporary and historical artwork and performance, with a focus on the early modern English theatre, a new enterprise distributed across a loosely affiliated world of actors, spaces, material texts and objects, and audiences. We examine the polytemporality of the theatre in the specific case of the Fool’s prophecy in the Folio text of King Lear, and in the embodied skill of the player, probably Robert Armin, and the connections between his performances and those of the most famous of Elizabethan clowns, Richard Tarlton. This kind of cognitive history escapes both individualism and universalism, suggesting new ways to conceptualize relations between agents and technologies.
1543 And All That: word and image in the proto-scientific revolution, 2000
This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory an... more This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory and personal identity. I treat theoretical models of memory in history as specimens of the way cultural norms and artifacts can permeate ('proto')scientific views of inner processes. I apply this analysis to the topic of psychological control over one's own body, brain, and mind. Some metaphors and models for memory and mental representation signal the projection inside of external aids. Overtly at least, medieval and Renaissance theorists agreed that such models had to allow for, or even guarantee, some conception of cognitive order and discipline. Individual memory traces had to be independent, not mixed up or interfering with others. The long tradition of improving or bypassing 'natural memory' by deliberately internalizing artefactual models was part of an arduous process of self-fashioning. Moral panic about confusion and mixture features centrally in the imposition of cognitive discipline in local memory traditions.
Early Modern Culture: an electronic seminar , 2012
Response to David Hawkes, 'Against Materialism', http://emc.eserver.org/Hawkes.pdf
Some natural philosophers in the 17th century believed that they could control their own innards,... more Some natural philosophers in the 17th century believed that they could control their own innards, specifically the animal spirits coursing incessantly through brain and nerves, in order to discipline or harness passion, cognition and action under rational guidance. This chapter addresses the mechanisms thought necessary after Eden for controlling the physiology of passion. The tragedy of human embedding in the body, with its cognitive and moral limitations, was paired with a sense of our confinement in sequential time. I use two strands of 17th-century natural philosophy to exemplify forms of the perceived connection between physiology, memory, and the passions. I deal at length with Cartesian mechanism, and more briefly with Restoration natural philosophy in England. These are fruitful historical domains for connecting cognition and culture, since relations of domination, disruption, or accommodation between present and past are in play for both selves and societies. Despite the difficulty of integrating affect with cognition in theories of brain and mind, the capacity to treat passion and memory together is crucial for future cognitive science to address issues which outsiders care about.
The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, 2013
Ideas about soul and body – about thinking or remembering, mind and life, brain and self – remain... more Ideas about soul and body – about thinking or remembering, mind and life, brain and self – remain both diverse and controversial in our neurocentric age. The history of these ideas is significant both in its own right and to aid our understanding of the complex sources and nature of our concepts of mind, cognition, and psychology, which are all terms with puzzling, difficult histories. These topics are not the domain of specialists alone, and studies of emotion, perception, or reasoning have never been isolated theoretical endeavours. As Francis Bacon described human philosophy or ‘the knowledge of our selves’, within which he located the study of body, soul, and mind, it ‘deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly’ (1605/ 2000: 93). The history of ideas in these domains is
particularly challenging given the practical dimensions and implications of theories of mind. Because theories of human nature and debates about body and mind do ‘touch us’ so ‘nearly’,
they attract and can thus reveal, in specific historical contexts, interconnected discourses or associations which may be quite unlike our own. This chapter retains a focus, however, on the history of theories of mind: we address an array of distinctive positi
ons inmetaphysics and psychology which emerged in wider British debate, each with potential religious, moral, and political implications. We proceed by selectively surveying the conceptual inheritance and challenges for British philosophers in the early seventeenth century with regard to both the soul and the humoral temperament of body and mind. We look at some of the eclectic systems developed by British philosophers of the soul in the mid-century period, and at different ways new ideas in both medicine and metaphysics were integrated.
The Uses of Antiquity: the scientific revolution and the classical tradition, 1991
This paper in history of philosophy covers themes about determinism from Pomponazzi to Cudworth. ... more This paper in history of philosophy covers themes about determinism from Pomponazzi to Cudworth. It deals with Pico della Mirandola, Lipsius and the neo-Stoics, Pietro Pomponazzi's attacks on free will, the English dramatist John Webster, Marin Mersenne, Hobbes's deterministic psychology, and English NeoPlatonism.
Hermes: University of Sydney Union magazine, 1990
Theories of autobiographical memory emphasise effortful, generative search processes in memory re... more Theories of autobiographical memory emphasise effortful, generative search processes in memory retrieval. However recent research suggests that memories are often retrieved
directly, without effortful search. We investigated whether direct and generative retrieval differed in the characteristics of memories recalled, or only in terms of retrieval latency.
Participants recalled autobiographical memories in response to cue words. For each memory, they reported whether it was retrieved directly or generatively, rated its visuo-spatial
perspective, and judged its accompanying recollective experience. Our results indicated that direct retrieval was commonly reported and was faster than generative retrieval, replicating recent findings. The characteristics of directly retrieved memories differed from generatively retrieved memories: directly retrieved memories had higher field perspective ratings and lower observer perspective ratings. However, retrieval mode did not influence recollective experience. We discuss our findings in terms of cue generation and content construction, and the implication for reconstructive models of autobiographical memory.
JARMAC: Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2020
Contradictions and other changes across retellings can result from contamination from others, dec... more Contradictions and other changes across retellings can result from contamination from others, deception, or natural variation. In this study we used the social contagion paradigm to investigate (a) the relative frequencies and types of contradictions resulting from outside suggestion and from natural variation and (b) a baseline measure of variation in autobiographical memory accounts across retellings. Participants recalled memories of four personal events. One week later, participants and confederates alternated in describing their own and summarising each other’s autobiographical events. The confederates included a contradictory contagion detail in two of the participants’ events. The participants then individually recalled their own events. Twenty percent of participants made contradictions due to contagion, but 63% of participants made contradictions due to intrinsic variation. Accounts also exhibited other forms of variation. Concern about negative evaluation and social closeness ratings predicted contradictions due to contagion but not intrinsic variation. We discuss applications to forensic settings.
Memory, 2020
Recalling autobiographical memories with others can influence the quality of recall, but little is... more Recalling autobiographical memories with others can influence the quality of recall, but little is known about how features of the group influence memory outcomes. In two studies, we examined how the products and processes of autobiographical recall depend on individual vs. collaborative remembering and the relationship between group members. In both studies, dyads of strangers, friends, and siblings recalled autobiographical events individually (elicitation), then either collaboratively or individually (recall). Study 1 involved typing memory narratives; Study 2 involved recalling aloud. We examined shifts in vividness, emotionality, and pronoun use within memory narratives produced by different relationship types. In Study 2, we also coded collaborative dyads' collaborative processes or communication processes. In Study 1, all relationships showed decreased positive emotion and I-pronouns and increased negative emotion within collaboratively-produced memory narratives. In Study 2, all relationships showed increased vividness, reduced emotionality and positive and negative emotion, and increased I- and we-pronouns within collaboratively-produced memory narratives. However, strangers used collaborative processes differently from friends and siblings. Some collaborative processes were associated with memory qualities. Across studies, collaboration influenced memory quality more than did relationship type, but relationship type influenced dyads’ recall dynamics. These findings indicate the complexity of social influences on memory.
Psychology of Consciousness: theory, research, and practice , 2018
Memories of personal events can generate complex subjective experiences with high sensory details... more Memories of personal events can generate complex subjective experiences with high sensory details, a clear visuospatial context, and deep emotions. Future events, on the other hand, are thought to be experienced less strongly and less clearly than remembered past events. In this experiment, participants either remembered past events, imagined future events, or planned future events. Each mental representation of the event was followed by an extensive phenomenological questionnaire. As a second step, we added a new level of comparison by asking participants to generate alternative versions of these events and answer the same phenomenological questionnaire to examine phenomenology in counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and prefactual planning. We ran an exploratory factor analysis to reveal common underlying features to this variety of autobiographical thinking. We extracted four principal factors that explained 53% of the total variance: an Autonoesis factor, a Scene-Construction factor, a Visual-Perspective factor, and an Optimism-Bias factor. When comparing remembered, imagined and planned events using our factor scores, we found that memory and prospection did not generate significantly different subjective experiences. However, participants experienced the representation of counterfactual events less vividly and less clearly than memories, whereas they experienced prefactual imagined
and prefactual planned events similarly to their original versions. In conclusion, our findings indicate that humans construct diverse forms of autobiographical events with similar underlying features, but with some differences in the phenomenology of retrospection and prospection, as reality constrains the way we perceive the past, but not so much the future.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , 2016
Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to cre... more Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to create future thoughts, but has not yet examined the role of semantic scripts. In this study, participants recalled how they planned a past camping trip in Australia (past planning task) and imagined how they would plan a future camping trip (future planning task), set either in a familiar (Australia) or an unfamiliar (Antarctica) context. Transcripts were segmented into information units that were coded according to semantic category (e.g., where, when, transport, material, actions). Results revealed a strong interaction between tasks and their presentation order. Starting with the past planning task constrained the future planning task when the context was familiar. Participants generated no new information when the future camping trip was set in Australia and completed second (after the past planning task). Conversely, starting with the future planning task facilitated the past planning task. Participants recalled more information units of their past plan when the past planning task was completed second (after the future planning task). These results shed new light on the role of scripts in past
and future thinking and on how past and future thinking processes interact.
Abstract 1. We often remember in the company of others. In particular, we routinely collaborate w... more Abstract 1. We often remember in the company of others. In particular, we routinely collaborate with friends, family, or colleagues to remember shared experiences. But surprisingly, in the experimental collaborative recall paradigm, collaborative groups remember less than their potential, an effect termed collaborative inhibition. Rajaram and Pereira-Pasarin (2010) argued that the effects of collaboration on recall are determined by “pre-collaborative” factors.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 65 (1), 179-194, 2012
"We often remember in groups, yet research on collaborative recall finds “collaborative inhibitio... more "We often remember in groups, yet research on collaborative recall finds “collaborative inhibition”: recalling with others has costs compared to recalling alone. In related paradigms, remembering with others introduces errors into recall. We compared costs and benefits of two collaboration procedures—
turn taking and consensus. First, 135 individuals learned a word list and recalled it alone (Recall 1). Then, 45 participants in three-member groups took turns to recall, 45 participants in three-member groups reached a consensus, and 45 participants recalled alone but were analysed as three-member nominal groups (Recall 2). Finally, all participants recalled alone (Recall 3). Both turn-taking and consensus groups demonstrated the usual pattern of costs during collaboration and benefits after collaboration in terms of recall completeness. However, consensus groups, and not turn-taking groups, demonstrated clear benefits in terms of recall accuracy, both during and after collaboration. Consensus groups engaged in beneficial group source-monitoring processes. Our findings challenge assumptions about the negative consequences of social remembering."
Memory 18 (2), 2010, 185-197, 2010
Conversations about the past can involve voicing and silencing; processes of validation and inval... more Conversations about the past can involve voicing and silencing; processes of validation and invalidation that shape recall. In this experiment we examined the products and processes of remembering a significant autobiographical event in conversation with others. Following the death of Australian celebrity Steve Irwin, in an adapted version of the collaborative recall paradigm, 69 participants described and rated their memories for hearing of his death. Participants then completed a free recall phase where they either discussed the event in groups of three or wrote about the event on their own. Finally, participants completed the original questionnaire again, both 1 week and 1 month after the free recall phase. Discussion influenced later memories for hearing of Irwin’s death, particularly memories for emotion and shock. Qualitative analysis of the free recall phase suggested that during conversation a shared understanding of the event developed, but that emotional reactions to the event were silenced in ways that minimised the event’s impact. These findings are discussed in terms of the processes and consequences of sharing public and personal memories in conversation.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2013
Memory 18 (2), 2010, 170-184, 2010
A large body of literature on ‘‘within-individual retrieval-induced forgetting’’ (WI-RIF; Anderso... more A large body of literature on ‘‘within-individual retrieval-induced forgetting’’ (WI-RIF; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) shows that repeatedly retrieving some items, while not retrieving other related
items, facilitates later recall of the practised items, but inhibits later recall of the non-practised related items. This robust effect has recently been extended to ‘‘socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting’’ (SSRIF; Cuc, Koppel, & Hirst, 2007). People who merely listen to a speaker retrieving some, but not other, items*even people participating as speakers or listeners in conversations*show the same facilitation and inhibition. We replicated and extended the SS-RIF effect with a structured story (Experiment 1) and in a free-flowing conversation about the story (Experiment 2). Specifically, we explored (1) the degree to which participants subsequently form a coherent ‘‘collective memory’’ of the story and (2) whether schema consistency of the target information influences both WI-RIF and SS-RIF. In both experiments, speakers and listeners showed RIF (that is, WI-RIF and SS-RIF, respectively), irrespective of the schema consistency of the story material. On final recall, speakers and listeners described similar renderings of the story. We discuss these findings in terms of the role of ‘‘silences’’ in the formation of collective memories.
Multiperspectival imagery: Sartre and cognitive theory on point of view in remembering and imagining
Phenomenology and Science: confrontations and convergences (eds Reynolds & Sebold), 2016
When remembering events from one’s life one often visualises the remembered scene as one original... more When remembering events from one’s life one often visualises the remembered scene as one originally experienced it: from an ‘internal’, ‘own-eyes’, ‘first-person’, or ‘field’ perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the remembered scene: from an ‘external’, ‘third-person’, or ‘observer’ perspective. One puzzling piece of evidence is that the perspective within a single memory can shift from one point of view to the other: a single memory may involve both field and observer perspectives. How would one make sense of this multiperspectival imagery? We apply the insights of phenomenological analysis of mental imagery to the puzzles of point of view in personal memory. We draw on Sartre’s remarks on imagery as a way of making sense of some of the evidence on visual perspective in memory. The key phenomenological idea that the image is an act of consciousness, or a way of thinking about an object or event can help account for what we will describe as the self-presence of observer perspectives in personal memory
Memory and perspective
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (eds Bernecker & Michaelian), 2017
The imagery involved in remembering past episodes in one’s life often involves visual points of v... more The imagery involved in remembering past episodes in one’s life often involves visual points of view. In this chapter we discuss the phenomena of perspectival memory. While surveying the field, we suggest that visual perspective alone is not a guide to the truth or falsity of memory, and that genuine memories can be recalled from an observer perspective. Such memories can satisfy conditions placed on genuine memory. Observer perspectives can satisfy factivity constraints, and can stand in appropriate causal connections to the past. In the first section we identify the phenomena and provide an overview of some of the empirical evidence related to point of view in personal memory. We articulate some doubts about remembering from an observer perspective, before responding to these worries. We suggest that observer perspectives may retain other forms of internal imagery: there is no neat division between internal and external perspectives. We suggest that external perspectives may help in understanding the past, and question the primacy of egocentricity.
Contextualizing Human Memory, eds L. Bietti & C.B. Stone, 2015
Through a selective historical, theoretical, and critical survey of the uses of the concept of sc... more Through a selective historical, theoretical, and critical survey of the uses of the concept of scaffolding over the past 30 years, this chapter traces the development of the concept across developmental psychology, educational theory, and cognitive anthropology, and its place in the interdisciplinary field of
distributed cognition from the 1990s. Offering a big-picture overview of the uses of the notion of scaffolding, it suggests three ways to taxonomise forms of scaffolding, and addresses the possible criticism that the metaphor of scaffolding retains an overly individualist vision of cognition. The chapter is aimed at a broad interdisciplinary audience interested in processes of learning, teaching, and apprenticeship as they apply to the study of memory.
The Language of Memory in a Cross-linguistic Perspective, 2007
"In a theoretical commentary on the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to the semantics... more "In a theoretical commentary on the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to the semantics of memory and remembering, this paper argues that evidence of rich cross-linguistic diversity in this domain is entirely compatible with the best interpretations of our interdisciplinary cognitive sciences. In particular, it responds to Anna Wierzbicka’s critique of contemporary psychology, suggests some specific modifications to her proposed explications of some ways of talking about what happened before, and questions her claim that certain historically contingent features of modern Western views of memory are built in to the semantics of English terms. The paper concludes by suggesting a different approach to semantic diversity and the study of memory, and a more positive vision of a culturally-sensitive interdisciplinary science."
The early development of autobiographical memory is a useful case study both for examining genera... more The early development of autobiographical memory is a useful case study both for examining
general relations between language and memory, and for investigating the promise and
the difficulty of interdisciplinary research in the cognitive sciences of memory. An otherwise
promising social-interactionist view of autobiographical memory development relies in part
on an overly linguistic conception of mental representation. This paper applies an alternative,
‘supra-communicative’ view of the relation between language and thought, along the lines
developed by Andy Clark, to this developmental framework. A pluralist approach to current
theories of autobiographical memory development is sketched: shared early narratives about
the past function in part to stabilize and structure the child’s own autobiographical memory
system.
Cartographies of the Mind: philosophy and psychology in intersection, 2007
Memory is studied across a bewildering range of disciplines and subdisciplines in the neural, cog... more Memory is studied across a bewildering range of disciplines and subdisciplines in the neural, cognitive, and social sciences, and the term covers a wide range of related phenomena. In an integrative spirit, this chapter examines two case studies in memory research in which empirically-informed philosophy and philosophically-informed sciences of the mind can be mutually informative, such that the interaction between psychology and philosophy can open up new research problems—and set new challenges—for our understanding of certain aspects of memory. In each case, there is already enough interdisciplinary interaction on specific issues to give some confidence in the potential productivity of mutual exchange: but in each case, residual gulfs in research style and background assumptions remain to be addressed. The two areas are the developmental psychology of autobiographical memory, and the study of shared memories and social memory phenomena.
Proof and Truth: the humanist as expert , 2003
Mistakes can be made in both personal and official accounts of past events: lies can be told. Sto... more Mistakes can be made in both personal and official accounts of past events: lies can be told. Stories about the past have many functions besides truth-telling: but we still care deeply that our sense of what happened should be accurate. The possibility of error in memory and in history implies a commonsense realism about the past. Truth in memory is a problem because, coupled with our desires to find out what really happened, we recognize that our individual and collective access to past events may be indirect. This chapter sketches some approaches, from across the disciplines, to such problems about authority over the past. I open up recent lines of research on autobiographical memory which should be more accessible in the humanities and social sciences. Psychological work on constructive remembering should not be seen as sceptically challenging the very possibility of everyday authority over our own past, but as identifying specific forms of fallibility. I argue that the study of historical and social processes is an integral part of the cognitive sciences of memory, not a humanistic curiosity.
Constructive Memory , 2003
Scienze cognitive: un'introduzione filosofica (Cognitive Sciences: a philosophical introduction), 2011
Collaborative Remembering: theories, research, applications, 2018
Contributors: Catherine Haden, Maria Marcus, & Erin Jant; Robyn Fivush, Widaad Zaman, & Natalie M... more Contributors: Catherine Haden, Maria Marcus, & Erin Jant; Robyn Fivush, Widaad Zaman, & Natalie Merrill; Suparna Rajaram; William Hirst & Jeremy Yamashiro; Fiona Gabbert & Rebecca Wheeler; Gerald Echterhoff & René Kopietz; Linda Henkel & Alison Kris; Nicole Müller & Zaneta Mok; Lucas Bietti & Michael Baker; Steven Brown & Paula Reavey; Chris McVittie & Andy McKinlay; Kourken Michaelian & Santiago Arango-Munoz; Robert A. Wilson; Monisha Pasupathi & Cecilia Wainryb; Magdalena Abel, Sharda Umanath, James V. Wertsch, & Henry L. Roediger III; Qi Wang; Elaine Reese; Karen Salmon; Helen Paterson & Lauren Monds; Andrew Hoskins; Elise van den Hoven, Mendel Broekhuijsen, & Ine Mols; Rupa Gupta Gordon, Melissa Duff, & Neal Cohen; Helena Blumen; Lars-Christer Hyden & Mattias Forsblad.
The Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe
The Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe marks the arrival of early mode... more The Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe marks the arrival of early modern material culture studies as a vibrant, fully-established field of multi-disciplinary research.
The volume provides a rounded, accessible collection of work on the nature and significance of materiality in early modern Europe – a term that embraces a vast range of objects as well as addressing a wide variety of human interactions with their physical environments. This stimulating view of materiality is distinctive in asking questions about the whole material world as a context for lived experience, and the book considers material interactions at all social levels.
There are 27 chapters by leading experts as well as 13 feature object studies to highlight specific items that have survived from this period (defined broadly as c.1500–c.1800). These contributions explore the things people acquired, owned, treasured, displayed and discarded, the spaces in which people used and thought about things, the social relationships which cluster around goods – between producers, vendors and consumers of various kinds – and the way knowledge travels around those circuits of connection. The content also engages with wider issues such as the relationship between public and private life, the changing connections between the sacred and the profane, or the effects of gender and social status upon lived experience.
Constructed as an accessible, wide-ranging guide to research practice, the book describes and represents the methods which have been developed within various disciplines for analysing pre-modern material culture. It comprises four sections which open up the approaches of various disciplines to non-specialists: ‘Definitions, disciplines, new directions’, ‘Contexts and categories’, ‘Object studies’ and ‘Material culture in action’.
This volume addresses the need for sustained, coherent comment on the state, breadth and potential of this lively new field, including the work of historians, art historians, museum curators, archaeologists, social scientists and literary scholars. It consolidates and communicates recent developments and considers how we might take forward a multi-disciplinary research agenda for the study of material culture in periods before the mass production of goods.
Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: the early modern body-mind [eds Johnson, Sutton, & Tribble]
This collection considers issues that have emerged in Early Modern Studies in the past fifteen ye... more This collection considers issues that have emerged in Early Modern Studies in the past fifteen years relating to understandings of mind and body in Shakespeare’s world. Informed by The Body in Parts, the essays in this book respond also to the notion of an early modern ‘body-mind’ in which Shakespeare and his contemporaries are understood in terms of bodily parts and cognitive processes. What might the impact of such understandings be on our picture of Shakespeare’s theatre or on our histories of the early modern period, broadly speaking? This book provides a wide range of approaches to this challenge, covering histories of cognition, studies of early modern stage practices, textual studies, and historical phenomenology, as well as new cultural histories by some of the key proponents of this approach at the present time. Because of the breadth of material covered, full weight is given to issues that are hotly debated at the present time within Shakespeare Studies: presentist scholarship is presented alongside more historically-focused studies, for example, and phenomenological studies of material culture are included along with close readings of texts.
The most comprehensive collection of essays on Descartes' scientific writings ever published, thi... more The most comprehensive collection of essays on Descartes' scientific writings ever published, this volume offers a detailed reassessment of Descartes' scientific work and its bearing on his
philosophy. The essays, written by some of the world's leading scholars, cover topics as diverse as optics, cosmology and medicine, and will be of vital interest to all historians of philosophy
or science.
This book places Descartes' scientific projects, rather than his metaphysics or epistemology, at the centre of his philosophical concerns. Descartes' picture of the natural world admits of
surprising complexity, with both his cosmology and his physiology modelled on the dynamics of fluids. Rejecting the tired caricature by which Descartes' dualism left nature and the human
body as barren, inert matter to be dominated by active ghostly soul, the authors in contrast focus on the details of the links Descartes sought to forge between physics, medicine, and
ethics. Among the topics covered are mechanics and meteorology, optics and experimental method, anatomy and embryology, and theories of imagination, perception, and the passions.
Metascience, new series 7, pp.70-104, 1998
Metascience (New Series), pilot issue, pp.31-38, 1991
Times Literary Supplement 5722, Nov 30, 2012
Metascience, 5, 1994, 147-150., 1994
Metascience, 6, 183-185, 1994
interconnections among developments in science, policy, and the popular imagination which Spencer... more interconnections among developments in science, policy, and the popular imagination which SpencerWeart attained in Nuclear Fear,the brilliant 1988 study of nuclear physics, is not approached. There are sticky fundamental issues about changing relationsboth actual and perceivcdbetween basic and applied science over the period and across helds, which are glossed
Metascience 5 (2), 1996, 179-182 (issue also labelled Metascience, new series, 9)
In a "parenthesis of fascinated horror" before "the complete discovery and subjection of the body... more In a "parenthesis of fascinated horror" before "the complete discovery and subjection of the body to science", Renaissance anatomists and poets shared peculiar emotions of dread and desire towards the bodies they dissected and described. Jonathan Sawday's ambitious project is to evoke the common taboos, resistances, and fears which the human body provoked in its various early modern investigators, while telling "stories of terrible cruelty, which are tinged by a form of dark eroticism". He is justifiably proud of the historical range of his study, across medicine, cartography, literature, the law, myth, art, theology, social history, and philosophy. But he seeks more than a synthesis of these disparate domains, hoping also both to sketch a new grand narrative about conceptual, practical, and phenomenological changes regarding the body, and further "if not to dispel, then at least to explain" our own multiple, ambiguous feelings about our innards. Thus he marvellously maintains simultaneous attention to culture and psychology, combining high theory with historical precision in rare and risky fashion.
Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques, XIX, (4) 299-301., 1999
Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques, XIX (4), 1999, 299-301.
Metapsychology, online reviews, June 2000. , Jun 3, 2000
Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques, XXI (2), 2001, 106-109., 2001
and http://johnsutton.net/ Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques, XXI (2), 2001, 10... more and http://johnsutton.net/ Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques, XXI (2), 2001, 106-109.
Times Literary Supplement 5152, 28 December, 2001, Dec 28, 2001
Douwe Draaisma, Metaphors of Memory: a history of ideas about the mind. 241pp. Cambridge Universi... more Douwe Draaisma, Metaphors of Memory: a history of ideas about the mind. 241pp. Cambridge University Press. 18.95. 0 521 65024 0. Review by John Sutton, Macquarie University: john.sutton@mq.edu.au and http://johnsutton.net/ Review published: Times Literary Supplement 5152, 28 December, 2001.
Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 10 (3), 2001, 355-358., 2001
Metapsychology online reviews, 2002, May 30, 2002
In the late 16 th and early 17 th centuries, a number of 'liberal Jesuit scholastics' produced th... more In the late 16 th and early 17 th centuries, a number of 'liberal Jesuit scholastics' produced the last great synthesis of Aristotelian psychology with Christian theology. In this magnificently sympathetic reconstruction of their systems of the soul, Dennis Des Chene rescues Toletus, Suarez, and the other 'schoolmen' from the neglect resulting from scornful dismissals by Descartes and his fellows. Deliberating bypassing the political and medical contexts of their work, and focussing almost exclusively on Jesuit rather than other, 'dissident' Renaissance Aristotelianisms, Des Chene focusses intensely on intellectual history, what he calls at one point 'the flurry of subtleties' of these astonishing systematic commentaries on Aristotle.
British Journal for the History of Science, 30 (1), 1997, 101-103, 1997
British Journal for the History of Science, 36 (2), 2003, 233-235, 2003
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 42 (3), 2006, 298-299., 2006
Metapsychology, 2001
The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) can't explain "much of what's special about our kinds of m... more The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) can't explain "much of what's special about our kinds of minds". Or so argues Jerry Fodor, who has defended this very theory more vigorously than most over the past 25 years. And Fodor's not talking about consciousness, or emotion, or even about the ultimate origin and nature of meaning and intentionality, mysteries which CTM was never designed to dissolve. So what's going on? Has Fodor finally been caught in the connectionist net? Or (God, Granny, and Turing forbid) started worrying about phenomenology or 'embodiment'? No. In fact this short, difficult, quirky, important book is no heresy in the High Church of Classical Computationalism, but rather a series of doctrinal skirmishes with overzealous and over-popular sympathizers. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the philosophy of cognitive science.
The Times Literary Supplement, Aug 20, 1999
Cognitive science, with its exuberant neuromythologies, is a regular target for wise humanists wh... more Cognitive science, with its exuberant neuromythologies, is a regular target for wise humanists who insist that our rich, sharp, sad, and chancy mental life will easily resist the misplaced physics-envy of zealous reductionists. Yet there is little cause for their concern: in the current confusion of multidisciplinary inquiry into computation and the brain, there are few even half-developed visions of a future completed psychology, which challenge straightforward metaphysical and moral faith in personal identity and rational agency. Perhaps then those who fear the encroach of science on mind, warning that it will swamp cultural-historical awareness and care, are bewitched only by the memory of a ghoulish behaviourism.
Times Literary Supplement, Feb 5, 1999
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2003
Analysis 72 (1), 181-184, 2012
Philosophy in Review 26 (6), 420-422, Dec 2006
The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon, Larry Nolan (ed), 2015
Descartes thought about memory in the distinct contexts of method, metaphysics, medicine, mortali... more Descartes thought about memory in the distinct contexts of method, metaphysics, medicine, mortality, and morals. Keenly aware of the fallibility and instability of natural corporeal memory, he considered various ways to bypass it or avoid relying on it, but also came to see its importance in understanding and dealing with the passions and the union of mind and body. His account of memory influenced Malebranche and associationist traditions, but was subject to sharp attack from critics who saw it as dangerously materialist and chaotic.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010
Winter 2012 Edition 3 memory and the non-conscious ways in which we are influenced by the past do... more Winter 2012 Edition 3 memory and the non-conscious ways in which we are influenced by the past does not drive a useful wedge between philosophy and the sciences. On the one hand, scientific psychology is not, either in principle or in practice, restricted to the study of implicit learning and the varieties of conditioning: indeed, the study of our rich, socially-embedded capacities to remember our personal experiences is at the heart of much current research. On the other hand, philosophers too want to understand the operations of habit memory, skill memory, and involuntary memory, and their implications for expanded notions of agency and identity.
The Berkshire encyclopedia of world history, 2011
Memory Studies, 2017
Asking readers to 'look beyond memory studies' in my first editorial for this journal (Sutton, 20... more Asking readers to 'look beyond memory studies' in my first editorial for this journal (Sutton, 2009), I suggested that we respect our topic best by disregarding disciplinary boundaries and by embracing the extraordinary diversity of relevant phenomena. The fact that memory is so often in use when it is not explicitly in question remains a practical and intellectual challenge for movements towards integration, institutionalisation, and discipline-formation in memory studies. Care for and attention to the motley breadth of memory phenomena might help address residual, frustrating gulfs between the various forms of cultural memory studies and the equally diverse cognitive sciences of memory.
Collaborative Remembering: theories, research, applications , 2018
In this introduction to the edited volume, Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, and App... more In this introduction to the edited volume, Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, and Applications, we first provide a historical context that highlights the emerging focus on social factors in the study of memory. We then consider the range of social memory phenomena examined in the book including remembering with an intended future audience, remembering in the presence of others, remembering in direct collaboration with others, and remembering in larger social and cultural contexts. We also discuss the various methods used in the book to measure collaborative remembering, including productivity, content, accuracy, process, and function. The focus throughout the chapter is on the points of overlap and contrast across and within perspectives. We then conclude with a preview of the specific chapter contents.
Collaborative Remembering: theories, research, and applications, 2018
In this chapter, we provide concluding remarks on the edited volume, Collaborative Remembering: T... more In this chapter, we provide concluding remarks on the edited volume, Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, and Applications. We first discuss common themes that emerge across the chapters. Specifically, we discuss points of overlap and contrast between research and applications, costs and benefits of collaboration, accuracy, scaffolding, the shared nature of the original experience, technology, and culture. Given these themes, we then propose that future research should consider the context and goals of collaboration and the nature of individual differences among and within groups. We end the book with a call to integrate methods and concepts from across fields and perspectives.
Embodied Cognition in Shakespeare's Theatre: the early modern body-mind, 2014
The phrase "the mind-body problem" does not point to a single, unitary, perennial, and obvious hu... more The phrase "the mind-body problem" does not point to a single, unitary, perennial, and obvious human concern. Many people in diff erent times and places have individually and collectively puzzled or agonized-in a range of intellectual, spiritual, and practical contexts-over the relations between various aspects of their nature which can operate in harmony or in tension. In English and other European languages, terms like psychological and physical have come to label what are sometimes seen as two realms or two sets of features and processes-the ingredients for that "mind-body problem." Yet both body and mind have complex and uncertain semantics that exceed the simple binary encapsulated within the parameters of this conceptual "problem." There is dramatic historical change and cross-cultural variation in the usage and meaning of mind, psychology, and body, of apparently central related general terms such as cognition and consciousness, and of many more specifi c "psychological" terms such as emotion and memory. 1 By adopting the less familiar conjoined phrase body-mind in this volume, we seek therefore to defamiliarize our topics and to embrace the cultural, historical, and indeed scientifi c diversity of views, practices, and problems about thinking and the passions, imagining and dreaming, planning and communicating-about touch and vision and pain and fury. The essays we include cover an extraordinary array of "body-mind" topics, which cannot be reduced to singular terms. But even the label body-mind, of course, bears traces of the two connected dichotomous assumptions that our contributors seek to combat: the ideas that mind and body each name a unifi ed set of phenomena held together by unique properties, and that there is thus a single problem about how they relate or connect. As a number of these essays suggest, we are so culturally marked by these historically specifi c assumptions that it is diffi cult to bracket them in addressing other ways of feeling, reasoning, remembering, or grieving embedded in quite diff erent lived worlds.
Descartes' Natural Philosophy (Routledge, 2000), 2000
This volume gathers together a number of new studies of Descartes' natural philosophy. We have no... more This volume gathers together a number of new studies of Descartes' natural philosophy. We have not concerned ourselves with the textbook image of Descartes in philosophy or the history of ideas, as father of modern philosophy, or as the inventor of modern epistemology, mind/body dualism, or advocate of a universal method. Rather, we focus on Descartes in the context of his times as a pioneer of the mechanical philosophy and leading practitioner of mathematics and a number of the then existing specialised traditions of scientific endeavour, such as mechanics, optics, anatomy, and physiology (including psycho-physiology). We view Descartes, moreover, as a natural philosopher whose aims and agendas were not independent of the social and intellectual contexts within which he was working; and as someone who, over time, not only achieved numerous remarkable successes, but who also endured several deflections of aim, tactical retreats and outright failures.
Philosophical Psychology, 2006
I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Jerome Dokic, Richard Menary, ... more I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Jerome Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.
Cognitive Processing, 2005
Behavioral & Brain Sciences , 2019
Sociocultural developmental psychology can drive new directions in gadgetry science. We use autob... more Sociocultural developmental psychology can drive new directions in gadgetry science. We use autobiographical memory, a compound capacity incorporating episodic memory, as a case study. Autobiographical memory emerges late in development, supported by interactions with parents. Intervention research highlights the causal influence of these interactions, whereas cross-cultural research demonstrates culturally determined diversity. Different patterns of inheritance are discussed.
Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 2018
In this commentary on Cheng ('Cognition Beyond Representation: Varieties of Situated Cognition in... more In this commentary on Cheng ('Cognition Beyond Representation:
Varieties of Situated Cognition in Animals', 2018), we highlight some relevant history of the situated cognition movement and then identify several issues with which we think further progress can be made. In particular, we address and clarify the relationship between situated cognition and antirepresentational approaches. We then highlight the heterogeneous nature of the concept of morphological computation by describing a less common way the term is used in robotics. Finally, we discuss some residual concerns about the mutual manipulability criterion and propose a potential solution.
Current Anthropology, 2014
Comment on Mette Lovschal, Current Anthropology 55 (6), 2014, 725-750, at pp.744-5.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2014
We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to ... more We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social
organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
HAGAR Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities 12 (Winter 2014), 163-164, 2014
Metascience 9 (2), 2000, 226-237, 2000
Sutton's response to three reviews, by Catherine Wilson, Theo Meyering, and Michael Mascuch. Topi... more Sutton's response to three reviews, by Catherine Wilson, Theo Meyering, and Michael Mascuch. Topics include historical cognitive science; the historical link between animal spirits and neural nets; conceptual change; control and time in memory; and Descartes the neurophilosopher.
Early Modern Culture: an electronic seminar 9 (2012), 2012
1. We begin this brief response to David Hawkes by clarifying the nature of our collaborative res... more 1. We begin this brief response to David Hawkes by clarifying the nature of our collaborative research and the disciplines in which we work. Sutton is not a 'natural scientist', as Hawkes strangely claims. His first degree was in Classics, his PhD in Philosophy. Though he now works in an interdisciplinary Cognitive Science centre, he continues to study memory, mind, self, and skilled movement as topics in their own right, as a philosopher of mind or a cognitive philosopher. In any case, the cognitive sciences and psychology study the activities and phenomena of human emotion, decision-making, remembering and the like: they are not brain science. If on specific topics Sutton, like his colleagues, may seek integrative connections and links with the neurosciences, as a cognitive philosopher he does so also with the humanities and the social sciences, with anthropology, linguistics, social theory, history, art, and literature. Our ongoing collaboration in developing a form of 'cognitive history', alongside a number of our colleagues, operates within this pluralistic setting: it's not a 'natural scientist' working with 'a humanist', but specifically a cognitive philosopher and an historian of literature, culture, and theatre, fusing what skills we've got in trying to understand particular, historically contingent cognitive ecologies, driven by topic rather than tradition, domain rather than discipline.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 1999, 850-851, 1999
According to Gold and Stoljar, one cannot both consistently be reductionist about psychoneural re... more According to Gold and Stoljar, one cannot both consistently be reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then I reject their characterization of reductionism: reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the argument from unification-as-reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical, but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine.
Abstract: McKay & Dennett (M&D) suggest that some positive illusions are adaptive. But there is a... more Abstract: McKay & Dennett (M&D) suggest that some positive illusions are adaptive. But there is a bidirectional link between memory and positive illusions: Biased autobiographical memories filter incoming information, and self-enhancing information is preferentially attended and used to update memory. Extending M&D's approach, I ask if certain false memories might be adaptive, defending a broad view of the psychosocial functions of remembering.
Recent theory suggests that action prediction relies of a motor emulation mechanism that works by... more Recent theory suggests that action prediction relies of a motor emulation mechanism that works by mapping observed actions onto the observer action system so that predictions can be generated using that same predictive mechanisms that underlie action control. This suggests that action prediction may be more accurate when there is a more direct mapping between the stimulus and the observer. We tested this hypothesis by comparing prediction accuracy for two stimulus types. A mannequin stimulus which contained information about the effectors used to produce the action and a point stimulus, which contained identical dynamic information but no effector information. Prediction was more accurate for the mannequin stimulus. However, this effect was dependent on the observer having previous experience performing the observed action. This suggests that experienced and naïve observers might generate predictions in qualitatively difference ways, which may relate to the presence of an internal representation of the action laid down through action performance.
R. Heath, B. Hayes, A. Heathcote, & C. Hooker (Eds.), Dynamical Cognitive Science: Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Cognitive Science Conference (1997). , 1999
A case study in historical cognitive science, this paper addresses two claims made by radical pro... more A case study in historical cognitive science, this paper addresses two claims made by radical proponents of new dynamical approaches. It queries their historical narrative, which sees embodied, situated cognition as correcting an individualist, atemporal framework originating in Descartes. In fact, new Descartes scholarship shows that 17th-century animal spirits neurophysiology realized a recognizably distributed model of memory; explicit representations are patterns of spirit flow, and memory traces are changes left by experience in connections between brain pores. This historical sketch supports the second dynamicist claim, that connectionists' stress on the cognitive importance of pattern-recreation needs supplementing by dynamicists' real-time focus and attention to the active roles of body and environment. Animal spirits theory exhibits just the 'continuous reciprocal causation' between brain, body, and environment which Andy Clark sees as dynamicism's central contribution, and allows for the embedding of brains in culture as well as the physical world.
In W. Christensen, E. Schier, & J. Sutton (eds), ASCS09: proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, pp.131-134, 2010
Experimental memory research has traditionally focused on the individual, and viewed social influ... more Experimental memory research has traditionally focused on the individual, and viewed social influence as a source of error or inhibition. However, in everyday life, remembering is often a social activity, and theories from philosophy and psychology predict benefits of shared remembering. In a series of studies, both experimental and more qualitative, we attempted to bridge this gap by examining the effects of collaboration on memory in a variety of situations and in a variety of groups. We discuss our results in terms of a functional view of collaborative remembering, and consider when and in what ways remembering with others might help or hinder memory.
W. Christensen, E. Schier, and J. Sutton (eds), ASCS09: proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, pp.106-113., 2010
"Seeking to expand on previous theories, this paper explores the AIR (Applying Intellig ence to t... more "Seeking to expand on previous theories, this paper explores the AIR (Applying Intellig ence to the Reflexes) approach to expert performance previously outlined by Geeves, Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain (2008). Data gathered from a semi-structured interview investigating the performance experience of Jeremy Kelshaw (JK), a professional musician, is explored. Although JK’s experience of music performance contains inherently uncertain elements, his phenomenological description of an ideal performance is tied to notions of vibe, connection and environment. The dynamic nature of music performance advocated by the AIR approach is illustrated by the strategies that JK implements during performance. Through executing these strategies, JK attempts to increase the likelihood of vibe and connection by selectively exercising agency over performance vari
ables within his control. In order to achieve this, JK must engage in ongoing monitoring of his performance, whereby the spotlight of his attention pans across a vast array of disparate performance
processes (and levels within these processes) in order to ascertain how he can most effectively meet the specific demands of a given performance situation. It is hoped that future research compiling data from numerous interviews and sources as well as using different research methodologies will further unlock the potential that the AIR approach holds for understanding expert performance."
W. Christensen, E. Schier, and J. Sutton (eds), ASCS09: proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, pp.49-56, 2010
The ability to predict the actions of other agents is vital for joint action tasks. Recent theor... more The ability to predict the actions of other agents is vital for
joint action tasks. Recent theory suggests that action prediction relies on an emulator system that permits observers to use
information about their own motor dynamics to predict the actions of other agents. If this is the case, then predictions for self-generated actions should be more accurate than predictions for other-generated actions. We tested this hypothesis by employing a self/other synchronization paradigm where prediction accuracy for recording of self-generated movements was compared with prediction accuracy for other-generated movements. As expected, predictions were more accurate when the observer’s movement dynamics matched the movement dynamics of the recording. This is consistent with that idea that the observer’s movement dynamics influence the predictions they generate.
M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth (eds), Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp.2082-2087). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society., 2013
Recent theory suggests that action prediction relies of a motor emulation mechanism that works by... more Recent theory suggests that action prediction relies of a motor emulation mechanism that works by mapping observed actions
onto the observer action system so that predictions can be
generated using that same predictive mechanisms that underlie
action control. This suggests that action prediction may be
more accurate when there is a more direct mapping between
the stimulus and the observer. We tested this hypothesis by
comparing prediction accuracy for two stimulus types. A mannequin stimulus which contained information about the effectors used to produce the action and a point stimulus, which
contained identical dynamic information but no effector information. Prediction was more accurate for the mannequin stimulus. However, this effect was dependent on the observer having previous experience performing the observed action. This
suggests that experienced and naıve observers might generate
predictions in qualitatively difference ways, which may relate
to the presence of an internal representation of the action laid
down through action performance.
Early Science and Medicine 5 (3), 2000, 314-315, 2000
John Sutton is a cognitive philosopher engaged in intense debate with other philosophers about me... more John Sutton is a cognitive philosopher engaged in intense debate with other philosophers about memory and self, and this book is an historical brief for his side. ... The notes and references are superb. Sutton's ambitious thesis is well-served by his facility with primary and secondary sources in natural philosophy, history of science, cognitive science, and cognitive philosophy. He writes clearly, often gracefully, and the result is a tour de force. It may also be sui generis; at least, I have not encountered another contemporary philosophy or history text that attempts to give equal value to both perspectives. ... Sutton's arguments are brilliant, but his highly selective interrogation of the past raises questions, of which this review has space to raise just one ...
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1), 2000, 127-129, 2000
This is a remarkable book: elegantly written, impressive with regards to its scholarship and its ... more This is a remarkable book: elegantly written, impressive with regards to its scholarship and its attention to a wealth of relevant material (historical and contemporary), and excitingly innovative in its ideas about memory as the creative link between self and world.
Metascience 9 (2000), 203-237 (author's response 226-237), 2000
Catherine Wilson: *Philosophy and Memory Traces* is a fascinating and important book, methodologi... more Catherine Wilson: *Philosophy and Memory Traces* is a fascinating and important book, methodologically and substantively. In addition to a broad and thoroughly revisionary interpretation of Cartesianism and the "death of nature" problem, the reader will find a wealth of illuminating remarks about poetics and physiology, conceptualization in science, and theory change. Sutton moves easily back and forth between physiology and cultural studies and sensitizes the reader to the ubiquity of discourses of self-government. This is an original and adventurous book, forcefully written, and worth multiple re-readings.
History and Philosophy of Psychology 1 (1999), 86-90, 1999
In The Modularity of Mind, Fodor wrote that "cognitive science is a body of research pathetically... more In The Modularity of Mind, Fodor wrote that "cognitive science is a body of research pathetically out of contact with its own history". John Sutton's absorbing monograph seeks to rectify that defect, tracing the historical context of contemporary connectionist accounts of memory. An absorbing read, it offers intriguing insights into some of the peculiar and not so peculiar views about memory held by our philosophical and psychological forebears. It is clearly written and well-researched, and an important addition to the literature on memory.
British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 51 (2000), 923-926, 2000
The reason why [animal spirits] theories merit a second look, according to Sutton, is that they s... more The reason why [animal spirits] theories merit a second look, according to Sutton, is that they share important features with current connectionist theories of cognition. At the heart of both sets of theories is the idea of memory traces as distributed, superpositional representations which exist only as dispositions of the whole system to settle into a variety of transient patterns. Sutton's interest is not purely historical, though. He also argues that the idea of distributed, superpositional representations, as it was used then and is used now, casts doubt on notions of the self as an instance of executive control. As such, it contains a physiological understanding of the way in which experience leaves its traces on us which, properly understood, may ultimately call for a radical revision, or even elimination, of common-sense understandings of who we are. ... Just as earlier theorists tried to make the physiology of memory fit into the mould of their
moral and social ideals, Sutton argues, contemporary theorists impose strictures on accounts of memory because of preconceived ideas of the role of memory in systematic reasoning and possession of knowledge of the past.
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 74 (4), 2000, 822-823, 2000
This is a somewhat unusual book. Written by a philosopher, it aims to make historical materials r... more This is a somewhat unusual book. Written by a philosopher, it aims to make historical materials relevant to current discussions on the philosophy of mind. In particular, Sutton seeks to draw parallels between modern connectionist theories of memory and the doctrine of animal spirits that, in various forms, held sway as an account of the physical mechanism of memory for much of the early modern period. He is aware that eyebrows are likely to be raised by such an approach: it carries a danger of distorting the ideas of a previous epoch by insisting on their similarities to later doctrine. Sutton adopts an avowedly "skewed" historiographic approach; he "must flirt throughout with the twin dangers of nostalgia and present-centredness" (p. 15).
For most of the book Sutton, in fact, successfully steers his way between these twin perils. His discussion of historical materials is for the most part judicious and sensitive to context. He manages to expand upon what may seem a narrow and technical issue to show how discourse about memory was implicated in and contributed to cultural concerns with the nature of agency, control, and identity. "Notions about selves," Sutton maintains, "in relation to natural and social worlds are always implicated in theorising about memories" (p. 13). While localist models of memory were supportive of a strong executive self presiding over a stable and credible stock of recollections, more dynamic theories of how memories were created and sustained carried disturbing intimations. If memories were--quite literally--fluid, then error, illusion,
and even fantasy might hold sway; the integrity of the self could dissolve amid the swirling of the spirits.
... Sutton concentrates on treatments of animal spirits in English natural philosophy. He argues that a special concern with memory was part of a more general preoccupation with order in the aftermath of the civil war and the heady days of the Commonwealth. In this context there was a felt need for discipline and stability within the body as well as within society. Theories that undermined these values were deemed immoral as well as erroneous.
Rather than developing these themes, Sutton asks "what use is all this history?" (p. 149). His answer is that a historical perspective can illuminate the issues involved in the choice between distributed and local theories of memory, even though the distinction would not have been intelligible to the historical actors themselves. Such an approach is somewhat frustrating to the historian; others must judge its philosophical utility. Nonetheless, this book does suggest a range of avenues for further research: the discussion of John Locke's theory of personal identity is especially stimulating.
John Sutton reviews the history of two kinds of memory theories: local and distributed models of ... more John Sutton reviews the history of two kinds of memory theories: local and distributed models of memory. The main difference lies in the extent to which the subject is in command of his or her memories. Sutton tries to show that opposition to these models has often been motivated by moral and social concern about the lack of control over memory and the past rather than by conceptual or empirical considerations. The ever-shifting memory patterns threaten notions of personal identity and accountability. Perhaps surprisingly, Sutton traces the ancestry of distributed connectionist models back to Descartes, showing the place of his brain theory in the much older tradition of animal spirits coursing through the pores of the brain. Thus the Cartesian body-machine is much more active, independent from control by the soul, than is commonly thought. Sutton's historical analyses are illuminating, and by his naturalistic focus on scientific theories he uncovers a history
of neurophilosophy that has long remained underexposed.
Medical History 44 (2000), 128-130, 2000
It is common for writers on cognitive science and neuroscience to deploy historical statements, e... more It is common for writers on cognitive science and neuroscience to deploy historical statements, especially about Descartes, as part of a rhetorical strategy to expose confusion and error. Most such writers are actually indifferent or even antagonistic to history as disciplined knowledge. This book is different ... John Sutton makes a huge excursus through the early modern theory of the animal spirits, memory and the self. The result is a thickly detailed dialogue with intellectual history. ... Sutton is persuasive: knowledge of modern distributive processing, but more especially attention to mechanisms of memory, can make a difference to historical interpretation. He also argues that history can make a difference to modern theories; but here the outcome is not so clear.
Journal of Early Modern History 5 (1), 2001, 76-78, 2001
*Philosophy and Memory Traces* is a textbook example of how different periods in the history of t... more *Philosophy and Memory Traces* is a textbook example of how different periods in the history of theory construction can be meaningfully compared and contrasted.
Eighteenth-Century Studies 33 (4), 2000, 596-599, 2000
John Sutton has written an intriguing and well-researched book ... that makes for fascinating rea... more John Sutton has written an intriguing and well-researched book ... that makes for fascinating reading. It also demonstrates marked sensitivity and insight into both the individual lives as well as the work of such historical figures as Descartes and Locke. Moreover, Sutton's defense of modern connectionism against Jerry Fodor and other critics of passive mental representation is again both artful and again insightful in elucidating how problems of the self are implicated in the new, fast-developing area of cognitive science.
Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 9 (3), 2000, 324-327, 2000
Compelling ... relies on an intimate understanding of the current philosophy of science and histo... more Compelling ... relies on an intimate understanding of the current philosophy of science and history of memory and philosophy of mind. This is clearly a very important work [which] successfully ties in historical, scientific, philosophic, and social elements in the transition of memory theories.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (3), 2000, 559-561, 2000
John Sutton’s rich and absorbing book interweaves two related themes. ... Throughout, Sutton coun... more John Sutton’s rich and absorbing book interweaves two related themes. ... Throughout, Sutton counters both explicitly and implicitly the idea that there is a sharp divide between philosophical and scientific issues. ... All those interested in the history and philosophy of memory should benefit from this work.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3), 2000, 329-333, 2000
Review of Metaphysics 2001, 469-471, 2001
Sutton's approach is an interdisciplinary one, drawing on cognitive science, medicine, and neurop... more Sutton's approach is an interdisciplinary one, drawing on cognitive science, medicine, and neurophysiology as well as literature, psychology, and philosophy. ... The section on Locke is particularly valuable and raises interesting philosophical questions. Sutton's underlying philosophy is, he says, "crudely characterisable as mechanism, naturalism, associationism, determinism, and reductionism", but he hopes to overcome humanist repugnance to these doctrines by "adding a sense of history, culture, and play" (pp.2-3). His tendency to take a playful, aesthetic, and polemical approach to his material, however, often gets in the way of engaging philosophical issues in a careful and sustained way. His approach to the problems that the unruly animal spirits were thought to raise for human beings' rational and moral capacities is heavily influenced by postmodernist and feminist thought, and he tends to poke fun at those who worried about maintaining control over their animal nature, drawing on Foucault's theory of madness, which probably accounts for his pervasive use of sexual metaphors ... Finally, Sutton seems to have succumbed to a postmodern attitude of indifference to (or despair of the possibility of) any sort of objectivity. For example, he says that history of science "demands unbalanced judgement, polemic, and selective evaluation" (p.31), and that his historical studies "build on and twist existing research" (p. xiii).
Animal Spirits: the mind in history
ABC Radio National, All in the Mind, Apr 27, 2003
Memory as a Test Case for Distributed Cognition [online lecture]
http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/memory-test-case-distributed-cognition This online lecture for t... more http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/memory-test-case-distributed-cognition This online lecture for the 'A History of Distributed Cognition' project (http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/) has two aims. First, I explain the link between theories of distributed cognition, on the one hand, and contemporary currents in the sciences of memory, on the other. The resulting framework for studying distributed ecologies of remembering is, I suggest, a promising basis for interdisciplinary research. Secondly, I show specifically what this framework offers for research in history and the humanities.
After a general overview of ideas about distributed memory, the lecture addresses four features of memory: the distinctive kinds of memory, the constructive nature of remembering, the development of memory, and the functions of remembering. It then develops one particular version of the idea of distributed cognition, underlining the complementarity between integrated but disparate neural, bodily, social, and material resources. Putting these two independent sets of ideas together, three layers or forms of distributed ecologies of memory are described: first and in most detail, the case of socially distributed remembering; then the idea of the cognitive life of things; and finally the internalization of cognitive and cultural artifacts. The lecture concludes with a brief discussion of the place of history in this interdisciplinary framework for studying cognitive ecologies of remembering.
Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism, 1998
This is chapter 3 of 'Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism' (CUP, 1998). I re... more This is chapter 3 of 'Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism' (CUP, 1998). I reinterpret Descartes' 'philosophy of the brain'. Descartes used animal spirits flowing through brain pores in tentatively suggesting a distributed model of memory employing superpositional storage. I defend this anachronistic reading against four strong objections, and articulate surprising conclusions about dynamics and the body in Cartesian mechanism. I discuss Descartes' spirits at such length not just to analyse his puzzling model of memory, but to query his talismanic place in philosophy and cultural studies alike as the demonic source of modern alienation. The permeation of psychology by context, culture, and body which animal spirits promoted (chapter 2) did not cease with the sudden fracture of self from matter with which Descartes is supposed to have urged on new scientists to master and possess passive nature. Mechanistic bodies are *also* dynamic (chapter 3).
Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism (chapter 2), 1998
Chapter 2 of *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism* (Cambridge UP, 1998). Thi... more Chapter 2 of *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism* (Cambridge UP, 1998). This chapter outlines the long background of animal spirits theory, questions the assumption that spirits were inevitably detrimental to the development of sciences of brain and mind, and describes strange 'pre-modern' human bodies, filled with turbulent fluids and rummaging spirits. Animal spirits, those 'ultimate oxymorons' (Krell 1990:5) were neither animals nor spirits. Coursing through brain and nerves, they long remained candidates for the role of bearers of neural information: in philosophy, neurology, and medicine, this old physiological psychology was still all but ubiquitous in the early eighteenth century. Spirits touched feeling as well as theory, in odd early modern experiences of uneasy innards. What some lament as 'confusions and contaminations' across discourses and levels of explanation involving the spirits (Walker 1984:223) can instead be seen as rare proximity between theory, culture, and phenomenology. The bodies in which spirits flowed are quite alien to us: the 'kinesthetic model of oriented flows' (Duden 1993:85) was both hypothesis and lived reality.
Porous memories fuse and interpenetrate. Fragments of song mingle in hot remembered afternoons, m... more Porous memories fuse and interpenetrate. Fragments of song mingle in hot remembered afternoons, mysterious angers return at a flush with a chance forgotten postcard. Such memories were once the motions of old fluids, animal spirits which meandered and rummaged through the pores of the brain. They held experience and history in bodies which were themselves porous, uncertainly coupled across tissues and skin with their air, their ethics, their land. Now they are patterns of activation across vast neural networks, condensing and compressing innumerable possible trajectories into the particular vectors of flashing or torpid memories. Dynamic cognitive systems coevolving with the physiological, environmental, and social systems in which they are embedded (van Gelder and Port 1995: 27-30) need the wishful mixings of absence which interfering traces bring. These studies in the history of theories of memory are grounded in new interpretations of strange, neglected old French and English neurophilosophy. But only late twentieth-century worries about memory, science, and truth make sense of indulgent attention to 'seventeenth-century French connectionism' (Diamond 1969), and to bizarre historical beliefs about interactive relations between self, body, mind, and coursing nervous fluids. This kind of historical cognitive science aims to demonstrate that it is possible to attend to contexts and to brains at once. ... I undertake both the description and the defence of related theories of memory, from animal spirits to connectionism, which employ superpositional storage: memories are blended, not laid down independently once and for all, and are reconstructed rather than reproduced. In dissolving old and new lines of attack on such theories, I suggest that they exemplifY the sensitivity to culture and history which good psychological science can exhibit. Working between historical and contemporary material suggests that wider issues about the self and psychological control are also implicated in current debates. The models of memory distributed through these studies, in mosaic from Descartes to connectionism, hintata more reckless algebra, an understanding of how complex self-organising physical systems like us can be so psychologically plastic, attuned to the configurations of culture in which cognition and remembering are situated.
http://www.amazon.com/The-Last-Candles-Night-Bedford/dp/1922198129, 2014
Talk given at the launch of Ian Bedford's novel, The Last Candles of the Night (Lacuna Publishing... more Talk given at the launch of Ian Bedford's novel, The Last Candles of the Night (Lacuna Publishing), at Gleebooks, Sydney, 19 June 2014.
Fifth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Futures in the Arts and Humanities, to be held 5-7 June ... more Fifth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Futures in the Arts and Humanities, to be held 5-7 June 2017 at Stony Brook University
Web: http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/cognitivefutures/CFP.html
Panel Participants:
Stephen Turner (University of South Florida)
Jacob Mackey (Queens College, CUNY)
Georg Theiner & Nikolaus Fogle (Villanova University)
Evelyn B. Tribble (Otago University) & John Sutton (Macquarie University)
“On the whole, what is familiar is precisely not understood because it is familiar” (Hegel, Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit)
In some musical genres, professional performers play live shows many times a week. Arduous tourin... more In some musical genres, professional performers play live shows many times a week. Arduous touring schedules bring encounters with wildly diverse audiences across many different performance ecologies. We investigate the kinds of creativity involved in such repeated live performance, kinds of creativity that are quite unlike songwriting and recording, and examine the central factors that influence musicians' wellbeing over the course of a tour. The perspective of the professional musician has been underrepresented in research on relations between music and wellbeing, with little attention given to the experience of touring. In this case study, we investigate influences on positive and negative performance experiences for the four professional musicians of Australian pop/rock band Cloud Control. Geeves conducted intensive cognitive ethnographic fieldwork with Cloud Control members over a two-week national Australian tour for their second album, Dream Cave (2013). Adapting a Grounded Theory approach to data analysis, we found the level of wellbeing musicians reported and displayed on tour to be intimately linked to their creative performance experiences through the two emergent, overarching and interdependent themes of Performance Headspace (PH) and Connection with Audience (CA). We explore these themes in detail and provide examples to demonstrate how PH and CA can feed off each other in virtuous ways that positively shape musicians' wellbeing, or loop in vicious ways that negatively shape musicians' wellbeing. We argue that their creative practice, in thus re-enacting musical performance afresh in each venue's distinctive setting, emerges within unique constraints each night, and is in a sense a co-creation of the crowd and the band.